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Rhapsôidos, Prophêtês, and Hypokritês: A Diachronic Study of the
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Rhapsōidos, Prophētēs, and Hypokritēs: A Diachronic Study of the Performance of Homeric Poetry in Ancient Greece

A thesis presented

by

José Miguel González

to

The Department of the Classics

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

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Rhapsōidos, Prophētēs, and Hypokritēs:
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Abstract

This dissertation studies the performance of Homeric poetry in Greece from archaic to Hellenistic and Roman imperial times. I focus on the professional performer, the rhapsode, and on the changing nature of his training and recitation. I argue that a diachronic understanding of the rhapsodic profession is possible only when the rhapsode is seen in his archaic cultural connection to the prophet and in his relation— spanning the archaic and classical periods—to orators and actors. There is a sense in which it is legitimate to view the *rhapsōidos* as a sort of *prophētēs* and *hypokritēs*. This work explains why and how this assertion holds true. For the classical period, my investigation centers on Athens. This choice is not merely practical: it is dictated by the prominence of Athens' Panathenaic festival as *the* venue for recitations of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* during the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Rhapsodic recitation, dramatic acting, and oratorical delivery were three of the chief performance domains in classical Athens. Each exerted significant influence on the others, though the precise nature and impact of such influence varied with time. The underlying affinity between orators, rhapsodes, and actors is not reducible to the universals of the performer-audience interaction, important though these are. Historical ties of mutual influence extended at first from the rhapsodic trade towards the emerging professional actors: even the label *hypokritēs* was borrowed from the rhapsode. Just as the latter played a mediating role as *hermēneus*—'revealing' and conveying the divine speech of the Muses to his audience—so, originally, the actor was viewed as commenting upon and explaining the song of the chorus. The hermeneutic dimension of rhapsodic performance and the association between *hermēneus* and *hypokritēs* derived from the well known kinship between mantic and epic poetry. This kinship also affected how cultural insiders viewed the poetic tradition itself: to it they attached a 'notional fixity,' as if the rhapsode always recited the same poem, when in fact he recomposed his material anew in every performance. I also argue that the sophists, to whom we largely owe the invention of rhetoric as a discipline, arose in self-conscious imitation of, and competition with, the rhapsodes, who were themselves

the first to make poetry the object of study and commentary. The link between or-
ators and rhapsodes was acknowledged by Aristotle in his discussion of *hypokrisis* in
Rhetoric III.1–12, which I analyze in detail against its historical background. I de-
part from previous scholars in reading the relationship between 'style' and 'delivery'
as one designed to capture the philosopher's concern with rhetoric's oral and auditory
dimensions. Aristotle's link between orators and rhapsodes was also recognized by
Alkidamas' *On the Sophists*. In both cases, this recognition occurs precisely at the
point where Aristotle and Alkidamas are concerned with the orator's use of written
drafts to aid his training and delivery. This coincidence is significant, for it shows
that the cultural factors responsible for this development among speakers were also
at work among rhapsodes. Therefore, I suggest that the fixation of the text of the
Homeric poems—for which Athens was largely responsible—was not the result of an
act of dictation, but a gradual process driven by the changing performance practices
of classical rhapsodes. One final direction of influence between the three performance
domains extended from actors to rhapsodes. It was evident in the increasing the-
atricality of rhapsodic delivery, with an emphasis on the mimetic potential of the
Homeric poems at the expense of a 'purer' narrative mode of recitation. The princi-
pal drive here was the Athenians' love of drama. I trace this evolution towards the
histrionic not only in the fourth century BC—especially during the times of Lykour-
gos and Demetrios of Phaleron—but also among the *homēristai* of Hellenistic and
Roman imperial times. I end by considering the extant record—inscriptional and
literary—about post-classical performances of epic poetry generally.

PARENTIBUS CARISSIMIS

Contents

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Like Homeric poetry, though itself hardly oral, this dissertation has benefited from the hands of many masters. It is a pleasure to acknowledge here the debts I have incurred during the writing. I am grateful to the Harvard Department of the Classics for a supportive and congenial research environment. I thank my dissertation readers, Albert Henrichs, Nino Luraghi, and Carolyn Higbie, for their intellectual generosity, help, and guidance at every stage of the work. Their sharp eyes and superb scholarship have saved me from many errors. A very special thank-you to my thesis advisor, Gregory Nagy, whose fertile mind, imaginative scholarship, inexhaustible energy, and sheer pleasure in Classical scholarship have been and remain a constant source of inspiration. His support, good sense, and encouragement have been crucial in helping me reach the end of this, at times, very long road. I could not have hoped for a better mentor.

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Soli Deo gloria.

"For the LORD is good;
His lovingkindness is everlasting,
And His faithfulness to all generations."
Psalm 100:5

Introduction

This dissertation studies the performance of Homeric poetry in Greece from the archaic period to Hellenistic and Roman imperial times. I focus on the rhapsode—on the changing nature of his training and recitation. My claim is that a diachronic understanding[1] of this professional is possible only when he is seen in his archaic cultural connection to the prophet and in his relation—spanning the archaic and classical periods—to orators and actors. There is a sense in which it is legitimate to view the ῥαψῳδός as a sort of προφήτης and ὑποκριτής and as a performer who engages in ὑπόκρισις. Explaining why and how these assertions hold true is central to this work. An equivalent way to frame my subject is to focus on the related triad ὑπόκρισις, ὑποκριτής, and ὑποκρίνεσθαι. Modern scholars will doubtless associate ὑπόκρισις with rhetorical theory, where it designates the speaker's 'delivery'; and ὑποκριτής with the dramatic stage, the common label in classical Athens for a tragic or a comic actor. Therefore the reader might be excused for thinking at first strange my choice of this triad as the fulcrum of my inquiry into the performance of Homeric poetry in ancient Greece. But, in fact, my investigation shows that, if we want to understand the cultural significance of Homeric epic and the changing nature of its performance over time, we must consider the manner and contexts in which the Greeks themselves used these terms in their writings, cultural analysis, and scholarly discourse. What emerges from such a study is that often our modern terms 'performance', 'performer', and 'to perform' are, in ways that this dissertation makes clear, best rendered by ὑπόκρισις, ὑποκριτής, and ὑποκρίνεσθαι. This is by no means an obvious claim; I do not mean it absolutely and it shall be my concern to justify this assertion. After all, one might object that ὑποκριτής and ῥαψῳδός are never used interchangeably; and that the verbs associated with the recitation of Homeric poetry are, e.g., καταλέγειν

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[1]By 'diachronic' I mean an understanding of the rhapsode's place in the performance culture of ancient Greece that takes into account the full sweep of its historical evolution, i.e., how it changed over time and why.

or ἀείδειν, not ὑποκρίνεσθαι. And is it not obvious that ὑπόκρισις and ὑποκριτής, whatever their connection, if any, with epic poetry, reach beyond its boundaries into the domains of oratory and drama?

But the first objection is undermined by Sokrates' repeated juxtaposition of ῥαψῳδός and ὑποκριτής when he refers in Plato's *Ion* to members of the rhapsodic profession.[2] And the second, qualified by the occasional yet significant use of ὑποκρίνεσθαι in the Homeric poems when a character answers questions that call for interpretation. Even if this constitutes a semantic borrowing from the domain of oracular interpretation, we must still ask ourselves whether this in any way affects the poetics of epic performance. The characters, after all, are engaging in the interpretation of traditional epic material in contexts that are especially significant to the course of the poems' plot. And if the rhapsode himself, from a certain point of view explored here, may be construed as the *hermēneus* of his tradition, the parallel between interpreting rhapsodes and interpreting epic characters may be thought to have something to contribute to our understanding of the poetics involved. Finally, I may counter the third objection by noting that what my critic observes is only to be expected, since neither among us is 'performance' or 'performer' circumscribed to the recitation of poetry. Though our own culture generally reserves 'performance' for the artist on stage before an audience (whether a singer, a musician, or an actor), a narrower, technical meaning is in evidence when we talk about the 'performance' of a lawyer at a trial or a politician campaigning for office at a public event. This is the primary meaning in which ὑπόκρισις appears in the literature of the classical period. In view is the 'delivery' before the audience, an individual's deportment when he is in the spotlight, on the 'public stage,' so to say. The analysis of this concept took place in connection with the discipline of rhetoric, where the public discourse of an emerging democratic society called for rules of engagement between a citizen and the assembled polis, whether in the political or the forensic stage. Its goal was to secure the welfare of the individual and, ideally, at the same time advance the good of his community. But together with the earliest extant reflection on the art of the orator and, particularly, on his delivery, we find the explicit realization that rhetorical ὑπόκρισις was intimately tied, historically and conceptually, to the art of the actor on the dramatic stage and the rhapsode before a festival audience. We find clear testimonies to this effect in Alkidamas' *On the Sophists* §14 and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* III.1. Some have thought these statements the consequence of a late con-

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[2]Cf. *Ion* 532d6–e1 and 535e10–536a1.

vergence between the three domains of epic, dramatic, and rhetorical performance, driven primarily by the Athenians' love for tragedy and comedy and by the importance of self-characterization for the speaker who hoped to convince his audience. The result of this convergence would have been a corruption of the political arena by the theater—the wretched *theatrocracy* of Plato's *Laws* 701a3—and a similar corruption by an exaggerated mimetic impulse of what should have been the 'purer' narrative mode of the rhapsodic performance of Homer—a distortion noted by Aristotle in the *Poetics* 26 and hinted at by Plato in the *Republic* 392e–396.

I do not deny that such cultural pressures existed: they did, and they made their influence felt. Arguably, in the sphere of Homeric performance the result was the natural issue of the poetry's own mimetic potential. But if we focus too narrowly on this dynamic of convergence alone, we shall fail to appreciate that the connections between these three great performance domains of classical Athens—rhapsody, oratory, and drama—are older and more consequential than a growing appreciation of histrionic emphases in performance. Indeed, following the suggestion of Koller (1957), I argue in Chapter 1 that diachronically speaking ὑποκρίνεσθαι and ὑποκριτής originally pertained to the prophet as the intermediary between the oracular god and an inquiring seeker. As a middleman, the prophet was said to 'interpret' the divine message: he was the ὑποκριτής, the 'interpreter'. But mediation is a notion that allows for varying constructions, depending on what is thought of as the source and as the final addressee. Insofar as the god himself was not heard apart from his prophet, in practice the word of the latter might also be considered a source in its own right. Then the verb ὑποκρίνεσθαι and its agent noun would underscore not so much the interpretive act as the attendant notion of a speech-act: the authoritative and efficacious divine speech that carried the force and ability of the god to bring to pass what he declared. In time, the notion of performative speech gained semantic priority over the notion of interpretive speech, and the verb was used for festival performances on stage, usually connoting histrionic delivery since the dramatic stage was the preeminent context for such usage.

Oracles, of course, are not the only form of divine speech. Epic poetry openly declares its status as the speech of the Muse. It is therefore conceptually related to mantic poetry and casts the rhapsode as a mediating agent who conveys the divine song to his audience. Thus I argue that, in the cultural context of archaic Greece, he inherited many of the notions associated with the prophet in his mediating role. These conceptual parallels become all the more significant in the light of Koller's

suggestion, which I accept, that the dramatic actor was called ὑποκριτής because he was initially viewed from the perspective of his hermeneutic function—as adding his commentary to, and elaborating upon, the song of the chorus. Koller's contribution must be complemented in two significant and related directions: the rhapsode himself, as already mentioned, would *also* have been viewed as discharging a similar hermeneutic function in his epic mediation between the Muse and the audience; and, as the preeminent archaic model of the performer, it would have been to rhapsodic ὑπόκρισις (understood as performance/delivery) that the emerging actor would have looked for professional inspiration and guidance. It is insufficient, therefore, to think of the lines of influence between the dramatic stage and rhapsodic recitation as unidirectional, from the former to the latter, solely in the direction evinced by the rhapsode's increasing theatricality, so clear during the fourth century BC and later. In the earliest stages of its development, the acting trade would have considered the performing bard as the model to emulate, adopting such techniques as might be transferable to the new occasion, self-consciously developing in the tragic genre the mimetic potential intrinsic in Homeric poetry. In the course of time the influence exerted became mutual, and it is for this reason that a clear picture of the rhapsodic performance of Homer in its full diachronic sweep emerges only when it is viewed as an element in a milieu where drama gradually gained cultural preeminence. Despised by some among the intellectual elite, generally admired by the common man, actors were envied by many on account of their public prominence, and their influence upon public speakers—informal 'performers' in an extended sense—is well known.[3] Just as momentous, I contend, was their influence upon rhapsodes. Chapter 3 traces this influence from archaic through Hellenistic and Roman imperial times.

Now, as I noted above, drama was not alone in providing the reciter of Homeric poetry with a historical connection to a performance domain other than his own. Just as significant is the relation between rhapsodes and orators. Here, again, the ties are not simply the universals of the performer-audience interaction, significant though these are. For the growth of the art of rhetoric came by the hand of intellectuals that might be loosely classed among the sophists, a group whose boundaries cannot be drawn as tightly as some scholars have led us to believe.[4] And the rise of the sophists, as Chapter 3 argues, should be seen partly in imitation of, partly in competitive reaction to, rhapsodes in their hermeneutic/explanatory role vis-à-vis the poetry of

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[3]Cf., e.g., Hall (1995).

[4]Cf. Kerferd (1950).

Homer.[5] The universals of the performance situation alone would commend to us the study of oratorical delivery, ὑπόκρισις, in the context of an inquiry into the performance of Homeric poetry. But the historical connection between rhapsodes, the rise of the sophists, and the development of oratorical theory makes it highly plausible that the cultural factors that shaped the rise and evolution of rhetorical delivery were similarly at work, *mutatis mutandis*, among rhapsodes. This is my rationale for the detailed reading in Chapter 2 of Aristotle's discussion of ὑπόκρισις in *Rhetoric* III, and of Alkidamas' *On the Sophists* in Chapter 3.

Here follows, then, the outline of my dissertation.

In Chapter 1 I take up one of the most puzzling aspects of the performance of Homeric poetry: the 'notional fixity' of the oral tradition.[6] This notion consists in the perception among insiders to the culture (the singer and his audience) that the bard always sang one and the same 'story'—or 'poem', for there was no self-conscious distinction drawn at this level between the content sung and the composition that embodied it—even though, in actual fact, the performer recomposed his song on every new occasion using traditional language, themes, and thematic sequence. Notional fixity is not only part of the archaic performance poetics of Homeric epic: though with a gradual narrowing of the range of textual variation possible, it survived into the classical period. Thus a diachronic study of Homeric rhapsodic performance is only complete when the implications of this notional fixity are understood. Chapter 1 argues that it had its roots in the common ideology that informed archaic views of epic poetry and mantic/oracular poetry. My analysis explores this widely acknowledged kinship and what it entails for a right understanding of the epic poet and his τέχνη. It suggests that this same notional fixity facilitated the rise of the mythic figure of 'Homer' as the culture hero and author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The parallel between prophet and rhapsode as mediating communication between the divine and human realms illuminates the argument of Plato's *Ion*, specifically, the philosopher's irony when on two occasions he has Sokrates pair ῥαψῳδός and ὑποκριτής to describe Ion and those who, like him, make their living by reciting Homer's poems. Indeed, the twining of these terms simultaneously looks back to the earlier meaning of ὑποκριτής as 'interpreter' (of dreams and oracles) and to the tendency among rhapsodes, al-

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[5]The parallel between rhapsodes and sophists is acknowledged by Pfeiffer (1968) 1.16

[6]'Notional fixity' is my own term for what Nagy (1996a) 69 calls the "distinctly nonoccasional and at least *notionally* unchanging" character of the epic poetry of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (his emphasis).

ready evident during the fourth century BC, to exaggerate their stage presence and overemphasize the mimetic cast of their delivery.

Chapter 2 focuses on the concept of 'delivery' in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* III, the sole surviving extended analysis from classical Greece where the term is explicitly introduced. The only other comparable treatment is Plato's *Phaidros*, which does not, as Aristotle's, explicitly mention ὑπόκρισις nor its connection with the performance of actors on the stage and rhapsodes in their recitals of epic. Chapter 2, then, is concerned with this analysis, setting Aristotle's observations in the context of earlier attempts to deal with oratorical delivery. But scholars have commonly argued that in his *Rhetoric* Aristotle touches on delivery only in a passing, dismissive way: he sets delivery aside, they say, in favor of a concept of 'style', λέξις, that is purged from its connections with the ethically objectionable ὑπόκρισις. I disagree. I believe that Aristotle's concept of style is different in emphasis from the later one familiar to us, developed in an age of literacy that had largely abandoned the predominantly oral habits of the earlier song culture. Aristotle's λέξις cannot be understood apart from delivery, and ὑπόκρισις is correspondingly in view throughout the first twelve chapters of *Rhetoric* III. The consensus interpretation I oppose hinges on an understanding of the word φαντασία in *Rhetoric* III.1 that glosses it as 'mere show' or 'ostentation'. An adequate rebuttal of this view requires a survey of Aristotle's use of this and semantically related terms in the *Rhetoric* and other writings. This necessary work yields additional insights into the philosopher's view of rhetoric and of the orator as the agent called to shape the perception of the audience in a democratic society. Aristotle's treatment of delivery is also of great value in improving our understanding of a matter that is of the utmost importance to any study of Homeric performance in classical Athens: how the use of writing came to play a role in the preparation and delivery of speeches. What cultural forces had a hand in bringing about this momentous technical development? A careful reading of Aristotle (complemented by Alkidamas) suggests how we should think of the parallel development among rhapsodes, as they too increasingly used transcripts of earlier performances as scripts for future recitals.

Chapter 3 focuses on the connections and mutual influence between oratory and rhapsody with respect to their increasing use of writing to aid future performances. The principal textual witness here is Alkidamas' discussion *On the Sophists*. In essence, my argument is that the cultural pressures that brought about the growing dependence of orators on the memorization of written speeches were also at work

among rhapsodes. The parallel between these two performance trades—Alkidamas himself makes the connection in a passing mention of rhapsodes in §14—is a happy one for the modern scholar, for there is very little evidence (and only indirect) that bears on rhapsodes, while the development among orators receives explicit attention. What, then, do we learn? So long as public speaking was the domain of the exceptionally gifted 'natural' orator, there was comparatively little need for an explicit science that would point the road to successful performance. As soon, however, as greater numbers of men of average skill either were enticed or else found it necessary to become involved in the democratic process, and thus had to address and persuade an audience—or as soon as the increasingly litigious society made it a matter of personal survival to have the requisite skill to convince a jury of one's innocence or of an opponent's guilt, instruction and training in the art of rhetoric became desirable, if not essential. A deficient natural gift for improvisation was bound to be compensated for, not primarily by an attempt, difficult and of limited promise, to develop the corresponding skill, but rather by a reliance on the rote memorization of written drafts carefully composed in advanced of the address. The ensuing demand not only produced the logographers, but also led speakers who did not depend on the scripts of professional writers to develop their own to aid their training and rehearsing. A similar dynamic, I believe, can be posited for the performance of Homeric poetry. The life-long apprenticeship from youth up that might eventually produce a bard able to recompose his traditional material in performance must have been exceptional in the Athens of the late fifth century BC. The high appreciation in which Ionian bards were held[7] suggests that their technique was more faithfully traditional and compared positively with the average Athenian's own. Athenian education at that time seems to have emphasized memorization and recitation of 'the classics' (with the rise of an increasingly canonical corpus), making a growing use of written material.[8] It is from

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[7]We need only remember the prominence of the Homeridai of Khios as arbiters of the Homeric tradition and supreme judges of rhapsodic performance, a reputation to which Plato's *Ion* 530d7–8, the *Phaidros* 252b4–5, and the *Republic* 599e5–6 allude. I may also mention the Kreophyleioi of Samos, from whom according to Plutarch the Spartan lawgiver Lykourgos is supposed to have received the Homeric poems (*Life of Lykourgos* 4.4). Although Kreophylos himself may not have enjoyed a good reputation in Athens (cf. Graziosi, 2002, 217–220, who cites Plato's *Rep.* 600b6–c1), the very fact that a rivalry between the Kreophyleioi and the Homeridai might be hinted at testifies to a high estimate of the former's proficiency as rhapsodes. Finally, it is worth noting that even Ion himself—conceited, to be sure, but nonetheless portrayed as successful—is said to hail from Ephesos, a choice that is unlikely to be accidental.

[8]Plato's *Prot.* 325e4–6 e.g., notes that [οἱ διδάσκαλοι] παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς [sc. τοῖς παισὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ ἐκμανθάνειν ἀναγκάζουσιν. See the recent

this pedagogic milieu (supplemented, no doubt, with a heavy additional focus on Homer and attention to current rhapsodic recitations) that the Athenian rhapsodes hailed. It was only natural, then, that any effort made towards the mastery of the traditional language and thematic material would have depended to some degree on the memorization of transcripts of performances that had already proved successful before a festival audience. This dependence amounted to a self-reinforcing tendency, a dynamic therefore that grew in strength with the passing of time. Its outcome, gradual but inexorable, was a fixation of the texts of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, not by the historical accident of an act of dictation but by a process driven by the changing performance practices of rhapsodes in their training and public recitations. My study in Chapter 3 of the cultural forces that encouraged the increasing use of writing in the performance of Homeric poetry is complemented by a general survey of the trade of rhapsodes and their performance practices from late classical down to Hellenistic and Roman imperial times. Particular attention is given to the formative periods of Lykourgos and Demetrios of Phaleron in the late fourth century BC.

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treatments by Griffith (2001) 66–71 (67n144 lists other passages), Ford (2002) 194–97 (195n26 has further bibliography), and Morgan (1999).

Chapter 1

The Notional Fixity of the Homeric Tradition

1.1 Notional fixity in oral poetry

In his classic work *The Singer of Tales*, A.B. Lord opened a fascinating window into the mindset of the Southslav oral poet. During an interview between the singer Đemail Zogić and Nikola Vujnović, Parry's assistant, the following exchange took place:[1]

> N[ikola]: [S]ome singers have told us that as soon as they hear a song from another singer, they can sing it immediately, even if they've heard it only once, . . . just as it was, word for word. Is that possible, Đemail?
>
> Đ[email]: It's possible. . . . I know from my own experience. . . . When I . . . had nothing to worry about, I would hear a singer sing a song to the gusle, and after an hour I would sing his whole song. . . . I would give every word and not make a mistake on a single one. . . .
>
> N: So then, last night you sang a song for us. . . . Was it the same song [you once learned from Suljo Makić], word for word and line for line?
>
> Đ: The same song, word for word and line for line. I didn't add a single line, and I didn't make a single mistake. . . .
>
> N: Does a singer sing a song which he knows well. . . , will he sing it twice the same and sing every line?
>
> Đ: That is possible. If I were to live for twenty years, I would sing the song which I sang for you here today just the same twenty years from now, word for word.

Commenting on this dialog, Lord noted that Zogić had *not*, in fact, learned the song "word for word and line for line," and yet both performances, Makić's and his

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[1] Lord (1960) 27. A fuller transcript can be found in Lord (1954) 1.240–41.

own, were two recognizable versions of the same story. This did not mean that Zogić was lying, for oral bards do not have the same notion of 'word' we, literate people, are accustomed to. They follow the old practice, attested in many poetic traditions, of using 'word' for units of utterance of varying length,[2] what Homeric Greek calls ἔπος;[3] and, from our point of view, we might consider Zogić's protestations an emphatic way of saying 'like', of asserting his role as guardian of the tradition.[4] We must here distinguish the perception of the outsider—the ethnographer—from the perspective of the insider—the singer: the ethnographer who studies a singer's actual practice is able to note objectively the empirical differences between two recorded tellings of the same song; the singer, while recomposing the story in performance, so long as he keeps within certain traditional parameters of acceptability, feels clearly at freedom, without self-conscious thought, to modify it in accordance with his personal skill and the particulars of the occasion. To this, however, he does not admit when faced with the outsider's perspective.[5] At most, he may grant it of other singers, worse or less principled than himself. Accordingly, we need further to distinguish this artistic freedom of an entirely traditional nature and the bard's self-conscious consideration of it, especially in the competitive context of a comparison between himself and other singers or between the better and worse practitioners of his profession. This exchange shows that the oral poet can both live the freedom of his traditional art and insist on the notion that his every new performance tells the same story unchanged, "word for word and line for line": for the story must 'tell it the way it was' and modifying it would compromise its truthfulness. As Đemail observes at an earlier point in the same exchange: "[P]eople like the ornamenting of a song. . . . There are people who add and ornament a song and say, 'This is the way it was,' but it would be better, brother, if he were to sing it as he heard it and as things happen. . . . You can find plenty of people in Novi Pazar who know these songs but who don't know how to sing

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[2]Martin (1989) 10–14. Note, however, that I am not using 'utterance' in Martin's (apparently) reified sense. For when he writes that "Homeric diction does not pose the poem as an utterance . . . [but as] an authoritative speech-act" (*ibid.* 237–38), he seems to divorce 'utterance' from 'speech-act'. (Though perhaps by 'utterance' he means just the words said, i.e. only the propositional content of the message.) I use utterance, on the other hand, to denote speech-in-action, the act of vocal expression. The essence of a speech-act, then, is a performative utterance (the so-called 'illocutionary act').

[3]Cf. Koller (1972) and Foley (1995) 2–3 (incl. 3n4). See also Schmitt (1967) §20 and §546.

[4]Although, strictly speaking, Zogić does not avow a high degree of resemblance with his model, but rather the exact identity that issues from an act of total appropriation.

[5]Cf. Lord (1954) 1.338n37. For more examples see below, n. 6.

them clearly, just as things happened, just as Bosnian heroes did their deeds. . . . ''
(Lord, 1954, 1.239).[6] In other words: placing a high value on truth results in a strong
insistence on the fixed character of the song, its necessarily unchanging nature from
telling to retelling—and yet, all the while, the song *is* being recomposed anew at
every performance. The fixity, therefore, is not empirical, but notional: this is what
I call the 'notional fixity' of a song or a poetic tradition.[7]

In line with Lord's analysis, my proposal here is that the same notional fixity ob-
tained in the epic tradition of archaic Greece (by which I mean Homeric and Hesiodic
poetry). But lest the structure of my argument be misunderstood, I must make the
following very clear: I am not claiming that the Southslav *comparandum* in and of
itself *proves* that the Greek epic tradition was characterized by notional fixity—this
is not my reason for adducing it. But the field work of Parry and Lord shows that
notional fixity and an artistic freedom of a traditional sort at times *can* and *do* co-
exist in certain cultures.[8] Since for most of us this is a strange and extraordinary
fact, we need an explicit demonstration that it is possible. This is my sole reason
for adducing the Southslav oral tradition. My argument for the notional fixity of the
Homeric tradition is of a different kind, and principally heuristic: I believe that it is
consistent with the worldview that informed the poetic production of epic during the
earliest stages of archaic Greece (a worldview conveyed by the surviving texts), con-
sistent, in particular, with the claim to divine inspiration. Furthermore, allowing for
notional fixity helps us to understand why a poetry cultivated since time immemorial
by a long line of oral bards was, in the event, so readily assigned to a single author,
Homer, the mythical wordsmith *par excellence*. This development would be hard to
conceive had the tradition encouraged change and modification rather than fixity of
form and content. Notional fixity, moreover, would have encouraged and contributed
to the actual text-fixation of the epic poems in a manner consistent with the per-
formance milieu of ancient Greece. For this reason it is preferable to the alternative
most often suggested: dictation theories that do violence to the song culture and fail

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[6]Cf. Lord (1954) 1.239–40, 1.242–43, 1.245 (Đemail Zogić); 1.266 (Sulejman Makić); 1.338n37
(Salih Ugljanin); 3.60, 3.66, 3.71–72 (Avdo Međedović, though Avdo's perspective is more in line
with the realities of oral poetics; see below, n. 91). For more on 'ornamenting a song', see below,
p. 22. Cf. also Boyd (1994) 118–20.

[7]This notional fixity applies not only to the transmission from one singer's telling to another
singer's retelling, but also to successive retellings by a singer.

[8]For studies that situate 'creativity', 'innovation', and 'tradition' in an anthropological context
and explore ways in which they are culturally relative, cf. Barnett (1953), Liep (2001), and Bronner
(1992).

to account for the dissemination of a hypothetical transcript and its immediate and comprehensive sway over the poems' performance throughout Greece.

By itself notional fixity, of course, is not enough to bring about a corresponding performance-driven textual fixity. Here, again, the Southslav epic tradition serves my purposes, now as a counterexample: Lord never observed any overall textual convergence for its songs. Typically, the thematic and formulaic discrepancies between two versions of a song by different singers were more numerous and serious than the differences between two retellings by the same performer. And where a performer's song revealed a tendency towards textual fixity, it was due to his performing it more frequently.[9] But while notional fixity is not sufficient, I believe it is necessary if textual fixation is to happen gradually by way of performance. Where (to us, paradoxically) notional fixity coexists with a measure of textual fluidity, the audience will expect to hear always 'the same song', will project its expectations on the performer in ever so subtle and unsubtle ways and will reward him to the extent that he meets them. And, in an agonistic context, performers themselves will seek to outdo each other not only in technical virtuosity, dramatic force and vividness, but also in the 'accuracy' and 'comprehensiveness' of their telling—in other words, in what may be called truthfulness or veracity, in their faithfulness to the notional integrity of the tradition they are singing about.[10] All these factors, to be ultimately productive, must be helped along by socio-cultural dynamics that will reinforce them. For example, to mention, among the many possible, one that was certainly true of the Homeric tradition: a diffusion of the poetry under the dominant control of one preeminent festival, the Panathenaia, whose prestige must have drawn to one venue the more influential Homeric performers of the time, subjecting them all to the same competitive rules and the expectations of the same audience. Other determinants must have been the Panhellenic cultural exchanges between *poleis*, and the tendency in Athens towards the end of the fifth century and during the fourth century BC to rely increasingly on the use of written transcripts to train and prepare for actual epic performance.[11]

But this chapter is not about these factors, and if I mention them it is only to

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[9]Lord (1981) 457–59.

[10]I do not mean to imply that oral traditions can generally and without qualification be viewed as monolithic, integral wholes. But where notional fixity is present, there is necessarily an attendant notional integrity of the story (or set of stories) that are conceived of as unchanging. Neither am I suggesting that notional fixity rules out competition between rival alternatives: this often takes the form of one version presented as the absolute truth and a silent snub of the rest. More on the matter of competition below, p. 51.

[11]For the use of written texts, first as transcripts and eventually as scripts, see below, pp. 162ff.

suggest how one might build on notional fixity to explore the cultural process that brought about a performance-driven textualization of the Homeric poems. Neither I am concerned here with showing that Homeric epic was actually recomposed in performance. This is a fact of the ancient Greek song culture that is no longer disputed. What scholars debate is the nature and particulars of the process undergone by the song culture that resulted in the written texts of our *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Rather, having established that notional fixity and recomposition in performance can coexist, my purpose is to argue that ancient Greek epic did, in fact, enjoy such notional fixity, and that this fixity derived from the well known kinship between poetry and prophecy that has its most immediate expression in the bard's claim to divine inspiration. My methodology is simple: I focus on key Homeric and Hesiodic passages and consider their portrayal of the medium of poetry and the role of the performer. I take these descriptions 'seriously', i.e., not as mere literary conventions, but as earnest expressions of a cultural paradigm largely shared by the professional and his audience. In other words, in performing these passages the poet says what he means and means what he says.[12] This need not imply that a performer's attitude is some homogeneous monolith of sustained seriousness: individual views and cultures are extremely complex systems, and experience teaches us, e.g., that humor can coexist with earnestness and heart-felt religious feeling. But however hard it may be to put it accurately into words, we all readily understand the difference between an invocation as a literary convention and one that not only serves to punctuate the performative situation but is also an authentic expression of belief. As part of my methodological considerations, it is important to note that the analysis of Homeric poetry must be simultaneously synchronic *and* diachronic. Particular attention must be paid to the skewing that arises from the rate of change in the medium's self-referential language,[13]

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[12]This matter of 'conventionality' is quite complex and it need not negate serious intent. Traditional Christian wedding vows, e.g., have remained unchanged for many generations and are thus highly conventional; yet no one doubts their seriousness or their performative status when uttered by bride and groom during an actual wedding ceremony. Similarly, a degree of conventionality in the mode and description of a poetic initiation or a hymnic invocation need not disallow the possibility of a real engagement with the corresponding religious implications: in other words, it may still denote a real transaction between the human actor and his gods. It is helpful, in this connection, to quote Griffith's (1983) 48n45 observation about Hesiod's *Dichterweihe* in the *Theogony*: "I do not doubt that an archaic poet might believe that he had experienced something like what Hesiod describes: Empedocles, Aristeas, and others were not adopting *purely* conventional postures (and where do conventions come from, if not from common human experience?)" (his emphasis).

[13]For example, references to performance practices: actors involved, instruments used, settings, etc.

which is comparatively slower than the medium's overall own. One must also consider the diachronic depth intrinsic to the medium, which can invest terms that are, from a synchronic point of view, ordinary with thickly layered meanings that resonate with metapoetic echoes in the context of performance.[14]

I take Finnegan's (1977) 205 concern that we be careful not to assume that the production of poets automatically stands for the society as a whole, or that the views expressed in oral poetry are *ipso facto* a culture's worldview. It seems right to consider a poet's voice, first of all, as his own, and to view him as a spokesman only when there is further justification to regard him as representative of the values and beliefs of his culture. But in the case of the Homeric and Hesiodic traditions, their preeminence from the very first as *the* paradigm for the cultural life of ancient Greece—for its religion, its intellectual production, and its *paideia*—gives us, I believe, precisely the justification needed to extrapolate, albeit carefully, from the record of its poetry to the worldview of its culture. After all, 'Homer' and 'Hesiod' gave Greece its defining cultural charter.[15]

One last preliminary comment is in order: simply to say that, whenever a bard sang an episode, say, from the Iliadic tradition, he claimed and believed that he was performing a divinely inspired song does not, in and of itself, imply its notional fixity; something more is necessary, for the Muse might conceivably change her song with every telling. But this would imply that the poet and his audience thought of the epic tradition as 'literary fiction' (to use our anachronistic terms), and restricted the involvement of the goddess to the ability, arguably nothing short of divine, to deliver a compelling story in flawless hexameters composed in performance. But this, I hope to show, is not the view of inspiration that follows from a careful analysis of the evidence. Just as we would expect the Delphic oracle to give a particular individual the same answer, if he should pose the same question under the same circumstances—whether about the past or the future—on two different occasions,[16] so also when the

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[14]Nagy (2003) 39–48, esp. 45–46.

[15]Cf. Hdt. 2.53.

[16]Some might object to the parallel I am drawing here by citing the example of Kroisos in Hdt. 1.46–49. Wishing to make trial of the oracles of Greece and Lybia in order to learn which, if any, spoke truthfully, Kroisos dispatched embassies that, at a previously agreed time, were to pose a question whose answer was known only to the king himself and to the gods. My critics may counter that on this occasion not all oracles gave the same answer to the same question, posed under the same circumstances. But this is obviously a case of true vs. false oracles, whereas my illustration assumes *ex hypothesi* the truthfulness of the oracle. Another, arguably more relevant, objection is the so-called oracle of the wooden wall of Hdt. 7.140–41. (Cf. Evans, 1982, and Mikalson, 2003, 52–56.) There the question, posed twice, is ostensibly the same, as are the circumstances, yet two different

epic rhapsode stood before his audience to sing a given episode from the story of Troy, their expectation and his was that he would tell it just the same today as he had done yesterday or would do tomorrow; or that two different rhapsodes would perform it just the same. This expectation reflected the notional fixity of the tradition, and wrought upon the performance even when it remained implicit and the culture did not call for its articulation and recognition. Where rhapsodes competed for approval, faithfulness to the 'story' would have been rewarded, and this, in a way that did not necessarily make a distinction between form and content: for the virtuosity of form that made a given performance compelling may well *ipso facto* have been judged more faithful—for was it not the song of the Muse? And would not the performance of the goddess, unencumbered by the imperfections of her human instrument, meet with resounding success?[17]

Now, appealing to divine inspiration to argue for notional fixity might be thought an obvious strategy. But this is arguably not the case, for Finkelberg (1990) has viewed the involvement of the Muse as a poetic pretext to innovate.[18] Her analysis pits tradition against divine inspiration, seeing the former as constraining and shackling to individual creativity, and the latter, on the contrary, as liberating: "To the Yugoslav singer, the guarantee of the song's truthfulness is the tradition itself. . . . To the Greeks, the guarantee of the song's truthfulness lies in the Muses. . . . In other words, while the Yugoslav poet sees himself as first and foremost a preserver of the tra-

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answers are given. This, however, is not a valid counterargument, since the two answers are in no way contradictory (even if the tone of the second seemed to the *theopropoi* milder than the first); they merely address two aspects of the same future events: the destruction and burning of Athens (especially its temples) in the first; the protection of the wooden wall and the future confrontation with the Persians at Salamis (with a typically ambiguous oracular hint of victory) in the second. But whatever the disparity in tone, the two oracles are largely complementary in substance, and, where they overlap, they are in exact agreement with each other: e.g., in enjoining flight from the enemy (140.2 and 141.4) and stressing the inevitability of the impending evil (140.3 and 141.3). It is simply not accurate to say that "Delphi delivered two *contradictory* directions" (Macan, 1908, 189, my emphasis). More correctly, Kirchberg (1965) 91 notes: "Die Pythia gibt ihnen ein zweites Orakel. . . . Es . . . bekräftigt die Aussagen des ersten Orakels." One genuine element of discontinuity between the rhapsode as mediator of the Muse and the Pythia as mouthpiece of Apollo is that exceptionally—and there is no doubt that Timon's encouragement to the Athenians to approach the oracle a second time as suppliants is very unusual—one might request the god not merely to reveal, but to affect the future for the better, since this was arguably within his power. This, however, the Muse traditionally cannot do and, at any rate, only makes sense when the object of one's inquiry is not the past, as is largely the case with Homeric epic. (Homeric poetry rarely addresses matters that lie in the audience's future.) It is in this fusion of the ability to disclose and the ability to affect the future that the performative power of divine speech is best seen. See further below, p. 27.

[17]Thus Avdo Međedović equates the "better" song with "the true one" (see below, n. 91).

[18]With the seeming approval of Grandolini (1996) 44n37.

dition, the ancient Greek poet sees himself as a mouthpiece of the Muse" (*ibid.* 295).
This formulation substitutes the scholar's outside perspective for that of the cultural
insider. It is true, of course, that the Southslav singer does not set his performance
in the context of an invocation of the deity, nor does he claim to be divinely inspired.
But it is wrong to cleave Muse and tradition on the grounds that for validation the
Slav singer need only appeal to the shared knowledge of his audience and the perfor-
mances of other singers. The Greek Panhellenic tradition, in eliminating all traces of
occasionality, does indeed absolutize its authority as the testimony of the Muse. But
tradition it is nonetheless, for the rhetoric of the appeal to the Muses is precisely that
they, as eyewitnesses, can tell the story fully and accurately. The rationale would
utterly fail if there were not a story to begin with that, to hearers and singers alike,
is fixed and well defined. For what accuracy would be involved in reporting a notion-
ally moving target? Thus, in pondering the way the Greek poet "sees himself," one
must consider what this rhetoric from within implies about the performer-audience
interaction. Merely looking at the situation synchronically, as if the singer had never
sung his material before and his every word, given by the Muse, were new to his
audience, flattens the diachronic dimension of the poetry and fails to see that the
invocation of the Muse is not one particular appeal by an individual singer on one
historically contingent occasion; rather, it is emblematic of countless actual perfor-
mances of the tradition by many rhapsodes and, as such, speaks to the accuracy and
reliability—and, therefore, the notional fixity—of the eyewitness report.

A comparable misunderstanding of the working of traditional oral poetry is re-
flected by following: "In Yugoslav oral tradition the poet's creativity has no niche to
be classed in. . . . In the Greek tradition, the idea of the poet's inspiration by the Muse
offers an excellent alibi for creative intervention."[19] Here the word 'alibi' is revealing:
it shows that the analysis takes only the outsider's stance. If followed to its logical
conclusion, we shall have to view the Greek bard as dishonestly evading the reality of
his non-traditional innovation and, in order to legitimize his creative freedom, draw-
ing upon a cultural convention merely as a pretext to fend off the charge of singing
about "things of which he did not hear from his predecessors."[20] But such a reasoning
cannot be accepted, because it projects the outsider's perspective upon the insider.
As Nagy (1996a) 19 reminds us, "the here-and-now of each new performance is an
opportunity for innovation, whether or not any such innovation is explicitly acknowl-

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[19]Finkelberg (1990) 296.
[20]*Ibid.* 296.

edged in the tradition." We must be careful not to equate the innovation proper to traditional poetry with what Nagy (1990c) 55n19 calls the "anxious modernist vision of the creative self," with "creation out of self-contained genius." Indeed, innovation is possible in oral traditions, but it is culturally specific and itself traditional. So, to return one last time to alleged 'alibi' of the Greek poet: the corresponding synchronic leveling and misconstrual of traditional innovation contradicts the notion of the poetic οἴμη that governs the performances of the Homeric Phemios and Demodokos. When Demodokos is said to start his song οἴμης (θ 74), this should be translated 'from that thematic thread',[21] and, as the metaphor makes clear, it conceptualizes the story as an established sequence that, once picked by the poet, he must faithfully follow.[22] This is what the Muses have implanted in the heart of the bard, 'all sorts of threads' (χ 347–48), not a romantic creative genius. It might be helpful here to quote Nagy (1996b) 22: "[A] tradition may claim unchangeability as a founding principle while at the same time it keeps itself alive through change. . . . Participants in a given tradition may of course choose to ignore any change whatsoever. If they do recognize change, however, either it must be negative or, if it is to be positive, it must not really be change after all. In other words, positive change must be a 'movement' that leads back to something that is konwn . . . [a movement] that aims at the traditional, even the archetypal."

The key, then, to a right understanding of the nature of epic poetry, with its notional fixity, is its claim to inspiration. The poet's appeal to the gods, most commonly the Muses, for divine assistance is already present in the oldest strata of the Homeric and Hesiodic traditions, for this old *topos* of Greek poetics has its roots in the common stock of Indoeuropean cultural practices.[23] Both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* open with invocations of the Muse, and the *Theogony* presents us with He-

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[21]Cf. Durante (1976) 176–77.

[22]The insistence on an established notional sequence, which answers, in turn, to the notional fixity of the song, is a central tenet of rhapsodic poetics. It is reflected by the language of performance as it focuses on the precise narrative 'point of entry': μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά . . . ‖ ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα . . . (A 1 6); ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα . . . ‖ τῶν ἁμόθεν γε, θεά, θύγατερ Διός, εἰπὲ καὶ ἡμῖν (α 1 10; this should be rendered 'from a point [along the thread] of these events': the Muse is free to choose her starting point, but notionally the narrative thread is always the same); μοῦσ' ἄρ' ἀοιδὸν ἀνῆκεν ἀειδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν, ‖ οἴμης, τῆς τότ' ἄρα κλέος οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἵκανε (θ 73–74); ὁ δ' ὁρμηθεὶς θεοῦ ἤρχετο, φαῖνε δ' ἀοιδήν, ‖ ἔνθεν ἑλών, ὡς . . . (θ 499–500).

[23]Cf. Schmitt (1967) §89 and §95. See also Durante (1968), whose views, however, I cannot endorse where he seems to follow Setti (e.g. Durante, 1968, 263) in embracing a distinction, attested as early as χ 347–48, between 'creative' singers, responsible for their own repertoire, and those who merely sang what they learned from others (Setti, 1958, 150; for more on Setti's position and my disagreement with him see below, n. 81).

siod's *Dichterweihe* by the Helikonian Muses. The ἀοιδός is the 'attendant of the Muses', the Μυσάων θεράπων,[24] a term that defines the singer's relation to the goddesses and their leader, Apollo, and is fraught with ritual implications.[25] The many instances of divinely sanctioned poetry furnish obvious points of contact between traditional oral epic and forms of communication, such as oracular speech, between the Greeks and their gods.[26] All this is familiar ground.[27] My goal here is to focus on the performative implications of 'inspiration', in particular, on the notional fixity of the epic tradition. To this end, this chapter redraws the familiar ideological connections between oracular and poetic speech in the milieu of archaic Greece. This helps me to delineate the worldview that informed the activity of epic rhapsodes: I argue that from the notion of epic as 'divine speech' flowed a 'mentality of fixity' as the characteristic insider's view of Homeric epic, a view that conceptualized this traditional poetry as a notionally unchanging whole, to be faithfully reproduced as the same in every new performance.

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[24]Hes. *Theog.* 100 and *h. Hom.* 32.20 (to Selene).

[25]Cf. Nagy (1999a) 289–300, esp. §4 and §6. For the relation in which Apollo stands to the Muses and, by implication, to the poet, see below, note 83.

[26]A convenient comparative study of the relation between literature and prophecy is Chadwick (1942). See also the relevant chapters of Chadwick and Chadwick (1932–40), esp. III.839–53.

[27]At θ 62–103 Hainsworth writes concerning the ἀοιδός that "the nature of his skill is mysterious and attributable to divine aid and favour, but this does not set him apart from other craftsmen (diviners, doctors, and carpenters are mentioned at xvii 383–5) or give his art a value beyond that of acrobats and wrestlers" (Heubeck et al., 1988, 349). This statement, which might seem to threaten the unique status advocated here for singers in archaic Greece, is, in my opinion, an oversimplification: ρ 383–85 does list the μάντις, the ἰητήρ, and the τέκτων along with the ἀοιδός as itinerant δημιουργοί (cf. Hes. *WD* 25–26), but this hardly justifies our judging them all to be equally valuable and respected. (For a hierarchy of *dēmiourgoi* see Nagy, 1990c, 56n26.) This ignores the rhetorical structure of the passage: a tricolon capped by an entire line devoted to the singer, who is introduced by the emphatic ἢ καί. (Russo et al., 1992, 38: "Homer reserves an entire verse for describing his own trade in glowing terms.") I do not mean to imply, however, that the other professions are anything but valuable and, in some respects, it is right to consider them the social equals of the ἀοιδός (esp. the μάντις, who also makes a trade of ἔπη). After all, the root *tek*- on which τέκτων is built, was used in Indoeuropean poetics to describe the activity of the singer (see further below, n. 81). And the mention of the μάντις, moreover, is not without significance for my argument, although the particular nature of its close tie with the ἀοιδός has to be independently established. But surely the unique love of the Muse for the singer (θ 63) and the honor in which the people hold him (θ 472) distinguish him from doctors, carpenters, acrobats, and wrestlers, elevating him above them. θ 479–81 makes clear, moreover, that such reverence is not peculiar to Demodokos (whose very name etymologizes his reception; cf. the scholia *ad* θ 44), but is shown to all singers generally.

1.2 Invoking the Muses

Let us start, then, with a Homeric invocation of the Muse; specifically, with the familiar claim to derived autopsy, with which the omniscient narrator of the *Iliad* opens the *Catalog of Ships* (B 484–86):

> ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι·
> ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε πάρεστέ τε ἴστέ τε πάντα,
> ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν·
> οἵ τινες ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν·
> πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω,
> οὐδ' εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἶεν,
> φωνὴ δ' ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνείη,
> εἰ μὴ Ὀλυμπιάδες Μοῦσαι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο
> θυγατέρες μνησαίαθ' ὅσοι ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθον·
> ἀρχοὺς αὖ νηῶν ἐρέω νῆάς τε προπάσας.

The interpretive key to this passage is the opposition between *hearing* and *seeing*: the poet and, by extension, his audience 'only hear the *kléos*', the sung report of divine and heroic deeds which constitutes the very medium of epic poetry. (As is well known, ἔκλυον is built on the zero-grade root of κλέϝος.) The Muses, on the other hand, were present as divine eye-witnesses at all the events narrated.[28] As Benveniste (1969) 2.173–74 remarked of a similar case,[29] the verbs ἴστε and ἴδμεν must be given their full etymological force: not merely 'to know', but specifically 'to see'.[30] Because the goddesses have *seen* the events, they are able to relate them to

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[28] On a similar statement at θ 491 touching Demodokos, see below, p. 26.

[29] At T 258 the imperative ἴστω is used to summon Zeus and other gods as witnesses to an oath: ἴστω νῦν Ζεὺς πρῶτα θεῶν ὕπατος καὶ ἄριστος. Benveniste (1969) 2.173 observes: "Le but n'est pas seulement de faire connaître aux dieux le texte de l'engagement par lequel on se lie. Il faut rendre ici à *ístō* sa pleine force étymologique : non pas seulement « qu'il sache », mais proprement « qu'il voie »" (emphasis his).

[30] Someone might object to giving ἴδμεν its full etymological force here and not elsewhere. But the peculiar nature of Homeric poetry readily meets this criticism: the meaning 'to see' lies in its diachronic layering and was available to composing bards; hence the context may always 'reactivate' it, bringing it to the hearer's interpretive awareness. This is so here: note the πάρεστε, which equates the knowledge of the goddesses not merely with abstract omniscience but, specifically, with that of an *eyewitness*. Thus, in κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν it would be natural for the audience to oppose ἴδμεν not to κλέος (as many do today) but to ἀκούομεν. Hence my contention that the latter be given its full etymological force. (To be sure, since the word κλέος refers to the act of hearing, it readily builds on the contrast between seeing and hearing. But just as the opposition by itself does not necessarily compromise the epistemological reliability of the poet's hearing—it merely denies him immediate eyewitness access to past events—neither does it question the credibility of the κλέος whose source is the Muse.) Cf. Τ 203–5, where there is no παρεῖναι to activate the meaning

the poet in song; he himself 'knows nothing' because he lacks autopsy—and here, as often, we meet the stereotype of the blind bard who is endowed with second-sight.[31] But the Muses put him in contact with his subject and supernaturally enable a special kind of 'recollection':[32] unerring knowledge of the heroic past; the bard, 'in turn[,] will tell' his audience, αὖ . . . ἐρέω. This infallible power of total recall is designated by the verb μνάομαι and its semantic family (μνῆμα, μιμνήσκω, etc.).[33]

In disowning *personal* knowledge of events far removed from the time of his telling and sealed in mythical heroic time, the singer paradoxically claims the divine dispensation of perfect 'memory',[34] i.e., the gift of epic poetry, which, as ever-present and ever-knowing deities, only the Muses have. Thus an acknowledgement of personal ignorance turns into an affirmation of professional aptitude and poetic sufficiency. It would be an error to miss the rhetorical point of the opposition between the κλέος of the tradition and the Muses' song, and read it for its surface meaning as a straightforward statement of fact. This is what Finkelberg (1990) 295 does when, following Lattimore's translation (here, uncharacteristically misleading), she makes too much of his word 'rumor' for κλέος:[35] "[T]he tradition, or 'what we hear,' is . . . not envisaged as sufficiently reliable. The true guarantors of the catalogue's authenticity are the omnipresent and omniscient Muses, who inspire the poet and are thus responsible for his song." Not so; the gap between the report of the Muses and the tradition is only rhetorical: the Muses' song *is* the tradition, and the κλέα ἀνδρῶν

'to see', the opposition between seeing/knowing and hearing is not absolute (for there are things they *do* know, and this from hearing), and ἴδες is explicitly qualified by ὄψει.

[31]Cf., e.g., θ 62–64. For the *topos* of blindness (in particular, Homer's blindness) see Graziosi (2002) 125–63.

[32]Usually, the Muses' gift is expressed by δίδωμι with an object such as ἀοιδή or αὐδή (e.g. θ 64). At the time of performance the goddesses are said to impel the bard (θ 73: μοῦσ' ἄρ' ἀοιδὸν ἀνῆκεν ἀειδέμεναι κλέα ἀνδρῶν).

[33]For a fuller understanding of the archaic notions associated with μνάομαι and μνήμη, see Benveniste (1954). His etymological analysis alone, however, is not enough; one must also survey the contexts in which we find 'memory', 'remember', the Muses, etc., and the views that flow from them must be ascertained. This is what Detienne (1996) does.

[34]As Nagy (1999a) 17 §3n2 remarks, Hektor's wish that there be 'a remembrance of devouring fire' when the Trojans reach the ships (μνημοσύνη τις ἔπειτα πυρὸς δηίοιο γενέσθω, Θ 181), though at the surface level of the narrative it merely stands as a periphrasis for 'let someone remember [to bring me] fire', on a metapoetic level it surely calls for its inclusion into the permanent record of epic. And this is what happens at the invocation of Π 112: ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι, ‖ ὅππως δὴ πρῶτον πῦρ ἔμπεσε νηυσὶν Ἀχαιῶν.

[35]On the meaning of κλέος and the related debate whether κλέος ἄφθιτον is a formula, see Finkelberg (1986), Edwards (1988), Olson (1995) 2–3 and 224–27, Watkins (1995) 173–78, Volk (2002), and Nagy (2003) 45–48.

that the poet hears *and* sings is the quoted utterance of the Muses. From the point of view of traditional poetry, the way the invocation works is to point out that the authority behind the κλέος—what makes it reliable and trustworthy, and its singing, an authoritative sacral speech-act—is that the Muses, the omniscient witnesses, are the notional source of the report. Setting the Muses against the tradition they themselves recount betrays a serious misunderstanding of oral-traditional poetics and its rhetorical pose. More accurate is Nagy (1999a) 16: "[T]he word *kléos* itself betrays the pride of the Hellenic poet through the ages. . . . the poet hears *kléos* recited to him by the Muses . . . [b]ut then it is actually he who recites it to his audience." In other words, the singer views himself as a link in the transmission of the song, both hearing and conveying authoritative speech, the divine song of the Muses.

Another textual instance of divine inspiration is θ 487–98, where Demodokos is praised by Odysseus for his accurate singing about the taking of Troy as if he himself had witnessed it:

> Δημόδοκ', ἔξοχα δή σε βροτῶν αἰνίζομ' ἁπάντων·
> ἢ σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς πάϊς, ἢ σέ γ' Ἀπόλλων·
> λίην γὰρ κατὰ κόσμον Ἀχαιῶν οἶτον ἀείδεις,
> ὅσσ' ἔρξαν τ' ἔπαθόν τε καὶ ὅσσ' ἐμόγησαν Ἀχαιοί,
> ὥς τέ που ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας.
> ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι καὶ ἵππου κόσμον ἄεισον
> δουρατέου, τὸν Ἐπειὸς ἐποίησεν σὺν Ἀθήνῃ,
> ὅν ποτ' ἐς ἀκρόπολιν δόλον ἤγαγε δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς
> ἀνδρῶν ἐμπλήσας, οἳ Ἴλιον ἐξαλάπαξαν.
> αἴ κεν δή μοι ταῦτα κατὰ μοῖραν καταλέξῃς,
> αὐτίκα καὶ πᾶσιν μυθήσομαι ἀνθρώποισιν,
> ὡς ἄρα τοι πρόφρων θεὸς ὤπασε θέσπιν ἀοιδήν.

In this case, as an alternative to the Muse, Apollo, the god most commonly associated with μαντική, is mentioned as a possible source of the bard's song. The choice is only apparent: in his engagement with poetry Apollo is often known as the *Mousēgetēs*,[36] and he works in concert with the Muses, presiding over and authorizing the performance. The difference between them is one of emphasis: Apollo is the marked, the Muse the unmarked choice for the invocation, so that, even when the Muse alone is addressed, one should also think of the poet as tacitly calling on Apollo.[37] The divine action is denoted by the verb διδάσκω, which casts the gods

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[36]See below, n. 83.

[37]However, as Nagy (1999a) 301–8 observes, there is a latent opposition between Apollo and his bard not unlike the ritual antagonism between a hero and the divinity whose τιμή the hero's deeds

as song-masters and the bard as apprentice-in-training.[38] Several technical terms of rhapsodic professional practice stand in comfortable contiguity with the acknowledgement of supernatural help. This underscores the conceptual compatibility and necessary concurrence of divine assistance and rhapsodic skill. Thus, e.g., we find μετάβηθι, 'shift [your song]',[39] answered by ἔνθεν ἑλών ὡς, 'taking it from the point when'; the passage also features κατὰ κόσμον, which recalls the κοσμέω of Plato's *Ion* (530d7)[40] and whose semantics is almost certainly to be related to the κόσμος ἐπέων of Solonic fame (fr. 1.2 W).[41] The adverbial expression is quite frequent,[42] and it can be rendered 'aright', 'duly'. But the root sense of κόσμος is 'good order', and it describes the proper arrangement of the parts into a well ordered whole. For this reason it naturally inhabits the metaphorical universe of the artisan, particularly, of the ἀοιδός, whose craft can be denoted by such verbs as τεύχειν (ω 197), ἐντύνειν (μ 183), ἁρμόζειν (Pind. *Pyth.* 3.114), δαιδάλλειν (Pind. *Nem.* 11.18), etc. κόσμος, therefore, connotes the ideal of harmony that pervades properly ordered relations of every kind, both social—in Hdt. 1.65.4 it designates the 'constitution' of a polis—and natural—the sophists used it to refer to the universe (Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.11).[43]

But the notion of the song as well ordered speech that is faithful to the structure of reality is so strong in archaic Greek poetics, that not only is κατὰ κόσμον frequent in this context (θ 489, *h. Herm.* 433 479; cf. κοσμῆσαι ἀοιδήν *h. Dionys.* 59), but the very word κόσμος is used metonymically for the song itself.[44] The earliest example of this acceptation is θ 492, in the passage that now concerns us, where Demodokos is to sing the ἵππου κόσμον. Modern scholars pass over this expression in silence (Lattimore, e.g., does not render it at all) or else take it to mean 'preparation', 'contrivance', 'stratagem'.[45] But it cannot mean 'stratagem' or 'contrivance', for nothing in the

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challenge the most (cf. *ibid.* 62–64). This opposition does *not* obtain between the singer and the Muses (except in cases of blatant defiance, such as Thamyris' at B 594–600).

[38]From such uses διδάσκω acquires demonstrative and revelatory nuances. Cf., e.g., *h. Herm.* 556. See below, p. 104, n. 97.

[39]Cf. *h. Hom.* 5.293, 9.9, 18.11.

[40]For more on κόσμος, not only as 'order' but also as 'adornment', see below, Chapter 3, p. 154.

[41]For the use and meaning of κόσμος before its adoption by philosophers see Diller (1956).

[42]Most commonly as οὐ κατὰ κόσμον or εὖ κατὰ κόσμον.

[43]Cf. Plato's *Gorgias* 507e6–8a4.

[44]I say metonymically, and not metaphorically, for the relation between the song and the order it narrates, as we shall see below, can even be described as one of cause and effect: the song is efficacious, it brings its universe into being.

[45]Thus, Diller (1956) 51 underlines the importance of the horse's design, the arrangement that made it suitable for its intended purpose: "κόσμος ἵππου [ist] die besondere Ordnung, die dem

root meaning of κόσμος ('order') or its natural semantic development ('adornment') suggests 'plan'—unless we stretch it to apply to anything that receives forethought— nor is there any other instance of this alleged sense. Scholars who make this choice try to bridge the gap between 'order' and 'contrivance' by emphasizing the design of the horse, the particular arrangement of its parts that made for a successful stratagem. This corresponds to κατασκευή, the first of three glosses in the scholia *ad loc.*[46] But there are two problems with this: there is still a significant conceptual distance between 'order' and 'design' or 'manufacture',[47] and parallels of this exceptional gloss simply do not exist; but, to me, as serious an obstacle is that, when Demodokos picks up the song, he starts with the departure of the Akhaian ships and the horse already (ἤδη, θ 502) standing in the Trojan *agora*, with the warriors in its belly. Not only do we fail to find a description of its manufacture or design, but there is not even a passing comment about its hollow inside, except to say that the Trojan assembly considered splitting the 'hollow wood'—presumably to ascertain whether it contained anything harmful to the city.

Some, however, may point to 'form, fashion', the gloss in LSJ *s.v.* I.3, for the required parallels. But this subsection is only a mirage, at least insofar as the sense of 'form, fashion' that might be applicable to θ 492 is not elucidated by the other examples:[48] the fragment by Parmenides (DK 28 B8.52)—like the Solonic, also an instance of κόσμος ἐπέων[49]—draws, in my opinion, just like Solon's, on rhapsodic ter-

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Trojanischen Pferd zu seinem besonderen Zweck gegeben wurde, daß es Versteck für die bewaffneten Griechen sein konnte. . . . κόσμος [ist] die Zusammenordnung zubereiteter Teile, die an das Subjekt herangebracht wird, um es zu besonderem Zweck zu qualifizieren. Vom Subjekt aus gesehen ist κόσμος der Zustand der Qualifikation, der durch die Zurüstung herbeigeführt wird. Das Tun, das die erforderlichen Relationen herstellt, heißt κοσμεῖν."

[46]If we ignore the objections based on the established meaning of κόσμος and consider only the manner in which Odysseus requests the song, especially the clause "which Epeios fashioned with Athena's help," we might accept a gloss like 'construction', 'building', or 'fashioning'. And so, with nothing but Odysseus' words to go on, we might be excused for expecting next the performer to narrate Epeios' part: his implements, his skill, how the wood was acquired, the cutting, carving, smoothing, and assembly of the parts, etc. But none of this is forthcoming.

[47]Murray (*LCL*) renders it 'the building of the horse'.

[48]'Form, fashion' is a remarkably poor choice for a lemma, because its semantic range is so broad. I would pose no objection, e.g., to rendering κόσμος in Hdt. 1.99 as 'form', so long as this is understood in the sense of 'arrangement', the procedural order of Deiokes' rule. But no such meaning of 'form' is applicable to ἵππου κόσμος. In the case of Parmenides, LSJ might seem to intend 'form' as 'outward appearance' (again, not applicable to θ 492). But one should expect a lexical subdivision only to include passages where the word in question means one and the same thing.

[49]ἐν τῶι σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα ‖ ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας ‖ μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων (B8.50–52)

minology, and therefore does not stand in need of a special acceptation of its own.[50]
Neither do the two Herodotean passages call for the suggested 'form, fashion'. In-
deed, in Hdt. 1.99.1[51] κόσμος refers to the procedural form of Deiokes' rule, a civic
order reproduced by the arrangement of the houses around the circumference of the
outer wall of his palace. This 'urban plan' is a replica of the political κόσμος—the
noun, used here in a sense not far from 'constitution' or 'political order'.[52] As to
Hdt. 3.22.2,[53] the parallel with the preceding ὅ τι εἴη καὶ ὅκως πεποιημένον seems
to suggests (falsely, I am convinced) that here κόσμος might mean 'manufacture';
but one should only embrace this anomalous sense if none of the *established* ones will
do. ἐξηγεῖσθαι, I agree, indisputably shows that the answer to the king's question
was an 'explanation', but nothing here clinches its subject matter, whether 'manufac-
ture' or something else. I believe that in this passage κόσμος means 'ornament'[54]—
which ψέλια and στρεπτὸς περιαυχένιος doubtless are—and that αὐτοῦ refers to τὸν

[50]Apparently, it is the use of ἀπατηλός that led to the gloss 'form', as if the goddess were saying:
'henceforth learn the opinions of mortals by listening to the deceptive form of my *epea*'. But the
deception is not peculiar to the *form*—there is no obvious change in the poem's form at this point:
the utterance in its entirety lacks veracity. (If the *epea* now turn deceptive, it is because the song
henceforth is formally indistinguishable from what preceded, yet it no longer publishes divine truth.)
On the other hand, if I am right in rendering κόσμος as 'song' or 'lay'—well ordered speech that, in
the archaic context, carried the stamp of divine authority—Parmenides' use is natural: he is, after
all, quoting divine speech (such is the conceit) uttered in hexameter (hence the ἐμῶν ἐπέων), the
meter common to oracles and inspired song. 'Of my *epea*' is a genitive of explanation or material
(Smyth §§1322–23): 'the *kosmos* that is my *epea*' or 'the *kosmos* that is made of my *epea*'; in other
words, κόσμος is not a quality, component, or facet of the *epea*, but the very *epea*, described in the
rhapsodic language of archaic poetics. The real discontinuity here is that the truthfulness connoted
by κόσμος is undermined: this is a significant departure from the symbolic system evoked by the
term. The reason is polemical, for what follows is a cosmogony that, unlike Hesiod's theogony, has
its source in mortal man, not the Muses. The transfer of κόσμος from the context of authoritative
true speech to that of deceitful utterance is rhetorically effective and maximizes the polemical impact
of Parmenides' teaching. Cf. Diels (1897) 66 (κατὰ κόσμον = "in dem Gefüge seines Baues") and 92
(citing Demokritos DK 68 B21); Untersteiner (1958) XCIXn195, CLXVIIIn9; Bormann (1971) 85–86
(κατὰ κόσμον = "der Ordnung entsprechend"; cf. 86n2); and Coxon (1986) 218.

[51]ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὁ Δηιόκης ἑωυτῷ τε ἐτείχεε καὶ περὶ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ οἰκία, τὸν δὲ ἄλλον δῆμον
πέριξ ἐκέλευε τὸ τεῖχος οἰκέειν. οἰκοδομηθέντων δὲ πάντων κόσμον τόνδε Δηιόκης πρῶτός ἐστι
ὁ καταστησάμενος (Hdt. 1.99.1–4). In Asheri and Medaglia (1990) *ad loc.* Antelami translates,
"Deiokes pose queste norme" (p. 119); Asheri comments: "Deiokes sarebbe anche il «primo inven-
tore» del ceremoniale e della burocrazia di corte" (p. 328).

[52]Powell (1938) glosses it 'constitution' (*s.v.* 2). The presence of the participle καταστησάμενος
is, perhaps, no coincidence, since κατάστασις in Herodotos can denote 'political constitution' (e.g.
Hdt. 2.173.1).

[53]δεύτερα δὲ τὸν χρυσὸν εἰρώτα, τὸν στρεπτὸν τὸν περιαυχένιον καὶ τὰ ψέλια· ἐξηγεομένων δὲ τῶν
Ἰχθυοφάγων τὸν κόσμον αὐτοῦ γελάσας ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ νομίσας εἶναί σφεα πέδας εἶπε ὡς παρ' ἑωυτοῖσί
εἰσι ῥωμαλεώτεραι τουτέων πέδαι (Hdt. 3.22.2).

[54]So also Powell (1938) *s.v.* 1.

χρυσόν.[55] Thus, the *Ikhthyophagoi* 'explain to him the ornament of gold'.[56] A more idiomatic translation would be 'when the *Ikhthyophagoi* explained the ornamental use of the gold'.[57]

Having disposed off the alternative 'form, fashion', the choice of the LSJ for θ 492, I can return to my main point, viz. that in this passage ἵππου κόσμος ‖ δουρατέου stands for 'the song of the wooden horse', and that the word for song, κόσμος, belongs to the specialized language of the rhapsode's trade. The third gloss in the scholia, ὑπόθεσις, come closest to its true meaning, despite reducing its rich symbolism to the relative conceptual poverty of 'subject matter'. For the argument of this chapter it is significant that the *Odyssey* itself acknowledges this technical meaning of κόσμος and employs it to refer to the medium of epic poetry; in so doing, it draws the closest of possible relationships between archaic epic song and the ideal of well ordered, efficacious utterance that is proper to the gods. The singer shares with them in the same conceptual universe of articulated speech because of his inspiration, because through him they reenact the order of reality—past, present, and future—bringing it into being by the speech-act of his performance. κατὰ κόσμον (θ 489), therefore, in the context of the bard's performance takes on a marked character and points beyond 'aright' or 'duly' to 'as the truth requires', 'exactly as it happened'. This includes, to be sure, the order of events, but it is far more comprehensive, notionally embracing all the dimensions of the story: whatever the song relates, it relates infallibly.[58]

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[55] Another genitive of material (Smyth §1323). Rosen's *Teubner* prints τὸν χρυσοῦν.

[56] As the apparatus shows, the manner of expression is somewhat strained and scribes tried to improve on it: αὐτοῦ competes with αὐτῶν and perhaps αὐτῷ (the apparatus of Hude's *OCT* offers "αὐτῶ V (?)"; but Rosen's *Teubner* reads αὐτοῦ for V also). The awkwardness results from the form of the question, τὸν χρυσὸν εἰρώτα, with 'the gold' followed by 'twisted collar' and 'bracelets' in apposition.

[57] So Rawlinson in *Everyman's Library*. Medaglia (with Rosen) prints χρυσοῦν in Asheri (1988) *ad loc.*; Fraschetti translates: "In secondo luogo chiese degli oggetti d'oro: la collana e i braccialetti. Quando gli Ittiofagi gli ebbero spiegato il modo di adornarsene . . . " (p. 39). The *Ikhthyophagoi* must have explained that the bracelets were for the wrists, and from this the Ethiopian king mistakenly inferred they must be fetters. The answer may have included a short description of their manufacture, to make clear that the gifts were indeed of gold. Just as with the εἷμα, concerning which the king did not know 'what it was' or 'how it had been made', he may have guessed that the bracelets and the collar were of gold and yet have wondered about their purpose; or he may have suspected that the objects merely looked like gold: asking about their manufacture would have addressed his doubts. ('He asked about the gold', of course, need not imply that the king *knew* it was gold. Herodotos did, and the question is narrated from his perspective.)

[58] κατὰ μοῖραν (θ 496) can be viewed from a similar perspective: the gods, esp. Zeus, are the ones who assign to all their μοῖρα: ἐπὶ γάρ τοι ἑκάστῳ μοῖραν ἔθηκαν ‖ ἀθάνατοι θνητοῖσιν ἐπὶ ζείδωρον ἄρουραν (τ 592–93). (Its root meaning 'portion', I think, motivates the choice καταλέξῃς, which suggests an enumeration; cf. Luther, 1935, 69.) This dispensation, dramatically enacted by the

θ 491 recapitulates, with slight modifications, B 485–86: Demodokos must have been taught by the Muse or Apollo, for his singing is as good as the report of an eyewitness, as if he himself had been present (ἢ αὐτὸς παρεὼν) or had heard it from one who was (ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας). Within the narrative framework, Odysseus acknowledges the possibility that the bard may have heard a true report some other Akhaian on his way back from Troy. These are, to be sure, only a rhetorical 'as if' (ὥς τέ που) that underscores the conviction of Demodokos' inspiration in the context of the subsequent challenge to prove, by singing κατὰ μοῖραν about the horse, that the god has readily granted him a 'divine song', θέσπις ἀοιδή (θ 498). The adjective θέσπις itself, from the same root as θεσπέσιος, is a composite *θεσ-σπ- of god, *θεσ-, and the zero-grade of *σεπ-, whence we get ἐννέπω: though θεσπέσιος comes to mean 'of a divine source' or simply 'divine', θέσπις, retains its close association with speech and is therefore used of song (α 328 θ 498) or the singer (ρ 385). Its basic meaning is 'uttered by a god', and if it is used, more broadly, for 'inspired', it is because the song of the poet is notionally the utterance of the god. In later poetry the same adjective is closely connected with oracular speech:[59] the kinship of prophecy and epic song, symbolized by Apollo as the source of the Panhellenic Delphic oracle and his leadership of the Muses, lies at the heart of the description of the epic minstrel by its own poetic medium. The corresponding fixity of the resulting message as an expression of the

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kerostasiai of Θ 69–72 and X 209–13, is too well known to require demonstration; here I will only mention δ 475 *exempli gratia*, which the question (δ 469–70) and answer (δ 472–74) clearly link to the divine will. Now, it is true that the gods are not said personally to kill a hero (with the possible exception of Ares at E 842; and at Π 787–804 Apollo all but spears Patroklos); but the explicit description of a god abandoning his ward immediately before his death (e.g. X 213) proves clearly enough that μοῖρα and an explicit reference to the divine will are mutually complementary ways of conceptualizing the unfolding of a fixed story that *must* happen. One should not dissociate this theological framework from the traditional quality of the poetry (*pace* Edwards, 1991, *ad* P 321): at the notional level, both demand that the integrity of the story be preserved without departure (cf. Π 431–38 X 167–76), even as they reflect the audience's expectation of stability in the telling (cf. ὑπὲρ μοῖραν Υ 336 and ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἶσαν P 321). 'Narrative necessity' is but another way of expressing notional fixity from the perspective of the outsider. For more on μοῖρα and the will of Zeus see Nagy (1999a) §17 and §25n2. Note also Luther's (1935) 68–69 perceptive comments: "Die Götter haben jedem Ding seinen Anteil zugewiesen. . . . Mit Recht betont Leitzke (S. 9), daß κατὰ μοῖραν umfassend auf die ganze Art des Gesanges geht, sowohl die Richtigkeit und Genauigkeit der Schilderung wie auch den kunstgerechten Vortrag."

[59]Two further instances of θέσπις are Eur. *Medea* 425 (the 'divine song of the lyre', the gift of Apollo) and Soph. *Ikhneutai* 250 (the 'divine voice' of Hermes' tortoise lyre). Other derivatives from the same root are clearly oracular in meaning: θεσπίσματα, θέσπισις, θεσπιῳδός, etc. According to Koller (1965), θέσπις is a backformation from the compound *θεσπιαοιδός, 'the one who proclaims the oracle through verse', which Koller connects with the epic singer, owing to his practice of starting the recitation of Homeric poetry with the 'oracular verse' of the προοίμιον.

divine will and the order of reality also carries over into the Homeric tradition of epic. Just as true prophecy offers infallible interpretation or prediction and, by its very nature, though it can be misreported, cannot change at all, neither in form nor substance, so also the epic tradition, notionally spoken by the Muse or Apollo, could not possibly change from one divine telling to another.

1.2.1 Efficacious speech

"Sung speech . . . was efficacious speech," says Detienne (1996) 43. "Its peculiar power instituted a symbolicoreligious world that was indeed reality itself." In other words, as I have repeatedly noted, Homeric song in performance is a sacral speech-act, an utterance that realizes its own meaning. In celebrating the deeds of gods and heroes the rhapsode preserves them from oblivion, λήθη, and, by his very singing, assigns to them the status of ά-λήθεια. The epic song is true, because it is, at its source, a divine speech-act.[60] Just as the words 'I forgive you' effect the pardon they promise—and if they are not uttered there is no remission of guilt—so also does the bard's singing underlie the reality of his story. Here we are dealing ultimately with a matter of authority, for without the proper authority the speech-act fails to be efficacious:[61] the seer is qualified by his oracular gift infallibly to predict the future,

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[60]The definition of 'speech-act' used here, though deriving from Austin's (1975) pioneering work, nevertheless goes beyond it. The most obvious divergence is that for Austin performatives are principally not true or false, but happy or unhappy (though a 'felicity condition' such as legitimate authority—under A.2, *ibidem* 15—does apply in either case). Yet common to both is the notion that the speech-act, i.e. the utterance of performative speech, is *doing*, as opposed to just *saying*, something (cf., e.g., *ibidem* 133). But divine speech may carry with it the force of inevitability, the implication of inexorable fulfillment. This is most readily illustrated by oracles and prophecies, a category of divine speech that regards the future; in which case, the performative character of a promise overlaps with what may at first be thought a merely declarative sentence. Thus, 'you shall die' in "the day you eat of it you shall surely die" is not so much a statement of future fact as a threat that carries with it divine authority and, implicitly, the promise that God will certainly bring it to pass. To illustrate the same on a strictly human level: we call 'self-fulfilling prophecy' a prediction believed with such conviction by the one who utters it that he acts in accordance with it—not, in our judgment, because of any supernatural necessity, but merely on account of his subjective, yet supremely controlling, persuasion that "so it must happen." There is real performative force in the utterance of a prediction that elicits full conviction. *A fortiori*, this is the more so with 'genuine' (from the point of view of a cultural insider) divine speech (speech that need not be only about the future). My parenthetical mention of the cultural insider underscores that a speech-act, as used here, is culturally specific. Cf. Nagy (1999b) 22–23: "[A] speech act is a speech act *only when it fits the criteria of the community in which it is being used*. To determine the validity or invalidity of a speech act is to observe its dynamics within the community in question." For an anthropological, rather than philosophical, approach to speech-acts, see, besides Nagy (1999b), Martin (1989) 1–42.

[61]This, by the way, is the archaic concept of lie or ψεῦδος; more on this below, pp. 51ff.

and the authority of the oracular god stands as guarantee of its fulfillment. One may draw a distinction between the god who brings his prediction to pass and the prophet who conveys it to the inquiring *theōrós*; but it is a logical, not practical, distinction, for without the human instrument there is no oracle at all, and the very words and authority of the god inhere in his mortal representative. So also with the rhapsode: his song, whether about the past or future, by the gift of divine voice, carries in the utterance the force of reality and imposes on the hearers the necessity of its truth. The symbolico-religious character of the speech-act bears with it a heightened emphasis on the comprehensive 'accuracy' of the utterance, down to the minutest details of form, even when such accuracy is not self-consciously measured by the modern standard of a faithful reproduction of some ur-text. But, notionally speaking, the sense that the utterance in its entirety reproduces divine speech—that its performance is a re-presentation of the gods' utterance—endows the song with the notion that it must correspond to what the gods narrate, to what really happened. There is therefore a fixity inherent in the Homeric tradition as a speech-act; or, to say it in another way, the fixity derives from the occasion of its performance, which is presided by the inspiring god, who makes the song comprehensively authoritative. We must, after all, remember that Homeric epic, as a super-genre, contains a series of performative sub-genres, among them the interpretation of dreams and portents, prophecies (by seer-prophets *and* heroes), and divine promises, which are themselves speech-acts that have a sure fulfillment.[62] What still lies in the future from the point of view of the narrative, is simultaneously past 'history' and present reenactment for the festival audience. (Other epic poetry, e.g., the Hesiodic song, may even have a future dimension, a prophetic statement about what 'history' holds, or else pertain to the recurrent fulfillment of seasonal phenomena: weather, crops, etc.)

To underline the efficacious nature of epic performance in the archaic setting— its status as a sacral speech-act—it is helpful to consider the word κραίνω in the *h. Herm.* 427 and 559. This verb, which should probably be reconstructed as *κρᾱαίνω, is a denominative from κρᾱ̄α-τος < *kr̥s-n̥-, 'head' (cf. Skr. śīrṣán- < *kr̥sen-), with the meaning 'to fulfill, to accomplish, to realize, to bring to pass'. (For similar semantics one can compare the word 'achieve', which derives from 'chief' (= 'head') and means 'to bring to a head' or 'to bring to an end' (Lat. *ad* and Rom. *capum* for Lat. *caput*). In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* it takes as objects 'injunctions, behest' (ἐφετμάς, E 508), 'wish' (ἐέλδωρ, A 41 504), and 'word, utterance' (ἔπος, υ 115).

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[62]For epic as a 'super-genre' see Nagy (1999b) 22–23 and 28–29.

Thus it is at first striking to read the following description of Hermes' lyre playing and singing (425–28):

> τάχα δὲ λιγέως κιθαρίζων
> γηρύετ' ἀμβολάδην, ἐρατὴ δέ οἱ ἔσπετο φωνή,
> κραίνων ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς καὶ γαῖαν ἐρεμνὴν
> ὡς τὰ πρῶτα γένοντο καὶ ὡς λάχε μοῖραν ἕκαστος.

Not surprisingly, Hermann emended κραίνων to κλείων and Stephanus to αἰνῶν; Hesychius had already glossed κραίνειν as τιμᾶν; others, departing from the established meaning, had suggested 'to celebrate'. Verses 429 and 432[63] offered the convenient equation κραίνω = γεραίρω (so Allen et al., 1936, 334 *ad* 427).[64] But in a magisterial analysis Benveniste (1969) 35–42 shows that κραίνω denotes the exercise of authority, and that, when a god is said to bring to pass a wish,[65] he is, *stricto sensu*, not performing it, but merely welcoming and sanctioning it: by authorizing it, i.e., by backing it with his authority, he sets in motion the course of events that brings it to fulfillment. The essential element in κραίνω, therefore, is authority, and its natural consequence, fulfillment. The vulgate text of I 310 (ἥ περ δὴ κρανέω τε καὶ ὡς τετελεσμένον ἔσται) rightly parallels κραίνειν and τελεῖν, 'to sanction' and 'to bring to pass'.[66]

What are we to make, then, of the use in the *Hymn to Hermes* noted above? How are we to understand κραίνω at 427, where it seems to stand for 'to sing' or 'to celebrate'? Benveniste (1969) 40 explains: "The god sings about the origin of [all] things and through his song 'brings into existence' the gods. A daring metaphor, but one that agrees with the role of a poet who is himself a god. A poet causes to exist; things are born in his song."[67] I can further refine Benveniste's point, for Hermes is portrayed here as a bard engaging in hymnic worship: the term ἀμβολάδην

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[63]Μνημοσύνην μὲν πρῶτα θεῶν ἐγέραιρεν ἀοιδῇ (429); ἀθανάτους ἐγέραιρε θεοὺς Διὸς ἀγλαὸς υἱὸς (432).

[64]Another artificial attempt at a solution is to read it in the sense of 'bringing [the song] to an end', i.e. ἀποτελῶν (cf. Radermacher, 1931, 149).

[65]Cf. B 419 for a negative example that involves Zeus.

[66]Cf. Plato's *Hipp. min.* 365a3. Similarly, at τ 565 ἔπε' ἀκράαντα correspond to dreams that pass through the gates of ivory, in contrast to those that, coming forth through gates of horn, 'bring to pass true things' (ἔτυμα κραίνουσι, τ 567). Cf. Empedokles DK 31 B111.2 and Eur. *Ion* 464 (μαντεύματα κραίνει).

[67]"Le dieu chante l'origine des choses et par son chant « promeut à l'existence » les dieux. Métaphore hardie, mais qui s'accorde au rôle d'un poète qui est lui-même un dieu. Un poète fait exister; les choses prennent naissance dans son chant."

corresponds to ἀναβάλλεσθαι, the making of a προοίμιον to precede his theogony; his theme is the immortal gods, their origin and how each received his μοῖρα (here used for τιμή), the subject of many a hymn and, more generally, of Hesiod's *Theogony* with its succession myths. Like Hesiod,[68] first among the gods (πρῶτα) Hermes celebrates Mnēmosynē as mother of the Muses; and, not surprisingly, he relates (ἐνέπων) everything κατὰ κόσμον, a term we now know to belong to rhapsodic practice—one that has the potential to resonate deeply with archaic sacral notions of performance. In fact, Hermes' initial recital offers a *mis en abyme*, for in singing about his own begetting he sends us back to the beginning verses 3–16.

Hermes here performs as the ideal rhapsode that all human bards should seek to imitate: the hymn carefully notes that Mnēmosynē 'received the son of Maia as her portion',[69] which speaks to his engagement with μουσική.[70] Not infrequently does Greek culture portray the gods as archetypes, even of activities that, by any reckoning, are eminently human—e.g. animal sacrifice, which (to go no further) in this very hymn involves Hermes himself (*ad* 115–37): this is also the case with rhapsodic performance.[71] It is no objection to my reading to note that Hermes is not singing heroic epic, but a theogony instead: the god starts with a hymnic προοίμιον, which, as I point out below (see p. 47), is the ritual framework of the archaic epic performance. And a theogony, too, is but a particularly elaborate and unusually long hymn, but a hymn nonetheless. The Panhellenic nature of the Homeric tradition is so thoroughgoing that, in the 'final' form in which it has come down to us, it lacks a hymnic opening such as must have regularly preceded it—no hymn, however Panhellenic, which might otherwise have provided any traces of occasionality, succeeded in acquiring canonical status as *the* fixed opening (though we have reports, even at a late date, of a written copy of the *Iliad* explicitly framed by such a hymnic προοίμιον). But that, ritually speaking, epic performance took place in the context of a hymn that invoked a presiding deity, at least at sufficiently early stages, is, I believe, unquestionable. And, *a fortiori*, we can assume that the sacral character of hymnic speech did apply to the Homeric tradition in performance.

Later in the same hymn Apollo gives Hermes a ῥάβδος. This is not *merely* a rhap-

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[68] *Theog.* 34; cf. 36, 53–54.

[69] ἡ γὰρ λάχε Μαιάδος υἱόν (430).

[70] "Die Beziehungen des Hermes zu Mnemosyne und den Musen sind in der musikalischen Natur des Gottes begründet" (Radermacher, 1931, 150). For Hermes' association with the nymphs, often in the context of dance and song, see Larson (1995) 349n25. Cf., also, Hübner (1986).

[71] For a study of Hermes as 'god of music' cf. Hübner (1986).

sode's staff: it has functions that exceed the bard's emblem of authoritative singing, for it promises to keep him safe, ἀκήριος,[72] and the attainment of wealth and fortune, ὄλβος and πλοῦτος. Doubtless we are supposed to think here of the κηρύκειον, which makes Hermes χρυσορραπίς (ε 87 x 277; cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 4.178). This gift of Apollo represents Hermes' τιμή[73] and signals his attaining the same honor and wealth that are the privilege of the other gods—a key theme in the hymn;[74] but, I think, it is also legitimate to read it in reference to the χάρις of performance, i.e., the economic reciprocity of patronage—the μισθός and τιμή—we know well from Pindar's poetry.[75] The staff, moreover, will fulfill, ἐπικραίνουσα, all the dispositions (θεμούς) of good words and deeds (ἐπέων τε καὶ ἔργων) which Apollo learns from the utterance (ὀμφή[76]) of Zeus.[77] The powers of Hermes' staff are unequivocally subservient to Apollo's gift of μαντεία and do not encroach upon Delphic divination, but it is unquestionable that they encompass the ability to bring to pass Zeus' utterance, as declared by Apollo. Somehow Hermes, in his role as a rhapsode, declares authoritatively the utterance of Zeus: the sacral character of his utterance is explicit. The ὀμφή of Zeus is denoted by θεμοί (from τίθημι) of good 'words and deeds': the oracular pronouncement is made of words that have the power to bring about the deeds they declare, and it is legitimate, I think, to read the usual dichotomy—here in reference to Zeus' speech—as a hendiadys, viz. 'performative words'.[78] It is true that Hermes

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[72]Perhaps a reference to some sort of τελεταί, which feature Hermes as the divine 'pioneer' in whose steps the initiates follow.

[73]That Hermes' τιμή should come by way of an exchange fits his role as worker of ἐπαμοίβιμα ἔργα (516–17). Nagy (1990a) analyzes the exchange as the mythical reenactment of the separation into the distinct realms of poetry and prophecy of what was, at first, an undifferentiated poet-prophet *demiourgos*; once *mantis* and *kērux*, the old labels for the poet-prophet, became semantically specialized and ceased to be appropriate, the general term *aoidos*—he argues—took over the general category. But (this is crucial) "the *aoidos* . . . remained in the sacral realm of prophecy, as evidenced by [his] institutional dependence . . . on the divine inspiration of the Muse" (*ibid.* 57). As regards the *h. Herm.*, by acquiring the lyre Apollo takes over μουσική as Panhellenic, just as the Panhellenic μαντική of Delphi remains strictly his purview, whereas Hermes is allowed only the ὀμφή conveyed by the 'bee maidens'.

[74]αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ τέχνης ἐπιβήσομαι ἥ τις ἀρίστη ‖ βουκολέων ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ διαμπερές· οὐδὲ θεοῖσι ‖ νῶϊ μετ᾽ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀδώρητοι καὶ ἄλιστοι ‖ αὐτοῦ τῇδε μένοντες ἀνεξόμεθ᾽, ὡς σὺ κελεύεις. ‖ βέλτερον ἤματα πάντα μετ᾽ ἀθανάτοις ὀαρίζειν ‖ πλούσιον ἀφνειὸν πολυλήϊον ἢ κατὰ δῶμα ‖ ἄντρῳ ἐν ἠερόεντι θαασσέμεν· ἀμφὶ δὲ τιμῆς ‖ κἀγὼ τῆς ὁσίης ἐπιβήσομαι ἧς περ Ἀπόλλων; cf. 460–62, 576.

[75]Cf. Nagy (1990c) 188–90 and Kurke (1991).

[76]ὀμφή < *song^ʰā is cognate with the word 'song'.

[77]αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα ‖ ὄλβου καὶ πλούτου δώσω περικαλλέα ῥάβδον ‖ χρυσείην τριπέτηλον, ἀκήριον ἥ σε φυλάξει ‖ πάντας ἐπικραίνουσα θεμοὺς ἐπέων τε καὶ ἔργων ‖ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὅσα φημὶ δαήμεναι ἐκ Διὸς ὀμφῆς (528–532).

[78]That is, words that are deeds, or deeds that come in the form of words.

is not known elsewhere as an intermediary of oracular speech, though in his capacity as a messenger or herald (ἄγγελον, 3), this function would not be entirely without conceptual precedent. But, even so, interpreting the role of the ῥάβδος in harmony with the rhapsodic language doubtless present in the earlier instance of χραίνω is preferable, I believe, to thinking of Hermes as fulfilling the utterance of Zeus by his direct action: where he is 'instrumental' in some way to the fulfillment of Zeus' will, it is most often in his function as divine herald, where the word of authority is first and last (so at ε 87–90[79]). I wonder if perhaps there is a hint here of the division of labor between the Delphic μάντις and her προφήτης; Hermes might then stand for the tradition of oracular hexametric poetry we know from Delphi.[80]

1.2.2 Quoted speech

To return to the Homeric poems, the invocation of the Muses at B 484ff. precedes what is, by any account, a mnemonic feat of the first order. But it would be an error to conclude from this that the goddesses are seen as providing the singer merely with the requisite information, without reference to its poetic form.[81] Not so: from the

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[79]τίπτε μοι, Ἑρμεία χρυσόρραπι, εἰλήλουθας, ‖ αἰδοῖός τε φίλος τε; πάρος γε μὲν οὔ τι θαμί-ζεις. ‖ αὔδα ὅ τι φρονέεις· τελέσαι δέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγεν, ‖ εἰ δύναμαι τελέσαι γε καὶ εἰ τετελεσμένον ἐστίν.

[80]Obviously relevant is the latter part of the hymn, with the three μοῖραι (or σεμναί, as one ms. and most modern editors would have it): sister-bees who live under the fold of Parnassos and whom Apollo grants to Hermes as independent 'teachers' of prophecy; when they feed on honey they 'bring each thing to pass', χραίνουσιν ἕκαστα (559). This is not the place to go into the many interesting issues raised by this puzzling passage (for two helpful assessments see Scheinberg, 1979, and Larson, 1995). For my argument here, the essential point to bear in mind is that their 'accomplishing' each thing takes place in the context of oracular inquiry (most likely, of cleromancy, cf. Larson, 1995, 350–51; the use of *astragaloi*, common in gaming, explains the pleasure [τέρπε, 565] and the luck [αἴ κε τύχῃσι, 566] involved in the inquiry). After feeding on honey they 'tell the truth', ἀληθείην ἀγορεύειν (561)—a statement that underlines the association of χραίνω and ἀλήθεια and recalls the Muses' words to Hesiod, ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι (*Theog.* 28); otherwise, they 'lie' (ψεύδονται, 563), which, considering the performative nature of oracular revelation, speaks not so much of its disparity with reality as of its failure to come to pass (cf. B 138 β 202).

[81]This is Setti's (1958) stance, calculated to dissociate Homeric performance from oracular delivery, which he views strictly as ecstatic: "[La modalità del dono della poesia] non riguarda, o non riguarda soltanto, una forma o qualità, un grado o perfezione di essa forma, ma più veramente investe il contenuto del canto, la sua essenza, che è essenza di storia e di verità" (p. 151). And yet commenting on χ 347–48 he does not oppose divine inspiration to Phemios' self-description as αὐτοδίδακτος (p. 150), and even questions the propriety of deriving from this passage a self-conscious distinction between form and substance (p. 152 n. 4). According to Lanata (1963) 13–14, Phemios claims to be self-taught not in regard to "il contenuto del suo canto," but to "l'arte, la tecnica poetica con cui dar forma a quel contenuto che gli viene dall'alto." Durante (1968) follows Setti, though with comparatively less nuance: "[D]er Dichter [befolgt] die alte Theorie vom

perspective of the oral tradition "the story's the thing," to use Lord's (1985) 37 own words; the audience gathers to hear a tale, and so the focus is not on the specific wording. Though the bard does not set out to 'memorize' the story (in the mechanical sense in which we today tend to think of memorizing), it is still true that, in performance, he 'remembers' it. Hence his natural focus on the story's actors and actions, without implying an anachronistic opposition of form to substance.

But, reciprocally, this does not mean that, from the perspective of the insider to the tradition, the particular words sung, with all their formal features—what we might call their 'poetic diction'—are indifferent. On the contrary, notionally they are an oral quotation of the Muses' own song, and thus they come with their divine performative sanction: the song of the goddesses is the song of the poet. Recalling that the additive style of oral epic tends to respect the limits of the verse-line by making the syntactical and metrical periods coterminous, Nagy (1999a) 272 notes that ἔπος refers to the hexameter line and, by extension, to a unit of poetic utterance; and, consequently, such well known introductions as καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα, which the master narrator uses to punctuate the beginning of quoted dialog, carry with them the notion of accuracy down to the minutest details of diction. Indeed, the medium of Homeric poetry has developed performative conventions of such a high degree of refinement, that formal features like correption may be found to discriminate between the quoted ἔπος of characters and the quoted ἔπος of the Muse in plain narrative.[82] Such a comprehensive accuracy of quoted speech requires the song's full correspondence to an original—only, here the original has a divine source, a matter of the greatest moment, which implies in turn, as I shall demonstrate in

göttlichen Eingreifen . . . in Beschränkung auf die Übermittlung des Erzählstoffes" (p. 263); "Folglich beschränkt sich die göttliche Beteiligung darauf, dem Sinn des Aoiden die Kenntnis der Fakten einzuflößen" (p. 277). I can readily agree that the primary reference of οἴμη (χ 347; cf. θ 74 481) is to what Lord calls the 'story', i.e., the sequence of themes that make up his singing (see immediately below). Form is not explicitly in view, simply because the oral bard (at least in those stages of the tradition where the poetry is most fluid) is not self-conscious about his formulaic diction. We are still far here from the poet who conceptualizes his trade as the artful assembly of words painstakingly arranged with an eye to the *formal* beauty of the whole. Not even Pindar's ἐξ ἐπέων . . . τέκτονες οἷα σοφοί ἅρμοσαν (*Pyth.* 3.113-14) should be read thus. Such ἔπη are *not* individual words (we might be tempted to think of his newly coined adjectives), but the archaic units of utterance: the language is thoroughly traditional, as is the corresponding description, one that likely underlies the identity of Homer as the one who assembles ἔπη together (ὁμ- + ἀρ-; cf. Nagy, 1999a, 297-300). Pindar's poetics, of course, are not those of archaic epic (witness, e.g., his very different use of μῦθος); but his adherence to traditional motifs and language results in a sort of diachronic skewing not unlike the one that shapes the self-reflection of Homeric poetics. (On diachronic skewing, see Nagy, 2003, 39-48.)

[82]Cf. Kelly (1990), cited by Nagy (1999a) 272 §7n8.

what follows, the notional fixity of the story.

1.2.3   The singer, instrument of the Muse

The epic singer, then, is seen here as the vehicle of the god; not a passive one, to be sure, despite Plato's strictures—which I take up below (p. 57)—but a vehicle all the same, one that makes available in the here-and-now events that transpired long ago. He transcends space and time, and the authority of the Muse or Apollo[83] guarantees the faithfulness of his re-performance of the tradition. As Vernant (1983) 75–81 and Detienne (1996) have observed, in this particular capacity archaic poetry embodies the 'social memory' of its oral culture. For this reason Mnēmosynē is conceptualized as the mother of the Muses in Hesiod's *Theogony* 54, and in Chios the Muses themselves were called Μνεῖαι.[84] Time and identity are here entwined, for identity is constructed by the reenactment, again and again, of what is notionally fixed, and the recurrence of sameness is the peculiar work of Memory. When the Muses supernaturally reenact the heroic past in the moment of performance, they thrust the bard *in medias res*, they grant him derived, but infallible, autopsy, so that the events take place in their natural order before him.[85] Hence, narrative time by and large simply reflects the

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[83]Apollo and the Muses are often joined together in poetry, e.g. in Hesiod's *Theogony* 94–95: ἐκ γάρ τοι Μουσέων καὶ ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος ‖ ἄνδρες ἀοιδοὶ ἔασιν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταί. Cf. A 603–4, *h. Herm.* 450–52, *h. Apoll.* 189, Hes. *Sc.* 202-6, Pausanias 5.18.4, Strabo X.3 §10, Plato *Laws* 653d, and Himer. *Or.* 62.7 (p. 226 Colonna). For Apollo as the μουσαγέτας (or μουσηγέτης in Ionic) see Pindar fr. 94c M, *IG* XII.5 no. 893 (Tenos, III/II BC), *Milet* I.3 no. 42 (Kawerau and Rehm, 1914, 145), and perhaps Sappho fr. 208 LP (*apud* Himerios). There is even a tradition, ascribed to Eumelos (*PEG* fr. 17), that made the Muses Apollo's daughters. Fr. 23 of the *lyrica adespota* (*PMG*) features Apollo as the μούσαρχος: σπένδωμεν ταῖς Μνάμας παισὶν Μούσαις ‖ καὶ τῶι μουσάρχωι ⟨τῶι⟩ Λατοῦς υἱεῖ; and *IG* VII.36 (Megara, *aet. Aug.*) gives him the epithet μούσειος. Though the Muses receive cult in their own right, sometimes they are also associated with Apollo (e.g., Paus. 8.32.2 and Sokolowski *LSCG* 180). See Farnell (1896–1909) 5.434–37. For a complex triangulation of Apollo, the Muses, and the poet in the matter of inspiration in the *Argonautica* of Apollonios of Rhodes, see González (2000). For the poet as the θεράπων of the Muses and Apollo, see Nagy (1999a) 289–308 (esp. 291f., 296f., and 305f.).

[84]Plu. *Quaes. conv.* IX.14.1 (743d): ἐνιαχοῦ δὲ καὶ πάσας, ὥσπερ ἐν Χίῳ, τὰς Μούσας μνείας καλεῖσθαι λέγουσιν. Cf. Pindar *Nem.* 1.12: Μοῖσα μεμνᾶσθαι φιλεῖ.

[85]The structure of the *Odyssey*, it is true, is more elaborate than the *Iliad*'s, since two independent but related thematic strands, the journey of Telemakhos and the return of Odysseus, are twined together into one. But the manner of braiding still reflects the same simplicity of linear development that characterizes the *Iliad*: not only do the events in each thread unfold in linear fashion, but in their mutual relation they observe a type of archaic non-overlap, the so-called 'Zieliński's law', according to which actions are "related in sequence, as if the second were suspended while the first was in progress" (Heubeck et al., 1988, 252). (The pictorial equivalent is the avoidance of overlap in late geometric vases.)

straightforward sequence of events;[86] even similes often fail to interrupt its flow, and when the narrator resumes the action, we discover that its progress has not been suspended by the apparent aside.[87]

It is important to remember that the time transcended by the poet is not 'historical' time, i.e., his performance does not recover a chronology of events that stands in continuity with contemporaneous history: he views the story, rather, in terms of genesis, genealogies, and becoming;[88] and though he may incorporate a logic of historical evolution—stages, races, epochs—the events remain in the otherwise inaccessible past. Only a later mind-set that has left the archaic mold can concern itself with fixing chronologically the time of the Trojan war or the date of Homer in relation to some near-contemporaneous milestone.[89] This is not to say that the events are not thought of as 'true': insofar as poetry exorcizes the specter of oblivion, the danger of forgetting, λήθη,[90] it is intrinsically ἀλήθεια, and both the archaic singer and his audience view the characters and the events narrated in the poetry as 'factual' and 'real',[91]

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[86]This 'linearity' does not preclude cross-referencing, by which a singer foreshadows a future episode or offers his audience a flash-back to an earlier one. Such chronologically intricate thematic ties can be forged entirely upon the dynamics of oral performance: viewing diachronically a song culture for which a given poetic tradition constitutes a notional whole, a coherent aggregate, nothing prevents a bard from making reference to previous performances by himself or a competitor. Obviously, this strategy will only succeed if the earlier recitals on which he draws are memorable enough for the audience to make the appropriate connections. Then, if the tradition is such that it gradually drives the song to textual fixity, any surviving reference to other performances will be synchronically perceived as cross-references from one episode to another. For more on the diachronic and synchronic aspects of oral cross-referencing, see Nagy (2003) 7–19.

[87]O 623–29 furnishes a convenient illustration: Hektor leaps on the battle throng of as a wave falls on a ship. But the comparison does not stop here, for the sailors of the simile shudder in fear, and their mental distress is then picked up by the narrative: 'so were the hearts of the Akhaians rent within their breasts' (629). Cf. Edwards (1991) 28 and 32.

[88]Genesis emphasizes the (typically remote) origin of what is; genealogies, the connection of past and present by lines of filiation; and becoming, concrete developments. There is no place here for abstract historical process and forces or for objective chronological sequence.

[89]Cf. Wace and Stubbings (1962) 386.

[90]Cf. Nagy (1990c) 58–60, 66.

[91]For a comparative perspective, consider the statement by Đemail above, p. 10. This was not the only time when Parry noted the Yugoslav singers' insistence on telling the story as they "heard it and as things happen[ed]," i.e. just as the "heroes did their deeds." A little later in that same interview Nikola asks Đemail if a singer may lengthen his song if he finds his audience exceptionally attentive: "Đ: He can [lengthen it] if he adds to it, but I do not like to listen to such a song. . . . N: In other words, as far as you are concerned the song is the song, is that it? Đ: That's it. . . . Even if it's short, let him sing it as it is. He shouldn't add to it so that he stays there all night, when the events in the story didn't happen that way" (Lord, 1954, 1.240). Sulejman Makić was similarly emphatic: "I would sing [the song] just as I heard it, whatever was worthwhile; what's the good of adding things that didn't happen. One must sing what one has heard and exactly as it happened. It isn't good

though they may remain mysterious, puzzling, and discontinuous if measured against their own experience. But it is not the story that is judged in the light of experience, but experience in the light of the story (often viewed as paradigmatic or archetypal), and only when the mythical mentality gives way to critical distance are these terms reversed and we find the tradition subjected to sceptical analysis. But this belongs to a later era.[92] Archaic poetry does not operate with a correspondence-theory of truth: singing that is divinely authorized, i.e. 'inspired poetry', reenacts the past, bestows on it 'undying renown', perpetuates it, preserves it from oblivion; and so, it is tautologically true, necessarily accurate. Notionally, the story cannot be otherwise, for the gods, themselves eye-witnesses, authorize and guarantee its re-performance; because the hearers, thinking of it as fixed, demand a faithful delivery, feeling their own connection to the story on terms that are themselves permanent, terms that may be grounded either on unchanging ritual, on an aetiological appropriation of the myth, or on the seasonally recurring performance occasion.

Pausanias 9.29 reports an old tradition from Askra, Hesiod's own hometown, ac-

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to change or to add. No sir" (Lord, 1954, 1.266). On the other hand, Avdo Međedović, who was most skillful with thematic expansion, expresses himself in a manner that is more self-consciously receptive to the oral poetics of thematic expansion: "*N:* Kasum said that if two singers don't sing the same song alike, then it isn't a true story. . . . *A:* Well, maybe one of them isn't right, because one of the two may not know the song exactly, and the other may know it better. Whichever is the better is the true one. *N:* But how can you tell which is the better? *A:* If you've got two singers, why, you can tell from the first third of the song which is the better. If a singer is any good, he won't borrow things from one song and put them in another" (Lord, 1954, 3.60; for ornamentation, see 3.67 and 74). Southslavic oral poetry is by no means the only tradition on record as insisting on high standards of 'truth'. Stone (1988) 12–61 (esp. 12–13) explains how in the Wọi epic of the Kpelle people of Liberia there are three performance levels: an epic-framing meta-narrative level that "helps establish and reassert the frame of epic as a style of performance" (p. 12); a narrative level, which takes up the interaction between the characters; and a song level, with proverbial content and invocations to the tutelary spirit that presides over the performance. The concern throughout for high standards of notional veracity is remarkable. Thus the constant invocations at the song level for clarity in the telling: "Ee, Maa-laa [= the spirit] bring my voice. ‖ Go, call the diviner to come" (p. 16). Furthermore, Stone (1988) 13n3 observes how the protagonist, Wọi, addresses the narrator at the narrative level to bring him on the scene of the action; his design is to buttress the narrator's claims to autopsy and trustworthiness, claims that are often articulated in response to concrete challenges by a questioner: "*Q[uestioner]:* Are you telling the truth? *N[arrator]:* Very close. Her stomach reached to the ocean. *Q:* Were you near? *N:* Very close" (p. 17). Or again: "*Q:* Don't lie to me here. *N:* Very close. Lying, I lie to you?" (p. 19); "*Q:* Kulung, don't lie to me here. *N:* I'm not lying. *Q:* They say you really lie" (p. 20). Though such an explicit register for performer-audience interaction does not exist in Homeric poetry (the invocation of the Muse is the only element that approaches it), this poetry, too, reflects an interest in veracity (albeit much more implicit by comparison) through its sacral scheme of inspiration and the archaic hymnic ritual framework of its performance (on which see further below, p. 47).

[92]Cf. Buxton (1999).

cording to which the Muses were three in number.[93] A rival to the nine Muses of
Thespiai—the city that since the third century BC organized the Boiotian festival of
the Μουσεῖα—this variant had the misfortune of not being adopted into the Hesiodic
corpus and, having failed to receive Panhellenic status, it has largely remained a foot-
note in modern scholarship.[94] And yet this tradition is presented as older than its
rival, and in all likelihood it is at least as old. For my purposes, however, what is
of particular interest are the names given to the Muses, Μελέτη, Μνήμη, and Ἀοιδή,
which constitute a transparent description of the poetic process. Μνήμη, 'Memory',
corresponds to the underlying subject matter in its oral-traditional form, and promises
its preservation in song; Μελέτη bespeaks the assiduous training and practice of the
bard, what William Race, in the case of Pindar, translates as 'premeditation', the
poet's "craft and training ground" (apud Nagy, 1990c, 16); and Ἀοιδή captures the
performance occasion, the moment of re-composition, for the song exists only in the
singing of the bard.[95] Μελέτη, in particular, confirms that the concept of divine influ-
ence and inspiration is compatible with the self-conscious training and exertion of the
singer's own abilities.[96] Here we must assume that, as with oral traditional poetries
the world over, the bard learned from other singers and his training probably took
place in the context of apprenticeship: this is the case in every sphere of professional
praxis, with every category of δημιουργός. Greek poetry, however, is too competitive
to have the singer openly acknowledge his debt to a human master, and the only
evidence left of what must have been the pervasive educational model is the denial
by Phemios that he had been taught by another (χ 344–49):[97]

> γουνοῦμαί σ', Ὀδυσεῦ· σὺ δέ μ' αἴδεο καί μ' ἐλέησον.
> αὐτῷ τοι μετόπισθ' ἄχος ἔσσεται, εἴ κεν ἀοιδὸν
> πέφνῃς, ὅς τε θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρώποισιν ἀείδω.
> αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί, θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἴμας
> παντοίας ἐνέφυσεν· ἔοικα δέ τοι παραείδειν
> ὥς τε θεῷ· τῷ μή με λιλαίεο δειροτομῆσαι.

Phemios' plea emphasizes the sacred status of the singer: we have good reason to
believe that δημιουργοί were sacrosanct, that they enjoyed juridical immunity in their

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[93]See also below, p. 66.

[94]Cf. van Groningen (1948).

[95]It may be, as van Groningen (1948) 290 observes, that this particular mythical tradition pri-
marily (or exclusively) regards epic poetry, for which ἀείδειν is the technical performance term par
excellence.

[96]Cf. Murray (1981) 96–97.

[97]Cf. above, n. 81.

itinerant travels,[98] and it is certain that in Hellenistic times they had the protection of Apollo through his Delphic oracle.[99] Phemios deserves αἰδώς, even from the βασιλεύς, because his solemn singing in cult and festival contexts makes him a sacred servant of gods and men.[100] The term αὐτοδίδακτος must, in my opinion, refer to the process of training, a social reality that fails to receive the explicit recognition of the poetry, to be sure, but must otherwise have been taken for granted by the audience.[101] What our poems feel free rhetorically to acknowledge is the gods in the explicit position of song-masters: Δημόδοκ', ἔξοχα δή σε βροτῶν αἰνίζομ' ἁπάντων· ‖ ἢ σέ γε Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, Διὸς πάϊς, ἢ σέ γ' Ἀπόλλων (θ 487–88; cf. Hes. Theog. 22–23). By professing to be self-taught, Phemios repudiates any debt to a human master-singer, even as he owns one to the god that exceeds the traditional bounds of divine involvement in the genesis of epic song. Hence the verb ἐμφύω,[102] which puts the emphasis on a process

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[98]So Nagy (1989) 19 and Nagy (1990c) 56–57 (who adduces the parallel of the old Irish áes cerd; cf. Durante, 1968, 268). Such a status for the ἀοιδός in early Greece is consistent with (and even suggested by) the epithet θεῖος (Σ 604 α 336 δ 17 θ 43 47 87 539 etc.), an appellative, too, of heralds (Δ 192 K 315) and rulers (δ 621 691 π 335), similarly sacrosanct on account of their function.

[99]Cf. Ghiron-Bistagne (1976) 169–71. Concerning the itinerant actors she observes that "[i]l leur restait cependant à résoudre une difficulté essentielle, dans la nécessité où ils se trouvaient de se déplacer constamment de ville en ville. . . . La situation, à cet égard, ne devait pas être très différente dans la Grèce du Vᵉ et IVᵉ siècle." In fact, such must have been the case since the eighth-century BC 'renaissance' and the establishment of the Olympic games and the Delphic oracle, the quintessential Panhellenic institutions. For a fourth-century instance see Dem. On the Peace 6. For more on juridical immunity see Aneziri (2003) 243–52 and the New Pauly s.vv. 'asylia' and 'asylon'.

[100]Cf. Hes. Theog. 93–95: τοίη Μουσάων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν. ‖ ἐκ γάρ τοι Μουσέων καὶ ἑκηβόλου Ἀπόλλωνος ‖ ἄνδρες ἀοιδοὶ ἔασιν ἐπὶ χθόνα καὶ κιθαρισταί. Although the benefit the poet confers on the gods (θεοῖσι . . . ἀείδω, χ 346) must be his celebrating their glory before men, we must not forget that poetry at first was sprung from the gods and was created for their pleasure (cf. Hes. Theog. 40ff. and h. Apoll. 188ff.).

[101]Though this passage has attracted much commentary, most of it fails to make contextual sense. The question that must be answered by any reading is how being αὐτοδίδακτος may move Odysseus to spare Phemios' life. I understand it as a claim to a heightened degree of 'supernatural' involvement in what is already a sacral context. Dougherty (1991) applies the term to the bard's ability to suit his song to the occasion of his performance. (This is essentially the view of Fernández-Galiano in Russo et al., 1992, 279–80.) Surely any process of apprenticeship would seek to develop this skill, and, to this degree, being self-taught would imply that this, too, he does not owe to another singer. But I fail to see why, from the insider's perspective, this facet of the singer's trade would be seen to contrast (as Dougherty, 1991, 94 claims) with the "traditional element of oral poetry"; nor why it should be read as a reference to "innovat[ing] within the tradition" (p. 95), or even why such a rationale may serve as a plea for sparing his life. The verb παραείδειν + dat. must mean 'to sing in someone's service', just as παραγίγνομαι means 'to be in attendance upon' (ρ 173) and παραδράω 'to do work in attendance upon, to serve' (ο 324). The unusual personal construction with ἔοικα must mean 'I am well suited to sing in your service as in the service of a god' (cf. Hes. Theog. 91 and θ 173). For more on this passage, see Bakker (1997) 137–38 and Grandolini (1996) 159–64.

[102]As Setti (1958) 150 claims, the following clause at χ 347–48 must be read as explicating the claim the precedes it (cf. Thalmann, 1984, 126–27). I cannot, however, agree with his dichotomy of

of growth for the poetry,[103] almost certainly not during a given performance, but in the course of the poet's life: in other words, it is the conceptual equivalent of a course of apprenticeship. Phemios would be saying, in effect: 'God, who has implanted within me song-threads of every sort, has so distinguished me with his favor that I have never depended on a human master; instead, I have learned my trade by myself, solely with divine assistance.'

1.3 Mantic poetry

1.3.1 Hesiod's *Dichterweihe*

Hesiod's *Dichterweihe* (*Theog.* 22–34) offers an alternative to the Homeric invocation of the Muses:

αἵ νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν,
ἄρνας ποιμαίνονθ' Ἑλικῶνος ὕπο ζαθέοιο.
τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον,
Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο·
ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι.
ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι,
καί μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὄζον
δρέψασαι, θηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν
θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα,
καί μ' ἐκέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
σφᾶς δ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν.

Here the Muses call the shepherd Hesiod to celebrate in song "past and future things," endowing him for this purpose with the gift of 'divine voice', a voice (αὐδή) qualified by the adjective θέσπις I have already examined (see above, p. 26). Just as with Demodokos (θ 481 488), his initiation can be described as the Muses 'teaching' him beautiful singing (καλὴν ἀοιδήν for καλῶς ἀείδειν). In the *WD* 659 the same event

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the self-taught singer, who composes his own repertoire, vis-à-vis the apprenticed one, who learns and reproduces with only minor variations that of his masters. Such a view misreads the rhetoric of Phemios' plea in terms of much later canons of individual originality. (Note, in particular, Dougherty's, 1991, 98 criticism of the notion of 'another poet's song'.)

[103]οἴμη, which some have related to εἶμι, is rather to be connected with *soim-, a root with the meaning 'thread'. Cf. Durante (1968) 276–77 and *DELG* s.vv. ἱμάς and οἴμη. See, further, Nagy (1996b) 63–64.

receives the wording με . . . λιγυρῆς ἐπέβησαν ἀοιδῆς, '[the Muses] set me on the path of clear song': ἐπιβαίνω with the genitive of the sphere of expertise recalls the language in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, where Hermes' attaining to his due rights, his μοῖρα or τιμή, is expressed as κἀγὼ τῆς ὁσίης ἐπιβήσομαι ἧς περ Ἀπόλλων (173). Important to my argument here is the strong accent on the divine origin of Hesiod's poetic voice and song, and that his purview, just as a seer's, is the past and the future. I will comment further below (p. 43) on this all encompassing temporal horizon; for now, I should note that Hesiod's initiation casts him in the role of a poet-seer, just as Homer's *persona* better corresponds to the prophet. The σκῆπτρον Hesiod receives (perhaps to replace a shepherd's crook that goes unmentioned) places him in regards to authoritative speaking in the same category as kings (Z 159; cf. A 279 B 86 etc.), priests (A 15 28), seers (λ 91), and heralds (H 277), and assimilates him to a rhapsode who performs staff in hand.

To understand the distinction between the μάντις and the προφήτης, the *locus classicus* is Plato's *Timaios* 71c–72b:[104] here μαντική is specifically tied to ecstasy, ἐνθουσιασμός, which the philosopher, with his usual tendentiousness, calls foolishness (ἀφροσύνη) and disease (νόσος). But—and this is the key distinction—if μάντεις are the vehicles of inspired sight, the προφῆται are appointed to 'interpret' them, i.e., to sit as judges, κριταί, over their meaning. "Some," Plato goes on, "call them μάντεις, being blind to the fact that they are ὑποκριταί of visions and riddling utterances, not μάντεις, and that the most correct label for them would be προφῆται of the utterances of the μάντεις."[105] As Nagy (1989) 26 remarks, the semantic connection

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[104]μεμνημένοι γὰρ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπιστολῆς οἱ συστήσαντες ἡμᾶς, ὅτε τὸ θνητὸν ἐπέστελλεν γένος ὡς ἄριστον εἰς δύναμιν ποιεῖν, οὕτω δὴ κατορθοῦντες καὶ τὸ φαῦλον ἡμῶν, ἵνα ἀληθείας πῃ προσάπτοιτο, κατέστησαν ἐν τούτῳ τὸ μαντεῖον. ἱκανὸν δὲ σημεῖον ὡς μαντικὴν ἀφροσύνῃ θεὸς ἀνθρωπίνῃ δέδωκεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔννους ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς ἐνθέου καὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὕπνον τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως πεδηθεὶς δύναμιν ἢ διὰ νόσον, ἢ διά τινα ἐνθουσιασμὸν παραλλάξας. ἀλλὰ συννοῆσαι μὲν ἔμφρονος τά τε ῥηθέντα ἀναμνησθέντα ὄναρ ἢ ὕπαρ ὑπὸ τῆς μαντικῆς τε καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικῆς φύσεως, καὶ ὅσα ἂν φαντάσματα ὀφθῇ, πάντα λογισμῷ διελέσθαι ὅπῃ τι σημαίνει καὶ ὅτῳ μέλλοντος ἢ παρελθόντος ἢ παρόντος κακοῦ ἢ ἀγαθοῦ· τοῦ δὲ μανέντος ἔτι τε ἐν τούτῳ μένοντος οὐκ ἔργον τὰ φανέντα καὶ φωνηθέντα ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κρίνειν, ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ πάλαι λέγεται τὸ πράττειν καὶ γνῶναι τά τε αὑτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτὸν σώφρονι μόνῳ προσήκειν. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν προφητῶν γένος ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐνθέοις μαντείαις κριτὰς ἐπικαθιστάναι νόμος· οὓς μάντεις αὐτοὺς ὀνομάζουσίν τινες, τὸ πᾶν ἠγνοηκότες ὅτι τῆς δι' αἰνιγμῶν οὗτοι φήμης καὶ φαντάσεως ὑποκριταί, καὶ οὔτι μάντεις, προφῆται δὲ μαντευομένων δικαιότατα ὀνομάζοιντ' ἄν (*Timaios* 71d5–72b5)

[105]A similar distinction seems to have been drawn at an early stage in Jewish religion. So, 1 Samuel 9.9 records the following parenthetical remark: "Formerly in Israel, when a man went to inquire of God, he used to say, 'Come, and let us go to the seer': for he who is called a prophet now was formerly called a seer." The word for seer is the participle *rō'eh*, from *rā'â*, 'to see, to perceive, to understand'. And though the verb is often used for the visual nature of theophanies,

between μάντις and μανία holds at the etymological level, both deriving from the root *men- (μανία < *mn̥-ieh₂); but what in the classical era denoted an altered mental state was, diachronically speaking, only a marked meaning of the same family that gives us the Latin *mēns*; this suggests the possibility that at an early stage μάντις did not connote the *furor* of ecstasy, but was rather cognate with the mental state denoted by formations with *mnē-* ('have in mind, remember, mention, remind'), which is but an extended form, *mneh₂-, of *mne-. In fact, though some still contest this, the word Muse itself in all likelihood should be traced to the same root in its o-grade, *mon-: μοῦσα < *mon-tu̯a or *mon-ti̯a.[106] We would expect, then, to find traces in the literature of ancient Greece of that undifferentiated usage which employed μάντις and προφήτης interchangeably, and which cast the poet, moreover, in a role such that the primeval unity of oracular speech and poetic utterance under the figure of the poet-seer might be discernible. This is, indeed, what happens, as we shall see below (see p. 62).

1.3.2   Revealing the song

For now, it is important to underscore the implications of this unity for the nature of the oral tradition. I have in mind here a function of epic poetry that in another work

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dreams, and visions, there is no evidence that the 'seer' himself obtained knowledge of divine secrets through visions or dreams. The word for prophet, *nābî*, has been variously connected to *nābā*, 'to bubble forth' (suggesting ecstatic behavior), to *bô*, 'to enter' (suggesting possession), to the Arabic root that means 'to announce' (suggesting herald), and to the Akkadian for 'to speak, to proclaim'; still others have taken it as passive for 'one called by God'. (The title *nabû*, perhaps 'diviner', is now attested in the Mari texts.) The great disparity in the etymologies discourages our relying on them and recommends, rather, that we look at the internal evidence of the Hebrew scriptures for a proper understanding of the word. There, though the context may occasionally hint at ecstatic behavior, the great majority of instances denote proclamation, authoritative public speaking. So, Exodus 6.29–7.2: "[T]he Lord spoke to Moses, saying, 'I am the Lord; speak to Pharaoh king of Egypt all that I speak to you.' But Moses said before the Lord, 'Behold, I am unskilled in speech: how then will Pharaoh listen to me?' Then the Lord said to Moses, 'See, I make you as God to Pharaoh, and your brother Aaron shall be your prophet. You shall speak all that I command you, and your brother Aaron shall speak to Pharaoh." Ultimately, what is of greater interest to my argument is that, just as with μάντις and προφήτης, regardless of the etymological distinction in emphasis between *rō'eh* and *nābî*, 1 Samuel 9.9 seems to make them interchangeable at an early stage, stating that only later, presumably after the former had become specialized, did the latter take over the generic meaning they had both once shared. The LXX usually preserves the etymological force of *rō'eh*, rendering it by ὁ βλέπων (Regn. I 1:9,11,18, 9:18; Par. I 9:22) or ὁ ὁρῶν (Is. 30:10) [or even ἴδετε, 'behold', at Regn. II 15:27]; but προφήτης is also used on three occasions (Par. I 26:28; Par. II 16:7,10). *nābî*, on the other hand, is always translated προφήτης. The word μάντις is reserved for *qāsam*, 'to divine', a practice that was despised and outlawed in Israel. (Balaam, e.g., is called *mantis* in Jos. 13:22.)

[106]Cf. Watkins (2000) 54 *s.v.* 'men-'.

I have called 'revelatory', in that the singer acts as a vehicle for the divine message, conveyed to his audience by the inspiring divinity.[107] We, as modern readers, tend not to think of epic narrative in this sense: we are more attuned to its literary qualities as fictional poetry; but it takes an anthropological perspective to realize that its social function and repercussions are more profound. When the singer is viewed from this particular perspective, his role has been called sacred and his speech religious, magic, or sacral.[108] Underlying this anthropological construction is the bard's access to the divine will—I might even say to the divine mind—and his kerygmatic and explanatory mediating role as κῆρυξ and προφήτης. This traditional reflex is so pronounced that, even at the much later and largely conventional stage of Hellenistic poetry, Apollonios of Rhodes, too, builds on it by explicitly including Apollo with the Muses and the poet in a triangle of mediated inspiration, invoking the goddesses in an openly hermeneutic role as ὑποφήτορες of Apollo.[109]

In Greek thought the 'revelation' effected by oracular speech is not ordinary 'speaking', λέγειν, but, as Herakleitos famously noted, 'the giving of signs', σημαί-νειν.[110] But σήματα, especially in the context of divine omens,[111] are strongly associated with vision—even inner vision[112]—and this serves to motivate the official title, θεωρός, for an envoy sent to consult an oracle. Etymology suggests that a θεωρός is one sent to observe a sight or spectacle, *θεᾱ-Ϝορός (cf. *DELG s.v.*), and indeed it can mean 'spectator'. Its connection with oracular consultation not only confirms the visual quality of the oracle's σημαίνειν, but it also underlines the fixed character of prophetic revelation: the oracular answer must not be changed; the θεωρός must scrupulously guard its accuracy and deliver it just as he received it. And so, Theognis warns: "An envoy (ἀνὴρ θεωρός) sent to Delphi, Kyrnos, must take care to be straighter (εὐθύτερος) than square or rule or lathe, that man to whom the priestess of the god, making her oracular response, indicates (σημήνῃ) the sacred utterance

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[107]González (2000) 276. Cf. Grandolini (1996) 29 (*ad* A 1): "La poesia, perciò, è presentata quale rivelazione da parte della divinità, qui indicata con il termine θεά."

[108]Cf. Detienne (1996) 43.

[109]Cf. González (2000).

[110]ὁ ἄναξ, οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει (DK 22 B93 = fr. 14 Marcovich, *apud* Plu. *De Pyth. or.* 404d). As Fontenrose (1978) 238 writes, this is not a reference to oracular ambiguity, at least in the context of Plutarch's argument, but an emphatic assertion of the instrumentality of the Pythia and its consequences.

[111]B 308 353 Δ 381 Ι 236 φ 413 with φαίνω; Θ 171 with τίθημι; Ν 244 with δείκνυμι; Χ 30 with τέτυκται (= ἐστί).

[112]Brugmann suggested that σῆμα was cognate with the Skr. *dhyā-man*, 'thought'. Cf. *DELG s.v.*

(ὀμφή) from out the wealthy shrine. You could neither find a cure if you add [to it], nor could you escape fault in the eyes of the gods if you take away."[113]

The orientation of the epic poet towards the past is no hindrance to his prophetic character. Hesiod, because of his mantic status,[114] was granted by the Muses the gift of song about things past, present, and future (*Theog.* 32, 38).[115] In practice, however, even he kept his focus generally on the past, though, to be sure, he did sing predictively in *WD* 176–201. Reciprocally, though oracular inquiries most often involved future concerns, questions about the past, usually about the identity of someone's parents or the cause of some present affliction, were by no means unexampled.[116] We have, moreover, the well known and puzzling statement by Epimenidēs (*apud* Aristot. *Rhetoric* III.17.10) that "the past is known already, even by *manteis*"; "for [Epimenidēs] used to divine not the future, but only about past and obscure matters," the philosopher adds by way of explanation.[117] However we interpret this quotation (which, if sarcastic, squares poorly with the seer's own practice),[118] it is clear that oracular speech could engage the past just as well as the future. But not only with regard to their temporal orientation (their varying emphases notwithstanding) do epic and oracular poetry show a certain affinity; the oracular valence of Homeric poetry, its unfolding of the divine will, is similarly explicit in the diction of the poet. Thus, when at Odysseus' urging Demodokos strikes up his song, the poet tells us that he 'revealed his song', φαῖνε δ' ἀοιδήν (θ 499). φαίνω and φημί, of course, can be traced to the same root, *bʰeh₂- (*DELG* s.vv.), and this suggests the semantic development 'to shine' → 'to make bright' → 'to make clear' → 'to say'

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[113]West's (1993) 71 translation, mod. τόρνου καὶ στάθμης καὶ γνώμονος ἄνδρα θεωρόν ‖ εὐθύτερον χρὴ ⟨ἔ⟩μεν, Κύρνε, φυλασσόμενον, ‖ ᾧτινί κεν Πυθῶνι θεοῦ χρήσασ' ἱέρεια ‖ ὀμφὴν σημήνηι πίονος ἐξ ἀδύτου· ‖ οὔτε τι γὰρ προσθεὶς οὐδέν κ' ἔτι φάρμακον εὕροις, ‖ οὐδ' ἀφελὼν πρὸς θεῶν ἀμπλακίην προφύγοις (805–10 West).

[114]The mantic quality of Hesiodic poetry is to be contrasted, as noted above (p. 40), with the prophetic character of Homer epic.

[115]West (1966) 166: "The phrase expresses the close connection between poetry and prophecy which is widespread in early literature. In the absence of written records, the ability to see into the distant past is no less marvellous than the ability to see into the future, and there is no reason for a sharp distinction between the two. Neither is possible without some form of divine revelation."

[116]Cf. Fontenrose (1978) 17–18, whose D2 category concerns "extraordinary and obscure statements of past or present fact." The corresponding frequency table for "legendary and historical responses" can be found on p. 21; for "quasi-historical responses," on p. 45.

[117]τὸ γεγονός, ὃ ἐπιστητὸν ἤδη καὶ τοῖς μάντεσιν, ὡς ἔφη Ἐπιμενίδης ὁ Κρής (ἐκεῖνος γὰρ περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων οὐκ ἐμαντεύετο, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν γεγονότων μὲν ἀδήλων δέ) 1418a23–26.

[118]Cf. Cope (1877) 3.203 and DK 3 B4.

(LIV^2 68–70).[119] It is not a coincidence that the word chosen is closely related to the manifestation of signs (σ 67 υ 114) or divine epiphanies (E 866 Υ 131). Where used, as here, for a statement, it underlines the marked character of the utterance, whether emphatic (Ξ 127) or of great significance to the plot (Σ 295). Hence, in terms of the archaic poetics of the passage, the song presents itself as the semantic equivalent of an oracular pronouncement. This suits the rhetoric of Odysseus' challenge: αἴ κεν δή μοι ταῦτα κατὰ μοῖραν καταλέξῃς, ‖ αὐτίκα καὶ πᾶσιν μυθήσομαι ἀνθρώποισιν, ‖ ὡς ἄρα τοι πρόφρων θεὸς ὤπασε θέσπιν ἀοιδήν (θ 496–98); it also complements the explicit hymnic framework in which the bard delivers his song: ὁ δ᾽ ὁρμηθεὶς θεοῦ ἤρχετο (θ 499).

1.3.3   The divine will

Indeed, we should not be surprised at the emphasis on the revelatory character of the song, a fact that has obvious implications for the worldview that informs epic performance and, consequently, for the notional fixity of the poetry. The poems present themselves as the outworking of the divine will, which without the bard's song would remain at best opaque. This is most emphatically expressed in the opening lines of the *Iliad*, where the anger of Akhilleus and the subsequent death of many heroes is summarized by Διὸς δ᾽ ἐτελείετο βουλή (A 5). One might think this a proleptic reference to Zeus' favorable answer to the request Thetis makes on behalf of her son. But fr. 1 of the *Kypria*[120] reveals that, at least in other epic traditions (if not in the Iliadic one itself), Zeus was directly and personally responsible for the Trojan war, which he devised as a strategy to lessen the earth's overpopulation;[121] significantly, the *Kypria* expresses the outcome by the phrase ἥρωες κτείνοντο, Διὸς δ᾽ ἐτελείετο βουλή. The plot of Zeus' conspiracy thickens with Proklos' summary, which adds that Zeus involved Themis in his planning. Whatever the possible diachronic developments within, and disagreements between, the traditions that informed the

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[119]It is traditional for lexica to offer two entries for *b^heh_2- (or *$bh\bar{a}$-), one for 'to shine' and the other for 'to speak' (cf. Watkins, 2000, *s.v.* bhā-); this does not necessarily mean that the primitive identity of the two roots is being denied. Concerning φήμη note that it, too, is marked speech, viz. 'a word of omen' (β 35 υ 100 105; cf. χ 376 and Plat. *Timaios* 72b3).

[120]ἦν ὅτε μυρία φῦλα κατὰ χθόνα πλαζόμεν᾽ αἰεὶ ‖ (ἀνθρώπων ἐπίεζε) βαρυστέρνου πλάτος αἴης, ‖ Ζεὺς δὲ ἰδὼν ἐλέησε καὶ ἐν πυκιναῖς πραπίδεσσι ‖ κουφίσαι ἀνθρώπων παμβώτορα σύνθετο γαῖαν, ‖ ῥιπίσσας πολέμου μεγάλην ἔριν Ἰλιακοῖο, ‖ ὄφρα κενώσειεν θανάτωι βάρος. οἱ δ᾽ ἐνὶ Τροίηι ‖ ἥρωες κτείνοντο, Διὸς δ᾽ ἐτελείετο βουλή. (I follow Bernabé's edition.)

[121]Cf. West (1997) 480–82 and Burgess (2001) 245n59.

Kypria and our present-day *Iliad*, three factors lead me to consider it reasonably certain that, notionally speaking, the poetry of the *Iliad*[122] was viewed by its audience from beginning to end as the explication of Zeus' will: first, the unity conveyed by the metaphor of an epic κύκλος, whose authorship, at an early stage, was ascribed solely to Homer;[123] second, the shared thematic and formulaic echoes just noted; and third, the frequent ascription to Zeus[124] of responsibility for the war. The same can be said of the *Odyssey*.[125] Contributing further to the revelatory character of Homeric

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[122]It is interesting that the debate whether A 5 and fr. 1.7 of the *Kypria* referred to the same ἱστορία (to use the ancient term) is already joined by the Homeric scholia. Thus, Aristarkhos reportedly construed verse five with the immediately following ἐξ οὗ δὴ τὰ πρῶτα, so as to rule out a preexisting divine animus against the Akhaians and reject the 'fabrications' of the *neoteroi*. Hellenistic scholars, of course, called *neoteroi* all poets chronologically later than Homer, and would therefore have numbered among them anyone associated with the *Cycle*. Consequently, Aristarkhos is rejecting a thematic connection between the βουλὴ Διός in the *Iliad* and in the *Kypria*. The *D scholia* (in the Venetus A *ad loc.*) fills in the picture: ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ ἱστορίας τινὸς εἶπον εἰρηκέναι τὸν Ὅμηρον. φασὶ γὰρ τὴν γῆν βαρουμένην ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων πολυπληθείας, μηδεμιᾶς ἀνθρώπων οὔσης εὐσεβείας, αἰτῆσαι τὸν Δία κουφισθῆναι τοῦ ἄχθους. τὸν δὲ Δία, πρῶτον μὲν εὐθὺς ποιῆσαι τὸν Θηβαϊκὸν πόλεμον, δι' οὗ πολλοὺς πάνυ ἀπώλεσεν. ὕστερον δὲ πάλιν συμβούλῳ τῷ Μώμῳ χρησάμενος, ἣν Διὸς βουλὴν Ὅμηρός φησιν, ἐπειδὴ οἷός τε ἦν κεραυνοῖς ἢ κατακλυσμοῖς πάντας διαφθείρειν, ὅπερ τοῦ Μώμου κωλύσαντος, ὑποθεμένου δὲ αὐτῷ γνώμας δύο, τὴν Θέτιδος θνητογαμίαν, καὶ θυγατρὸς καλὴν γένναν, ἐξ ὧν ἀμφοτέρων πόλεμος Ἕλλησί τε καὶ Βαρβάροις ἐγένετο, ἀφ' οὗ συνέβη κουφισθῆναι τὴν γῆν, πολλῶν ἀναιρεθέντων. ἡ δὲ ἱστορία παρὰ Στασίνῳ τῷ τὰ Κύπρια πεποιηκότι. . . . καὶ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἱστορούμενα περὶ τῆς τοῦ Διὸς βουλῆς, ἐστὶ τάδε. (This text is conveniently included by Bernabé as item I in his first apparatus to fr. 1 of the Kypria, pp. 43–44.) We need not assume, however, that the oral tradition faced the hearer with a dichotomy of mutually exclusive options. As Burgess (2001) 149–50 observes, "it is best to suppose that the reference to the plan of Zeus at *Iliad* 1.5 can suggest both the Iliadic and Cyclic manifestations of this phrase, not just one or the other" (cf. also his n. 61, p. 246). In other words, we should not assume that the *Kypria* 'copied' a fixed *Iliad* or *vice versa*: the relationship between them was one of oral traditions interacting through recurrent performances in the minds and repertories of individual singers. One should not rule out the possibility that the audience or their bard may have interpreted A 5 in the light of what we now consider cyclic themes.

[123]As Pfeiffer (1968) 1.73 rightly observes, Aristot. *Soph. el.* 171a10–11 implies that the Homeric authorship of the *Epic Cycle* was still widely received even in his time (his own stance against it notwithstanding). Furthermore, Nagy (1996a) 38, 89–90 has convincingly argued that the 'circle of poetry' is a metaphor (natural to Indoeuropean poetics) of a perfect (notional) whole, of a tradition of poetry viewed as a superb composite artifact, whose individual parts are masterfully fitted together by the wordsmith-poet. The archetypal ἀοιδός (once the cause for the notional fixity of the tradition was transferred from the divine to the human realm of individual authorship) is none other than Ὅμ-ηρος, i.e. 'Mr. Com-poser' (see above, n. 81). For the ancient attribution of the *Cycle* to Homer see Nagy (1990c) 78 and Burgess (2001) 129–30.

[124]Λ 78 Ρ 321 Τ 86–88 α 348 θ 82; cf. θ 579–80.

[125]The case of the *Odyssey* requires some elaboration since, on its face, Zeus appears to deny any responsibility in the famous *concilium* of the first book. And the words σφῇσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν (α 34) transparently picks up on the σφετέρῃσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὄλοντο of α 7. And, as Maehler (1963) 23 notes, there is a sense in which the emphasis on the blind folly of Odysseus' companions not only reflects a keen interest to exculpate the hero (and generally a focus on personal guilt, cf. ψ 67), but

poetry are its many connections to oracles, prophecies, dreams, and omens.[126] I might mention, e.g., the omen at Aulis (B 303–30); Kalkhas' prophecy (A 92–100); the intimation of Philoktetes' return (B 724); the prediction of Akhilleus' death by his horse Xanthos (T 415–17); the famous and puzzling Delphic χρησμός about the future strife between Odysseus and Akhilleus (θ 79–80); the self-interpreting dream-omen of Penelope (τ 535–53); the visionary outburst of Theoklymenos (υ 351–57); and Teiresias' prophecy about Odysseus and the oar (λ 119–30). Here, again, Apollonios of Rhodes proved his refined sense of inherited epic conventions by highlighting Apollo's

also suggests a contrast in emphasis with the Iliadic tradition, with its foregrounding of the will of Zeus. But matters are more complicated than it appears at first, for after Odysseus escapes from Polyphemos and offers the ram to Zeus in thanksgiving, we learn that "Zeus was contriving how my well-benched ships and my trusty comrades might perish" (ι 554–55). Scholars have seen in this doubling of the anger of Poseidon signs of a reworking of two independent traditions that made the wrath of only one of the two gods the 'divine narrative engine' of Odysseus' many adventures. However we account for Zeus' refusal to heed the offering and conceive of it in relation to Poseidon (and here it is hard to deny there is a *coincidence* of purpose), to say that "there is no question here of Zeus being hostile" and add that "[h]e must let events take their course in accordance with Moira" (so Heubeck in Russo et al., 1992, 41) seems to me inadequate and to fly in the face of the text. Add to this the words of Teiresias, who promises deliverance to the hero and his comrades *despite* Poseidon's anger, if they do not harm the cattle of Helios; otherwise, only Odysseus shall come home, late and in someone else's ship, and find trouble in his house (λ 114–15). The seer's words (ὀψὲ κακῶς νεῖαι, ὀλέσας ἄπο πάντας ἑταίρους, ‖ νηὸς ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίης· δήεις δ' ἐν πήματα οἴκῳ) are an oral quotation of Polyphemos' own curse (ὀψὲ κακῶς ἔλθοι, ὀλέσας ἄπο πάντας ἑταίρους, ‖ νηὸς ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίης, εὕροι δ' ἐν πήματα οἴκῳ, ι 534–35), and hence it would seem that it is still in Odysseus' power to escape the wrath of Poseidon if only he and his men avoid harm to the flock of Helios: there is no talk here of Moira, as would be natural—were the necessity of fate really in view—in the mouth of a seer who proceeds, in fact, to prophesy about the manner of Odysseus' death. One could counter with narrative necessity: that the hero *must* arrive late, find his palace overrun by suitors, slay them, etc. I agree. But this answer misses the point of my argument, which is that *from within the logic* of the story (call it the narrative or theological framework), some ascribe responsibility for the unfolding plot to Poseidon alone, whereas, in my view, ι 554–55 and the words of Teiresias suggest that Odysseus is not bound by some *moira* to which Zeus yields, but that it is Zeus himself who secures the fulfillment of the Kyklops' curse (with the obvious concurrence of Poseidon). The events on Thrinakia confirm this reading, for Zeus' unfavorable wind there (μ 313 325–26) is the ultimate cause of the men's sacrilege: they are driven by desperation, and even in their transgression they take care to be as inoffensive as possible; and Odysseus is overtaken by a protective sleep sent to prevent his hindering his men or sharing in their deed (μ 338 371–73). Furthermore, Zeus is emphatically instrumental in carrying out Helios' punishment and destroying the ship (μ 387–88). Neither must we forget that Zeus was also responsible for the onset of Odysseus' adventures (ι 67). For a forceful defense of the priority of Zeus' will in the *Odyssey*, presiding over the opposition of Athena to Poseidon, see Reinhardt (1996): "If the world experience of the *Iliad* is the result of a battle in which Zeus remains victorious despite setbacks, then the fates of the *Odyssey* are decided by a game of opposing and yielding, which leaves Zeus as the one on top, the one to whose will all the other gods submit" (p. 87).

[126]Cf. Nagy (2003) 27 and 21–38 *passim*.

prophecy (φάτις, 1.5) as the trigger to the plot of his *Argonautica*.[127]

Accustomed, as we are, to thinking about the constraints of genres (their observance, violations, and modifications) primarily within a self-referential framework of literary conventions—a sort of ahistorical 'New Criticism'—we must make an effort here to recover all the social dimensions attendant on this poetry, especially the religious ones. The invocation of the divinity is still, in this period, fraught with sacral meaning: the Panhellenic nature of the poetry, its strong tendency to eliminate any details tied to local cult and to stylize any remaining instances of prayers and sacrifices, makes the archaic ritual context of Homeric performance very difficult to recover.[128] But here, the practice of using hymns (e.g. the so-called Homeric hymns) as προοίμια[129] to the larger poems (in whatever stage of compositional development and textual fixity) attests to the religious character of the singing of the bard.[130]

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[127]Cf. González (2000) 278–79. The prophecy is otherwise known from Pind. *Pyth.* 4.71–78 and Pherekydes (*FGH* 3F105).

[128]For a succinct statement and analysis of this phenomenon see Nagy (1990c) 143n40. Some critics even deny Homeric poetry and its performance any connection at all to cult or ritual. But cf. Nagy (1990b) 10–12.

[129]For a look at poetics of προοίμια see Koller (1956). Cf. Nagy (1990c) 353–60 and Nagy (1996b) 62–64.

[130]It is currently fashionable to deny a cultic dimension to the Homeric hymns. A recent survey of Greek 'cult songs' tersely dismisses them "partly because they are not cult hymns in any real sense" (Furley and Bremer, 2001, 1.43). Strictly speaking, it is not clear that they are also being denied a religious dimension, for the same writers oppose their genre (which they call 'rhapsodic') to "all the *other* genres of religious hymns" (*ibid.* 1.42, my emphasis), thereby apparently conceding that the Homeric hymns, too, are in some sense 'religious'. A distinction between 'religious' and 'cultic' during the archaic and classical periods, however, is problematic and calls for careful elucidation. But in the section devoted to the Homeric hymns Furley and Bremer wield it without adequate scholarly nuance. If the key difference is the setting and peculiar manner of a hymn's performance, when it comes to the Homeric hymns the treatment by Furley and Bremer fails to address this matter, content with a cursory mention of "rhapsodic competitions at the pan-Hellenic centres" and possibly also "more informal recitations of epic at banquets, for example" (*ibid.* 1.43). The reader who wants to understand the distinction between cult and religious songs looks in vain for guidance in the section devoted to 'cult song' (Furley and Bremer, 2001, 1.14–20): terms that are just as problematic—religious ceremonial, cult images, religious adoration, gifts and offerings, melody and rhythm, epiphanies, congregational singing, etc.—are massed to paint a composite picture that does not fully apply to any one of the hymnic categories selected for treatment. What makes a song a 'cult hymn'? Do we need melody, or is recitation sufficient? Must it be accompanied by dancing? To what degree must its composition, its content, its tone be public? Must it address the divinity directly and must it do so corporately as 'we'? Or is a choral 'I' sufficient? Does the corporate appropriation of an individual hymn (whose original authorial 'I' was not choral) suffice to make it a cult song? Can we tell when this has happened? Must the 'Du-Stil' predominate over the 'Er-Stil'? Why? Must performance take place in the context of a public sacrifice? Questions like these can be multiplied *sine fine*. I do not mean to imply that they should not be posed or that satisfying answers cannot be offered. But it is wrong simply to dismiss the Homeric hymns because they are not 'cult hymns', without a careful account of the rationale followed. In fact, Furley and

A typical προοίμιον takes the form of a dialogue of sorts: first, the bard addresses himself to the god, beseeching his aid and favor as he presides over the performance (and often celebrating his τιμαί and deeds *seriatim*); the Muse, in turn, replies with her song, which in the mouth of the bard becomes his own song and message to his audience. The *Odyssey* itself provides illustrations of the use of preludes. Indeed, the verb ἀναβάλλειν, as noted,[131] refers to the bard 'striking up' his song (α 155 θ 266 ρ 262); there is also one explicit instance of a hymnic invocation: ὁ δ' ὁρμηθεὶς θεοῦ ἤρχετο (θ 499). Such preambles are further documented by Pindar (*Nem.* 2.3) and Thoukydides (3.104.4), and though neither the *Iliad* nor the *Odyssey* have come down to us accompanied by any one particular προοίμιον, Krates of Mallos knew of a copy of the former poem that included a prelude to Apollo and the Muses. The *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* do open with respective hymns to the Muses and Zeus, though a copy of the *WD* without its first ten lines was shown to Pausanias on his visit to Mount Helikon (9.31.4).[132] In fact, the entire *Theogony* could be considered a hymn to Zeus, even as it contains both a προοίμιον to the Muses (1–115) and, within the same, a micro-hymn to Zeus (71–75).

The religious mindset (I might say piety) that must have pervaded the performance of Homeric epic at its earliest stages need not mean, of course, that there were no other facets to this poetry. Thus, e.g., to mention only one that is amply attested, it was also supposed to delight the audience: μῆτερ ἐμή, τί τ' ἄρα φθονέεις ἐρίηρον ἀοιδὸν ‖ τέρπειν ὅππῃ οἱ νόος ὄρνυται; οὔ νύ τ' ἀοιδοὶ (α 346-47; cf. θ 44–45 and Hes. *Theog.* 55, 98–103). But even in regards to the pleasure of poetic performance do the gods receive notional priority:[133] τύνη, Μουσάων ἀρχώμεθα, ταὶ Διὶ πατρὶ ‖ ὑμνεῦσαι τέρπουσι μέγαν νόον ἐντὸς Ὀλύμπου (Hes. *Theog.* 37–38); αὐτίκα δ' ἀθανάτοισι μέλει κίθαρις καὶ ἀοιδή. ‖ Μοῦσαι μέν θ' ἅμα πᾶσαι ἀμειβόμεναι ὀπὶ καλῇ ‖ ὑμνεῦσίν ῥα

Bremer (2001) 43 themselves list two reasons to resist marginalizing them: cult hymns are not a homogeneous body to begin with, showing significant disparity according to individual cult and genre; and the emphasis on 'objective narrative' (i.e. 'Er-Stil') has to do more with the genre to which they were a prelude than with their character as hymns: the rhapsode, after all, *did* address the god. (Race, 1990, 103n48 proves that not only is the distinction precarious, but the way in which it is applied to the Homeric hymns, too, is questionable.) Full consideration of the issues involved here, even though obviously relevant, exceeds the limits of the present work. In a future study I intend to carry out a comprehensive analysis of this matter.

[131]See above, p. 30.

[132]Cf. van Groningen (1948) and West (1978) 137.

[133]See above, n. 100. The archetypal nature of divine action is also on display in Hes. *Theog.* 71–75, where the rule of Zeus and his apportioning τιμαί to the rest of the immortals is celebrated by the Muses at the beginning of Hesiod's song: their theogony is none other than Hesiod's own theogony.

θεῶν δῶρ' ἄμβροτα ἠδ' ἀνθρώπων ‖ τλημοσύνας, ὅσ' ἔχοντες ὑπ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι (*h. Apoll.* 188–91).

1.4   Of truth and lies

If we come down to the classical period, to the late fifth century BC, and consider Plato's *Ion*, we find that, according to Sokrates' chain of inspiration, Homer, the singer-poet, is possessed by the Muse (*enthusiasmos* works godward) and hence functions before the audience as a μάντις. There is here an important modification to the archaic picture: starting in the second half of the sixth century BC we find that the epic tradition, conceptualized earlier strictly as the word of the Muse, is henceforth assigned—largely in the shape of our modern texts—to a *prōtos heuretēs*,[134] Homer, the archetypal wordsmith *par excellence*.[135] This shift, attractive to the Greek mind

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[134]On this concept see Kleingünther (1933).

[135]The earliest reliable attestations of the name 'Homer' (as it happens, along with Hesiod) come from Xenophanes, whose *floruit* is in the second half of the sixth century BC (the reference is explicit in DK 21 B10–11; contextual in B12–13). Somewhat later (ca. 500 BC) are Herakleitos' (DK 22 B42, B56, and B105 = frr. 30, 21, and 63a Marcovich). The famous fr. 6 (West = 10 Gentili) of Kallinos is rightly classified as *dubium* by West (p. 245, *index verborum s.v.* Ὅμηρος)—and not surprisingly: for, as Davison (1968) 81–82 notes, we depend on a double emendation of Καλαῖνος to Καλλῖνος (twice) and Θηβαίοις to Θηβαῖς. The second is indifferent to my purposes, for I need only a mention of Homer (whatever the connection), but I can hardly judge the first sufficiently reliable. (Gentili's "prob[avit] Davison" does not accurately reflect the rather tepid endorsement of the latter, who merely opines that "there is more to be said" for the first emendation than for the second.) One may still argue that an explicit mention of the *name* 'Homer' is not strictly necessary, and that a mere reference to his *persona* would do. Allusions to 'the blind man from Khios' would be the obvious example. The two oldest instances are the *h. Apoll.* 171–73 and a fragment (*apud* Stobaios 4.34.28) ascribed to a 'Simonides' that scholars variously equated with Semonides of Amorgos or with Simonides of Keos. As to the *h. Apoll.*, most now place its composition in the second half of the sixth century (cf. Burkert, 1979, and West, 2003, 9–12), a date that gains us no greater antiquity than explicit instances of the name. As to Stobaios' fragment, *POxy* 3965 (fr. 20 West = 7 Gentili) would now seem to confirm that it is not Semonides', but Simonides'—bringing us, once again, to the late sixth century BC (cf. Davison, 1968, 73–77 and Sider, 2001). Furthermore, links at the level of theme or diction between an archaic author and Homeric poetry are not enough to establish a *terminus ante quem* for Homeric authorship, for these are satisfactorily explained by the influence of the epic tradition on other competing poetic production (for the case of Stesikhoros see Burkert, 1987); my concern here is strictly with the time when the locus of authority for the performance of Homeric epic moves from 'inspiration' (the god presiding over the public occasion) to the 'authorship' of 'Homer'. One final matter that requires attention is the reference to the Meles, the river of Smyrna, in the *h. Hom.* 9.3 and the connection (made at least as early as the fifth century BC) with 'Melesigenes', a competing name for 'Homer'. Graziosi (2002) 72–76 helpfully reviews the evidence, reaching, in my opinion, the wrong conclusion: that the link between 'Homer', the individual poet, and the Meles is at least as old as the hymn, i.e. with a *terminus ante quem* of ca. 600 BC. Now, it is not with the dating of the hymn that I disagree: that a goddess probably native to Anatolia (cf. Lebrun, 1987, 251–53) should be hymned in her connection with Smyrna is hardly surprising; but given the

in its historical simplicity, also took place in other social domains (e.g. lawgiving, animal sacrifice, etc.), and is not dissimilar to that culture's love of aetiologies. But from a sociological perspective, this shift is a transparent move of the locus of authority for the performance away from the religious—the Muse, who aids the singer and makes his performance authoritative—and towards the profane—a great and inimitable composer, whose original utterance the singer is called to reenact.

The issues, however, are the same: authority and veracity remain fungible, and with the evolving nature of authority we find a corresponding redefinition of truthfulness. The living tradition was once tautologically true, for untruth was relegated to oblivion. This did not place all parties beyond the charge of mendacity: it was in the

destruction of the city by Alyattes ca. 600 BC and its refoundation as an important urban center only three hundred years later, the composition—here I join the consensus—must be at least late seventh-century, if not older (cf. Càssola, 1997, 303). On the other hand, the connection of 'Homer' with the Meles or Smyrna (apart from the hymn itself, which I believe does not establish it) is not attested earlier than sometime before the Peloponnesian war. [The *Certamen* (cf. Graziosi, 2002, 73n62), at best, will not get us earlier than the classical period; Kritias (DK 88 B50) only mentions a river, not specifically the Meles, as Homer's father, and, like Stesimbrotos', his *floruit* is, at any rate, late fifth-century; the report that Pindar (fr. 264 Sn-M) made Homer hail from Smyrna (as Graziosi, 2002, 78 shows) is contradictory and unreliable; so we are left with Euagon's reference in the *Certamen* 20 (as Εὐγαίων), whose *floruit* Fowler (2000) 102 places "*ante bellum Peloponnesiacum.*"] So the *h. Hom.* 9 alone is left: the view that it makes a connection between a 'Homer' and the Meles has force solely on the assumption that Melesigenes can *only* derive from Smyrna's river; for otherwise, if it could have arisen independently and can be shown to be an apposite choice for a poet's sobriquet, then the connection with Smyrna would easily follow from the false etymology 'born from/by the Meles' (cf. West, 2003, 310). Graziosi's error, I think, is to assume that, since Smyrna was not a flourishing polis in the classical period, no one would have thought of linking a known 'Melesigenes' with an obscure river Meles. But this ignores the role that the hymn itself may have played (why should we assume that it too would have been obscure? its very transmission suggests otherwise) and the keen biographical interest in Homer's place of origin (starting perhaps with Theagenes of Rhegion, DK 8 1; cf. Heath, 1998,26), which must have been accompanied by what I may call, *faute de mieux*, an 'antiquarian' concern even for the relatively obscure, a concern that the curious must surely have brought to their investigations. If Athens was to own Homer, since it could lay claim (at least in the eyes of some) to the foundation of Smyrna (*Vitae* 4.16 and 5.34), it is only natural that it should tie the poet's name and the river. And so we now come to its etymology, about which Marx (1925) 406–7 observes that it must derive from the aorist stem of μέλομαι: "Μελησιγένης wurde ein Mann genannt, der für seine Familie, sein γένος zu sorgen weiss." But, of course, γένος (and the alternative γενεή) need not look forward in time to offspring: it may look backwards to genealogy and race—arguably an adequate generic characterization of the subject matter of Homeric poetry (especially, but not exclusively, its catalogs). Indeed, taking the perspective of a later age M 23 describes the Trojan war as one in which "the semi-divine race of men fell in the dust" (κάππεσον ἐν κονίῃσι καὶ ἡμιθέων γένος ἀνδρῶν). And μέλομαι, in turn, is readily used to denote the poet's engagement with the subject matter of his song—the *Odyssey*, e.g., mentioning the Argonautic tradition in an offhanded way simply by noting that the Argo was everyone's concern (Ἀργὼ πᾶσι μέλουσα, μ 70). So I conclude that 'Melesigenes' is a sobriquet that describes 'him whose [poetic] concern is the races [of gods and heroes]'. Applicable to any rhapsode of heroic epic, it hardly proves the antiquity of an *individual* conception of Homeric authorship.

opposition between competing poetic traditions that ψεύδεα may be discovered.[136] Divergences between multiforms of a given myth or song would have been most readily detected at *agones* between competing bards or in the rival festival traditions of locales that shared cultural contacts.[137] It is, in fact, primarily in the context of strife (ἔρις), quarrel (νεῖκος), and competing claims that Greek poetry brings matters of truthfulness to the fore. The rhetoric of ψεῦδος and ἀλήθεια reaches out in two complementary directions: there is, on the one hand, a challenge to the audience to embrace or reject the truth claim of the message, dream, or performance;[138] but there is also a direct challenge by the speaker (or performer) to any other offering a competing claim (or song) in the context of ἔρις (or an ἀγών, which is but an institutionally regulated form of ἔρις[139]). This conceptual affinity motivates Hesiod's choice in making quarrels, lies, tales, and disputes (Νείκεά τε Ψεύδεά τε Λόγους τ' Ἀμφιλλογίας τε, *Theog.* 229) siblings all descended from ἔρις and "like each other in habits" (συνήθεας ἀλλήλῃσιν, 230).[140] The association between lying and competition resurfaces at Ψ 576, where Menelaos forestalls the charge of lying by calling on Antilokhos to swear that he has not won the horse race with a δόλος; the context is one of arbitration (ἐγὼν αὐτὸς δικάσω . . . ἰθεῖα γὰρ ἔσται, 579–89).[141]

The conceptual ties between νεῖκος and ψεύδεα illuminate an otherwise puzzling

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[136]For the concept of ψεῦδος in archaic Greek literature see Luther (1935) and Detienne (1996) 158n4.

[137]As Nagy (1990c) 57 notes, his very itinerancy would have made a singer conscious of local variations.

[138]Cf. ξ 387–89. Odysseus' elaborate lies in the *Odyssey* belong to his program of disguise and recognition, putting his interlocutors to the test.

[139]Cf. Hes. *WD* 24–26.

[140]Theognis 390, too, associates ψεύδεα and οὐλόμεναι ἔριδες.

[141]Other Iliadic occurrences of ψεῦδος pertain to the following contexts: where reputation and family history is involved (Δ 404 E 635); in connection with oath-breaking (Δ 235); with promises (sometimes implicit or assumed), especially divine ones with an oracular or prophetic valence (B 349 M 164 Φ 276 Ω 222; cf. Luther, 1935, 87); or where faithful reporting is in view (O 159). The case of B 81 is complex: Zeus intends destruction on the Akhaians and sends an οὖλος ὄνειρος (B 6), a dream that not only spells ruin but is also false: it is *not* true that Troy may "now" by taken (cf. B 37–38). Agamemnon, however, fails to appreciate its deceptive nature—for which he is called νήπιος (B 38)— and tells the other chieftains. Thus the performer's challenge to his audience devolves on the Akhaian leaders, and it falls to Nestor, standing in for the rest, to fail the test. But he makes clear they would have called it a lie (ψεῦδός κεν φαῖμεν, B 81) had any other but Agamemnon told it. Of interest here is that the status of the dream is connected with the speaker's, who tells what amounts to an alternative denouement for the story of Troy: for the city cannot now be taken lest the tradition be falsified (cf. B 349). This is further brought out by Agamemnon, who turns the dream on its head by telling the army what, from his perspective, is a lie, but arguably, from the point of view of Zeus, is partially true.

episode in the *Theogony* (775–806), where Styx is presented as the arbiter of divine strife that results in competing truth claims, "when strife and quarreling arise among the immortals and if any of the gods, who live on Olympos, lies."[142] A ritual of potential self-incrimination follows, which includes an oath and a libation with the water of Styx. A god who perjures himself lies 'breathless' (νήυτμος, 795; ἀνάπνευστος, 797) until the end of the year; the image is one of helplessness and ineffectiveness, the conceptual parallel of ἔπε' ἀκράαντα (τ 565),[143] now touching not merely the god's will but his entire person; it is clear, however, that the lack of breath, though in the context of a κῶμα and abstention from food, focuses on the lack of voice, ἄναυδος (797), in what amounts to an inversion of 'authoritative speech': ⟨ἄναυδος⟩ τὸ ἀπαρρησίαστον τῶν ἀσεβῶν χαρακτηρίζει, notes the scholiast.[144] This ordeal, however, is but the start of the appointed punishment, viz. a forced exile of nine years from the company of the gods (εἰνάετες, 801; ἐννέα πάντ' ἔτεα, 803).[145] Likewise at Ω 222–24, Priam equates ψεῦδος with a ἄλιον ἔπος, an 'idle' or 'fruitless word'. And Hera tricks Zeus into swearing with the following challenge: ψευστήσεις, οὐδ' αὖτε τέλος μύθῳ ἐπιθήσεις (Τ 107); once again, the 'lie' consists in not accomplishing his word, in failing to bring it to pass. Not unrelated are the juxtaposition of μάψ, 'in vain, without result', and οὐ κατὰ κόσμον at Β 214; and the use of μαψιδίως to qualify ψεύδεσθαι at ξ 365. That ψεῦδος can be used to denote a statement's lack of fulfillment shows that, just as ἀλήθεια does not strictly correspond to our notion of 'truth', so does ψεῦδος resist a straightforward mapping onto our notion of 'lie'. Thus, when Nestor, ignorant of recent events, fears his observations may be found in error, he remarks: ψεύσομαι, ἦ ἔτυμον ἐρέω; κέλεται δέ με θυμός (Κ 534; cf. δ 140). It is not lies, but an erroneous statement he wants to avoid: where we distinguish between misspeaking

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[142]ὁππότ' ἔρις καὶ νεῖκος ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ὄρηται, ‖ καί ῥ' ὅστις ψεύδηται Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἐχόντων (782–83).

[143]See above, p. 28.

[144]Di Gregorio (1975) *ad loc.* is doubtless right in substituting ἄναυδος for the lemma οὐδέ ποτ' ἀμβροσίης: "οὐδέ - ἀμβροσίης v. 796 . . . seclusi et ἄναυδος praeeunte Sittl ut lemma inserui."

[145]The significance of the number nine is not clear (cf. 789–90), but it is noteworthy that it is the same period of time Hephaistos took refuge with Thetis after Hera cast him off Olympos (Σ 400). The Trojan war, of course, lasted nine years, with the city taken only on the tenth (γ 118 ε 107 ξ 240 χ 228); and there is the universal of the nine months of gestation with birth on the tenth, counting inclusively (e.g., *h. Herm.* 11–12; cf. *Theog.* 56, 722–25 and West, 1966, 341 *ad Theog.* 636); note, moreover, the temporal patterns in Hes. fr. 304. It is curious, if arguably coincidental, that, Panhellenic festivals being penteteric, the period of impotence covers precisely two such consecutive cycles.

and lying, Homeric Greek, regardless of culpability, uses ψεῦδος.[146] In sum, then, though ἀληθής and ἀψευδής belong together (*Theog.* 233), in the larger conceptual world of Greek archaic poetics the fundamental opposition is the one between ἀλήθεια and λήθη, not ἀλήθεια and ψεῦδος.[147]

There is an obvious rhetorical point to lying that tries to gain a hearer's favor (ξ 386–89;[148] *Theog.* 78, 709, 789), the coveted goal of the performer: ψεῦδος and θέλγω stand together at Φ 276 and ξ 387; Akhilleus uses ἀπατάω to describe Agamemnon's breach of the heroic code that would have rewarded his service with τιμή and γέρας (I 344 371 375); and λ 363–68 contrasts the deceiver who fashions lies (ψεύδεα ἀρτύνειν) to the skillful singer (ἐπιστάμενος) of noble heart (φρένες ἐσθλαί) and shapely words (μορφὴ ἐπέων).[149] But in this last passage the ἀοιδός, as the instrument of the Muse, is still the paragon of 'truthful' singing, and of him nothing less than unassailable moral probity is conceivable. And yet it is hard to see how a judgment based on the speaker's possession of these qualities would successfully tell the truthful from the lying, especially the artful lying; and this serves well to underline the precarious standing of truth in the context of performance, where competing singers are bent on winning the audience and defeating their opponents. Now, in the face of conflicting performances, only two judgments are open: either the Muse has

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[146]*Pace* S. West in Heubeck et al. (1988) *ad* δ 140, who, dismissing against the evidence that ψεύδομαι can denote "unintentionally saying what is not true," is forced to reject the translation, "Shall I be wrong or right in what I say?" But even she admits that E 635 could be so taken (and, I would add, *must* be so taken, if we adopt the most natural translation). It is true that the real question, as the rejoinder 'my heart bids me' proves, is whether to speak or to keep silent; but the only reason Helen has a stake in the choice is that she may be wrong if she speaks—here, she is not certain whether in fact the young man before her is Odysseus' son or not. Similarly in error is Adkins (1972) 14, who assumes that Helen's statement may revive painful memories of war and cause so acute a feeling of embarrassment that she really does consider lying to disguise her thoughts. This, however, is contradicted by the following κέλεται δέ με θυμός, which shows, as I have just observed, that the choice is between speech and silence, and not between deceitful and truthful speaking (which would call for γάρ, not δέ, as the joining particle: 'since I must speak, shall I tell the truth or dissemble?'). Not to mention that Adkins's reading would force us to conclude that Helen had openly acknowledged she might resort to lies: would such an admission be likely to escape opprobrium? If not, why would Helen willingly bring herself under moral condemnation, if, as alleged, she was so eager to escape embarrassment on another account? I find this reading socially and psychologically implausible.

[147]In Hesiod's *Theogony*, ψευδέας (229) corresponds to ἀψευδέα (233) just as ἀληθέα (233) to λήθεται (236). Cf. Detienne (1996) 158n4.

[148]For the use of παραπείθω in this connection see Luther (1935) 98.

[149]μορφή, with only two occurrences in Homer, is both times used with ἔπεα: μορφὴ ἐπέων (λ 367) and θεὸς μορφὴν ἔπεσι στέφει (θ 170). As *DELG s.v.* notes, μορφή "signifie « forme » en tant que cette forme dessine un tout en principe harmonieux," and its restriction to speech, however accidental, highlights its affinity with the rhapsodic appropriation of κόσμος explored above (p. 22)

inspired one singer but *not* another; or else she has filled the mouth of one with 'truth' and of the other with 'lies'. This (perhaps undesirable) state of affairs is but the reflection of the discriminating and variable nature of divine favor: now giving, now taking away, showing or withholding blessing for the gods' own, at times inscrutable, reasons.[150] In the one recorded instance where archaic poetry grew self-conscious at the boundary of competing traditions, the προοίμιον to Hesiod's *Theogony*, it granted the Muses comprehensive responsibility for its poetics and, in good consequence, had to allow for the tantalizing possibility of 'lying inspiration'. In effect, as the Hesiodic theogony makes a bid for Panhellenic status it must at the same time discredit any other local variants. The Muses rebuke the poet with pointed abuse, calling him a 'mere belly', drawing on the *topos* of the man who is willing to do anything to satisfy his hunger; thus, Eumaios tells Odysseus that "wanderers in need of substance tell idle lies and have no desire to tell the truth (ἀληθέα μυθήσασθαι)" (ξ 124–25; cf. η 215–21 σ 53–54). There is therefore in the Muses' rebuke a stab at the singer who is willing to compromise the veracity of his song by changing it to suit the expectations of local patronage.[151] Some writers, of whom Luther (1935) is representative, approach this passage by placing a false emphasis on the alleged 'individuality' of Hesiod vis-à-vis the anonymous 'Homer'. This is supposed to explain what they view as a radically new, reflective approach to truth and deceit, an approach that now, for the first time, would have problematized the truth-value of poetry, overcoming the identification of the Muses' song with truth.[152] The alleged individuality of Hesiod, however, tends to be overemphasized, and it has to do more with the distinctive character of this poetic tradition than with an individual self-awareness or self-disclosure.[153] Luther (1935) 123n1 misreads the Iliadic narrator's dependence on the Muse as insufficiency,

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[150]Perhaps the most immediately relevant expression of this sentiment is the hymn to Zeus that opens the *WD* (3–8). Cf. also Hes. *Theog.* 442–43, Υ 242–43, and Xenophanes DK 21 B25.

[151]For Odysseus' lies (e.g. τ 203) and his portrayal as a poet's equal, see Nagy (1990b) 43–47.

[152]"Im homerischen Epos fallen „Dichtung" und „Wahrheit" zusammen. . . . Bei Hesiod ist diese Anschauung bereits überwunden" (Luther, 1935, 124); "Der grundsätzliche Unterschied der hesiodischen Einstellung zum ψεῦδος-Phänomen im Vergleich zu der des homerischen Menschen besteht darin, daß Hesiod dasselbe als Problem nimmt. Bei den Dichtern des Epos und den von ihnen gestalteten Helden fehlt jede derartige Reflexion" (*ibid.* 138).

[153]With the frequently quoted ἐγὼ δέ κε Πέρσῃ ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην (*WD* 10), commonly construed in opposition to the Muses' song as an innovative affirmation of Hesiod's self-conscious 'I' (e.g. Luther, 1935, 123), one can readily compare Β 488 (πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω) and Β 490 (ἀρχοὺς αὖ νηῶν ἐρέω νῆάς τε προπάσας). Since Hesiod's 'I' stands at the end of his hymnic προοίμιον, one might also compare the device that regularly closes Homeric hymns (e.g., *h. Dem.* 495, *h. Apoll.* 546, *h. Herm.* 580, etc.).

and Hesiod's remark as self-sufficiency that reduces the opening hymn to a mere literary convention. Not so; in truth, the real distinction is the slender biographical schema that frames the *Works and Days* as Hesiod's instruction to his brother Perses. This hardly exceeds the bounds of an undeveloped poetic persona, and the real innovation is that it belongs at all in the tradition and serves to articulate its authority in the presentation of its didactic poetry. This third-person identification of Hesiod, which takes place in line 22 of the hymnic προοίμιον that opens the *Theogony* (1–35), can only be construed as a departure from the greater 'anonymity' of the Homeric poems if we consider the latter strictly without *their* own προοίμια.[154] But it is analogous to the function the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* 157–78 would have performed as a προοίμιον to the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey*, especially if we accept Nagy's (1990c) 375–77 suggestion[155] that the Delian Maidens are the local Muses of Delos.[156] It is important that we view the particular use the Homeric and Hesiodic traditions make of their respective archetypal authors not as a biographical curiosity, but as fulfilling a traditional function within their own particular genres, whether a historical core can be recognized or not. Even West (1966) 161, who thinks that the mention of Hesiod's name in the *Theogony* occurs "out of simple pride," and that in the *WD* "Hesiod goes out of his way to be informative about himself and his family" because he is "anxious . . . for us to know these things" (West, 1978, 33), must ultimately admit that Perses (his interlocutor brother and complementary 'personality') "is a changeable figure" whose biographical details are sometimes "invented for the purposes of argument" (*ibid.* 40). In the agonistic engagement of the Hesiodic theogony with other local theogonic traditions as it made its bid for Panhellenic status, the opposition between them could not be marked generically (for the polemic was not directed against a different genre, e.g. heroic epic); neither could it be marked by geography, for this would have worked against its Panhellenic drive;[157] it is left, then,

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[154]The actual name 'Hesiod' does not appear again at all neither in the *WD* nor in the *Theogony*. A pseudo-biographical framework is really operative only in the *WD*, where the terms are a simple opposition between an unnamed ἐγώ (10, 106, 174, 286, 396, 654, 658, 682) and his brother Perses (10, 27, 213, 274, 286, 299, 397, 611, 633, 641).

[155]Cf. also Nagy (1992b) 127n6.

[156]The 'blind bard from Khios', generally assumed to be 'Homer' (cf. Graziosi, 2002, 62–66), identifies himself here in the third person through an imagined dialog between a visitor to Delos and the Δηλιάδες. (Their response is conceptualized as the re-performance of the dialog itself.) Just as in the *WD* 10, an emphatic ἐγὼν follows (177).

[157]But even if a geographical label had not been objectionable, still the Hesiodic theogony could not pose as true merely because it was Boiotian, for even Thespiai and nearby Askra, e.g., held competing traditions about the Muses (see above, p. 36).

to divine election, to the particular favor showed by the Muses to 'Hesiod' the indi-
vidual, to mark the tradition of poetry he represents as true over against all others.
Whereas the truth of Hesiodic poetry is a function of Hesiod's authorization by the
Muses (his authority stems from his initiation), in its earliest stages the truth of the
Homeric tradition would have been located notionally in the quoted speech of the
Muses, without the interposition of the individual 'Homer', whom later generations
credited with the authorship of its poems.[158]

The polemical engagement with the tradition remained even after the locus of au-
thority had shifted into the hands of the archetypal Homer; but rival multiforms were
now assailed as illegitimate insertions (ἐμποιεῖν) of foreign material into the fixed, no-
tional whole that was his oeuvre (just what, according to Hdt. 7.6.3, Onomakritos was
accused of doing ἐς τὰ Μουσαίου); or, if the confrontation was with widely received
Homeric oral tradition—as, e.g., with Pindar's assertion that Odysseus' reputation
had been exaggerated at the expense of Ajax' (*Nem.* 7.20–23)—the strategy was to
relativize the authority of the tradition by ascribing it not to quoted divine speech,
but to a manipulative composer or one carried away by his superior skill: here the
rhetoric of the indictment would divorce technical skill from the piety that had traced
it to the Muse (remember Μελέτη); with such a break the truthfulness of the song
was greatly undercut.

It is important to realize and affirm that the shift from the Muse to Homer was
facilitated by the notional fixity of the poetic tradition. The bard's song had once
been considered sacral speech, the quoted utterance of the Muse, a veritable speech-
act that retold what was, what is, and what is to come—matters that relate to the
unchanging order of the cosmos and to events fixed, whether by the record of the
past or by the necessity of divine will and prophetic insight. Now, according to the
new perspective, Homer—inheriting the conceptual fixity built into the tradition—
was said to have sung one thing but not another, and a guild of rhapsodes devoted
to the semi-official control and arbitration of the tradition became conceivable, with
a corresponding store of 'unpublished' ἔπη (cf. Plato's *Phaidros* 252b4–6). That
'Homer' the individual had no existence independent from the poetic tradition could
only be of help: every locale attached such biographical material as reflected its own

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[158]As Nagy (1992b) 126 writes: "If there is a historical inference to be made from these differences,
it is not that Homer and Hesiod had different attitudes about truth. It is rather that the traditional
role of the performer is different in Homeric and Hesiodic poetry." For the conventional nature and
function of Hesiod's 'autobiographical' material, cf. Griffith (1983) with the important corrective of
Nagy (1992b).

local appropriation of the poetry, and thus arose a large body of apocryphal anecdotes and competing lives of Homer.[159]

1.5 μάντις and προφήτης

1.5.1 Ecstasy

As remarked above (p. 39) in my study of Hesiod's *Dichterweihe*, the notional fixity of the Homeric tradition has its mirror image in the twin professions of μάντις and προφήτης.[160] Plato—we shall see momentarily—introduces two others: ἑρμηνεύς and ὑποκριτής.[161] The philosopher's testimony, though indispensable, must be carefully weighed. For, having always an axe to grind, his material is both true to fact, reflecting faithfully real facets of the culture, and tendentious, recombining the data and redefining their mutual relation. Most famously, the *Ion* puts the strongest possible emphasis on a view of ecstatic possession, during which the subject retains no self-control and is merely the mindless vehicle of the divine presence within him. But this, as has often been remarked in recent times, was not the archaic view of poetic inspiration. Indeed, at no point in the few places where he comes to the fore (at invocations of the Muse or when he addresses a character in the story), does the narrator of the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* appear as anything other than self-possessed. The same is true of the two bards in the *Odyssey*, Phemios and Demodokos. The latter maintains his self-control at all times, even when he is described as prompted by the god or Muse. Thus, even though θ 73 makes the Muse responsible for the onset of his singing, from θ 87 90–91 we learn that the performance was punctuated by pauses and by the Phaiakian nobles' encouragement to resume the singing: Demodokos' inspiration, then, did not rule out a sensitive singer-audience interaction. Similarly, at θ 492 he is urged by Odysseus to move his song on (μετάβηθι) to the episode of the wooden horse and the sack of Ilion. Demodokos obliges him, starting at the appropriate point (ἔνθεν ἑλών ὡς . . . , θ 500); yet, all the same, he is said to begin his song at the prompting of the god (ὁ δ' ὁρμηθεὶς θεοῦ ἤρχετο, θ 499). And this is not all: for Alkinoos, seeing Odysseus cry at the hearing of the story, commands the minstrel to check his singing (θ 537 542), and we have every reason

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[159]Cf. Graziosi (2002).

[160]There are other terms, such as ὑποφήτωρ, that relate to προφήτης.

[161]See below, pp. 150ff.

to believe that Demodokos does as he is told. The same can be said of Phemios who, while singing as his νόος moves him[162] and Zeus metes out (α 346–49),[163] is yet assumed by Penelope to have a choice of repertoire, just as he is said at α 154 to sing under the compulsion of the suitors. Furthermore, scholars have noted that even the few μάντεις who appear in the story (e.g. Kalkhas) never show any of the traits of ecstatic oracular delivery.[164] To Setti this has proved so surprising that he has been misled into describing Homeric poetry as the humanistic product of a secular polis culture (Setti, 1958, 136–38). But this only reveals his narrow view of inspiration, which robs of sacral notions and religious feeling whatever does not correspond to his expectations of an ecstatic oracular milieu. Setti is, in effect, looking for incantatory poetry when he insists on alliteration and rhyme as the *sine qua non* of truly religious poetry (*ibid.* 139); but magic is only a narrow domain of a much larger religious landscape.

1.5.2   The Delphic Oracle

To speak only of the most famous of oracular seats, it is hardly a coincidence that the ancients themselves held divergent traditions about Delphi.[165] On these, modern scholars in turn have formulated two radically different reconstructions of the mantic session.[166] Some insist that the Pythia herself, in her right mind, delivered the oracles in prose or hexameters; that she could even be bribed to lie is adduced in

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[162]This refers to more, I believe, than a personal inclination or preference, for the psychology of the singer, to which νόος here, and θυμός at θ 45, speaks (cf. I 702–3) is not exclusive of divine influence, but rather coordinate with or instrumental to it. Thus, according to θ 44, a god has given Demodokos the gift of singing as his θυμός moves him.

[163]In all likelihood, the main thrust of this statement has reference to α 32–33; but I believe it goes beyond it in suggesting that Zeus has not merely made it possible for Phemios to sing of the Danaans' evil doom, but has also given the bard this specific theme as the choice of song for the occasion. Since Penelope's reproach centers on Phemios' selection, merely to argue that the events have happened and are therefore potential songs would not suffice as defense. But to argue, that Zeus not only brought the events to pass but also moved the bard to sing about them would be an adequate apology.

[164]Cf. Nilsson (1967) 166 and Tigerstedt (1970) 169 with n. 30.

[165]Focusing only on Delphi is justified, I believe, on the grounds that this sanctuary was one of a handful of institutions that in the eighth century BC transcended the local interests of particular Greek city-states; together with Homeric poetry, the rise of the polis, the proliferation of the alphabet, organized colonizations, and the establishment of the Olympic games, Delphi shaped and was shaped by the dynamic of supra-political communication that we call Panhellenism. Cf. Nagy (1990b) 10 and 37. Note the mention of Pytho at I 404–5 and θ 79–81. For Claros, often cited as a close parallel, see Picard (1922) 197–220, Parke (1940) 86, and Haussoullier (1898).

[166]Cf. Compton (1994).

support of this view (cf. Hdt. 6.66 and 6.75.[167]) Others emphasize the mediation of the προφήτης, who, they suppose, conveyed the suppliant's question to the Pythia and reported back her answer. A few writers go even further, asserting that, in the case of the more important inquiries, he would also 'recompose' her message into hexameters.[168] Most of the literary evidence supports the former reconstruction; owing to his office as priest at Delphi and his writings on the oracle, Plutarch represents a late but distinguished exponent of it.[169] Indeed, much of *De Pythiae oraculis* is explicitly built on the assumption that the Pythia herself is directly (and primarily, if not solely) responsible not only for the content, but also the form of the oracles. The question at issue, after all, is why Delphic oracles are no longer rendered in verse. The reasons offered are several and various; among them is Theon's, who argues that Apollo merely places within the *mantis* the ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, and she in turn is moved according to her natural endowments: "For the voice is not the god's, nor the utterance or diction or meter, but the woman's."[170] This agrees with Herodotos, whose narrative conveys the distinct impression that the Pythia herself delivered her oracles to the inquirers,[171] at times even anticipating their questions and speaking unbidden upon their crossing the threshold of the temple.[172] Thus, Crahay (1956) 83 states definitively that "Delphes n'a qu'un seul prophète, dont le rôle exact nous échappe, mais auquel, en tout cas, Hérodote n'attribue jamais de réponse."[173] Now, one might argue that, given Plutarch's late date and his admission that in his own time oracles were no longer in verse, he may simply have been ignorant of the

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[167]Cf. Paus. 3.4.3 and Thouk. 5.16.2. But one might conceivably imagine some sort of collusion between the Pythia and her προφήτης, in which case the alleged bribery of the prophetess would not bear decisively on the particular division of labor that obtained between them. In fact, collusion is in evidence at Hdt. 6.66, though the historian makes clear that Kobōn was not a προφήτης.

[168]Cf. Parke (1940). That prose was the dominant mode of delivery is stated at Plu. *De Pyth. or.* 403e. (On the choice of form, verse or prose, in relation to the Pythia see Amandry, 1980.) Dempsey (1918), a rather extreme supporter of a raving *mantis*, opines that the Pythia's utterances would have been unintelligible apart from the mediation of the προφήτης, whose work it was to put her babblings into articulate speech. Farnell (1896–1909) 4.189, more moderate, notes that her "wild utterance" was "probably some kind of articulate speech," which the Ὅσιοι and προφήτης knew how to interpret.

[169]See, however, Flacelière (1950), who is responding to Amandry (1950). For a general overview of this old *zetema* see also Nilsson (1958), Fauth (1963), and Fontenrose (1978) 196–228.

[170]οὐ γὰρ ἔστι θεοῦ ⟨γ'⟩ ἡ γῆρυς οὐδ' ὁ φθόγγος οὐδ' ἡ λέξις οὐδὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀλλὰ τῆς γυναικός (*De Pyth. or.* 397c). Cf. also *ibid.* 405c–e.

[171]Typical introductions are ἡ Πυθίη λέγει τάδε (Hdt. 1.65), ἡ Πυθίη χρᾷ τάδε (Hdt. 1.66), or ἡ Πυθίη εἶπε τάδε (Hdt. 1.85).

[172]E.g. Hdt. 1.47, 1.65, 5.92, etc.

[173]Cf. Fontenrose (1978) 197 and 212–24.

workings of classical and pre-classical Delphi. But he knows of a report that, in the past, 'some men with the gift of poetry' (ποιητικοί τινες ἄνδρες), overhearing the Pythia's words, would 'twine them round extempore with epē, meters, and rhythms as containers' (*De Pyth. or.* 407b). This is certainly not quite the same as an officially appointed mediating προφήτης, but there is enough overlap that it is hard to believe that Plutarch would have failed to mention the prophet's participation in the re-composition of oracles into verse, had he known about it. After all, he is often well informed about classical Greece, even about subjects of which he had no personal experience; whereas regarding Delphi, his many years at the oracle as priest make his writings on the matter intrinsically authoritative. One may retort that it is precisely such first-hand experience that made him incapable of viewing Delphi's early history objectively. At any rate, that he draws on sources at least as old as the fourth century BC is clear from his reference to Theopompos (*De Pyth. or.* 403e).[174] We shall never know for sure, but the fact remains that Plutarch never mentions the cooperation of the prophet in composing the oracle, and the specific duties of this official remain elusive and conjectural.[175] While he is not epigraphically attested, Hdt. 8.37 (cf. 7.111) and Plutarch *De def. or.* 438b explicitly mention him,[176] but the only text that unequivocally tells of resident poets whose role it was to put the oracles to verse is Strabo 9.3.5: φασὶ . . . τὴν Πυθίαν . . . ἀποθεσπίζειν ἔμμετρά τε καὶ ἄμετρα· ἐντείνειν δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς μέτρον ποιητάς τινας ὑπουργοῦντας τῷ ἱερῷ; note, however, that he does not identify these ποιηταί τινες with the προφῆται.

Now, concerning ecstasy, there are scattered indications of behavior that could be called irrational, but their historicity is dubious. Thus, Strabo draws attention to the πνεῦμα ἐνθουσιαστικόν that allegedly ascended from the chasm in the adyton, inducing the Pythia's prophecies; and Diodoros' legend (16.26) famously records the bizarre behavior of goats that accidentally breathed the vapors, adding that, after many people had leaped into the chasm under their influence, the locals restricted

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[174]The same mention also proves that by the fourth century BC some believed that the Pythia herself prophesied in verse, while others rejected this tenet.

[175]If 'prophets' and 'priests' were the same officials, at least in the time of Plutarch—as appears from Nikander being called προφήτης in *De def. or.* 438b and ἱερεύς in *De E ap. D.* 386b—it is easier to imagine what functions they may have discharged. In particular, the priest would have presided over the oracular session. Cf. Amandry (1950) 119n2.

[176]For other references see Amandry (1950) 118–22 and Fontenrose (1978) 218n30. If the identity between Delphic priests and prophets is as old as *h. Apoll.* 393–96, some may see support there for a mediating προφήτης; similarly with Eur. *Ion* 369–72, 413–16, though I personally do not consider the evidential value of these passages high.

access to a single woman, the prophetess, furnishing her with the tripod as a device to prevent her falling into the chasm too. Loukianos, in turn, mentions the chewing of laurel leaves, which was also thought to induce an altered state of mind (*Bis acc.* 1). Despite the weakness of the evidence, modern scholars have found it hard to shake their attachment to the story of Delphic ecstasy (certainly attested in classical Athens, e.g. in Plato's *Phaidros* 244b). Since the existence of trance-inducing vapors has found no geological support, some have had recourse to self-induced trances (e.g. Burkert, 1985, 116), while others rightly draw attention to the psychological complexity of trance-like behavior, not all of which can be simply mapped onto "hysterical excitement."[177] Like Strabo, ancient writers who took for granted an ecstatic Pythia must have assumed that she was sufficiently coherent, all the same, to speak in hexameters, or else that Apollo put the ἔπη in her mouth to deliver while out of her mind—apparently, this latter is the model Sokrates wields in his dialog with Ion—though under this harmonizing scenario the specific role of the prophet is hard to determine.[178] Nevertheless, as Amandry (1950) 168 observes, regardless of one's view about the access an ordinary inquirer might have had to the Pythia, it is hard to believe that in the marked occasions of politically momentous (usually 'institutional') inquiries she would have spoken directly to the θεωρός or θεοπρόπος without prior screening and consideration by the men who run Delphi. If indeed the prophet got involved especially at such times, we can understand why one can trace back to these instances the greater fraction of the extant oracular verse. Poetry's latitude of form and capacity for ambiguity would have been welcome where powerful clients or delicate 'international' politics were affected.[179] The confluence of ecstatic *mantis* and self-possessed prophet was even historicized by Rohde as the arrival in Delphi of Dionysiac elements and their influence on what, until then, would have been rational Apollinean communication through incubation.[180] Or, at the suggestion of Parke

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[177]Thus Dodds (1951) 87n41. See his stimulating treatment *ibid.* 71–75 and 295–99, though Plutarch's emphasis in *De def. or.* 438b on the abnormal nature of the incident fails to bear out Dodds's views about the character of the Pythia's trance.

[178]It should be emphasized that, except for Lucan (*Pharsalia* 5.169–74, 190–3, 211–18) and the Christian polemicists, the Pythia was never portrayed as raving deliriously, emitting sounds that called for translation into intelligible speech by a mediating interpreter. In the context in which it is introduced, not even Herakleitos' famous fragment about the Sibyl's "frenzied mouth" (DK 22 B92 = fr. 75 Marcovich, *apud De Pyth. or.* 397a) hints at any measure of unintelligibility. Thus Amandry (1950) 120 calls "entièrement gratuite" the notion "des sons inarticulés ou des cris sauvages proférés par la Pythie et interprétés par le prophète." Cf. further *ibid.* 19–24.

[179]Cf. Plu. *De Pyth. or.* 407c–d.

[180]Rohde (1925) 287ff., esp. 290–91. For the relationship between Apollo and Dionysos at Delphi

and Wormell (1956a) 12–13, the terms might be inverted, with Apollo taking over a primeval oracular seat of Γῆ, which already exhibited elements cognate with the ecstasy of maenadism.[181]

Where poets chose to draw on the original sacral dimensions of their profession, they described themselves as prophets (Pind. *Paian* 6.6, Bacchyl. *Epinician* 8.3). A striking, celebrated instance is Pind. fr. 150: μαντεύεο, Μοῖσα, προφατεύσω δ᾽ ἐγώ. On first thought we might be inclined to focus on the apparent dichotomy between the Muse-as-*mantis* and the poet-as-prophet; but if we remember that the voice of the Muse is the song of the poet, this fragment turns out, instead, to reflect an early stage in which *mantis* and prophet were one and the same. Thus we are not surprised that Teiresias, the Homeric μάντις *par excellence*, is called by Pindar in the same breath "Zeus' prophet" and "straight *mantis*."[182] Therefore, Pindar sees himself as intermediary and herald of otherwise hidden divine utterances. The same shifting valance of terminology was in evidence at Delphi. In Aiskhylos' *Eumenides* 18–19, the Pythia calls Apollo both μάντις and Διὸς προφήτης: insofar as he speaks for Zeus, he is his 'prophet'; vis-à-vis the mortals who inquire of him he is the *mantis*. But taking this logic a step further, the communication of Apollo's prophecy, too, can be similarly re-analyzed: viewed in relation to Apollo, the Pythia is commonly designated προφῆτις,[183] while from the point of view of the mediation of her own προφῆται, though most often simply called ἡ Πυθία, she could also be named μάντις[184] or πρόμαντις.[185] A further echo of this conceptual and terminological state of affairs is furnished by Plato's *Ion*, where Homer, himself the first link in the chain of inspiration, is described as the ἑρμηνεύς of the Muse. Strictly speaking, as poetic 'composer' (to use our terms) he does not *interpret* a prior message (as the prophet would do with the Pythia's). He can only be said to 'interpret' the utterance of the goddess in the extended sense of the 'original composition' that wells up in his mind and constitutes

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see Latte (1940).

[181]Dodds (1951) 69–70, leaning heavily on Apollo's alleged Anatolian provenance (a theory now largely displaced or abandoned; cf. Burkert, 1985, 144–45) insisted that ecstasy in some form had always been part of the worship of this god.

[182]Διὸς ὑψίστου προφάταν ἔξοχον, ‖ ὀρθόμαντιν Τειρεσίαν (*Nem.* 1.60–61).

[183]Cf., e.g., Eur. *Ion* 42, 321, 1322; Plato *Phaidros* 244a8; Plu. *De Pyth. or.* 397c1, 397d1; Plu. *De def. or.* 414b6–7.

[184]Aiskh. *Eum.* 29.

[185]Hdt. 6.66, 7.111, 7.141; Thouk. 5.16.2; Paus. 3.4.3–5 and 10.5–6, 13; Loukianos *Bis acc.* 1 and *Hermotimos* 60. Cf. Hdt. 8.135, where the 'prophet' of Apollo's temple at Ptōion is called both πρόμαντις and προφήτης.

the very substance of his song. In other words, there is, strictly speaking, no need for explanation and commentary in the ordinary sense, as if his poetry were to be something short of a 'primary text'. But insofar as he has access to and reveals the divine mind in song—i.e., insofar as we view him within the archaic framework—his poetry can be called revelatory, unfolding before our eyes divine truths that would otherwise remain obscure, unintelligible. In that restricted sense, then, he can rightly be called the *hermeneus* of the Muse: he 'reveals the song' (see above, p. 43) and his ἔπη carry the full performative force of a divine utterance.

The role of the prophet might seem slightly different in that, notionally, his poetry derives—interprets—the Pythia's utterance. But we must remember that without him the inquirer receives no oracular response, and for this reason only conceptually does his prophecy enjoy a secondary textual status. And thus we are not surprised to find that there was at Delphi a tradition of oral composition, with its own particular formulaic emphases—emphases that were traditional nonetheless, to the extent that the necessarily occasional nature of oracular consultation allowed for it.[186] Each inquirer posed his own peculiar question, but their number was high enough and the nature of many must have been repetitive enough that the answers can be safely assumed to have largely followed established patterns. Where such replies where in hexameter, this would have fostered a formulaic tradition of oral poetry responsible for rendering, on short notice, the appropriate answer to each questioner's concerns.

1.5.3   Oracular verse

It is true that such poetry was of a comparatively low quality, and that it was for this reason subjected to mockery and satire.[187] But it is remarkable that, even then, the belief of its divine origin was not surrendered and Apollo was made the butt of jokes by those who could not understand how the *Mousēgetēs* demonstrated less poetic skill than the very Muses he led and poets he inspired.[188] For my purposes, however, the

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[186]Cf. McLeod (1961) and Andersen (1987). That writing was not used in delivering the answer is clear form Plu. *De Pyth. or.* 397c (καὶ γὰρ εἰ γράφειν ἔδει μὴ λέγειν τοὺς χρησμούς), and Parke and Wormell (1956b) xxix wisely underline the 'improvisatory' character of most responses (an 'improvisation' that I take here in the sense of oral traditional poetry). For a *formal* study of oracular verse, see Fontenrose (1978) 166–95. Helpful analyses can also be found in Parke and Wormell (1956b) and Crahay (1956) *passim*, which should be read with McLeod's (1961) 324–25 caveat against source criticism in mind.

[187]Cf. Todd (1939) and Henrichs (2003) 216–22 (with bibliography).

[188]Thus, when Zeus asks Hermes to use greater solemnity in summoning the gods to a meeting, Loukianos the satirist has Hermes answer him thus: ἀλλ' ἐποποιῶν, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ ῥαψῳδῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα,

important fact is that the unchanging divine answer, a fixed oracular utterance that could be neither modified nor retracted, was rendered into hexameter by practitioners of a peculiar kind of oral-traditional poetry, even when, conceptually, their mediation was elided in the interest of tracing the utterance immediately to the Pythia—as if the interposing of any strictly human agent might compromise its infallibility.[189] It is notable that, even though iambic was occasionally used in contexts of abuse, when the oracle was not rendered in prose, hexameter was the meter of choice. To explain this fact some adduce the influence of Homeric epic and its cultural ascendancy. But I rather think it must have been the notion of a divine speech-act—a notion shared by epic and oracular poetry—that led both to use ἔπη for the notionally quoted utterance of the gods. This perspective views the system of Homeric poetry on its own archaic cultural terms—with its full sacral dimensions—rather than in the anachronistic terms of a cultural icon, Homer, who imposes his genre by dent of stylistic brilliance. Parke (1981) undertakes a distinguished, but ultimately flawed, attempt to explain the origin of oracular verse at Delphi in terms of the dominant prestige of epic poetry, viewed here strictly as a 'literary' phenomenon used or imitated for its register (elegance, solemnity, etc.).[190] Observing that most of the oracles at Delphi down to the time of Alexander were in prose, he argues that the earlier poetic utterances owed their form to a cult of the Muses alleged by Plutarch to have existed of old at the oracular seat, a cult that was only a distant memory in his own time (cf. *De Pyth. or.* 402c–d). Now, it is obvious that, even if we agree that there were fictitious hexameter oracles, versifying prophetic utterances must have been a genuine (if not uniform) practice: why else trouble yourself with meter if all knew the Pythia only rendered the

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ἐγὼ δὲ ἥκιστα ποιητικός εἰμι· ὥστε διαφθερῶ τὸ κήρυγμα ἢ ὑπέρμετρα ἢ ἐνδεᾶ συνείρων, καὶ γέλως ἔσται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῇ ἀμουσίᾳ τῶν ἐπῶν· ὁρῶ γοῦν καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω γελώμενον ἐπ' ἐνίοις τῶν χρησμῶν, καίτοι ἐπικρυπτούσης τὰ πολλὰ τῆς ἀσαφείας, ὡς μὴ πάνυ σχολὴν ἄγειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐξετάζειν τὰ μέτρα (*Iup. Trag.* 6). And in Plu. *De Pyth. or.* 396c–d, amazed at the mean and cheap quality of oracular verse Diogenianos complains: καίτοι μουσηγέτης ὁ θεὸς καὶ τῆς λεγομένης λογιότητος οὐχ ἧττον αὐτῷ [τὸ] καλὸν ἢ τῆς περὶ μέλη καὶ ᾠδὰς [καὶ] εὐφωνίας μετεῖναι καὶ πολὺ τὸν Ἡσίοδον εὐεπείᾳ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ὑπερφθέγγεσθαι· τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν χρησμῶν ὁρῶμεν καὶ τοῖς μέτροις καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πλημμελείας καὶ φαυλότητος ἀναπεπλησμένους.

[189]Cf. Iokasta's speech in Sophokles' *OT* 707–25.

[190]This is not to deny that these associations existed at a later date. Aristotle, at any rate, considered the heroic meter 'solemn' (*Rh.* 1408b32–33). And though at first its use for dedicatory epigrams may have reflected the status of *epos* as the preeminent form of marked utterance—remember that archaic inscriptions speak in their own voice—doubtless in time it must have been fostered by the cultural prestige of epic poetry. Such epigrams, to be sure, are ideologically distant from the divine speech of oracles, but they still furnish a 'performance' of sorts, borrowing the voice of the viewer to utter statements marked by deixis (whether personal pronouns like με or ἐγώ or demonstrative adjectives like τόδε).

god's answers in prose? The question, then, is why the poetic form, and specifically the hexameter, should have been used at all. It will not do, I suggest, merely to argue that, during Delphi's earliest stages (no later than the eighth century BC), only the epic hexameter was available to mark speech as solemn against ordinary prose. For even if we grant *ex hypothesi* the priority of hexameter over lyric meters (a view many scholars no longer hold), we must still explain why and in what sense epic poetry was perceived as 'solemn'—i.e., what sort of marked speech it was—and why oracular utterance should have called for the kind of solemnity the epic style could lend. This reasoning, then, brings us back to the argument of this chapter, viz. that the archaic traditions of hexameter poetry were imbued with notions of quoted divine speech. If true, this view makes the use of hexameter poetry at Delphi entirely natural, and there is no longer any reason to make the versification of oracles immediately dependent on antecedent Homeric or Hesiodic traditions. In fact, the association of Apollo and the Muses is Panhellenic and, as far as I can tell, was already fully developed at the earliest stages of the oral traditions of epic. Therefore, to argue, as Parke does, that they owe their ties to Delphi, seems to me implausible on chronological and other grounds. Plutarch's passage is the sole witness to an alleged archaic cult of the Muses at Delphi; by itself, it falls far short of establishing this fact: in his own time there was no shrine left, only the story that there had once been one. On what grounds are we to believe it? Only two Simonidean fragments[191] that mention χέρνιβα are marshaled in support, and neither names Delphi explicitly. The proem of Hesiod's *Theogony* (vv. 3, 6) already shows the association of the Muses with fountains and streams of water,[192] and the debate whether the second fragment referred not to Kleiō but to Styx, as Eudoxos claimed, shows how precarious the link is between the first passage and the water that flowed from the oracle of Γῆ. I do not see how these fragments are supposed to prove the existence of a shrine to the Muses predating the 'arrival' of Apollo in Delphi. Even if such a shrine existed (which is far from certain), and even if it was placed in so central a location of the sanctuary (where else should we expect the worship of goddesses subordinate to Apollo but in the shadow of his temple?), what could prove its temporal priority over the worship of the god? It seems to me much more probable that Apollo's Panhellenic

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[191]*PMG* 577a and 577b (Sim. 72a and 72b).

[192]This association should not be confused with the notion, which I believe erroneous, that originally the Muses were nymphs of the mountains and the streams (cf. Farnell, 1896–1909, 5.434–35), a view embraced by Parke (1981) 104 that would require Wackernagel's etymology μοῦσα < *μοντ-ια, with *μοντ- cognate with Latin *mōns* (see *DELG s.v.* μοῦσα).

association with the Muses—though independent from the cult at Delphi nevertheless reinforced by the use of the hexameter for the composition of oracles—should have found cultic expression, if anywhere at all, at the Panhellenic oracle of Delphi.[193] Besides Plutarch's doubtful testimony, only Pausanias' description (10.19.4) of the pediments of the fourth-century BC temple of Apollo offers further evidence of the ties at Delphi between the Muses and their *Mousēgetēs*: it featured Artemis, Leto, Apollo, and the Muses [East], and the setting Sun with Dionysos and the Thyiades [West]. But this falls short of proving the existence of an archaic shrine to the Muses, or else we should expect, e.g., pedimental depictions of Γῆ and Athena, and shrines to Leto and the Sun. It is clear, instead, that the choice of sculptures draws on traditional artistic devices (the setting Sun), Panhellenic myth (the god's mother and sister), and a certain representational symmetry (Apollo and Dionysos, each with his own cortege).

Neither is there support to be found in Plutarch's *Quaest. conv.* 744c, where his brother observes that the Delphians held the Muses to be three,[194] making them correspond to the notes that define musical intervals (οἱ τὰ διαστήματα παρέχοντες ὅροι). Parke (1981) 105 relates this to the "names of the three strings of the primitive lyre," presumably because of 745b, which seems to present φθόγγοι and χορδαί as alternatives. But I believe that these are not two *different* options, but synonyms, naturally juxtaposed and used for redundancy.[195] That, I submit, is why this numeric correlation is said to associate the Muses with τὸ ἁρμονικόν (744c). In any case, as Parke admits, this equation betrays late schematism and cannot be original. Though a three-string archaic lyre probably did exist, there is reason, however, to question that it was widely used or ever held a central position.[196] And if so, why would the number of the Muses be related to the strings of a marginal instrument?[197] Furthermore, the

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[193]Since Delphi was the only truly Panhellenic oracle of Apollo in archaic Greece, it was there alone that the Panhellenic association between Apollo and the Muses was likely to find cultic expression at so early a stage. This explains the absence of a similar cult at other oracles of Apollo (assuming now, for the sake of argument, that the Muses had a shrine at Delphi).

[194]See above, p. 36.

[195]Cf. LSJ *s.vv.* φθόγγος II.2.b and χορδή II.1.b.

[196]I am using 'lyre' in a non-technical sense to stand for the φόρμιγξ and the κίθαρις. Cf. Guillemin and Duchesne (1935) 118.

[197]In her survey of the evolution of the lyre from late-bronze down to geometric times, Stella (1978) 277–92 writes that the number of its strings ranged from three to seven; but whereas the hepta- and octachord (I am using 'chord' for 'number of strings', not 'interval') were predominant during the late Mycenaean and Minoan palatial cultures, geometric depictions almost always feature four strings (*ibid.* 280, 288). Stella (1978) 280 dates the dominance of three strings to remote

three-string lyre was still in (limited) use in late antiquity (Stella, 1978, 278), and, at any rate, in music theory the three tones were of abiding significance: thus a schema 'three Muses ↔ three strings' need not have drawn at all on old lore. But one might argue that, all by itself, the claim that the Delphians, in defiance of Hesiod's canonical number, had taught that the Muses were three (even though the report passes along as genuine admittedly late speculation) might be reason enough to believe that such indeed was the archaic Delphic doctrine.[198] But I wonder, rather, if the triad of Muses might not reflect the indisputably archaic veneration accorded to the Θριαί, a triad of Delphic goddesses, probably the Corycian Nymphs, which, Larson (1995) argues, lie behind the famous 'bee maidens' of the *h. Herm.*[199] It would not be surprising if the veneration rendered at the Corycian cave had also once been represented at the oracular site itself (though no longer so by the date of the hymn, cf. line 556). In this connection it is curious that the hymn calls the maidens μοῖραι or σεμναί (depending on the ms.), and that in the dialog that concerns us Plutarch should also link the Muses with the three Fates (*Quaest. conv.* 745b). To sum up: the veneration of a triad of female goddesses, variously identified by competing traditions, is too entrenched at Delphi to argue with any degree of certainty that the cult of the Muses was archaic and original to the locale, older than the 'arrival' of Apollo (a chronological priority that might lend plausibility to the view that oracular poetry took up the hexametric form

Cycladic times, but cites in support only the famous Keros harpist (now at the Athens' National Archaeological Museum, no. 3908) and other cycladic fragmentary statues (*ibid.* 280n9). As far as I can see, there is no firm basis on which to infer the number of strings the *trigōnon* might have featured (cf. Zervos, 1957, figs. 316, 317, 333–34). Stella's view, then, is only a conjecture, and, with Evans (see immediately below), one might just as well assume that the strings were four (or more!). Now, though there are occasional instances of late bronze-age trichord lyres, they are mostly in seals, where limitations of size and their practical nature might have encouraged an artificial simplification of detail (though a gifted artist working on an item of significance may succeed in representing even an octachord; cf. Evans, 1928, 834, fig. 551). Thus, Evans (1928) 834 accords clear priority to the seven strings, calling the three-string "cursive versions" on clay documents (see his fig. 550 c,d) "secondary forms," adding that "too much importance must not be attached to these secondary forms" (cf. *ibid.* 834n3). [Minoan representations of eight strings are common; Evans, 1928, 835 thinks this is but the doubling of a cycladic tetrachord *trigōnon* (cf. Strabo 13.2.4; for other ancient *loci* see Barker, 1984–89, 1.49), and observes that the octa- and heptachords are one and the same, since consecutive tetrachords would have had one tone in common.] The same can be said about the geometric lyre: most vases depict it with four strings (cf. Deubner, 1929; see also Wegner, 1968, 2–16, esp. 5 with fig. 5, Stella, 1978, plate LI, figs. 82 and 83, and Guillemin and Duchesne, 1935, figs. 26, 29, 30, 32, and 35). Wegner (1968) 12 sums up the data well by concluding the the iron-age lyre had four strings, and adds that examples of apparent two- and three-string instances "bieten keine Veranlassung, damit zu rechnen, daß es im wirklichen Gebrauch Saitenspiele mit geringerer Saitenbespannung als diejenige der kanonischen Phorminx gegeben habe" (*ibid.* 14).

[198]So Teodorsson (1996) 354.

[199]See above, n. 80.

in strict dependence on the antecedent poetic tradition of epic).[200] Thus, I conclude that use at Delphi of hexameters to compose its poetic oracles was not derivative of the Homeric or Hesiodic oral traditions of epic, but a related consequence of the notional association of epic diction with divine speech.[201]

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[200]Note, moreover, that the association of Apollo and the Muses is already attested by A 603-4 and θ 488.

[201]The view defended here would be weakened if one could show that the use of verse at Delphi was exceptional and without parallel at other oracular seats. This is Parke's (1981) contention: that versification at Delphi was due to a historical accident found nowhere else, viz. the geographical coincidence of an ancient cult of the Muses with the later prophetic seat of Apollo. Reports of oracular verse at other locations would either be late fabrications or, if true, instances of the influence exerted by Delphi on lesser oracles. Certainty here, as often, is not possible, but Parke's (1981) case is not as persuasive as he would make it. After all, there are only two contemporaneous *comparanda*: Dodona and Didyma in Miletos (Parke, 1981, 102). But from Dodona we have no preserved archaic answers, only a few questions on lead tables which, unsurprisingly, are in prose (cf. Amandry, 1950, 171-72 and Parke, 1967, 110-11). Nothing can be concluded from this: was there ever a *verse* question posed at Delphi? (Cf. Dieterle, 1999.) As to Didyma, we have the added complexity of the possible interference of pre-Hellenic Anatolian practices. There are also fourth-century BC reports of one response in hexameters and an iambic line. One might, with Parke (1981) 103, dismiss these as late fabrications: this is entirely possible, but we cannot be certain. As to the three extant fragmentary oracular responses, Parke (1981) 102 affirms with great confidence that "of two it can safely be said that they are not in verse." And "the third . . . can at least be identified as not in hexameters." But matters are not that simple: I note with interest that one of them is in fact analyzed as elegiac by Roehl (1882) 132 no. 489. The fragment is now lost, but the surviving squeeze can be found in Harder (1958) no. 11. Harder assumes the integrity of the inscription along its left edge: it would then have to be prose. But after inspecting the squeeze I am not convinced that his view must be accepted, and Roehl's solution cannot be discounted. Now, it is true that an oracle in elegiac would be exceptional (cf. Apul. *Met.* 4.33!), but given its transition from non-Hellenic to Hellenic control, I would not think it impossible that, in adopting a Greek meter, Didyma would have experimented with one cognate with hexameter, which had been recently developed in Ionia and was surely current in the compositional practice of local poets. (Fontenrose, 1988, 180 no. 2 follows Harder. On the meter of oracles cf. Pomtow, 1881. I have not been able to locate his obviously relevant *Ad oraculorum quae exstant graecorum editionem prolegomena*, published by Weidmann.) The second of Parke's fragmentary oracular responses, Kawerau and Rehm (1914) no. 132, is inscribed on both sides: side A alone indisputably contains the god's answer, ΘΕΟΣΕΠΕΝ (*sic*), and, as the editor notes, it fits the iambic trimeter; side B does not, but it is by a later scribe and merely contain sacrificial regulations that, though surely sanctioned by the god, are not part of the oracular utterance. (Cf. Fontenrose, 1988, 180-81 no. 3.) We are left, then, with Kawerau and Rehm (1914) no. 178, which, I agree, must be prose (cf. Fontenrose, 1988, 179-80 no. 1). I conclude, therefore, that the 'exceptionality' of Delphi (in Parke's, 1981, 102 sense) cannot be established.

1.6   Plato and inspired poetry

I would like to close this chapter by returning to Plato for a last but very important insight into the ways in which the notional fixity of the Homeric tradition had an impact on its performance. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* make clear that ὑποχρίνεσθαι was used in the context of oracular hermeneutics.[202] Though we do not have any pre-classical surviving instances of ὑποχριτής (its *nomen agentis*), the verb is regularly used by Homeric poetry for the interpretation of signs and dreams (M 228 o 170 τ 535 555; cf. H 407 β 111). In view of the strong association of ὑποχρίνομαι with the interpretation of omens and oracles, and given the notional fixity that attached to divine utterances—to the ἔπη of the Muse and Apollo—the verb also acquired the same connotation of conceptual fixity and, where used, it conveyed that things must necessarily be as they are, or will surely come to pass exactly as predicted. An important example is Penelope's dream-omen. This instance is significant, because the plot's notional fixity is emphatically asserted by the self-interpreting omen. Penelope challenges Odysseus to interpret the dream, requiring him, in effect, to agree or disagree with the tradition of poetry of which he is the protagonist. The narrator quotes Penelope, who quotes the speaking eagle; Odysseus welcomes the challenge and aligns himself with the tradition: "Lady, in no way is it possible to bend this dream aside and give it another meaning" (ὦ γύναι, οὔ πως ἔστιν ὑποχρίνασθαι ὄνειρον ‖ ἄλλη ἀποχλίναντ'[α], τ 555–56). The meaning is fixed, and, hence, interpretation can only reperform the quotation.[203]

But consider now Plato's use of ὑποχριτής as a label for the rhapsode[204] in the light of the tension, expounded above (p. 62), between one who is a primary, revelatory *hermeneus* of the god, unfolding the divine will before his audience, and one who is a *hermeneus* of the poet in a derivative, exegetical sense—who, notionally speaking, not only quotes the ἔπη of the poet, but also unfolds their meaning. (The distinction turns on whether the *hermeneus* mediates between god and man or between man and man.) This means that, diachronically speaking, the rhapsode straddles the shift between the divine Muse as fountain of inspiration and the human poet as the source of the songs he reperforms for his audience.[205] Belonging as he does to a

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[202]See below, pp. 150f.

[203]For more on this dream and the mentality of fixity associated with ὑποχρίνεσθαι, see Nagy (2003) 21–38, esp. 24–25.

[204]See below, p. 152.

[205]In actual performance practice the distinction is a matter of degree, for in either case is there

stage when Homeric poetry is relatively less fluid and, insofar as notionally fixed, ascribed to the authorship of Homer, there is a sense, then, in which the Platonic rhapsode finds in his designation as ὑποκριτής a label that comprehends not only the reception and more or less stable reproduction of relatively fixed material, but also his recomposition of what is relatively more fluid. This latter material can be seen under a dual perspective: not only as a ἑρμηνεία of the Muse, in that it is a creative reappropriation of the tradition (a true recomposition in performance), but also as a ἑρμηνεία of the poet, for the rhapsode elaborates upon the relatively more fixed traditional material (notionally ascribed now to the archetypal poet), developing the story through thematic expansion and contraction, 'ornamenting' the plot (with additional, non-essential themes), and providing transitional passages that join episodes whose text is relatively less fluid.

It is in this sense that the rhapsode can truly be called a ὑποκριτής of Homer. In time, as the preponderance of the poetic material grew increasingly fixed, the explanatory function of the rhapsode might have adapted correspondingly, and his personal contribution might have taken to prose comments, not unlike in kind, if perhaps in quality, to the sophistic lectures that came to dominate the cultural scene in late fifth-century Athens. This would spell a direct line between the rhapsodic ὑπόκρισις and the sophistic ἐπιδείξεις to which the former were often unfavorably compared.[206]

Plato's slant in the *Ion* is now clear: by collapsing poetic and rhapsodic ἑρμηνεῖαι, and exclusively choosing as his model of oracular delivery the ecstatic Pythia, rather than the self-possessed prophet, he upsets the dominant archaic paradigm of poetic inspiration, opting instead for a comparatively late minority one that made literal *mania* the performer's *modus operandi*. No wonder Ion objected!

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some measure of recomposition in accordance with canons of traditional oral poetic production.
[206]See below, pp. 152.

Chapter 2

Aristotle on Delivery

2.1 Why Aristotle on ὑπόκρισις matters

As I noted in the Introduction,[1] the term ὑπόκρισις is not connected solely with or-
atorical delivery but, more broadly, with the general notion of 'performance'; and a
central witness to its conceptual development is Aristotle's *Rhetoric* III.1–12.[2] But
before we consider what the philosopher has to say about it, I must justify my engag-
ing in the detailed and comprehensive study that is presented in this chapter. For,
given the subject matter of this dissertation, namely, a diachronic study of Homeric
performance, it is not difficult to suppose that even the sympathetic reader might
question, if not the need, at least the scope and depth of the ensuing analysis. It
is, therefore, essential that I restate here the rationale that moves me to do so. My
point of entry is the reference to ῥαψῳδία at 1403b22, in the context of Aristotle's
discussion of ὑπόκρισις:

> τρίτον δὲ τούτων ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην, οὔπω δ' ἐπικεχείρηται, τὰ
> περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ῥαψῳδίαν ὀψὲ παρῆλθεν·
> ὑπεκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸ πρῶτον.

"What has to do with *hypokrisis*" is here said to have come "late" to rhapsody.
This observation seems to mark a development in the manner of performance of
Homeric poetry—for, whatever else ῥαψῳδία includes, it must at least include this—
and hence the report has a *prima facie* claim on our attention. The joint mention
of τραγική makes clear that what has come late to rhapsody is not the *exercise* of

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[1]See above, p. 1.
[2]See above, p. 6.

'delivery': for τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν came late to tragic drama too, which could not exist without on-stage delivery—for surely, in that context, ὑπόκρισις must be what the ὑποκριτής does. The two statements that follow make clear that the philosopher is speaking about the *study* and *formal instruction* of 'delivery': "For initially the poets themselves used to act their tragic plays." We must remember that in the beginning there was only one actor;[3] thus, if the poet himself acted his plays, he had no reason critically to reflect upon and write about the principles that made for successful delivery, since no one needed to learn them from him. Doubtless, Aristotle assumes the poet's natural gift not only for composing but also delivering his lines effectively.[4] A second statement helps to clarify the meaning of τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν: δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ποιητικήν, ὅπερ ἕτεροί ⟨τέ⟩ τινες ἐπραγματεύθησαν καὶ Γλαύκων ὁ Τήιος (1403b24–26). There is "that sort of thing" in relation to rhetoric which also exists with reference to poetics;[5] which Glaukon of Theos and some others have taken in hand (in connection with poetics). Evidently, in view is studying, teaching, and writing about poetics. And οὔπω δ' ἐπικεχείρηται (1403b21) points in the same direction: "not yet taken in hand" does not address the attempt to *practice* delivery, but its analysis and instruction by scholars.[6]

Now, what could the philosopher mean when he writes that ὑπόκρισις has come to rhapsody late? Pointing to the paring of ῥαψῳδία and τραγική, someone might conclude that what Aristotle has in mind is the theatricality of rhapsodic recitation: an exaggerated stage presence, with overdone histrionic vocal intonation, gestures, attire, perhaps even too 'mimetic' an impersonation of Homeric characters when reciting their speeches. The thought of the passage would be construed thus: at length, under the influence of tragic performance, someone started to reflect upon dramatic technique—what made for effective delivery on stage—and brought in turn such reflection, in writing and teaching, to bear on rhapsody. Now, let me speak clearly to this point: as early as the fourth century BC (if not before) we do see tragic drama exert such influences upon rhetoric and rhapsody, with the corresponding overemphasis on histrionic delivery. But restricting Aristotle's meaning to this alone, I believe, drastically impoverishes his thought, not only in regard to what he says

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[3]Cf. Aristotle's *Poetics* 1449a15–17.

[4]Cf. his assertion at 1404a15.

[5]ποιητική presumably includes τραγική and ῥαψῳδία.

[6]This understanding receives further support from the related ἐγκεχειρήκασιν of 1404a13–15.

about rhetoric but, more germanely, what he says *by implication* about rhapsody too. My argument is simple to state, though it takes this entire chapter to make it convincingly: the philosopher's view of ὑπόκρισις is *not* simply the superficial one of dress, gestures, and emotive vocal delivery, which a critic of the encroachment of acting on the practice of orators and rhapsodes might decry. Vocal delivery, to be sure, is involved (for he says that ὑπόκρισις is in the voice, 1403b27); and πάθη are certainly in view, for his focus is on how to use the voice "for each *pathos*" (πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος, 1403b27–28). But his intent is to study ὑπόκρισις as a most powerful means to the end of persuading an audience. 'Delivery', then, is an essential aspect of the orator's task, a crucial element of rhetoric, and it must be diligently considered from the point of view of the civic psychology of emotions that the *Rhetoric* undertakes to investigate.

If my reading of *Rh.* III.1 is correct, an examination of the first twelve chapters of the third book of Aristotle's treatise should open a window into the thought and practice of rhapsodes concerning their training and delivery of Homeric epic. For the philosopher himself says that the τὸ τοιοῦτον that he addresses there in connection with rhetoric came late to rhapsody too. In other words, our understanding of ὑπόκρισις in the *Rhetoric*—the only extant classical treatise that deals explicitly with delivery—will, *mutatis mutandis*, illuminate the performance practices of rhapsodes during the classical period. And, since at 1404a19–20 Aristotle explicitly refers to the technique of writing as an element of rhetorical practice (a matter more famously treated by Alkidamas in his *On the Sophists*),[7] we are offered a glimpse of what was a cultural watershed, at a time when it was still a relatively recent phenomenon and its impact is still under consideration and debate.

But now I must relate the two principal objections that motivate the inquiry presented in this chapter. The first is that Aristotle, in fact, does not think of delivery in the terms I have just outlined: namely, as an essential part of the oratorical task that needs to be understood, embraced, and practiced by one who desires to succeed as an orator. Rather, critics claim, Aristotle thinks that delivery is *inherently* an ethically objectionable matter that is best set aside and disposed off; consequently, his goal in *Rh.* III.1–12 is *not* ὑπόκρισις, 'delivery', but λέξις, 'style'—and a notion of style, at that, purged from the moral stain of ties to delivery. Although this stance is variously advocated, it finds particular expression in a view of φαντασία at 1404a11 that contemptuously glosses it as 'mere appearance', 'outward show' *vel sim*. The

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[7]See below, p. 162.

second main objection, built upon the first, is that the statement about writing at 1404a19–20 has nothing to do with delivery but solely, if anything, with style: and note how, by stating his case thus, the critic has implicitly divorced style and delivery, has made them separate in Aristotle's thought and treatment, and has mapped the philosopher's onto our own modern views of style—views that are inextricably linked to the written word, and hence connote matters that can be satisfactorily captured by what is on the page, with only a derivative reference (if any) to vocal utterance or performance.

These views are so insidious—if only, because they so readily fit the mold of our own thinking and reflect a longstanding scholarly consensus—that it takes much effort to undo them. To that end, I undertake a comprehensive rereading of *Rh.* III.1–12 that places the philosopher's thought back in its own historical context, without the distortions of what I believe to be anachronisms, however appealing or natural to us. To anticipate my results: in Aristotle's thought λέξις and ὑπόκρισις cannot be divorced, nor are they, in fact, divorced in his actual treatment: delivery (as an element, or even the characteristic shape of, rhetorical style) is in view all throughout these twelve chapters; φαντασία is not 'outward show', but the soul's [re]presentational device that mediates between the sense perception and man's critical faculties; and hence, the writing that is in view in 1404a19–20 is an element of the orator's delivery: a technique only recently introduced and used *with a view to delivery*. It is in that light that we must, in particular, read chapter 12 of *Rh.* III. Once I have established that this is Aristotle's thought regarding oratorical delivery, I shall be free to bring my conclusions to bear upon the rhapsode and *his* training and practice. For if the γραφόμενοι λόγοι of 1404a19–20, e.g., had really been a matter of style tied to the written word and not to delivery, one could legitimately challenge its applicability to rhapsodic performance, which, after all, is concerned not with the written word but with vocal utterance.

2.2   Relationship between λέξις and ὑπόκρισις

In the third book of his *Rhetoric* Aristotle turns from πίστεις,[8] his focus in books I and II, to λέξις and τάξις ('style'[9] and 'arrangement'[10] respectively). By connecting λέξις with ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν and τὸ φανῆναι ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον (1403b16–18), the philosopher explains the general meaning and scope of this term. There is, however, less terminological (if not conceptual) neatness to it than most commentators assume, and one of the difficulties in explicating the thought of chapters 1 and 2 of the third book of the *Rhetoric* is the specific relationship between λέξις—apparently the more inclusive rubric for *Rhetoric* III.1–12—and ὑπόκρισις, the notion that arguably takes center stage in chapter 1.

Rh. 1403b18–22 marks the transition to the new subject: τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἐζητήθη κατὰ φύσιν ὅπερ πέφυκε πρῶτον, αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα ἐκ τίνων ἔχει τὸ πιθανόν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τούτων ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην, οὔπω δ' ἐπικεχείρηται, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. The 'natural order' (κατὰ φύσιν) of the inquiry had led to what was 'first by nature' (ὅπερ πέφυκε πρῶτον), τὰ πράγματα, specifically, "whence it gains τὸ πιθανόν"—this, clearly, a reference to the study of πίστεις in books I and II. The headings that follow under δεύτερον and τρίτον are not a recapitulation of the basic outline of the *Rhetoric* (πίστεις, λέξις, and τάξις), as is the opinion of those who equate τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι with πῶς χρὴ τάξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ λόγου. For the verb διατίθεσθαι here does not mean 'to arrange' (it is therefore not a synonym of τάξαι); indeed, if *arrangement* were in view, with 'style' playing the organizing principle, we would expect κατὰ λέξιν (or similar) instead of the instrumental τῇ λέξει. Rather, the *DGE s.v.* διατίθημι B.II.2 correctly cites *Rh.* 1403b20 under 'explicar, exponer, narrar', placing the emphasis not on the structure, but on the character of the speech in view.[11] Thus, taking at face-value

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[8] At *Rh.* 1403a36 the philosopher also refers to πίστεις by the expression τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν.

[9] Though 'style' is its usual translation, λέξις denotes broadly how thought is expressed in words. Thus, depending on the context it may be rendered 'language', 'word choice', 'expression', *vel sim.* (Kennedy, 1991, 216). In this chapter I will argue that *oral* expression is most often in view.

[10] *Rh.* 1403a36–b2 and 1403b7–8.

[11] Though related to it, this acceptation is not the same as the (later common) 'to set forth' (LSJ *s.v.* B.6), a meaning illustrated by διατίθεσθαι with objects such as λόγους, ἐπαίνους, or δημηγορίαν. The *DGE* collects such instances *s.v.* B.II.1, a division that differs from B.II.2 in that it emphasizes the publication of the discourse. Thus, I agree with Cope (1877) 3.3 when he dismisses the meaning *in publicum proponere, in medium proferre*, choices that would make τὸ ταῦτα τῇ λέξει διαθέσθαι near identical with the *third* head of Aristotle's list, ὑπόκρισις. Kennedy (1991) *ad loc.* translates, "how to compose this in language"; Dufour and Wartelle (1973), less literally, "la valeur que leur

the statement of intention περὶ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, we should read the δεύτερον and τρίτον of *Rh.* 1403b20 that follow the reference to the foregoing material (the πρῶτον) as a twofold conceptual division of λέξις—that second great head in the overall outline of the treatise as we know it today.

It is clear, then, that at this stage of the argument ὑπόκρισις is seen as the second phase in the deployment of the resources of λέξις by the oratorical art: first comes the stylistic shaping of the material; then follows τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν "which," we are told "is of the greatest moment."[12] Aristotle does not attempt here a formal definition of ὑπόκρισις, assuming, perhaps, that its connection with the theater (τραγική, 1403b22) suffices to explain it. He soon adds that "it [ὑπόκρισις] lies in the voice (ἐν τῇ φωνῇ), how one should use it to express each emotion" (1403b27–28). The inventory that follows pertains in its entirety to the management of the voice and, generally, to oral delivery: its 'loudness', whether μεγάλη, μικρά, or μέση; its 'intonation' or 'pitch' (τόνος): ὀξύς, βαρύς, or μέσος;[13] and the 'rhythms' (ῥυθμοί) that correspond to each case. He then gathers these under the headings μέγεθος, ἁρμονία, and ῥυθμός, which must be, I think, the antecedents of the αὐτῶν at 1403b35: οὔπω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὀψὲ προῆλθεν· καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, καλῶς ὑπολαμβανόμενον (1403b35–1404a1).

It is at this point in the text of the *Rhetoric* that scholars start sensing difficulties with its terminology. For some translate the ἐπεὶ καί of 1403b35 as "since even," as if the philosopher's treatment of ὑπόκρισις marked a detour, opening a parenthesis on 'delivery' before the matter of λέξις (properly considered) is finally taken up in section eight.[14] So, e.g., Kennedy (1991) renders the passage as follows: "An *Art* concerned with [the delivery of oratory] has not yet been composed, since even consideration of *lexis* was late in developing."[15] When it comes to 1404a8, however, he

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prête le style"; while Cope (*ibidem*) helpfully writes that "διαθέσθαι denotes . . . the investing of the speech with a certain character, putting it in a certain state, by the use of language. . . . It does not mean here distribution, ordering, arrangement, which is not the special office of the graces and properties of language or style."

[12]Cf. the use of κυριώτατος at *Rh.* 1355a7, 1356a13, and 1358b17.

[13]The feminine gender is used throughout, which makes clear that φωνή, 'voice', is still conceptually in view under the plural τόνοι.

[14]Kennedy (1991) 217 writes: "A third beginning is then supplied in section 3 [of *Rh.* III.1], followed by some remarks on delivery, and the *actual* discussion of *lexis* does not begin until section 8" (my emphasis).

[15]Despite Kennedy's (1991) 216 acknowledgment that "*lexis* . . . refers to the 'way of *saying*' something" (my emphasis), his perspective as a modern scholar naturally gravitates towards a reading of the *Rhetoric* that makes the *written* word its primary focus; this frame of reference

translates τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως as "the subject of expression," adding in a footnote, tellingly: "*Lexis*, here apparently including delivery"; in other words, whereas he had thus far separated λέξις and ὑπόκρισις, now at last he brings them together. Kennedy is forced to make inconsistent exegetical choices—*lexis* now excluding, now including 'delivery'—because he wishes to restrict the characterization of φορτικόν at 1403b36 to ὑπόκρισις (hence also the "since even" that suggests a detour); but now, at 1404a8f., Aristotle speaks of the "small necessary place" of λέξις in all teaching, a regrettable consequence (as the μὲν οὖν makes clear[16]) of the corruption of the audience (διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν). If φορτικόν applies only to ὑπόκρισις, and μοχθηρία in the hearer calls for λέξις (in a limited way, as a concession to weakness), then it follows that λέξις now *must* include ὑπόκρισις. But another option (defended

in turn leads him to introduce hard distinctions—in this case, between ὑπόκρισις and λέξις—where the relation between the terms is more nuanced. Freese's (1926) translation *ad* 1403b35 avoids the impression of a false dichotomy: "But no treatise has yet been composed on delivery, since the matter of style itself only lately came into notice." καί (as the "itself" hints) *is* emphatic, but the comparison does not intend a contrast between 'delivery' and 'style' that sets the former apart from the latter. If there is an argument *a minore ad maius*, it is one of the part vis-à-vis the whole: τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν denotes the sphere of all matters related to λέξις; if only lately did the general sphere of 'stylistic matters' itself receive scholarly attention, the correspondingly late focus on 'delivery'—a subordinate component of λέξις—is only to be expected. Now, I agree that a translation like Kennedy's (1991) that renders ἐπεὶ καί 'since even' does not necessarily exclude this meaning, even if it tends to obscure it. Thus, e.g., although Ross (1924) *ad loc.* writes "indeed, even the study of language made no progress till late in the day," a footnote clarifies: "From this and other indications it would seem that Aristotle regards delivery as a subordinate part of λέξις, 'expression'." And, sensitive to the 'oral' overtones of the terminology, he adds (*ibidem*): "The classification of ὑπόκρισις under λέξις is helped by the relation of the latter to λέγειν. λέξις is 'a mode of speaking'." Cope (1877) 6, in his note to §5, offers an acceptable translation, but unduly restricts the φορτικόν to ἡ ὑποκριτική (obscuring its clear, and immediately preceding, neuter referent, viz. τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν; see further below, n. 150): "But no art has been as yet composed of it; for in fact it was not till late that that of composition made any advance."

[16]Reviewing the uses of μὲν οὖν, Denniston (1950) 470–81 divides them into three main categories: (1) retrospective and transitional οὖν with prospective μέν; (2) οὖν emphasizing a prospective μέν; (3) οὖν emphasizing an adversative or affirmative μέν. This passage falls under the first category (the repeated mention of the 'hearer' at 1404a8 and a11 makes this clear): with transitional and inferential force Aristotle retakes the immediately preceding μέγα δύναται in order to restate his point (διαφέρει γάρ τι) with an additional qualification (οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον), deriving from it as well a practical consequence for the study of rhetoric (ἔχει τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ). The ὅμως of a8 might seem at first to hinder my view that this section presents a restatement and an inferential summary (which would call for overall agreement with and perhaps expansion of the foregoing, but not for an adversative); but, just as the μὲν οὖν, this ὅμως *also* looks back, responding to the tension between the philosopher's censure of the ἡ τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρία that gives λέξις its force, and his implicit repudiation of any device that does not strictly answer to the bare facts—this latter, an imperative of justice that only an ideal society, devoid of the corrupting allure of style, might realize. This, moreover, is not the only ὅμως in the passage: an ἀλλ' ὅμως in the previous sentence makes explicit the tension between the status of λέξις as περίεργα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι and its influence (μέγα δύναται).

here) opens before the interpreter: that Aristotle's view of λέξις, from the vantage point of an ideal ethics, is more radically negative than commentators usually allow, and that φορτικόν applies not only to ὑπόκρισις but to λέξις as a whole. Now, those who accept the suggestion of a detour usually blame the undeniable awkwardness of the resulting thematic outline on an unfinished (or unpolished) redaction, either by Aristotle himself or by later members of the Academy who allegedly merged two originally independent works into a single treatise.[17] But the suggestion of a detour or parenthesis cannot be sustained. As argued above, following upon his clear statement of intention, Aristotle sets out to discuss λέξις, of which he reckons ὑπόκρισις a subordinate division. From our modern point of view, this choice is by no means self-evident: why should 'oral delivery' (if we accept this as a valid tentative rendering of the term) be considered part of 'style'? It is quite possible to think of 'style' as including only what can be immediately conveyed by the written word, *without* embracing matters more narrowly connected with *oral* delivery. This is the way most interpreters think about the items covered in chapters 3–11:[18] word choice suitable to prose, metaphors, similes, frigidity, grammatical correctness, conciseness, appropriateness, prose rhythm (for loud reading), periodic style, elegance, expressiveness, use of proverbs and hyperbole. This *we* find eminently possible to do, because of the predominance in our conceptual universe of the written word (and, hence, of written discourse) over performance.[19] We think of the *word*, first and foremost, as reified, on the page (so to say), and 'style', therefore, as subsuming what belongs to the literary study of *written* texts—with voice and its qualities logically falling under some other head, 'delivery', 'acting', or similar. My argument here resists this proclivity by highlighting the *discontinuity* between Aristotle and later scholars in the way they articulated the relation between λέξις and ὑπόκρισις. Although I do not fully subscribe his argument and conclusions, at least in this regard I agree with Graff (2000) 4–5: "[W]hile it is true that style (λέξις, *elocutio*) would become a regular component in

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[17]I am not denying the possibility (which has much to commend it) that the present-day book III of the *Rhetoric* may originally have been an independent work: this would account for the admittedly awkward double transition from *Rh.* II to III: ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἔστιν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον at 1403a34–35 and ἐπειδὴ τρία ἐστὶν ἃ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ τὸν λόγον at 1403b6–7. For a possible reconstruction of the historical development of the treatise, see Kennedy (1991) 217 and 299–309 (his appendix II).

[18]I make clear below (see p. 82) that I disagree with this narrow construction of the contents of these chapters.

[19]Note, in this connection, the helpful distinction between *primary* and *secondary* rhetoric in Kennedy (1999) 2–3.

the major rhetorical systems after Aristotle, its status is less clear in works prior to
the *Rhetoric* and also in the Aristotelian formulation of the art." The discontinu-
ity, however, is not simply one of content, of topics covered: it arises primarily from
the emphasis the philosopher placed on oral and aural dimensions of style and from
his corresponding focus on delivery as its controlling τέλος. But as writing acquired
greater pedagogical and cultural prominence, it did not take long before λέξις came to
mean what we ourselves generally understand by style: the diction and composition
of the written word, a set of formal qualities at times even better suited for reading
than hearing. This development is already clear in Demetrios' *On Style*:[20] he shows
no interest in the management of the voice, and references to ὑπόκρισις are restricted
to stage acting[21] or to short, passing observations about the γραφική and ὑποκριτικὴ
λέξις,[22] comments that turn on the use of σύνδεσμοι and are largely derivative of
Aristotle (*Rhetoric* III.12). Typical of his attitude is *Eloc.* §195, where he abruptly
cuts off his analysis of the scope for acting in a particular scene of Euripides' *Ion* with
the words: ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ ὑποκρίσεως ἡμῖν τὰ νῦν ὁ λόγος.[23]

This is not Aristotle's view: though the destabilization of the oral culture of An-
cient Greece was already under way in his own time (and, to go no further, chapter 12

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[20]Today scholars date most, if not all, of the treatise (to which I shall refer by the Latin *Eloc.*) to
no later than the second century BC, with a few excepting only what they think are minor editorial
touches by a later hand. Cf. Innes (1999) 312–21.

[21]*Eloc.* §§58, 195.

[22]*Eloc.* §§193–94, 226, 271

[23]Aristotle himself planted the seeds of this development: his divergent analyses of λέξις in the
Poetics and the *Rhetoric* implied that poetry (or, more broadly, literature) and oratory called not
merely for two different styles, but for entirely different ways of conceptualizing style (see below,
p. 125). To understand how natural it was for the study of λέξις to shift its focus from oratory to
literature, we need only remember the philosopher's dismissal of ὄψις as 'least integral to poetics'
because the δύναμις of tragedy did not depend on actors or on competitive performance (ἀγών)
(*Poetics* 1450b16–20); and that he thought reading unassisted by the κίνησις of performance quite
able to reveal the qualities of tragedy (*ibid.* 1462a12). *Letteraturizzazione* is the Italian term used
to denote this move away from oratory—in Kennedy's (1999) 3 words, "the tendency of rhetoric
to shift focus from persuasion to narration, from civic to personal contexts, and from speech to
literature, including poetry." It is difficult to say whether this development was already under way
with Theophrastos. His writing an independent treatise on delivery (cf. Diogenes Laertios 5.48)
suggests that he held to a greater autonomy of λέξις and ὑπόκρισις than Aristotle did. A passage of
Athanasius (Fortenbaugh et al., 1992, 558 fr. 712) shows that to voice, he added the study gestures
(κίνησις τοῦ σώματος), and that he was more successful than his predecessor in integrating voice
and gesture with an analysis of human emotions. (Yet facial expressions are not entirely ignored
by the *Rhetoric*: cf. 1386a33 [see below, p. 86] and 1408b7 [see below, p. 87].) But fragments 687
and 691 (Fortenbaugh) show an emphasis on the senses (sound and sight) that is remarkably similar
to Aristotle's own (cf. *Rh.* 1405b6, 17–18). Thus, it is hard for me to tell how great a departure
Theophrastos' treatment really represents. Cf. Fortenbaugh (1985).

of *Rhetoric* III may well serve as witness), ὀνόματα, 'words', are for him *still* primarily *mimetic* and a matter of the φωνή: ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινῆσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, οἱ ποιηταί· τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν, ὑπῆρξεν δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν· (1404a20–22). This statement, the cause of much dismay for some scholars, as one writer notes,[24] has nothing to do with the Platonic theory of words we encounter in the *Kratylos*, but is rather an admission of the degree to which, even as late as Aristotle, ποιητική and ῥητορική ('literature' and 'oratory', to use *our* terms), not to mention ῥαψῳδική and ὑποκριτική, all were preeminently oral professions, and scholarly study of these would not have easily dissociated their 'strictly oral' dimensions (e.g. intonation) from their (from our cultural perspective) 'more literary' qualities (say, the use of *tropoi* or grammatical correctness). A careful reading of *Rhetoric* III.3–12 will discover many instances where the *oral* dimension of delivery is clearly in view,[25] well beyond what a study of style strictly bound to the written word would lead the scholar to consider. But Aristotle's perspective is particularly clear in chapters 1 and 12, where (as I will presently argue) ὑπόκρισις, though first apparently limited to the voice and its properties, quickly expands its purview, and soon comes to stand more generally for λέξις—while, reciprocally, λέξις stands for a style that is tailored to and controlled by ὑπόκρισις. This move, which has confused many a scholar, should not surprise us: though we might have wished for greater terminological clarity throughout, the philosopher's usage opens to us a window into his thought, still primarily controlled by the oral dimensions of rhetoric, which is sooner embodied by the performance of the speaker before his audience than by the written text of his oration; this allows 'delivery' to stand for the 'stylistic shape' of the performance, including, yes, the use of metaphors, similes, elegance, conciseness, grammatical correctness, and so on.

2.3   ὑπόκρισις, not a detour

That Aristotle actually dealt with matters that fall strictly under the narrow definition of ὑπόκρισις (i.e. those connected with the management of the voice) should be

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[24]Cf. Rapp (2002) 2.819–20.

[25]Note, e.g., how even at 1407b11–12, where Aristotle is explicitly concerned with *written* texts (τὸ γεγραμμένον), εὐανάγνωστον, 'easy to read aloud', is equated with εὔφραστον, which LSJ *s.v.* renders 'easy to make intelligible', an acceptable gloss that has, nevertheless, an undeniable *speaking* semantic component, and is correspondingly rendered by translators as 'easy to speak' (Kennedy), 'easy to utter' (Freese, *LCL*), or 'leicht auszusprechen' (Rapp).

considered *a priori* plausible. After all, at least on two different occasions he states
that no one had attempted a treatise about them: at 1403b21 he notes that τὰ περὶ τὴν
ὑπόκρισιν had not yet been taken in hand (οὔπω δ' ἐπικεχείρηται);[26] and at 1403b35
he adds that οὔπω δὲ σύγκειται τέχνη περὶ αὐτῶν, where, as mentioned above (p. 76),
the αὐτῶν most likely points to the three qualities of the voice (1403b30). There is
no existing manual (τέχνη), the philosopher says, "since also the [broader] field of
λέξις has come up late" (ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὀψὲ προῆλθεν). The ὀψὲ προῆλθεν
of 1403b36 parallels the ὀψὲ παρῆλθεν of 1403b23, this latter noting the introduc-
tion of ὑπόκρισις into the dramatic and rhapsodic arts. There is a third statement
at 1404a12–15, in my opinion to be listed along with the other two; though I will con-
sider it in detail below (see p. 118), I may now advance some of my conclusions here
for the sake of clarity in my presentation. The text runs as follows: ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν
ὅταν ἔλθη ταὐτὸ ποιήσει τῆ ὑποκριτικῆ, ἐγκεχειρήκασιν δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν
τινές, οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς Ἐλέοις. The ἐκείνη, as I will argue below, takes λέξις
as its immediate antecedent, but does so not to the exclusion of ὑπόκρισις, which is
subsumed under 'style' as the larger heading: this conceptual overlap alone accounts
for the grammar (which calls for λέξις) and the context (which calls for ὑπόκρισις)—a
fact of great significance from which it follows that where 'style' is mentioned, 'oral
delivery', its primary subdivision, is preeminently in view. The ὅταν ἔλθη, 'when it
comes',[27] clearly picks up on ὀψὲ παρῆλθεν and ὀψὲ προῆλθεν; and ἐγκεχειρήκασιν
δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον answers to and qualifies οὔπω δ' ἐπικεχείρηται (1403b21). Should there
be any need further to establish the tie between this last and the first two passages,
note the statement about ἄθλα at 1404a17, with the pointed πάλιν that precedes it,
which sends us forward to the καθάπερ clause that follows it and back to the similar
comment at 1403b32. Aristotle's focus is on the lack of an appropriate scholarly treat-
ment of ὑπόκρισις and, more broadly, λέξις. In light of this, is it plausible to think
that he, too, would have failed to cover ὑπόκρισις in his *Rhetoric*? After pointing out
the gap (twice, if not thrice), would he also have failed to fill it? Scholars by and large
seem to think so, and Kennedy (1991) 219n8 may serve as illustration; for, translat-
ing 1404a12–13 "when delivery comes to be considered," he adds the footnote: "As it
apparently was by Aristotle's student Theophrastus." But, if he is right, how are we

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[26]By itself, this might mean that his own treatise had not yet addressed it, but the second
occurrence makes the sense clear, viz. that no scholar had yet given it sustained attention. Of
course, had he meant the former, this would imply that he himself would presently take it up.

[27]For which we must doubtless supply something like "into use" or "into vogue."

to justify the philosopher's failure? One might perhaps adduce that ὑπόκρισις is not that important after all: but Aristotle calls it ὃ δύναμιν μὲν ἔχει μεγίστην. Or one may claim that studying it is undesirable, for it is only likely to corrupt the audience; but, to this view and its underlying presumptions (which I examine below and find wanting), Aristotle's own considered judgment may suffice: τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως ὅμως ἔχει τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ.[28] But, one may yet protest, what the philosopher does study is λέξις, not ὑπόκρισις, and therefore he does, after all, fill the gap. The problem with this view, however, is that it drives too wide a wedge between ὑπόκρισις and λέξις, wider than the philosopher's thought and words will allow; and that it fails to account for the two statements that are unequivocally about ὑπόκρισις in its narrow concern with φωνή: thus a glaring failure to address what Aristotle himself owns as being of the greatest moment would stand—and that, without any explicit admission of what must then be considered by all an intentional oversight, nor a rationale for this *a priori* unexpected course of action.

Another option must be considered: that Aristotle *did*, in fact, treat ὑπόκρισις in chapters 3–12, though in a manner that has so failed to meet the expectations of modern scholars as to lead them to believe that he did *not* do so. A full explanation must wait until I consider 1404a12–19 in detail below; but I can now anticipate my conviction that most scholars have read Aristotle with anachronistic expectations, tacitly presuming that only the presence of material on delivery such as is attested in later works would justify the claim that the philosopher had indeed written, if not a whole independent treatise on it, a least a section of his *Rhetoric* on delivery. Thus it will be helpful, at this point, to survey the chapters in question and see if there are any sections where voice and its properties—under the subheadings of loudness, harmony, and rhythm—come explicitly into play. As we do, we must remember at all times that the primary application of ὑπόκρισις is πῶς αὐτῇ [i.e. φωνῇ] δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος. I am not thereby conceding that only passages that explicitly discuss the voice and the emotions would qualify as a study of ὑπόκρισις, for my main contention is that, for Aristotle, all of λέξις is intimately bound with delivery; but identifying such sections would help to make the point that the philosopher, far from

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[28] According to Aristotle, τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν had only come to the dramatic art of late because the poets themselves had at first acted out their own tragedies. Hence there was no need to instruct others in delivery—the assumption being, perhaps, that poets were 'natural' actors (cf. 1404a15). Once some distance intervened between the poet and the performer, the conceptual space necessary for abstract study arose. But, as regards rhetoric, Aristotle lived during a time when teachers of the art were many and in great demand; so, it is only reasonable to expect that his rhetorical manual would have made sure to impart the all essential instruction in oral delivery.

excluding delivery as socially noxious and unworthy of his attention, is clearly engaged with what he has already granted is of the greatest consequence for the practicing orator.

2.4 ὑπόκρισις, not just in *Rhetoric* III.1

We have already remarked that Aristotle considers voice to be the 'most mimetic' of man's constituent parts (see above, p. 80). The corresponding connection between ὀνόματα and φωνή is grounded upon articulate sound, evident in performance but only latent on the written page. This is the starting point of λέξις, of which poets are named the pioneers (1404a20ff.). Among the orators, Gorgias of Leontini provides Aristotle with a suitable illustration of the early and unsatisfactory 'poetic style'; and, lest we forget that we are dealing with rhetorical performance first, and only then with its written record, we read that "the majority of the uneducated still think that such [as he] *speak* (διαλέγεσθαι) best" (1404a27–28). A similar concern with sound surfaces at 1405b6–7, where we learn that the beauty of words (κάλλος ὀνόματος) resides in their sound (ἐν τοῖς ψόφοις) or their sense; therefore metaphors[29] should be derived "from what is beautiful in their sound (ἐν τῇ φωνῇ), their effect, their display (τῇ ὄψει), or any other sense perception (ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει)"—and with these words the philosopher extends the perceptual field of the audience from the immediacy of the auditory to such φαντάσματα of the other senses as might be evoked by the imagery of the metaphor.[30]

When it comes to propriety of style, we are easily misled into thinking of it primarily (or even exclusively) in terms of word choice.[31] And such a view would not be

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[29]*Rh.* 1405b17–18.

[30]This is what is involved in "making the thing appear 'before the eyes'" (ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὀμμάτων), which is treated at greater length in *Rh.* III.10–11. (Cf. also *Poetics* 17.) For an exploration of φαντασία in connection with rhetoric, see below, pp. 105ff. It is helpful to cite here Kennedy's (1963) 107 insightful comment about Aristotle's distinctive approach to the study of metaphors: "The account [of ornament] is a subtle one and seeks to penetrate to an understanding of the psychological effect of a metaphor." To this, he adds: "[The knowledge communicated by metaphors], like rhythm and like the sense of grammatical completion, produces a feeling of pleasure and satisfaction and is thus a characteristic of good style. Happiness is as much the object of Aristotle's theory of style as of his ethics" (*ibid.* 112). Kennedy is acknowledging that, even when it comes to what many would consider the most traditional of stylistic topics, viz. metaphor, the philosopher is eminently concerned with the emotions, the very target of delivery. And his concern, as we have seen by his statement at 1405b17–18, centers on the sensory qualities of metaphors.

[31]Thus, Kennedy (1991) 220 titles *Rh.* III.2 "The *Aretē*, or Virtue, of Good Prose Style; Word Choice and Metaphors."

problematic if we reckoned as part of that choice its effect on delivery, i.e. its ensuing sound shape: intonation, loudness, rhythm, the melodic line of the resulting phrase, etc. But for the average modern literate sensibility, word choice is mostly a matter of lexical semantics, and propriety connotes a register suitable to the topic and the character or social standing of the 'notional speaker' (often merely the author of the text, whose speech is usually read in silence)—without giving thought to any performative dimensions. Aristotle once again confutes our assumptions; for though he speaks of propriety as 'contracting' or 'augmenting' the tone—and illustrates his meaning *a fortiori* from poetry by censuring slaves and youth who use fine language—when it comes to a real-life example, he mentions "the voice of Theodoros" (ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνή): "for his [voice] seemed to belong to the one speaking, those [of the other actors] to someone else" (ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λέγοντος ἔοικεν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἀλλότριαι, 1404b23–24). A concentrated focus on the voice is all too easy to understand, considering that the actor was masked, and hence could not change his facial expression to enhance his acting.[32] He could of course gesticulate and move about the stage, but the lion's share of his dramatic art would necessarily fall on the voice. It is perhaps Aristotle's conceptual dependence upon the stage as he develops his own ideas about the orator's λέξις and ὑπόκρισις that explains why he largely failed to include in his study the use of the face, hands, and any appropriate scope for gestures.[33] But the fact remains that, in illustrating proper word choice, as he holds up the goal of a 'natural art' that hides its artifice (1404b18–19), he makes clear that his concern is with its impact on the voice, i.e. on the orator *in performance*.

Another place where φωνή and its properties are clearly in view is chapter 7. We must remember, as I pointed out above (see p. 82), that delivery is primarily concerned with how one should employ the voice in regard to every πάθος. Thus, when we read at 1408a10–11 that "style will possess propriety if it is expressive of πάθος and ἦθος and proportional to its subject matter," we should immediately think of the voice in performance, and how its loudness, harmony, and rhythm are to be deployed to achieve these goals.[34] Hence, to speak αὐτοκαβδάλως or σεμνῶς

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[32]His eyes, though visible through the mask, would have been too small for his audience to see.

[33]Stage gestures were exaggerated and, in his view, unbecomingly crude (cf. *Poetics* 26 and below, p. 100). The same attitude may underlie his vehement criticism of Kleon's manner in addressing the assembly (cf. *Ath. pol.* 28 §3).

[34]As Rapp (2002) 2.861 remarks, that style be ἀνάλογον to its subject matter should not be construed as a third requirement unrelated to its ability effectively to portray *ēthos* and *pathos*: "Natürlich liegt die Angemessenheit nicht schon dann vor, wenn die sprachliche Form ‚emotional' und ‚charaktervoll' ist; also wird man den letzten Teil des Definiens „dem zugrunde liegenden Gegenstand

shall be a matter of word choice in the extended sense discussed above: not only with attention to the semantic register involved, but also to intonation, loudness, and any other quality that serves to project a persuasive *persona* or communicate the requisite feeling. We shall not be surprised that it is λέξις that aims to be παθητική, if in Aristotle's mind, as argued above (and further shown below), this term readily stands for ὑπόκρισις; nor shall we wonder that the list at 1408a16–19 would affirm the propriety of the 'angry style' when dealing with insolence, of the 'indignant' and 'reticent' when handling impious and shameful matters, of speaking with admiration of what is worthy of praise, and humbly of pitiable things. Some readers might indeed miss here the more explicit hints offered by the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* in its section on *pronuntiatio*,[35] and conclude, with its author, that *nemo de ea re diligenter scripsit*; or else judge the philosopher deficient in comparison with Cicero's *De Oratore* III §§213–27. But it would be an error to let ourselves be guided by anachronistic notions of what a proper account of delivery should look like, and fail to see that, in his own way (admittedly compressed by contrast), Aristotle offers guidance as to the proper voice one must use successfully to convey such πάθη as arise in the presence of insolence, impiety, shame, pity, etc. Apparently he thought it sufficient to indicate the connection between a cause and its corresponding emotional response, leaving it to the student to consider how volume, melodic line, timbre, and so on should combine to express anger.[36] The outcome is that καὶ συνομοπαθεῖ ὁ ἀκούων ἀεὶ τῷ παθητικῶς λέγοντι, κἂν μηθὲν λέγῃ. διὸ πολλοὶ καταπλήττουσι τοὺς ἀκροατὰς θορυβοῦντες[37] (1408a23–25). Note the performative setting: the goal is a community

entsprechend" auf die Merkmale ‚emotional' und ‚charaktervoll' zurückbeziehen müssen, so dass die Behauptung wäre: Die sprachliche Form muss dem jeweiligen Gegenstand entsprechend emotional oder charaktervoll sein."

[35]Book III, chapters 11–15, §§19–27.

[36]One might reasonably argue that, since we all have experienced (in ourselves or others) the full range of emotions under consideration, such explicit directions would have been superfluous. There is, besides, a marked tendency in the *Rhetoric* towards compression of treatment, so that material not strictly necessary is omitted or a subject already mentioned is not repeated, even when it calls for development from a new vantage point. Cf. Striker (1996) 289 and 300n9 and Brinton's (1988) 208 comment on the scope of Aristotle's study of πάθη.

[37]It is only natural that a section concerned with φωνή would mention raising a loud clamor as a strategy sometimes used to confound the audience. Just as the volume (μέγεθος) of one's voice can be modulated in accordance with the art of rhetoric without detriment to the truth, it can also serve the purposes of less principled orators. Thus, I disagree with Rapp (2002) 2.863, who takes θορυβοῦντες and the concessive statements that accompany it (on which see note 38) as paradigmatic of Aristotle's view of delivery; thus he reasserts his opinion that the philosopher has entirely excluded ὑπόκρισις from his treatment of style (as pernicious to the interests of justice), and he denies that this section develops the art of oratorical delivery.

of feeling between the hearer and the speaker.[38] Rapp (2002) 2.862 calls this the "musikalisch-sympathetische Wirkung der emotionalen Rede," and he thinks that this outcome of the παθητικὴ λέξις has nothing to do with the artistic ("kunstgemäßen") emotional arousal considered in *Rhetoric* II.1–11. He is mistaken: for Aristotle makes clear that an inference takes place, a false one (παραλογίζεται, 1408a20), to be sure, but a mental reckoning nonetheless, which on the basis of personal experience (ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις) weighs the truthfulness of the claim that purports to give rise to the emotion displayed. Rapp is wrong in thinking that the mind is irrationally bewitched and thereupon does away with the qualifications set forth in *Rhetoric* II—e.g. those of chapter 8 concerning pity, where we read that "on the whole, [a person feels pity] when his state of mind is such that he remembers things like this happening to himself or his own or expects them to happen to himself or his own"; and that "since sufferings are pitiable when they appear near at hand . . . necessarily those are more pitiable who contribute to the effect by gestures and cries and display of feeling and generally by their acting [*hypokrisis*]."[39] Nevertheless, this scholar helpfully draws attention to *Politics* VIII.5, where μέλη, 'melodies', are called μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν, an assertion justified by the distinct moods with which the hearers are affected in listening to the several musical modes. The passage makes clear that *pathē* are in view,[40] and it is followed by a similar statement about the effects of ῥυθμοί (1340b7–10). The balance is to underscore the potential inherent in the voice's ἁρμονία and ῥυθμός to communicate πάθη—precisely the stated aim of ὑπόκρισις.

The focus on delivery is unchanged in the section of *Rhetoric* III.7 that follows, where Aristotle considers λέξις as expressive of ἦθος. We may best understand his

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[38]The concessive clauses εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ⟨λέγει⟩ ὁ λέγων and κἂν μηθὲν λέγῃ do not condone, much less enjoin, deception or encourage emotional appeals ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος. They only state the obvious: that rhetoric, as any other social endeavor, is open to the manipulation of deceit. On the valence of ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, see Grimaldi (1980) *ad* 1354a15–16. On this, Halliwell (1994) 212 writes: "Here the formulation (assisted by a certain latitude in the established terminology of speaking 'on/outside the subject,' *peri/exō tou pragmatos*) somewhat elides two things that might properly be distinguished: first, an emphasis on the importance of criteria of judicial relevance; second, a general deprecation of (distortingly) emotional appeals in rhetoric (cf. 3.1.5, 1404a5–8)." I would only modify his statement to say 'a general deprecation of (potentially distorting) emotional appeals as ideally superfluous.'

[39]ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζομένους σχήμασι καὶ φωναῖς καὶ ἐσθῆσι καὶ ὅλως ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι (1386a32–33). Both this and the quotation immediately preceding are Kennedy's (1991) translation *ad loc.* (Apparently, at 1386a33 he reads αἰσθήσει for ἐσθῆσι.)

[40]The words used are ὀδυρτικωτέρως, συνεστηκότως, μαλακωτέρως, μέσως, καθεστηκότως, and ἐνθουσιαστικούς (*Pol.* 1340a42–b5; cf. b10–12). For the relationship between ἦθος and πάθος in this context, see Susemihl and Hicks (1894) 622–24.

definition of ἠθικὴ λέξις, namely ἡ ἐκ τῶν σημείων δεῖξις (1408a25–26), if we heed Labarrière's (1984) 34–40 observation that the philosopher regularly uses σημεῖα as the units of meaning of φωνή, i.e. of articulate sound, whether man's or the animals' (in contrast to σύμβολα, which he restricts to λόγος).[41] And indeed, the fitting style (ἡ ἁρμόττουσα [λέξις]) involves not only the actual words selected but also the manner of their utterance.[42] Rapp (2002) 2.864 himself points out that there is no ready opportunity for deception by the speaker here (the grounds on which, he claims, Aristotle contemns delivery)—and by doing so, he undermines his own view that the doctrine of this chapter equips the orator with such artifice as will allow him to trick the audience into false inferences. The point, rather, is that only by speaking in character can the orator clothe his subject with persuasion. Rapp may be too quick, however, to assume that the listed categories cannot be blurred; for the orator who boasts of manliness, say, should not display stylistic traits that stereotype or prejudice declare typical of the female sex; nor should a defendant who pleads the naivete of youth clothe his appeal in sophisticated delivery.[43] The goal is successful μίμησις, and the voice—we well know—is the most 'mimetic' of our constituent parts. One further item proves the full involvement of voice and face in delivery: if the words uttered are harsh, to avoid the appearance of artificiality and speciousness, one should not also use a harsh voice and countenance.[44]

Chapter 8 of *Rhetoric* III is yet another section where delivery is clearly in view and

[41]σημεῖον, as the unmarked term, can also be used for λόγος.

[42]οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ οὐδ' ὡσαύτως ἀγροῖκος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν (1408a31–32).

[43]The material in this passage and the approach Aristotle takes is best understood if we suppose his ideas to have developed under the influence of stage acting, where the need for a successful characterization, e.g., of females by males or the old by youths would be real and acute. Cf., e.g., Plato's *Republic* 395d5–e3. There is also the fourth-century phenomenon of λογογραφία, which further separated composition from delivery; the professional speech-writer had to place himself in his client's shoes and make him say nothing inconsistent with his origin, social status, occupation, etc.

[44]ἔτι τοῖς ἀνάλογον μὴ πᾶσιν ἅμα χρήσασθαι (οὕτω γὰρ κλέπτεται ὁ ἀκροατής)· λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα σκληρὰ ᾖ, μὴ καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τῷ προσώπῳ [καὶ] τοῖς ἁρμόττουσιν (1408b4–7). The language of 'escaping notice', 'cheating the hearer', etc. is not so much an admission of the potential for deceitfulness inherent in naturalistic art as it is a statement of the paradox essential to its success: for then *ars adeo latet arte sua*. Cf. *Rh.* III.2.4–5 and 8.1. Fortenbaugh (1996) 161 calls to mind an interesting analogy. In *Politics* 1310a2–12, Aristotle counsels that demagogues in a democracy should *seem* to speak (δοκεῖν λέγειν) on behalf of the wealthy; whereas in an oligarchy, oligarchs should *exhibit* (ὑποκρίνεσθαι) a correspondingly favorable attitude towards the δῆμος. Fortenbaugh comments: "Those words may suggest feigned concern, and undoubtedly there are moments to be disingenuous" (*ibidem*), but "[t]he verb *hypokrinesthai* . . . need not imply feigned exhibition" (161n34).

the canon of naturalism controls the outcome. Prose is to strike a middle course be-
tween an ἔμμετρον ('metrical') and an ἄρρυθμον σχῆμα ('arrhythmic shape'): μέτρον
would make the λόγος into a ποίημα, and this is to be avoided; but the lack of
ἀριθμός renders the speech unformed, without boundaries, and therefore unpleasant
and beyond our grasp. Aristotle has in view certain metrical shapes for cola, chosen
to meet given canons of propriety detailed in this section, which avoid the sort of
predictable recurrence characteristic of poetry;[45] these, he calls 'rhythm': ὁ δὲ τοῦ
σχήματος τῆς λέξεως ἀριθμὸς ῥυθμός ἐστιν, οὗ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τμήματα· διὸ ῥυθμὸν δεῖ
ἔχειν τὸν λόγον, μέτρον δὲ μή (1408b28–30). But 'rhythm' is, of course, the third
of the basic properties of voice (cf. 1403b30–31). This proves that we are once again
dealing with ὑπόκρισις in its narrow sense of 'oral delivery'. The expressed need for
σεμνότης in this context—used to disqualify the trochaic meter as "too much like the
cordax" (1408b36)—should alert us to the connection between propriety and the voice
(intensity, intonation, and rhythm), a connection I have tried to highlight above (see
p. 84) as I do again here. The recommendation of iambic as the λέξις of the people
(οἱ πολλοί) does not focus on its abstract metrical qualities (the view of the scholar),
but on its status as a performative commonplace: "therefore, of all meters people in
conversation utter (φθέγγονται λέγοντες) iambics most" (1408b34–35).

We must still consider ἁρμονία, listed as the second property of voice. There is
no agreement about its meaning at 1403b31: we know it concerns τόνοι, whether
the pitch is ὀξύς, βαρύς, or μέσος. Some think this refers to pitch accent at the
word level (Kennedy, 1991, 218 and n. 5), but the textual evidence renders this
interpretation too narrow. Cope (1877) 3.5 seems to leave his options open, for
he translates "accents (or *tones* of voice)" (his emphasis), and cites as *comparanda*
on "the modulation of the voice in the expression of various emotions" Cicero's *De
Oratore* III §§215–19. In Cope (1867) 380 he is nearer the rhetorical meaning when
he parallels it with the Latin *apta compositio*. Of course, in its primary musical
sense, it stands for "the orderly succession of certain sounds, determined by definite
intervals, which appeals to an instinctive sense or taste in the human mind . . . and
constitutes 'tune' or 'melody'" (Cope, 1867, 380, his emphasis). The difficulty resides
in transferring this concept from a musical to an oratorical context. This semantic
move is attested elsewhere in Aristotle, specifically, in the *Poetics*. Indeed, at its
first appearance (1447a22) it refers to 'melody',[46] which explains why μέλος takes its

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[45]ῥυθμὸν δὲ [δεῖ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον] μὴ ἀκριβῶς· τοῦτο δὲ ἔσται ἐὰν μέχρι του ᾖ (1408b31–32).

[46]Lucas (1968) *ad loc.* writes: "I translate it by 'melody', though this does not exclude the notion

place at a later point (1447b25).[47] But, significantly, at *Poetics* 1449a28, ἁρμονία designates a quality of prose: "For the iambic trimeter, more than any other metre, has the rhythm of speech: an indication of this is that we speak many trimeters in conversation with one another, but hexameters only rarely and when diverging from the colloquial register (ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας)."[48] Lucas (1968) *ad loc.* tersely remarks: "'ἁρμονίας' is said to refer to the pitch of the voice used by the Greeks in conversation (cf. *R.* 1403b31). We should have expected rather a reference to rhythm." Though I would take 'pitch of the voice' in the extended sense of 'melodic contour' or 'intonation' of an utterance, which was arguably the actual effect of the pitch accents at the higher level of the sentence, Lucas acutely senses the intimate relationship in prose between ἁρμονία and ῥυθμός, a relationship in evidence in chapter 8 of *Rhetoric* III.[49]

The vulgate reading here is τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικὸς ς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος, where 'ς' is the usual abbreviation for καί. Kennedy (1991) 238, apparently following Vettori (who argues for the insertion of οὐ before λεκτικός),[50] translates: "Of rhythms, the heroic [dactylic hexameter] is solemn and not conversational and needs musical intonation"; to explain his translation of ἁρμονίας δεόμενος he adds the note: "That is, it is chanted. In Aristotle's time rhapsodes no longer used a lyre." The problem with this, of course, is that hardly anyone would understand ἁρμονία in this unusual technical sense (i.e. 'melodic contour of non-instrumental chanting') without further explicit textual support, as its use for 'tunings' or 'attunements'[51] is by far the commonest technical one, of which the λεκτικὴ ἁρμονία

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of rhythm." That it means musical tune is clear from 1447a23, which only includes instruments.

[47]The triad ῥυθμός, λόγος, and ἁρμονία at 1447a23 corresponds to ῥυθμός, μέλος, and μέτρον at 1447b25. This can be easily explained if we note that μέλος already implies words, and that μέτρον corresponds to metrical λόγος (Lucas, 1968, 61). Meters, as *Poetics* 1448b21–22 shows, are categories (μόρια) of rhythms.

[48]Translation by Halliwell (1999). The entire passage runs thus: μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖόν ἐστιν· σημεῖον δὲ τούτου, πλεῖστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἑξάμετρα δὲ ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας (1449a24–28).

[49]Apparently, such correlation was true even in their technical musical sense; cf. West (1992) 178 and 181.

[50]Roemer (1898) and Kassel (1976) *ad loc.* report that Vettori emends to καὶ οὐ λεκτικός. Strictly speaking, Vettori (1579) 615–17 does *not* adopt any such emendation. His Greek text reads: τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν, ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος, σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικὸς καὶ ἁρμονίας δεόμενος; which he translates: *e numeris autem, herous grandis est, dignitatisque plenus et orationi aptus quique requirit harmoniam.* But it is true that in the note adjoined he makes clear that the sense requires οὐ λεκτικός. Otherwise, *valet* λεκτικὸς *hoc in loco, sonorus ac grandiloquus. quod sane mirum videtur.*

[51]Often called 'modes' by modern scholars, *harmoniai* represent ancient scales (i.e. distinctive

is an attested extension; but by itself, ἀρμονίας δεόμενος would almost certainly be understood in its generic sense as 'lacking harmony', or, if in its technical sense, as 'lacking [instrumental] melody' or perhaps even 'needing [instrumental] melody'. 'Lacking [instrumental] melody' will not suit the contrast; neither will 'needing [instrumental] melody' do, for Kennedy's translation calls for non-instrumental chanting. As to 'lacking harmony', Cope (1877) 3.86 rightly says that "[it] is absurd in itself, and contradictory to the evidence of our ears, and all ancient authority." Of Vettori's emendation[52] the same writer comments that "[it] leaves ἀρμονίας δεόμενος to explain itself as it best may" (*ibidem*). But for the substitution of ἀλλά for καί, Roemer's (1898) text[53] is near identical to Cope's and Spengel's and superior to Vettori's.[54] Paradoxically, its meaning most likely implies Kennedy's, for lacking 'the melody of common speech' surely suggests that 'the melody of heroic verse' (with 'melody' in its extended sense) must contain non-conversational cadences such as chanting would produce.[55] Ross (1959) emends more heavily,[56] but his meaning is much the same in the event.[57]

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series of intervals assembled as scales). In this technical sense ἀρμονία does not imply words; it might denote the music of an instrument (ψιλὴ ἀρμονία) or the voice's singing (with or without words). μέλος, on the other hand, referred primarily to the melody of singing and in this sense involved words. (Because it was the singing of poetry and it was usually accompanied by instruments, μέλος also stood for a poetic composition with musical accompaniment, especially lyric poetry.) By conceptually abstracting the music from the singing, μέλος was also at times used for ἀρμονία (West, 1992, 177–78). But clearly one would be far more likely to construe the statement "the heroic meter calls for ἀρμονία" as implying that it calls for musical accompaniment than that it calls for chanting. Quite apart from the intrinsic unlikelihood of the textual reading (given the unquestionable application of ἀρμονία at 1403b31 to the voice of the orator, which rules out chanting; and the incontrovertible use of λεκτικὴ ἀρμονία in the *Poetics* 1449a28, which renders the restoration of the same expression in the present passage very plausible), had this been Aristotle's meaning one would have expected τοῦ ᾄδειν δεόμενος *vel sim.* [One may still argue that, for an audience familiar with the performance practice of epic (assuming for the moment that it was non-instrumental chanting, i.e, a vocal recitative not far from speech tones; cf. West, 1981a, 114), the meaning of ἀρμονίας δεόμενος would have been transparent: I agree. This would justify Vettori's reading and Kennedy's translation. But, even then, if ἀρμονία can be used of the melodic contour of non-instrumental chanting, given the use of the word in the *Poetics* for the melodic contour of prose, we would still have chapter 8 of *Rhetoric* III concerned with ἀρμονία as one of the three components of φωνή that affect the orator's delivery.]

[52]This he quotes not as οὐ λεκτικός (as Roemer, 1898, *ad loc.*) but as οὐ λογικός (Cope, 1877, 3.87). Cf. Demetr. *Eloc.* §41.

[53]τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνὸς ἀλλὰ λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος.

[54]Which Kassel adopts.

[55]Demetr. *Eloc.* §42 uses the term ἠχώδης.

[56]τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνῆς ἀλλ' οὐ λεκτικῆς ἀρμονίας δεόμενος.

[57]His contribution is to oppose a σεμνὴ ἀρμονία to the attested λεκτικὴ ἀρμονία, a contrast in itself plausible; and to motivate the αὐτή in the following clause: "whereas heroic verse calls for an

Thus we have in *Rhetoric* III.8 ἁρμονία and ῥυθμός linked together as related properties of the voice in delivery: the latter denotes the measured delivery of cola for rhythmical effect, which facilitates the hearers' grasp of the orator's meaning; the former denotes the melodic contour of the speech,[58] correlated with the orator's rhythmic utterance, shaping the speech to express the necessary *ēthos* and *pathos*. This interpretation finds support in Aristoxenos, who explicitly recognized a kind of prose melody: λέγεται γὰρ δὴ καὶ λογῶδές τι μέλος, τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ τῶν προσῳδιῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν· φυσικὸν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιτείνειν καὶ ἀνιέναι ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι.[59] This same author also observed that "there are three things that can be made rhythmic: utterance (λέξις),[60] melody (μέλος), and bodily motion; thus utterance will divide time by means of its own parts, e.g. letters, syllables, words, and all such things."[61] A fragment of Theophrastos in Plutarch's *Quaest. conv.* (p. 623) further reinforces the analogy between the melody and rhythm of music and the melody and rhythm of speech: [Θεόφραστος] ἀρχὰς μουσικῆς τρεῖς εἶναι λέγει, λύπην ἡδονὴν ἐνθουσιασμὸν,

elevated—not a colloquial—intonation, iambic by itself [i.e. without any peculiar intonation] is the λέξις of the common people."

[58] I do not agree with Cope (1877) 3.86, who, though using 'harmony' in his translation "[to leave] open whether we are to understand by ἁρμονία 'harmony' in its ordinary musical sense," nevertheless calls this "a somewhat non-natural interpretation." On the impact of Greek accents upon the melodic shape of the utterance, see Allen (1973) 230–34 and West (1981a) 114–15.

[59] *El. harm.* 23.13–16 (da Rios). Barker (1984–89) 2.138 translates: "For there is indeed said to be a kind of melody which belongs to speech, that constituted by the tone-patterns that occur in words, since tension and relaxation belong naturally to speech."

[60] That Aristoxenos here means 'utterance' (the action of λέγειν) and not 'style' or any other more technical meaning is clear from its use in *El. rhythm.* 17.15–23 (Pighi): ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα πλείους ἰδέας λαμβάνει σχημάτων, ἐὰν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη τεθῇ διαφερόντως, ἤτοι πάντα ἢ τινα αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ῥυθμιζομένων ἕκαστον πλείους λαμβάνει μορφάς, οὐ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ. ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ λέξις εἰς χρόνους τεθεῖσα διαφέροντας ἀλλήλων λαμβάνει τινὰς διαφορὰς τοιαύτας, αἵ εἰσιν ἴσαι αὐταῖς τῆς τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ φύσεως διαφοραῖς. ὁ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλους καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο πέφυκε ῥυθμίζεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ ῥυθμῷ ὅς ἐστιν ἐκ χρόνων συνεστηκώς. Barker (1984–89) 2.185 translates the key sentence as follows: "For the same utterance [*lexis*], when disposed into durations that differ from one another, takes on differences of a sort that are equal to the differences in the nature of the rhythm themselves." We find a similar use at Aristotle's *Soph. el.* 165b23–24 and *Rh.* 1401a2, where παρὰ τὴν λέξιν is variously translated 'verbal', 'of diction', 'depends on language', 'beruhen auf dem sprachlichen Ausdruck', *vel sim.* Cf. Halliwell (1993) 53–54, who identifies three different ways in which Aristotle uses λέξις; though I am not entirely comfortable with the manner in which he apportions the semantic range and the illustrations adduced in support, he does to my mind correctly identify the two ends of the spectrum: "ordinary speech," roughly equivalent to my 'utterance', and "style or expressiveness," an evaluative term that, among other, focuses on register, genre, and tone. (I would transfer to his category C some of his examples for B that, by his own admission, display a "semantic emphasis.")

[61] *El. rhythm.* 19.15–18 (Pighi). ἔστι δὲ τὰ ῥυθμιζόμενα τρία· λέξις, μέλος, κίνησις σωματική. ὥστε διαιρήσει τὸν χρόνον ἡ μὲν λέξις τοῖς αὐτῆς μέρεσιν, οἷον γράμμασι καὶ συλλαβαῖς καὶ ῥήμασι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. This division of λέξις is indebted to Aristotle's treatment in the *Poetics* 20.

ὡς ἑκάστου τούτων παρατρέποντος ἐκ τοῦ συνήθους καὶ ἐγκλίνοντος τὴν φωνήν (fr. 90 Wimmer).[62] In *De oratore* III §§173ff. Cicero follows Aristotle in connecting *numerus* (∼ῥυθμός) and *modus* (∼ἁρμονία). His usage is not uniform throughout; e.g., at §171, when he first introduces them, he apparently designates rhythm by *modus quidam* and *harmonia* by *forma*;[63] but once he employs the more technical *numerus*, he makes clear that *modus* stands for *harmonia*: *Namque haec duo musici, qui erant quondam idem poetae, machinati ad voluptatem sunt, versum atque cantum, ut et verborum numero et vocum modo delectatione vincerent aurium satietatem. Haec igitur duo, vocis dico moderationem et verborum conclusionem, quoad orationis severitas pati posset, a poetica ad eloquentiam traducenda duxerunt.*[64] In this case, of course, the vocal melody will depend on notions of intonation and rhythm that are more familiar to us than the ancient Greek modulation, of which tonal accents were so important a component. One can speak similarly of the famous §§39–41 of [Longinus] *On the Sublime*, written at a time when accentual stress had replaced pitch; and yet these sections preserve a recollection of the Aristotelian connection between ἁρμονία and ῥυθμοί in the orator's choice and arrangement of words (σύνθεσις).[65]

This survey, I trust, has shown that, far from excluding ὑπόκρισις, Aristotle has more than once explicitly made voice and its properties the focus of his study in chapters 2–11 of the *Rhetoric*. Considering the notorious thematic compression characteristic of this work, his coverage, in substance and significance, is such as to warrant the view that he does indeed endeavor to instruct the orator in proper delivery, if only we suppress anachronistic prejudices of what an adequate, comprehensive treatment of *pronuntiatio* by the philosopher should look like. My survey completed, I return to the peculiar Aristotelian relation between ὑπόκρισις and λέξις.

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[62]Cf. Fortenbaugh et al. (1992) 572 fr. 719A.

[63]At §173 he repeats the terms: *modus etiam et forma verborum.*

[64]Wilkins (1892) *ad loc.* comments: "[H]ere [*modus*] covers variations both in duration and in pitch, i.e. what we call 'tune'." He further translates *vocis moderatio* 'the modulation of the voice', and *verborum conclusio* 'the periodic arrangement of the words'. I might also mention Hermog. *Id.* I (p. 218.23–26 Rabe), where rhythm is defined thus: ἡ γὰρ ποιὰ σύνθεσις τῶν τοῦ λόγου μερῶν καὶ τὸ ὡδί πως ἀναπεπαῦσθαι τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡδὶ ποιεῖ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀλλὰ μὴ τοιόνδε εἶναι τὸν ῥυθμόν.

[65]See especially §39.

2.5   Semantic development of ὑπόκρισις and λέξις

In my view, then, and in the light of the foregoing considerations, regardless of the particular rendering of the καί in the ἐπεὶ καί of 1403b35 (cf. above, p. 76), it is important to bring out the relationship Aristotle is establishing between ὑπόκρισις and λέξις—here, that of a part to the whole, but soon to become somewhat more involved. For, from 1403b18–22 and the ensuing treatment, it follows, I believe, that ὑπόκρισις (at least any aspect of ὑπόκρισις susceptible of 'technical' treatment, as will become clear below, p. 120) bears such a relationship to λέξις that either term can be used to designate what might be broadly described as 'rhetorical stylistics.'[66] This intimate connection of mutual implication between ὑπόκρισις and λέξις is one that Aristotle labors to establish and explain in chapters 1 and 2; and the explicit return of the term ὑπόκρισις in chapter 12, at the end of the section on λέξις (the philosopher takes up τάξις in chapter 13) should alert us to the possible presence of an intentional ring structure of sorts: ὑπόκρισις may well open and close the discussion of λέξις because, in fact, Aristotle sees successful delivery as the ultimate aim and guiding principle of his study of rhetorical style. The term ὑπόκρισις, first employed at 1403b22 to refer to that subordinate division of λέξις that wields the greatest influence and is preeminently concerned with voice and its attendant properties, becomes at 1404a12–19, from the point of view of terminology, synonymous with λέξις itself, as I will make clear below.[67] This is perhaps not to be wondered at, for, after all, it is but an instance of a common occurrence, viz., when the most important conceptual subdivision of a given subject is used metonymically to refer to it.

This semantic development takes place over a short span, and the guiding principle is the equivocal ethical status of λέξις, which becomes a necessity out of expediency because of rhetoric's concern with δόξα:[68]

ἀλλ' ὅλης οὔσης πρὸς δόξαν τῆς πραγματείας τῆς περὶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, οὐχ

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[66]See below, p. 125.

[67]See below, p. 118.

[68]What will those say who shy away from applying the unflattering φορτικόν to λέξις, when faced with this frank admission regarding the entire rhetorical enterprise? Though it come as a rude shock to those who insist on too hard a distinction between ὑπόκρισις and λέξις—asserting that the former alone may rightly be criticized as φορτική—the statement will not appear so radical to any who have come to terms with the philosopher's rhetorical view of style. Thus, even Cope (1877) *ad loc.* must make the following admission: "[N]ot only ὑποκριτική, but the whole of Rhetoric, is directed πρὸς δόξαν. So that φορτικόν here must stand, as it often does, for the vulgarity which is shewn in unphilosophical habits of mind . . . and, as applied to a study or art, may signify popular, showy, unsubstantial."

ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαίου τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιητέον, ἐπεὶ τό
γε δίκαιόν ⟨ἐστι⟩ μηδὲν πλέον ζητεῖν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὥστε μήτε λυπεῖν
μήτ' εὐφραίνειν· δίκαιον γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὥστε
τἆλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι περίεργα ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὅμως μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ
εἴρηται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως ὅμως
ἔχει τι μικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον ἐν πάσῃ διδασκαλίᾳ· διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ
δηλῶσαι ὡδὶ ἢ ὡδὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ' ἅπαντα φαντασία
ταῦτ' ἐστί, καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν· διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδάσκει.
(*Rh.* 1404a1–12)[69]

The triumph of the ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι[70]—arguably necessary, but, in strict justice,
superfluous[71]—is perhaps best exemplified by the abuse to which it is open, e.g. by

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[69]Here I have quoted Ross's (1959) Greek text. Kassel's (1976) text *ad loc.* does not offer any
significant improvements over Ross's and, despite differences in detail, ultimately has the same
meaning. He prefers the vulgate οὐκ ὀρθῶς at 1404a2 over the emended οὐχ ὡς ὀρθῶς; but an
explicit ὡς is not required and, as Spengel (1867) 2.357 notes, it must be imported here from the
ἀλλ' ὡς that follows. And at 1404a4 he emends ζητεῖν to ζητεῖ, preserving the readings πλείω (over
πλέον) and ὡς (over ὥστε). Yet other than style, there is hardly a difference between "justice is to
seek nothing more (μηδὲν πλέον) than" and "justice does not at all (μηδὲν) seek more (πλείω) than"
(the choice between ἢ ὥστε and ἢ ὡς seems to me largely indifferent; cf. Smyth §2007).

[70]On the related ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος see above, n. 38. τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι here refers narrowly to rational
demonstration (i.e. the *enthymeme* derived from πράγμα or λόγος); for ἀπόδειξις and ἀποδεικνύναι
in the *Rhetoric* see Grimaldi (1972) 139–41.

[71]Too much can be made of 1404a2–7, which states that "justice (τὸ δίκαιον) consists in seeking
nothing more in connection with one's argument (or 'speech', περὶ τὸν λόγον) than that one should
cause neither pain nor pleasure" (hinting at *pathos*, cf. 1378a19–21); and that "it is just to contend
(ἀγωνίζεσθαι) [only] with the facts themselves" (αὐτοῖς τοῖς πράγμασιν). Accordingly, some infer
that departing from this ideal would not be merely undesirable, but even *unjust*; and they think
that the οὐχ ὡς ὀρθῶς ἔχοντος of 1404a2 corroborates this view. But the comparison aims not at
discriminating justice from injustice, but at evoking an ideal vision of what strict justice calls for.
Although ἀγωνίζεσθαι can be used of an epideictic competition (or even a political debate), I think
Aristotle is here thinking primarily of the court setting, which leads him naturally to state this ideal
in terms of 'justice'. Justice, strictly speaking, must always bind defendant and plaintiff to the facts
of the case: the facts are their one and only necessary point of reference; strictly speaking, everything
else must be judged superfluous. This does *not* mean, however, that the contribution of *ēthos* and
pathos is *unjust*; simply that justice does not *require* it. This interpretation is conclusively proved
by the ὥστε clause, which declares whatever else (τἆλλα) falls outside the realm of demonstration
not unjust, but 'superfluous', περίεργα. Therefore, in οὐχ ὡς ὀρθῶς, 'not because it is right', 'right'
does not mean 'morally right' (with 'unjust' or 'morally wrong' as its opposite), but 'correct', as in
'the correct choice', the choice demanded and strictly justified by the circumstances (its opposite,
then, being 'erroneous' or 'incorrect'). This is similar to its use in the expression ὀρθῶς λέγειν,
'strictly speaking' (cf. LSJ *s.v.* ὀρθός III.2), where accuracy and inaccuracy, correctness and error,
are opposed, rather than justice and injustice. Jebb's translation conveys the meaning well: " . . . we
must give our attention to this subject, considered as necessary, not as desirable in itself; for, strictly
speaking, our sole aim in our language should be to give neither pain nor pleasure; our facts ought to
be our sole weapons." Cf. also Dufour and Wartelle (1973) *ad loc.* [On ὀρθός, Irwin (1985) 391 writes:
"*Orthos* indicates success in pursuing an end or correctness in picking it, as opposed to error. . . . It
is not confined to moral rightness: nor is any special moral sense of the term required."]

the base appeal to emotions, a practice, however, not exclusively the province of delivery (strictly considered)—for is not striking imagery itself (to mention only one aspect of the wider field of style) quite able forcefully to affect the emotions of the hearers?[72]—but arguably most readily illustrated by the use of the φωνή, viz., πῶς αὐτῇ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος (1403b27–28).[73] Thus, ὑπόκρισις understood strictly as 'delivery' becomes the preeminent exhibit in the trial against the potentially unethical facets of λέξις, and the connection made *exempli gratia* with the upper hand the ὑποκριταί have over ποιηταί (a parallel extended next to the political arena) follows all too naturally. But even if ὑπόκρισις be 'exhibit A' (so to speak), Aristotle wishes to apply the conclusion to λέξις as a whole, as the syntactic agreement of φορτικόν with τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν makes clear (the efforts of many commentators to explain it otherwise notwithstanding).[74] From that point onward, the text is primarily engaged with λέξις (principally in its neuter form, τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν[75] or, at 1404a8, τὸ τῆς λέξεως) and calls on ὑπόκρισις only subordinately, to make the wider point concerning λέξις by mutual implication.[76]

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[72]Rapp (2002) 2.814 §3.1 suggests that Aristotle's goal is to move the ethically objectionable ὑπόκρισις off the center of his study, in order to focus instead on those aspects of style that do not so crassly take advantage of the μοχθηρία of the hearers: "Der mündliche Vortrag wird als eine Sache der Begabung vom Zentrum der folgenden Überlegungen ausgeschlossen. Die sich tatsächlich anschließende Behandlung der sprachlichen Form konzentriert sich dagegen auf die Erleichterung des Verstehenprozesses." But here, realizing keenly that this, too, looks to affect the hearer in ways that go beyond a strict appeal to the facts themselves, he tellingly adds: " . . . was zwar auch *wirkungsbezogen* ist, gleichzeitig jedoch in den Dienst der Sache gestellt werden kann" (my emphasis).

[73]Cf. *De int.* I 16a3–4: ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα.

[74]On this see further below, n. 150.

[75]This must be the noun phrase implicitly in agreement with the participle ἔχοντος and the adjective ἀναγκαίου at 1404a2–3.

[76]My understanding here again diverges from Rapp's, much the most sensitive and careful of recent readers of the *Rhetoric*, whose translation and commentary of *Rh.* III is the most important extended treatment of that book to appear since Cope (1877). Rapp (2002) 2.812 §1 understands the uncertainty facing the reader as to the respective boundaries of ὑπόκρισις and λέξις: "[D]ie vorigen Abschnitte [erweckten] den Eindruck . . . als handle es sich beim mündlichen Vortrag und der sprachlichen Form um zwei klar voneinander getrennte Bereiche." But he adds that 1403b35–36 hints "dass das vorliegende Kapitel von einem Diskussionsstand ausgeht, auf dem sprachliche Form und mündlicher Vortrag eng miteinander verknüpft sind, bzw. letzterer einen Teilbereich der sprachlichen Form ausmacht." I believe his suggestion misguided, however, that the conceptual development of the argument lies in so delimiting the purview of style that a discussion of delivery, its subordinate component, can be excluded. At 2.814 §3.1, after recalling that it is "durchaus unklar, inwieweit vom mündlichen Vortrag und inwieweit von der sprachlichen Form . . . die Rede ist," he offers two possible explanations to καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι (1403b36). The first, which I believe correct, flows readily from the text (as he himself admits): "Gemeint ist tatsächlich die sprachliche Form, denn zu Beginn des Abschnitts wird ausdrücklich das gennant, „was die sprachliche Form betrifft". Dann würde auch für die Behandlung der sprachlichen Form gelten, dass sie nur

According to Aristotle (1404a9–11) attention to style has a small, but necessary place in every διδασκαλία, for it makes a difference to clarity (πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι), yet not so much (τοσοῦτον)—i.e., its importance should not be overstated—but all this is φαντασία directed towards the hearer.[77] πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι must not be overly restricted to *conceptual* clarity (as Rapp, 2002, 2.815 implicitly does by referring to "Gedanken" and "die gedankliche Anordnung"): Aristotle has in view such a presentation before the hearer as makes the *intentions* of the speaker—in their fullest scope, embracing not only the *logos* in the limited sense of 1356a3–4, but also the *ēthos* and *pathos*—clear to his audience.[78] Thus, at 1404b1–3, where ὁ λόγος is characterized as a kind of sign (σημεῖον γάρ τι ὁ λόγος ὤν) that fails to achieve its proper end unless it be clear (ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ), the philosopher implicitly calls to mind the entire communication process, with the complete circle of its constituent parts.[79] It is true that here 'clarity' is assigned to 'proper words' (τὰ κύρια ὀνόματα), and stylistic propriety to all the others mentioned in the *Poetics* 1457b1–3: loan word, metaphor, ornament, neologism, lengthening, contraction, and modification (Halliwell's terms in his *LCL* translation). If this appears, on the surface, to restrict clarity to a mere subset of the whole range of stylistic devices (word order among

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notwendig, aber nicht richtig ist." The second posits as aim a limited concept of style, one that has been "bereinigt", 'cleaned up' (so to say), from which delivery has been excluded, and that focuses on clarity of meaning. But the alleged goal (which I here dispute) of an unimpeachable λέξις that makes clarity its sole ambition proves elusive: for why then would Aristotle add that "no one teaches geometry thus"? (1404a12). If in fact λέξις (in its alleged restricted sense) pursues clarity (διαφέρει γάρ τι πρὸς τὸ δηλῶσαι, 1404a9–10), why would it not *also* apply to geometry and every other philosophical or scientific inquiry? But if geometry can achieve clarity without recourse to style, why should not the orator who renounces an appeal to man's baser inclinations not simply dispense with style altogether? The conclusion seems inescapable: if with a view to its effect upon the hearer ("aus Gründen der Wirkung") the orator is willing to compromise intelligibility (as Rapp claims), and, therefore, clarity becomes a stylistic trait—with style teaching us to negotiate the corresponding trade-off—how can λέξις be said to have escaped ethical indictment?

[77]I take καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν as epexegetic (cf. Smyth §2869a), i.e., as adding by way of clarification: "I mean [φαντασία] towards the hearer."

[78]Rapp (2002) 2.816, however, glosses "Gedanken" by διάνοια, which at 1403b1 seems to encompass *ēthos* and *pathos*; but from his discussion he still appears to be thinking of *conceptual* perspicuity only; cf. *ibid.* 2.829 §3.

[79]Here I follow the emendation by Richards (cf. Ross's *OCT*), which is clearly superior to the *paradosis*; for it not only accounts for the otherwise troublesome ὡς, but makes for a more coherent explanation of the importance of clarity. The alternative—to justify the need for perspicuity on the grounds of the *logos* otherwise missing its target—seems but a circular argument. Kennedy (1991) and Rapp (2002) also reflect Richards. Kassel accepts Vahlen's ὥστ' for Ross's ὤν and the ὡς of cod. Parisinus 1741 (both Ross and Kassel read τι for ὅτι). But "for *logos*, since it is a kind of sign, will not accomplish its goal unless . . . " is equivalent to "for *logos* [is] a kind of sign, so that it will not accomplish its goal unless . . . "

them; cf. 1407b21–25 and 1410a20–23), this is but a distorted impression that fails to account for what the philosopher says or implies elsewhere. So, e.g., metaphors, just classified among the τἄλλα ὀνόματα that contribute to propriety of style, are nevertheless ranked at 1404b31–32 with τὰ κύρια and τὰ οἰκεῖα as alone being serviceable (χρήσιμαι) to prose style, so that, where one uses these well, "there will be an unfamiliar quality and [the art] will escape notice and *will be clear*" (Kennedy, my emphasis). In other words: we must grant a wider role to form, *including* ornamentation generally, in bringing about the requisite perspicuity.[80] The τοσοῦτον at 1404a10 ('yet not so much') finds its conceptual (negative) correlative in the ἀλλά clause. The one who wishes to claim too broad a role for λέξις, Aristotle says, should consider that it works on the hearer through φαντασία: this fact will help him better to give it its due measure, neither under- nor overestimating its import. Happily, the philosopher does not leave us to feel our way blindly to the understanding of φαντασία, but has already given us a working definition at 1370a28–30:[81] it is said to be 'a kind of weak perception' (αἴσθησις), connected not only with sense perception but also with the mental faculties of memory and hope. Nevertheless, it appears to be the universal assumption of the translators of this passage that by φαντασία Aristotle means 'external show', 'mere appearance', 'fancy'.[82] The reasons for this unanimity seem obvious: the appeals to μοχθηρία and φορτικόν (1403b34, 36 and 1404a8)

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[80]It may be well further to drive this point home with the aid of another passage. There, quite apart from strict conceptual clarity, we learn that, when it comes to *ēthos* (and the same might be said of the designs of *pathos* on the affections of the audience) it is essential to communicate it clearly if it is to gain its proper end: "[T]he [forensic] narrative must indicate character (ἠθικήν); and it shall be so if we know what makes for *ēthos*. One way, indeed, is to make the motivation clear (τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν); [then] the *ēthos*, of a certain kind, by the motivation being such; and the motivation, of a given sort, by its end" (1417a16–19). [In translating προαίρεσις by 'motivation' (which should be understood as *deliberate* purpose), I follow *EN* 1139a31–33: πράξεως μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ προαίρεσις—ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗ ἕνεκα—προαιρέσεως δὲ ὄρεξις καὶ λόγος ὁ ἕνεκά τινος.] Though this comment belongs to the section on τάξις and no particular stylistic devices to secure a strong ethical cast are mentioned, it is clear from the observations at 1404b18–25 that style, particularly the stylistic register selected, will further or hinder this goal insofar as it lends conviction to, or detracts from, the portrayal of the man who is (so goes the claim) motivated thus, and acts in accordance with the alleged purposes: one must seem to speak in his own voice or else he will fail to persuade his audience. This explains why τὸ πρέπον, 'propriety'—here meant as *stylistic* propriety—immediately follows clarity as the λέξεως ἀρετή. Cf. Halliwell (1993) 57n12, where he makes a distinction between the "referential" and "expressive" uses of δηλοῦν in the *Rhetoric*, and lists some examples.

[81]ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, ἀεὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθεῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει.

[82]Cope (1877) *ad loc.* renders it 'fancy', adding that φαντασία is "the mental presentation, a mere copy, without reality" (with a reference to his note on *Rh.* I.11.6); Kennedy (1991) and Freese (1926) prefer 'outward show'; Jebb, more cautious, retains the more traditional 'imagination' (in Sandys, 1909, *ad loc.*); Ross (1924), too, chooses 'fanciful'; and Rapp (2002), 'reiner Anschein'.

arguably call for a negative judgment; the concern with λέξις, Aristotle admits, far from desirable in itself, is but a necessary concession (1404a2–3); ideally, what is not strict demonstration should be superfluous (1404a6–7); the often assumed close tie between δηλῶσαι and *conceptual* clarity seems designed to render the bulk of stylistic analysis external show, superficial fancy.

2.5.1 φαντασία, 'mere fancy'?

Nevertheless, there are good reasons to resist this interpretive consensus. Though perhaps understandable, it is but the fruit of our own prejudices against rhetoric and issues from a live suspicion of what this art portends for the pursuit of truth. Such mistrust has a distinguished ancient pedigree: the mention of μοχθηρία and the use of φορτικόν show that Aristotle is not impervious to it. All the same, I claim that the philosopher's attitude is far less negative (and, thus, more balanced) than the one that prevails among us, and that if we translate φαντασία as 'mere appearance' *vel sim.* we displace the center of gravity of his corrective and drive it to an unintended extreme. Let us revisit the reasons adduced for the consensus view. Despite the regretful reality of μοχθηρία (and who would not decry the weaknesses that play into the hand of oratorical abuse seeking to tread the 'facts' underfoot?), it is but a consequence of the ethical cast inherent in any political[83] process.[84] This is clear from the contrast drawn between rhetoric and geometry, echoed again at 1417a19–21, this time by the opposition between μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι,[85] which have no ἤθη because they

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[83]Here I employ 'political' in that basic sense most readily illustrated by Aristotle's famous dictum that ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον (*Pol.* 1253a2–3).

[84]We need only cite 1356a25–27, where, from the tripartite division of rhetoric into *logos, ēthos,* and *pathos,* Aristotle concludes: ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν. Cf. *EN* 1094a27–b3. For the negative perspective, cf. Plato *Gorgias* 463d1–2.

[85]Aristotle considers geometry a part of mathematics, as can be gathered from many passages in his works (cf. Heath, 1949, 1–16). In his *Posterior Analytics* 77b26–33, e.g., after stating that "in mathematics (ἐν δὲ τοῖς μαθήμασιν) formal invalidity is not so common," he illustrates this assertion with reference to the circle: ἆρα πᾶς κύκλος σχῆμα; ἂν δὲ γράψῃ, δῆλον. τί δέ; τὰ ἔπη κύκλος; φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν. Another clear statement can be found in the *Metaphysics* E 1026a25–27, where in a parenthetical comment the philosopher remarks that "even the mathematical sciences (ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς) differ in this respect—geometry and astronomy deal with a particular kind of entity, whereas universal mathematics applies to all kinds alike" (Tredennick's *LCL* translation), thus showing that mathematics includes geometry as a subdivision (see Ross's note in his commentary *ad loc.*). In Proklos' *Commentary on the First Book of Euklid's Elements* 38.4–12 (Friedlein) we learn that Geminos had described geometry as a μέρος of μαθηματική, a view that goes back, in turn, to Peripatetic scholarship (specifically, to Eudemos of Rhodes), thus confirming Aristotle's own classification (cf. *RE s.v.* 'geometria').

lack moral purpose, and the Σωκρατικοί, which do: it is the very nature of ῥητορική—the fact that it addresses the need of the political assembly (deliberative, forensic, or epideictic) to build consensus and manage dissent—that makes not only *logos*, but also *ēthos* and *pathos* its necessary ingredients, and for this reason it holds both the promise of effective democratic governance[86] *and* the danger of the unprincipled exploitation of man's prejudice and vanity.[87]

Now, as to the phrase καὶ δοκεῖ φορτικὸν εἶναι, we are supposed to appraise it in light of the ensuing qualification, καλῶς ὑπολαμβανόμενον. Cope (1877) *ad loc.* renders it 'and rightly so considered', adding Vettori's alternative 'when considered aright', which he nevertheless rejects because the former alone "is the more *natural* interpretation of ὑπολαμβάνειν; which will not in fact bear the meaning assigned to it by Victorius 'Si vere *iudicare* volumus'" (his emphasis). If Cope is right, he at least cannot claim a large following,[88] nor is it clear why his is the 'natural' translation and on what account Vettori's meaning (which glosses his translation *recte ponderatum*) is not allowable: for ὑπολαμβάνειν, as LSJ *s.v.* III.1 states, can mean 'to take up a notion, assume, suppose', and hence 'understand a thing to be so' or 'conceive of something in a certain way'.[89] The suggestion, then, is that the label φορτικόν for τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν holds in a restricted, yet basic, sense; and it does not take much effort to discover that here, as before, the logic behind this dim view of style is again the interaction between the unprincipled orator and his uncultivated audience, whose weaknesses he finds all too easy to exploit for selfish ends. As noted above (n. 87),

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[86]Hence the transmitted reading πολιτειῶν at 1403b35, which Lossau (1971) justifiedly defends against the suspicions of Spengel (1867) 2.357, whose conjecture was accepted by Ross in his *OCT*.

[87]One need only remember that φορτικότης had made its appearance at 1395b2, in the chapter on maxims, long before the matter of style was broached. There Aristotle reflected on the pleasure a hearer experiences when an orator hits upon opinions he already holds. Says Cope (1877) *ad loc.*: "The φορτικότης here ascribed to vulgar audiences is much the same as the μοχθηρία τῶν ἀκροατῶν, III 1.5, the vices or defects, which oblige the orator to have recourse to τἆλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι in order to convince them, because they are unable to appreciate logic alone." *Nota bene* 1395b12–13, where, as might be expected, we learn that the *ethical* character of the discourse is chiefly in view. Cf. also 1415b5–9: πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα· ἐπεὶ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτος ᾖ, οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσον τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν κεφαλαιωδῶς, ἵνα ἔχῃ ὥσπερ σῶμα κεφαλήν.

[88]Freese writes "and rightly considered it is thought vulgar"; Kennedy, "delivery seems a vulgar matter when rightly understood"; Jebb, "and, properly viewed, the subject is thought vulgar"; Dufour and Wartelle, "il semble d'ailleurs que ce soit là un art grossier à en juger sainement"; Rapp, "auch scheint es, richtig betrachtet, ungebührlich zu sein"; Tovar, "parece que es asunto fútil, bien considerado."

[89]This meaning is easily born by a survey of the verb elsewhere in the *Rhetoric*, where it is frequently used.

the adjective has already made its appearance at 1395b2, but it is the treatment in chapter 26 of the *Poetics* that brings out most clearly its rationale. There, as the philosopher debates whether epic or tragedy is the superior μίμησις, we learn that the label 'vulgar' does not so much inhere in the subject matter or practice at hand, as is intimately dependent on the target audience and the consequent interaction between performer and public: ἡ ἧττον φορτικὴ βελτίων, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πρὸς βελτίους θεατάς ἐστιν ἀεί (1461b27–29). In view is the practice of actors and αὐληταί who feel the need to add beyond what is proper or called for, on the assumption that the public will not otherwise notice and understand the performance. Epic, on the other hand, addresses itself πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς that need not such σχήματα, tragedy πρὸς φαύλους (1462a2–4). But, he adds, the fault is not really *poiētikē*'s, but should be laid at the door of *hypokritikē* (1462a5–6).[90]

So far, then, we have seen that μοχθηρία and φορτικόν share a common root concern, one that does not inhere so much in λέξις (and, by implication, ὑπόκρισις) as in the potentially corrupt interplay between orator and audience. On the other hand, if used in a principled way, style and delivery can play a significant hand in advancing the principles of justice.[91] This consideration, by itself, should caution us against rendering φαντασία by so utterly dismissive a gloss as 'mere fancy'. Several additional reasons concur with this judgment. After all, the entire rhetorical enterprise is

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[90]One other passage may be mentioned. In the *Politics* 8.6 (1340b20ff.) Aristotle takes up the question whether the education of freeborn youth πρὸς ἀρετήν should include μουσική, specifically, learning to sing and play an instrument. The inquiry—1340b34–35 makes clear—addressing itself to those who claim that it is a menial occupation (βάναυσον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν), suggests that μουσική is beneficial, so long as the degree to which it is practiced is carefully regulated, and melodies, rhythms, and instruments vetted for propriety (1340b42–41a3). Later on, at 1341b8–18, before turning his attention to 'harmonies' and 'rhythms', Aristotle again makes passing mention of the general disapproval bestowed on 'professional education' (ἡ τεχνικὴ παιδεία); he goes on, in a long parenthesis, to explain the opprobrium as follows: τεχνικὴν δὲ τίθεμεν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας· ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ὁ πράττων οὐ τῆς αὑτοῦ μεταχειρίζεται χάριν ἀρετῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκουόντων ἡδονῆς, καὶ ταύτης φορτικῆς, διόπερ οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν, ἀλλὰ θητικωτέραν· καὶ βαναύσους δὴ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι· πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος· ὁ γὰρ θεατὴς φορτικὸς ὢν μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικήν, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας τοὺς πρὸς αὐτὸν μελετῶντας αὐτούς τε ποιούς τινας ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ σώματα διὰ τὰς κινήσεις. Note that, once again, what associates a trade with φορτικόν (and, in this case, earns it the label θητικός) is the focus on the hearers, specifically, on their pleasure, which is compared unfavorably with personal ἀρετή, so that 'professional' practice is rendered illiberal: "for base is the target at which they aim." A θεατὴς φορτικός corrupts the τεχνίται who ply their trade with him in view. Cf. *ibid.* 1342a18–21, Plato's *Laws* II 659b–c, and especially Plato's *Gorgias* 512e5–13c2, with its insistence on the necessary conformity (as μιμητής) of the orator to his audience and their πολιτεία, if he desires to wield influence in the city (μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει, 513a3–4).

[91]Cf. 1355a21–23, on which more below, p. 112.

branded as πρὸς δόξαν, and interpretive consistency would demand that a φαντασία which is no more than 'outward show' tarnish with its stain the very art of oratory. Cope (1877) *ad loc.* appears to realize this when, quoting *Eudemian Ethics* I.4.2, λέγω δὲ φορτικὰς μὲν [τὰς τέχνας] τὰς πρὸς δόξαν πραγματευομένας μόνον, he adds: "This I suppose must be meant of arts that have nothing solid and substantial about them, but aim at mere outside show, ostentatious and hollow, πρὸς δόξαν contrasted with πρὸς ἀλήθειαν"; and though parenthetically he glosses πρὸς δόξαν as "directed to τὸ δοκεῖν, mere outward show, not τὸ εἶναι," he softens the outcome in translation by rendering the offending sentence: "But since the entire study and business of Rhetoric is directed to mere opinion, is unscientific." In fact, one might even question his *comparandum*, for Rackham's *LCL* translation of *Eudemian Ethics* 1215a29–30 is not 'ostentatious' or 'hollow', but the far more neutral "pursued only for reputation." (Reputation and truth need not be at odds.) Since the semantic range of δόξα is broad enough indeed to allow for 'show', 'ostentation' (should the context call for it), it might be inadvisable to look for guidance in the *Eudemian Ethics*, especially when the statement needing clarification contains a sweeping characterization of oratory as a τέχνη and the *Rhetoric* itself does not fail to provide us with parallels that, I believe, make the present one clear.

We start with the passage adduced by Cope above, when he opposes πρὸς ἀλήθειαν to πρὸς δόξαν to justify his "ostentatious and hollow." This opposition does, in fact, occur at 1365b1, in the seventh chapter of *Rhetoric* I, where Aristotle considers *greater* and *smaller* in connection with the potential disagreement between opposing parties over the degree of significance of a matter that is the object of debate. The abstract *greater* and *smaller* are illustrated with particular oppositions, such as *often* versus *seldom*, *proper* versus *acquired*, or *ends* versus *means*. The polarity that now occupies us ("what has respect to *truth* is greater than what has respect to *doxa*") is just one of these, and the philosopher offers the following definition: ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν, ὃ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἕλοιτο· διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ἂν αἱρετώτερον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν λανθάνῃ αἱρήσεται, ποιεῖν δ' εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἐλέσθαι. καὶ ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν βούλονται· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον· διὸ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φασὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν ἢ εἶναι αἱρετώτερον· τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν οὔ (1365b1–8). Aristotle could not be clearer: that has respect to *doxa* which one would not choose when likely to escape others' notice. The focus is clearly on appearances in a social context—what I might call 'social pretense' if 'pretense' did not carry such negative connotations. The concern is arguably for one's reputation in

society, for affecting the views that others have of us, for creating a social standing or managing our neighbors' attitudes towards us. It could, of course, involve empty show and ostentation, but it need not do so; and it has a legitimate claim on our interest as social beings. The examples point this out well: doing good versus faring well, or even justice versus health. No sham is involved in the act of conferring benefits on others: the suggestion is not that it looks *as if* someone is doing good while he is not; the point is simply that the benefaction is done with an eye on the profit that accrues to one's reputation with his neighbors. As to the latter opposition (i.e. justice versus health), no one would insist on a necessary connection between doing justice and mere outward show or ostentation;[92] but, clearly, whether a person or action is just is subject to debate and opinion in ways that the physical condition of a man—healthy or diseased—is not. It is in this sense, because it is open to judgment and pretension, that "justice is said to be of small value." The overriding concern, therefore, is with reputation, with social appearances (one might say *ethos*), and this is precisely what πρὸς δόξαν is intended to convey.[93]

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[92]As scholars have suggested, the choice of justice as an illustration might hint at an ongoing polemic with some of the more outrageous sophists, who may have publicly owned appearing just preferable to actually being so. (The φασί would then have specific subjects in view, which the reader in turn would be expected to identify. Thus, e.g., in Plato's *Republic* II 362e4–363a5 Adeimantos notes that parents commend justice for the good repute that accrues from it and the benefits that attend on such public esteem [cf. 365b4–7, 366d7–e5, and 367b6–c1].) This would go some ways towards explaining the statement, ὅτι δοκεῖν ἢ εἶναι αἱρετώτερον. It would, indeed, be surprisingly if this apparently sweeping and rather pessimistic judgment represented the view of the common man. Or are we to believe that most Athenians really thought the appearance of justice more desirable than its reality?

[93]Translators agree, rendering πρὸς δόξαν at 1404a1 'to influence opinion' (Freese), 'with opinion' (Kennedy), 'auf die Meinung abzielt' (Rapp), 'ne s'attache qu'à l'opinion' (Dufour and Wartelle). Jebb's 'aims at appearance' and Tovar's 'apariencia' approach Cope, but show greater restraint as neither carries the negative connotations of 'show' and 'ostentation'. Indeed, both can be argued to imply 'opinion' and hence are, in my view, acceptable equivalents. Of the other occurrences of δόξα in the *Rhetoric*, those at 1360b22, 1362b20, 1367a17, 1368b23, 1371a16, 1388a2, 1388a7, and 1404a25 clearly (1397b28 probably) carry the meaning 'reputation' (cf. also 1372b21–22); at 1381b20 τὰ πρὸς δόξαν (as 1381b31 makes clear) refers to anything that affects the opinion the public has of us (hence our 'reputation'), and is opposed to τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, 'what is actually true', for there may, of course, be a gap between one's reputation and one's true character; at 1384a20–25 too the argument hinges on 'loss of reputation' (ἀδοξίας), an opinion (δόξα) men heed only on account of those who hold it (οἱ δοξάζοντες); 'opinion' is the proper rendering too at 1369a22, 1377b3, 1378b11, 1391b23, 1395b3, 1403a32, and 1412a28 (here best translated 'expectation'), and perhaps at 1384b23 (though I rather incline, with Kennedy, to 'reputation', construing καταφρονοῦσι with τῆς δόξης and not with τοῦ ἀληθεύειν). (The well known idiomatic παρὰ δόξαν needs no discussion.) The only other relevant section is *Rh.* II.1, whose principal thrust is the importance of showing oneself to be, and rendering the *kritēs*, of a certain type (1377b23–24, the former pertains to *ethos*, the latter to *pathos* [ποιόν τινα κατασκευάζειν is construed *apo koinou* with αὐτόν and τὸν κριτήν, though its sense varies with either term]). The point is constructing a convincing *persona*, articulating and sustaining a

Another reason to reject the extreme translation of φαντασία is the statement at 1404a9 that "the matter of λέξις has some small [but] necessary part in every διδασκαλία." As it stands, the statement is ambiguous (though few scholars seems to realize this): are we to understand that style plays a small but necessary role in *teaching* a given τέχνη or in *practicing* it? To use rhetoric as an example: is the professional orator in view, or the teacher of rhetoric? It is hard to see how διδασκαλία could be taken without comment for τέχνη—though, arguably, this is how it has been universally interpreted. Perhaps 'instruction' is taken metonymically for the knowledge imparted, but this would still place the focus on the process of teaching.[94] Given the interpretive consensus, we might have expected Aristotle instead to say that "style plays a small but necessary part in every *technē*." The accompanying comment, διὸ οὐδεὶς οὕτω γεωμετρεῖν διδάσκει, is similarly ambiguous; for οὕτω could be construed with διδάσκει: "no one follows this method in teaching geometry" (which would then make style the province of *teaching*); or with γεωμετρεῖν: "no one teaches geometers to follow this method" (a translation found nowhere, yet commonly implied by scholars of the *Rhetoric*), which concludes that style is unnecessary for the geometer. And, arguably, this common interpretation seems to be required by the context, for, after all, we are dealing with style as a component of rhetorical practice, not with a meta-linguistic assessment of style's contribution to rhetorical instruction.[95] Perhaps

particular view of oneself, managing one's reputation with his hearers, how one comes across: hence the recurrence of φαίνεσθαι (at 1377b26, 29, 31; 1378a4, 16). Thus, there is no parallel to be found in the *Rhetoric* for Cope's (1877) 3.7 translation of πρὸς δόξαν, "aim[ing] at mere outside show, ostentatious and hollow"; and even his alternative "is directed to mere opinion, is unscientific," although it contains the otherwise acceptable 'opinion', distorted as it is by 'mere' and 'unscientific', fails to offer Aristotle's meaning. If there is one thing Aristotle makes clear (see 1356a1–4), it is that *ēthos* and *pathos* are ἔντεχνοι, that they *are* (so to speak) 'scientific'! Cf. Grimaldi (1980) 349–56.

[94]Just as the statement "listen to my instruction," while referring to the contents of the teaching, would draw attention to the teacher-pupil relation (say, between the teacher of rhetoric and the orator himself), not to the pupil's later exercise of what he has learned (namely, the orator's speech before an audience).

[95]It would be striking if, after stating unequivocally that style has some small necessary part in *every* διδασκαλία, Aristotle would contradict himself by asserting that geometry—arguably a διδασκαλία—does *not*, after all, call for style in any measure, however small. But, strictly speaking, that is not the nature of the claim, and the διό may simply reflect common (if inadvisable) practice: style is rarely (if ever) involved in teaching or applying geometry, not because the discipline has no place for it (it does, though small); but because, insofar as it offers the smallest imaginable scope for style, its neglect in this case occasions hardly any harm. In other words, established practice in connection with geometry illustrates the principle at issue by taking it to the limit. (Cf. Grimaldi, 1980, 36 apropos πειστική: "A[ristotle] acknowledges that the use of language in all the disciplines is always something more than notional and rational. The word greatly extends the area of 'persuasive speech' and recognizes that almost all discourse with another inevitably seeks to win acceptance for itself from the other. . . . A.'s examples of geometry and arithmetic . . . are even more interesting

a solution lies in the demonstrative nature of oratorical practice. Aristotle might have in mind the centrality of 'proof' to trial and deliberative assembly (and, in smaller measure, to epideictic argumentation).[96] And, in this restricted sense, the speaker can be said to 'teach' his audience the relevant facts—just as the geometer can be said to prove a particular theorem. For the former, however, the demonstration is πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν, whereas the latter does it, so to speak, πρὸς αὐτόν. Not that the geometrical proof cannot be directed at others; but that, by the nature of its reasoning, it is either correct or incorrect; and, if the former, it is so for one and all—the geometer as much as anyone else. Not so in the case of a rhetorical demonstration, which can be compelling to one, yet fail to convince another. This, I think, is the philosopher's point and why he speaks of διδασκαλία rather than τέχνη.[97] And this

in view of the fact that no kind of persuasion is ordinarily identified with scientific discourse.")

[96]Note the similar use in the *Poetics* at 1456b5 with Lucas's (1968) note *ad loc.* See also Plato's *Gorgias* 453d7–54e2, where both rhetoric and διδασκαλικαὶ τέχναι are said to work conviction (they are πειθοῦς δημιουργοί, 453e4–5). For Sokrates, however, the parallel between them breaks down when it comes to truth-value: whereas πίστις can be false, μάθησις (the goal of διδάσκειν) cannot.

[97]It is the same distinction implicit at *Rh.* 1355a24–29, where we learn that not even fortified with the sharpest knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) would a speaker be able to convince all: διδασκαλία [I have restored the reading of the mss.] γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς ἐλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως. An argument strictly based on ἐπιστήμη would constitute formal instruction; and, as the philosopher makes clear at 1359b8–16, constructing rhetoric (or dialectic) not as a δύναμις—which, as such, is available to any τέχνη, for each τέχνη is διδασκαλική and πειστική in its own domain, but rhetoric is πειστική about any given matter (1355b25–34)—but as an ἐπιστήμη would obscure and change its character from an ἐπιστήμη of speech to ἐπιστῆμαι of the underlying subjects (medicine, geometry, arithmetic, or some other). It is clear, then, that Aristotle sometimes applies to rhetoric the label ἐπιστήμη (it is "the knowledge of speech", "an analytical knowledge", etc.), sometimes disowns it: a *logos* based on ἐπιστήμη is a διδασκαλία—"but this is not possible." What is not possible? And why? We will readily grasp his meaning if only we note his reference to διδασκαλία, which aims to preserve the distinction between individual forms of knowledge (whose purview is limited to a particular subject matter) and oratory, whose search for τὸ πιθανόν embraces all other in their common relation to λόγοι. Thus, in his *Soph. el.* I.2 (165b1–3) he defines διδασκαλικοὶ λόγοι as "λόγοι that reason from the principles appropriate to each subject and not from the answerer's opinions," adding that "the learner must believe [what he is taught]"— presumably because only then can he learn at all (cf. *Top.* 159a28–30). A few lines later (165b9) he substitutes ἀποδεικτικοί for διδασκαλικοί, bringing out explicitly the tie between formal instruction and demonstration, a tie that, given the central role of rhetorical 'proof' (ἀπόδειξις)—we already observed above (see p. 104)—probably led to the use of διδασκαλία at *Rh.* 1404a9. The point, then, is that where διδασκαλία is involved, the teacher brings out the clear and necessary consequences of a subject's own peculiar principles, and he secures the necessary assent of the learner. This can well happen in the formal instruction of an ἐπιστήμη (say, geometry), given a pupil of the requisite ability; but it is hardly possible with each and every member of a given audience, and certainly not so where considerations of *ethos* and *pathos* play a role: then we are reduced to using common notions (τὰ κοινά) to make our arguments (πίστεις and λόγοι). Cf. Rapp (2002) 2.92–95 and Grimaldi (1980) 28–29.

is also why he writes, ἀλλ' ἄπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ' ἐστί καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν, where I do not, as others, punctuate with a comma before καί, which I take as adverbial, not conjunctive; for φαντασία is present *even* in the study of geometry, but it is πρὸς αὐτόν, not πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν, as in the case of rhetoric or, more broadly, wherever teaching takes place and the instructive and persuasive aspects of any τέχνη are called into action.[98]

2.6   φαντασία in the *Rhetoric*

A final reason to oppose 'mere show', 'ostentation' for φαντασία lies in the use Aristotle makes of this term.[99] The initial suggestion that in *Rh.* 1404a11 φαντασία meant 'pomp, ostentation' goes back to Freudenthal (1863) 17–18 and his attempt to explain the restriction "if we are not speaking metaphorically" in *De anima* (=*DA*) 428a1–4: εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ' ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, ⟨ἆρα⟩ μία τις ἔστι τούτων δύναμις ἢ ἕξις καθ' ἃς κρίνομεν καὶ ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα;[100] Nussbaum (1978) 254, the one scholar after Cope principally responsible for popularizing Freudenthal's idea,[101] realizes that it renders Aristotle's comment in *De anima* utterly trivial: "[H]e seems to be saying, 'Assuming when we say *phantasia* we mean the faculty in virtue of which we are appeared to in such-and-such a way, and we are not using the transferred sense according to which it means (mere) show, *then* it can be said that in virtue of *phantasia* we tell truth or falsehood—whereas to say, "in virtue of ostentatiousness we tell truth or falsehood"

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[98]Cf. *Rh.* 1355b28 and Grimaldi's comment above, n. 95.

[99]On this, see now the forthcoming article by González.

[100]I have quoted Ross's (1961) text (cf. his note on p. 286), even though there is much disagreement whether the last clause is in fact, as he prints it, a question. Note his insertion of ἆρα and his punctuation; he has no ms. support for this, though some scholars, obviously uncomfortable with φαντασία as a faculty of judgment, try to recast the statement as a query (to be answered later in the negative) or, like Bywater (who added ζητῶμεν εἰ), as a summary proposal of the examination that follows. (Cf. Watson, 1982, 106n10 and Wedin, 1988, 47–48 with nn. 29–30.) But contrary to the assumption of many, the list at 428a4–5 (τοιαῦται δ' εἰσὶν αἴσθησις, δόξα, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς) need not be exhaustive (otherwise, we would expect ταῦται, not τοιαῦται, at *DA* 428a4), and therefore φαντασία need not be, as claimed, ruled out as a faculty of judgment. As Wedin (1988) 47n30 himself acknowledges, we do not need a question here to establish that for Aristotle φαντασία turns out, in the event, to be something less than a full faculty; he might well have described it as a δύναμις that enables us to arrive at truth or falsity, while simultaneously asserting its subordinate role to the standard (truly independent) faculties. According to this view, φαντασία would then be "a system of internal [re]presentations that enables a person to have desires, beliefs, and thoughts about objects and situations in the world" (Wedin, 1988, 22).

[101]Cf. Cope (1877) *ad Rh.* I.11.6.

would be silly.' It will be objected that this is a trivial point. But for Aristotle it is never trivial to recognize all the senses of a word. . . . " This last observation notwithstanding, the point is utterly trivial, even silly, and it stretches credulity to think Aristotle would have felt the need to preclude such nonsense—not to mention that, as argued below (p. 109), this meaning was simply not commonly available until the much later time of Polybios.[102] Now, this is not the place to conduct a survey of the intricate and extensive scholarly debate on Aristotle's concept of φαντασία.[103] Some have even questioned whether he held a single, consistent view of its meaning throughout his works.[104] But if one can detect some measure of disjunction between (and at times even within) his various writings, this takes place against a background of overall conceptual coherence. It is, at any rate, clear that the meaning alleged by Cope, and widely accepted by other translators, cannot be paralleled in any other passage of Aristotle. Thus, Wedin (1988) 68 notes: "Following Freudenthal, [Nussbaum] remarks that φαντασία can mean '(mere) show, pomp, ostentatiousness' and argues that this is the metaphorical sense meant in [*De anima*] 428a1–4. The remark on the point of usage is acceptable, but that 428a2 counts as a case in point is, I submit, mistaken. An initial reservation is that *only one passage* in Aristotle can be marshaled in support of the Freudenthal reading, namely *Rhetorica* 1404a11" (my emphasis). But there are some discordant voices. Indeed, while not calling for a gloss so extreme as 'showy, ostentatious', similarly tending towards superficiality, and hence an obstacle to my view, is Halliwell's (1993) 59n16 proposal that the term is not used in its "psychological sense, but [taken] to mean merely 'appearance', as at *Sophistic Refutations* 4.165b25." My problem with this comment is that his otherwise unobjectionable "merely 'appearance'"—where 'appearance' can be neutral enough simply to denote 'what appears to the thinking (or sensing) subject'—seems to connote 'mere appearance', which in turn is glossed by 'show'; thus we move quickly from 'appearance' to the objectionable 'mere ostentation or show', the very meaning that cannot be substantiated from any Aristotelian passage—unless, of course, one chooses to call 'mere show' any appearance that happens to be false (as φαντασία can certainly be). The *locus* adduced in support is a case in point: ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν φαντασίαν ἒξ τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία,

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[102]For a better solution to what Aristotle means by κατὰ μεταφοράν, see Wedin, 1988, 69–70.

[103]A debate, however, that has overlooked almost entirely *Rh.* III.1. For a helpful overviews see, e.g., Rees (1971), Schofield (1992), Watson (1988), and Wedin (1988). For a partial bibliographical update see Fedele (1999) and Riccardo (1999).

[104]Cf. Frede (1992) 279–82.

ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσῳδία, σχῆμα λέξεως (165b24–27). Doubtless here the 'appearance' in question is false: false logic is the focus of the treatise, a point its opening reiterates by referring to οἱ φαινόμενοι ἔλεγχοι (164a20–21) and συλλογισμοί, οἱ δ' οὐκ ὄντες δοκοῦσι (164a23–24). There is nothing here of 'mere ostentation', for the superficiality of false reasoning is quite another from the 'sensual show' alleged at *Rh.* 1404a11. *Soph. el.* is not, after all, an ethical treatise that looks into the motivations of deceitful sophists in order to condemn them for their ostentation. Furthermore, I fail to see why this instance of φαντασία (or the one at 168b19) should not have "its psychological sense."[105] For Aristotle himself draws the parallel between the inexperienced, who reasons and refutes falsely, and "those who view things from a distance" (164b27), a formulation strongly reminiscent of the passage in *De anima* (428b17–22) where, discussing why φαντασία can be false, Aristotle distinguishes between perception of τὰ ἴδια and perception of the αἰσθητά to which these ἴδια belong:[106] "As to the whiteness of an object, sense is never mistaken, but it may be mistaken as to whether the white object is this thing or something else."[107] This comment must in turn be read against 430b29–30: "But just as sight perception of a proper object (τὸ ἴδιον) is [always] true, while [our perception] whether the white thing is or is not a man is not always true, so it is with immaterial objects." Thus, when Aristotle mentions the error of "those who view things from a distance," *De anima* leads me to believe that most likely he has in mind the false φάντασμα that results from viewing an object from too far a distance. I might add that the sources of false φαντασία in *Soph. el.* 165b26–27, "the ambiguity of a term, the ambiguity of a proposition, the possibility of wrong disjunction, the possibility of wrong conjunction, the possibility of wrong accentuation, and similarity of termination" (Poste's, 1866, translation *ad loc.*), have their grounds on aural or visual φαντασία.[108] Such errors come from the application of νοῦς to what one hears or reads (the φαντάσματα), e.g. in syntactic or semantic parsing, where learning (and hence memory) and deductive logic are involved. This would seem to me to fall squarely under the psychological sense of φαντασία.[109]

Another discordant voice is Fortenbaugh (2002) 96–100, who, opposing the anal-

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[105]LSJ *s.v.* 1.b places 165b25 under 'less scientifically, *appearance*', still not its fourth division 'parade, ostentation'.

[106]On ἴδια see below, p. 114.

[107]Hicks's (1907) translation *ad* 428b21–22.

[108]Concerning non-visual φαντάσματα, see Frede (1992) 285.

[109]Note also Halliwell's (1993) 60n19 self-corrective.

ysis of human emotions as "*phantasia* apart from belief," takes an approach similar to Halliwell's: he denies any 'scientific' intent in Aristotle's account of φαντασία in the *Rhetoric* (citing in support, as Halliwell, *Soph. el.* 164a20–24). Accordingly, any references to "appearance" would not pertain to the "biological faculty of *phantasia*"(*ibid.* 96): recognizing that courts and assemblies make decisions on the grounds of probabilities, not certain knowledge, the philosopher "is careful to speak of what appears to be the case," thus "calling attention to the fact that human emotions are caused by beliefs, which may or may not be true"(*ibid.* 97)—as if such a stance prevented φαντασία from being the psychological faculty more fully (and precisely) discussed in *De anima*! Of course it is possible to use φαίνεσθαι without implying any particular psychological framework: the word, by itself, will not settle whether its register is technical or colloquial, nor, if technical, the degree of precision invoked. But Fortenbaugh elides the fact that not only the verb but also the noun, φαντασία, is used, for which it is harder to argue a colloquial meaning devoid of any technical import. That Aristotle associates φαντασία and αἴσθησις at *Rh.* 1370a28–30, in fact, seems to militate against a strictly colloquial register for the verb and its noun, even in the context of the oratorical treatise. I would argue, moreover, that, considering the philosopher's undeniable interest in the epistemological role of φαντασία, one should assume, *ceteris paribus*, that in the rhetorical context of truth-seeking and decision-making φαίνεσθαι is more likely to bear a degree of technical precision than to be strictly colloquial, 'unscientific,' and devoid of psychological overtones. It seems to me that Fortenbaugh's rationale for a cleavage between *De anima* and the *Rhetoric* (see, e.g., Fortenbaugh, 2002, 100) is the distinction drawn in *DA* III.3 between φαντασία and δόξα, which allows a degree of psychological detachment to a subject who, pondering his φαντασία, denies it conviction (the πίστις that accompanies δόξα), resisting its implications (as when, looking at a picture, we know—however horrifying the depiction—that we need not flee from it as if from imminent danger). But it is *precisely* this effect of attachment to or detachment from a particular 'view' that opponents at law try to induce among their jury. Once rhetorical persuasion is achieved, the 'picture' carries the conviction of truth and action follows. Naturally, Aristotle need not raise in the *Rhetoric* aspects of φαντασία that follow from non-rational animals' possession of this faculty, since the purview of oratory is strictly *logos*-endowed man.[110]

Now, it is not only the case that the works of Aristotle fail to produce a single

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[110]Cf. the helpful analysis in Rapp (2002) 2.575 and 2.621 (*ad Rh.* 1382a21).

instance for which 'ostentatiousness' correctly translates φαντασία: in fact such a meaning finds no parallel in the literature before Aristotle's time. The closest approach is the use of the *verb* φαντάζειν (*not* the noun φαντασία) in Hdt. 7.10ε,[111] where, it is true, the usually neutral 'to show oneself' must connote 'to make an arrogant display of oneself'. This acceptation, first attested here, led in time to the late use of φαντασία for 'outward show' and 'ostentation'—for which there are, however, no examples before Aristotle, and which, in my view, the alleged passage of the *Rhetoric* does not illustrate either. Indeed, one cannot argue convincingly from a single, exceptional meaning of the verb φαντάζειν in Herodotos[112] that its corresponding noun, φαντασία, also in that same exceptional sense, was conceptually available to Aristotle; and, furthermore, that he actually used φαντασία with that anomalous meaning once and only once in his entire *oeuvre*, departing in so doing from other senses frequently attested elsewhere in his works. I find this unpersuasive, especially when the number of such instances of φαντασία exceed one hundred, giving more than ample scope for potential parallels—parallels that fail to materialize. Are we really to believe that Aristotle departed from the received meaning of the noun and his own usage elsewhere, attested in many passages, on the basis of a precedent so slim that only one Herodotean passage can be adduced for it? Admitting such a departure would only be justified under rather stringent contextual constraints, i.e., only if the local context should categorically demand it. I have already listed several reasons that, in fact, suggest that no such necessity obtains. My case will be further strengthened if I can offer an alternative interpretation of φαντασία that both suits the present passage and conforms to the philosopher's use of the term elsewhere: this I shall do presently.[113] Aristotle's interest, our critics notwith-

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[111]Warning Xerxes about the peril of rash arrogance, Artabanos remarks: ὁρᾷς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα ζῷα ὡς κεραυνοῖ ὁ θεὸς οὐδὲ ἐᾷ φαντάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ οὐδέν μιν κνίζει. How and Wells (1912) *ad loc.* write: "[P]roperly show oneself (iv.124.2; vii.15.2); here *se ostentare*, 'make a show of oneself'," noting, moreover, its agreement with Polybios' usage.

[112]I have not been able to turn up any other incontrovertible use of the verb in this peculiar sense before Aristotle.

[113]It may be helpful to add one last observation: quite apart from the uniqueness of Hdt. 7.10ε, it is pertinent to remember that verbs and nouns do not always possess the same semantic range. One need only consider ποιέω, ποίησις, and ποιητής, which have areas of overlap and disjunction; or, to use an English example, the word 'trip': its noun, widely used for 'short journey', now rarely (if ever) for 'nimble step' or 'stumble'; its verb, in turn, hardly ever for 'making a trip or excursion'. There are also adjectives without corresponding verbs ('pregnant' is very common; 'pregnate' rare and obsolete, 'impregnate' taking its place), verbs without their nouns ('cleave', 'to part', owns 'cleft'; but 'cleave', 'to adhere', lacks a noun), etc. Lexical semantics is too complex to allow for unexamined extrapolations. Not even when, in their full diachronic sweep, a verb and its noun are

standing, is with the psychology of perception and the mediating role φαντασία plays between sense perception (αἴσθησις) and judgment (ὑπόληψις): φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας, αὕτη τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις (*DA* 427b14–16).[114] If rhetoric studies the means for persuasive speech, surely its practical goal is to persuade or dissuade the audience; hence, in its *polis* setting and at the level of civic action, rhetoric becomes a legitimate object of interest in the study of 'animal motion', though here the ζῷον in question is one that possesses φωνή and λόγος and is eminently πολιτικόν. It is in this context that φαντασία and φαντάσματα—their generic role in voluntary movement—enter into the considerations of the orator and the teacher of oratory.

But before we consider the *Rhetoric*'s own engagement with φαντασία, we must survey statements elsewhere that illuminate the conceptual background of this word. *DA* 433b27–30 offers a convenient starting point: ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ᾗ ὀρεκτικὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὑτοῦ κινητικόν· ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας· φαντασία δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύτης μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει. Here Aristotle notes that motion must be traced to desire, desire that is not without φαντασία; and that φαντασία can be categorized as to its connection with either λόγος or perception.[115] Such λογιστικὴ φαντασία recalls a later section of the same work,[116] which speaks of ἡ βουλευτικὴ [φαντασία] ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (434a7), 'the

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attested with one and the same meaning should their synchrony be assumed. Cf., further, Schofield (1992) 251n11.

[114]Cf. *DA* 427b27–28.

[115]Though the ἢ . . . ἢ are disjunctive, the alternatives need not be mutually exclusive: they may simply offer two complementary ways of viewing any φαντασία, ways that depend on the point of view chosen. That is to say, even the λογιστική may, on further consideration, turn out to be connected to αἴσθησις in a manner still to be determined. This becomes clear at *DA* 432a3–10, where we learn that "apart from sensible magnitudes (παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη τὰ αἰσθητά) there is nothing, as it would seem, independently existent" (Hicks's, 1907, translation *ad loc.*), and therefore "it is by the perceptual forms (ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς) that the objects of thought (τὰ νοητά) exist" (my translation, taking Wedin into account). Wedin (1988) 114 interprets the point of the passage as follows: "[O]ne cannot think of things that are of a kind not to have existed or, even more liberally, . . . one cannot think of things whose salient parts are of a kind not to have existed." Cf. also Labarrière (1984) 47n32, where "la φαντασία produite par la νόησις" should be modified to 'φαντασία involved in νόησις' *vel sim*. (The γίνεται διά + gen. should not be construed with genetic force; see Wedin, 1988, 52 and 57n42. διά + acc. or μετά + gen. might have been read as granting φαντασία a status independent of the other faculties. The sense of διά + gen. is the qualified causal one of co-occurrence expressed at *DA* 429a2 by ὑπό + gen., where ὑπό retains some of its locatival force.)

[116] ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει· ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν). (*DA* 434a5–10)

deliberative φαντασία in rational beings': using reason a man decides whether he
will do this or that (pursuing the greater good), and proves that he is not moving
ἀορίστως (434a4), like the lowest animals, but measuring by a single standard; thus
it follows that he is able, from many φαντάσματα, to fashion one course of action.[117]
The operative word here is βουλευτική, which highlights the corresponding role as-
signed to φαντασία in deliberating a course of action.[118] There is only a small distance
from this to a corresponding *symbuleutic*, i.e. social, dimension, as the orator artfully
crafts φαντάσματα that will prompt his hearers to "do this or that." This argument
precludes the facile criticism that rhetoric merely addresses itself to no more than
the passions of the audience, in a manipulative attempt to elicit behavior that is as
irrational (or less than rational) as it is beneficial to the speaker (just as 'desire' is
said at times to overpower βούλησις, *DA* 434a12–13). No; the text tells us plainly
that choosing a plan of action is the work of λογισμός, and, in so doing, promotes
φαντασία (with its ethical and emotional components and the λέξις that expresses
them) to a cardinal tool of the rhetorical task.

For Aristotle, then, φαντασία—the soul's [re]presentational[119] device—mediates
between sense perception and the critical faculties[120] that, apprehending the object
as desirable or undesirable, move one towards or away from it. But αἰσθήματα are
not the only immediate sources of φαντάσματα: hope and memory too are associated
with φαντασία,[121] and more generally λόγος and νόησις: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀργανικὰ μέρη

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[117]With Wedin (1988) 82–83, I take 'deliberative imagination' to mean 'imagination connected with
deliberation', just as the λογιστική is that connected with λόγος, without prejudicing the question
whether such 'imagination' always preexists reflection or else can also be forged by the deliberative
process. There is no clear proof here of φαντασία as functionally complete, and Wedin's (1988) 45–
63 proposal may stand. This conclusion holds even if we understand the ἕν of ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων
φαντασμάτων as ἕν [φάντασμα], for deliberation would still have the active role. At any rate, it
is clear from *DA* 434a10–11 (καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ
οὐκ ἔχει) that the mind indeed constructs φαντάσματα through its deliberative faculty; for, *contra*
Wedin (1988) 147n60, we must read τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ as τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ [φαντασίαν], as
Hicks (1907) 567 and Nussbaum (1978) 264n66 (among many) point out. Cf. *De Mem.* 453a14: τὸ
βουλεύεσθαι συλλογισμός τίς ἐστιν.

[118]Cf. *DA* 431b6–8: ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν ἢ νοήμασιν, ὥσπερ ὁρῶν, λογίζεται καὶ
βουλεύεται τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα. Clearly, these φαντάσματα are λογιστικά and βουλευτικά.

[119]Though my analysis does not depend for its validity on it, I am attracted to Wedin's (1988)
view of φαντασία as functionally incomplete (cf. *DA* 429a1–2) and co-occurring with actual exercises
of functionally complete faculties (see his chapter 2 for an explication). Thus I also follow his use of
brackets for '[re]presentation', which is intended, he notes, "to alert the reader to the fact that I am
not foisting on Aristotle the view that we do not actually perceive objects but only make inferences
to them from Hume-like images" (Wedin, 1988, 17n27).

[120]τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει. (*DA* 431a14–15)

[121]*Rh.* 1370a29–30. On this passage and its context see below, p. 115.

παρασκευάζει ἐπιτηδείως τὰ πάθη, ἡ δ' ὄρεξις τὰ πάθη, τὴν δ' ὄρεξιν ἡ φαντασία·
αὕτη δὲ γίνεται ἢ διὰ νοήσεως ἢ δι' αἰσθήσεως (*De motu an.* 702a17–19).[122] The
causal chain is: 'thought' or 'sense perception' → φαντασία → 'desire' → 'bodily
affections' → motion.[123] As the translation indicates, in the previous passage πάθη
stands for bodily changes (chillings and heatings),[124] not for the psychic affections
that attend φαντασία and that are studied in *Rhetoric* II (see below, p. 115). These
latter πάθη would not follow, but precede, desire; in other words, they would constitute
motivations for judgments or actions.[125] Perception and thought are 'critical' faculties
the soul uses to judge: ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ δύο ὥρισται δυνάμεις ἡ τῶν ζῴων, τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ
διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως . . . (*DA* 432a15–16); and if φαντασία according
to Aristotle depends on perception, and thought, in turn, cannot happen without
it,[126] it should not surprise us to read the following: ὁρῶμεν δὲ τὰ κινοῦντα τὸ ζῷον
διάνοιαν καὶ φαντασίαν καὶ προαίρεσιν καὶ βούλησιν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα
ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ
νῷ χώραν ἔχουσιν· κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα (*De motu an.* 700b17–21).[127] It can hardly
be accidental that, in arguing for the usefulness of rhetoric, Aristotle should censure
κρίσεις that happen μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον (*Rh.* 1355a22–23), implying that "the agent
responsible for permitting the bad judgments is a rhetoric which does not achieve its
perfection as rhetoric, and thus fails to realize its usefulness" (Grimaldi, 1980, 27).
Though 'judgments' here are the decisions of the courts, these are but the social

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[122]Nussbaum (1978) *ad loc.* translates: "For the affections suitably prepare the organic parts,
desire the affections, and *phantasia* the desire; and *phantasia* comes about either through thought
or through sense-perceptions."

[123]Wedin (1988) 57 explains: "If, then, imagination is not a full faculty, it is surely involved in the
actual use of such faculties. Perception, desire, and thought require it and so do memory and even
dreams. Imagination is required because images are required not as the object toward which the
faculty is directed but as a means by which a faculty accomplishes [its task]."

[124]Cf. Nussbaum (1978) 154n19.

[125]On πάθη influencing judgment as opposed to action, see Striker (1996) 292–93.

[126]διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή. (*DA* 431a16–17)

[127]Nussbaum (1978) *ad loc.* translates: "Now we see that the movers of the animal are reasoning and
phantasia and choice and wish and appetite. And all of these can be reduced to thought and desire.
For both *phantasia* and sense-perception hold the same place as thought, since all are concerned
with making distinctions." Citing a study by John Cooper, she also notes that "there is no need to
interpret [κρίνειν] as implying that any kind of explicit or reflective judgment is taking place—and
in particular . . . it need not be associated with 'explicit verbal performance or the disposition to
such'—as indeed we can readily infer from [Aristotle's] ascription of κρίνειν to animals'" (*ibid.* 334).
The point is well taken. But a restriction necessary in the case of animals without *logos* must not
disallow the otherwise legitimate implications of the philosopher's statement for the social world of
the *polis*. Therefore, I think it is right to consider his analysis in the context of κρίσις that involves
discursive thought and decision making.

expression (at the civic level) of the individual's proper use of his own faculties of judgment.[128]

This line of reasoning is of a piece with Aristotle's division of the soul into two parts: one that possesses λόγος, the other ἄλογον (*EN* 1102a27–28). The former he divides further into the ἐπιστημονικόν, which studies things whose principles (ἀρχαί) cannot be otherwise, and the λογιστικόν, which makes calculating (λογίζεσθαι) and deliberating (βουλεύεσθαι) its task:[129] τὸ γὰρ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ λογίζεσθαι ταὐτόν, οὐδεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν (*EN* 1139a12–14). Drawing our attention to the appearance of ἐπιστημονικόν at *DA* 434a16, Labarrière (1984) 30 plausibly argues that the subdivision of the soul that has λόγος is in view throughout this section of *De anima*, where the philosopher discusses the λογιστικὴ φαντασία. The effect of this terminology is to underline the involvement of λόγος—*ratio* and *oratio*—as νοῦς makes use of the corresponding φαντάσματα in forming a ὑπόληψις. Like Plato before him (but with greater conceptual clarity[130]) Aristotle placed desire in the sphere of λόγος, and therefore made it, in some measure, the object of persuasion and rational appeal. We find this clearly stated at *Rh.* 1370a18–27: ἐπιθυμία (which he defines as "a desire for what is pleasant") can be ἄλογος or μετὰ λόγου;[131] the former kind does not come ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν, 'from forming an opinion' (e.g. hunger, thirst, or sleep); of the latter kind, he writes: μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσας ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ πεισθέντες (1370a25–27). Thus, the craving in this case comes from persuasion (whence, by implication, one forms ὑπολήψεις)—in particular, from aural persuasion: "for they often long to see and own when they have heard and been persuaded."[132] I do not think that ἀκούσαντες and πεισθέντες are conceptually

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[128]Cf. *Rh.* 1377b20–22, which plainly states that ἕνεκα κρίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική.

[129]*EN* 1139a3–8.

[130]Cf. Fortenbaugh (2002) 23–44.

[131]From the point of view of the terminology employed this contradicts 1369a1–4, where βούλησις (described as 'a desire for what is good') is assigned to the λογιστικὴ ὄρεξις, but ὀργή and ἐπιθυμία to the ἄλογος ὄρεξις. The disagreement, however, is superficial, for, as Grimaldi (1980) 231 explains, the same conceptual schema, detailed in *EN* 1102a26–3a10, underlies both passages. Indeed, at *EN* 1102b13–14 Aristotle mentions a subdivision of the soul's ἄλογον μόριον that "somehow shares in λόγος" ([ἄλλη τις φύσις] μετέχουσα μέντοι πῃ λόγου), for it responds differently in the continent and incontinent man. And a few lines later, at 1102b29–31, he structures the opposition as one between the φυτικόν, which "in no wise shares in λόγος," and the ἐπιθυμητικόν (and in general the ὀρεκτικόν), which "somehow does share [in λόγος], in that it hearkens to it and obeys it" (τὸ δ' ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικὸν μετέχει πως, ᾗ κατήκοόν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ πειθαρχικόν).

[132]Reading πολλά adverbially, and the verbs and participles absolutely.

coordinated, as if the former merely referred to learning about something by word of mouth, with the latter conveying the exercise of reason that results in conviction. Rather, I believe that Aristotle has selected the common scenario of rhetorical persuasion to illustrate the division (only too apposite a choice, we must admit, given the subject matter of his treatise), and that the participles, conceptually subordinated, might be translated thus: "for they often long to see and own when they are convinced by hearing [an oral argument]." This serves well to remind us that, for Aristotle, the rhetorical endeavor is preeminently of an oral (and hence aural) nature.

We should not be surprised, then, if the first occurrence of φαντασία in the *Rhetoric* is found at 1370a28, in this same passage, and that it appears in an argument about the very desires that are open to persuasion and should therefore be of concern to the orator: ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, κἀεὶ ἐν[133] τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἂν φαντασία τις οὗ μέμνηται ἢ ἐλπίζει· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν, ἐπείπερ καὶ αἴσθησις (1370a27–32). This famous passage, with its αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής, does not, of course, collapse the conceptual complexity of φαντασία surveyed above into a facile equation between it and perception. The enclitic τις here, as often, signals a simplification; it warns us of an approximation that, while suitable to the context and argument at hand, yet lacks the philosophical sophistication and accuracy that might be necessary and present elsewhere.[134]

The connection between φαντασία and αἴσθησις is helped by the semantic range of αἰσθάνομαι, which—Aristotle teaches in *DA* II.6—covers not only αἰσθητά perceived in themselves, but also what might be called 'incidental objects', perceived κατὰ συμβεβηκός. The former are proper, ἴδια, to one of the ordinary senses (e.g. seeing white or tasting sweetness); or common, τὰ κοινά, to all or some (e.g. size or number). The incidental, he illustrates as follows: "An object of perception is spoken of as incidental, e.g. if the white thing were the son of Diares; for you perceive this incidentally, since this which you perceive is incidental to the white thing. Hence too

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[133]I follow Roemer's text, which reflects Susemihl's emendation. Alternatively, the κἄν of ΘΠΓΣ (using Ross's *sigla*) may actually be κἂν = καὶ ἐν, where the ἀεί required by the syllogism, though not explicit, is nevertheless understood to apply. In any case, it is clear that εἰ δὲ τοῦτο summarizes the three protases, and that δέ must therefore be resumptive. Cf. Grimaldi (1980) 251.

[134]Cf. Watson (1982) 103n6 and Wedin (1988) 89. I am not hereby necessarily endorsing the widespread view of the *Rhetoric* as a treatise lacking in exactitude. For a survey of the literature for and against this view see Fortenbaugh (1974) 222n4 and 223n5. Cf. also Striker (1996) 286–88.

you are not affected by the object of perception as such" (418a20–24).[135] It is clear that perception of incidental objects is of a higher order, in that it calls for processing and integrating with memory an array of data (proper and common). And yet at one level—and certainly in popular parlance—we can still say that we 'see the son of Diares' just as we might as well say that we 'recognize' him: *seeing* considers it from the perspective of the senses, *recognizing*, from that of the mind. It is precisely this double-sidedness of perception that gives rise to the concept of an αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, and the discourse on φαντασία seeks to understand the individual roles of soul and body and their mutual interplay when such 'perception-as-realization' takes place. Only in this sense is it right to say that we feel an emotion: not as a bare affection, as a dog may be said to be angry—for emotion is not a sensory datum impinging on the senses—but by becoming aware of a φάντασμα that is, in turn, attended by pleasure or pain in their various forms.[136] This explains the words ἡ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἴσθησίς τις ἀσθενής: if αἴσθησις is attended by pleasure or pain,[137] and memories and hopes—which involve φαντάσματα of the things one remembers or hopes for—are painful or pleasurable, then, on the point of analogy, φαντασία is a sort of weak αἴσθησις.[138]

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[135]Hamlyn's (1968) translation *ad loc.* The Greek runs as follows: κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰσθητόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν εἴη Διάρους υἱός· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ τούτου αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι τῷ λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τοῦτο, οὗ αἰσθάνεται· διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν πάσχει ᾗ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. Note how πάσχειν and αἰσθητόν are connected, just as αἰσθάνεσθαι and πάθος.

[136]πάθος covers anything that comes about through πάσχειν (cf. *DELG s.v.* πάσχω). At *DA* 403a7, ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι are listed as πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς (for sweetness, cold, heat, etc. as πάθη, see *Cat.* 9b2–9). At 403a17–18 the list is: θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν; all these happen "with the body," the philosopher adds, "because together with these the body feels something" (ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα, 403a18–19). The concept of πάθος extends further to states of mind and body such as sleep (*De Insomn.* 462a3–4: ἐὰν μὲν αἰσθάνηται ὅτι καθεύδει, καὶ τοῦ πάθους ἐν ᾧ ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑπνωτικοῦ), to μνήμη, 'memory' (*De Mem.* 449b4–6), and even to φαντάσματα (*De Mem.* 450a10–11: καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν [bracketed by Ross, after Freudenthal]).

[137]In ἐστὶν τὸ ἥδεσθαι ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους (1370a27–28) πάθος stands broadly for τὸ πάσχειν τι (see above, n. 136). It might thus be rendered 'affection'—not in the narrow sense of 'emotion' (though emotions are certainly included) but the more general one of 'the state of being influenced or acted upon'. The connection of αἴσθησις with πάθη is natural, since sense organs must be *affected* by the corresponding stimuli for perception to occur (*DA* 424b25–26). But just as every sense has its corresponding pleasure (*EN* 1174b20–21), so also the emotions (πάθη as *animi perturbationes*) are accompanied by pleasure and pain: λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη (*EN* 1105b21–23).

[138]Cf. Wedin (1988) 89. Of course, Aristotle's reasoning does not deduce, but assumes as a premise, what I have presented as the conclusion; his goal is to argue that memory and hope are, in fact, attended by pleasure and pain: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδοναὶ ἅμα μεμνημένοις καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν,

The other instances of φαντασία in the *Rhetoric* follow the established norm; as Grimaldi (1980) 256 notes, through "imagination, the presentative faculty," φαντάσματα affect our appetitive system. Indeed, at 1370b33 victory is said to give rise to a φαντασία of superiority (ὑπεροχή), "which all strongly or mildly desire"; at 1371a9 honor and a good reputation are reckoned among the most pleasurable possessions, because on their account each has the φαντασία "that he is such as a worthy man (ὁ σπουδαῖος), all the more when they say so who he thinks speak truly"; at 1371a19, elaborating on why being loved is pleasant, the reason offered is that "there too [the one loved enjoys] a φαντασία that being good is his nature,[139] [a thing] which all who perceive it desire"; at 1378b10, the φαντασία is "dwelling upon the thought of revenge";[140] and at 1382a21, 1383a17, and 1384a22 the word enters into the respective definitions of fear and courage (which involve a future expectation—the ἐλπίς noted at 1370a29—of evil or safety) and shame ("a φαντασία of loss of honor"). In none of these instances is the emphasis on the unreality of what is 'presented' to the mind;[141] the focus is rather on the cognitive process that consists in entertaining a given notion or idea, a process that brings pleasure or pain to the one who engages in it. The point of view taken is δόξα,[142] often that of a third-party, and there is a keen interest in how our notions are affected by those around us. In one case we even read explicitly that the φάντασμα is what others *say* about us; and that the persuasion operative in the φαντασία is enhanced in proportion as the speakers are trustworthy—an argument

εἴπερ καὶ αἴσθησις (*Rh.* 1370a30–32).

[139]I read the construction as ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ [τὸ] ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Once this turns into an articular infinitive qualifying φαντασία, the τό, not strictly required, is dropped, perhaps to avoid the close succession of τοῦ + inf. and τὸ + inf.

[140]διότι διατρίβουσιν ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ (1378b8–9).

[141]Concerning 1384a22, Kennedy (1991) 146n56 notes: "As usual, this means a mental 'visualization' of the effects, not (as the English word may imply) a false conclusion."

[142]Labarrière (1984) argues for an understanding of λόγος that puts the accent on *oratio* rather than *ratio*. While animals do not have reason, he says, they are not entirely deprived of rationality: τὸ αἰσθητικόν—which animals obviously have—cannot be easily classified as either ἄλογον or λόγον ἔχον (*DA* 432a30–31); besides, many (if not most) animals have φαντασία and μνήμη of particulars (*EN* 1147b5); and, as a survey readily shows (cf. *ibid.* 34–40), Aristotle assigns to some a kind of μάθησις and διδασκαλία, and to birds, ἑρμηνεία ἀλλήλοις and even a διάλεκτος. Moreover, following *GA* 786b23–25 and *DA* 420b29–33, Labarrière links φωνή—a σημεῖον of pain and pleasure (*Pol.* 1253a10–11)—to αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία. The implication is that the opposition between αἰσθητική and λογιστικὴ φαντασία reflects the one between φωνή and λόγος; and hence, the λόγος in question is not so much *ratio* as *oratio*. Whether one agrees with him or no, one can hardly deny that, at the very least, wherever *ratio* is involved, persuasion is active as "l'espace intersubjectif et dialogal de l'opinion et de la délibération," a space that turns readily into the public sphere of δόξα where the community engages in dialog and persuasion.

that points the way to the 'scientific' (ἔντεχνον) study of reasoned emotional appeal, an appeal that, insofar as it is based on λόγος, has a legitimate place in the art of rhetoric.[143]

DA 433a10–22 calls φαντασία a kind of thinking: as δόξα, it is a critical faculty;[144] but, significantly, in contrast to δόξα, it does not carry πίστις (*DA* 428a20–24)— arguably the ultimate goal of rhetoric. This fundamental distinction is one that we must bear in mind as we think of the oratorical task: φαντασία, the very system of [re]presentation for the διανοητικὴ ψυχή, is the means by which the speaker shapes the perception of his audience. Such molding influence works at all the available cognitive levels (including the πίστεις inherent in the αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα, just as even the geometer must use φαντάσματα), but it pertains especially to *pathos*, as the orator endeavors to secure a desirable outcome or avoid a disagreeable one.[145] And λέξις, of course, studies which use of λόγος—including, we must always remember, φωνή and its attributes—best conveys the speaker's meaning, best achieves his goals, evoking such φαντάσματα as will support his case. These φαντάσματα are not like the ones the mind entertains on account of the facts themselves;[146] they are rhetorically con-

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[143]Cf. Brinton (1988).

[144]Even if not a *full*, i.e. independent, faculty.

[145]An orator's successful self-presentation, which turns on his ability to communicate proper *ēthos*, can also be reinterpreted as φαντασία towards the hearers with a view to creating such πάθη as will move them to act to the speaker's advantage. That such overlap between *ēthos* and *pathos* exists is generally denied by Fortenbaugh, who in a series of works (see Fortenbaugh, 1996, *passim*, esp. 147, with bibliography in nn. 3 and 4) has argued that persuasion through character is not intended to arouse emotion in the audience and does not compromise the objectivity of the juror. (His only concession is that at *Rh.* II.1 *eunoia* is thought of as an emotion, not of the audience but *of the speaker*; but cf. *Rh.* 1415a35–36, where it is paired with ὀργίσαι.) By insisting on the distinction Aristotle draws between εὔνοια and φιλία in *EN* 1166b30–35, he seems to imply that should the audience, e.g., see the orator manifest intense φιλία towards them (or their city), they would be inclined to mistrust him; or else that the speaker should seek to restrain such feelings for fear of warping his own or his hearers' judgment (Fortenbaugh, 1996, 164). Neither implication squares with intuition or actual practice. (Of course, if such protestations were overdone, they may look inauthentic and fail to convince, but this is entirely another matter.) And even if the distinction of *EN* holds, many an Athenian orator must have boasted strong affection for his city and convinced her of the honesty of his claims, or else the parody in Aristophanes' *Knights* would ring hollow (cf., e.g., 732, 773, and 1339–55). Far better, then, to acknowledge with Carey (1994) 35 that, "[i]n practice, *ethos* and *pathos* are closely connected, for one of the effects of *ethos*, as well as inducing a degree of trust, is also to produce a feeling of goodwill in the audience toward the speaker." (Cf. *ibid.* 39 and 43, and Russell, 1990, 205–6 and 212.) In other words: the orator succeeds when his εὔνοια and φιλία are reciprocated by his audience.

[146]Even in the case of φαντάσματα strictly subservient to the 'bare facts' (such as might be employed by the geometer), one must always remember that 'forms' (universals), not φαντάσματα, are the objects of thought: τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ (*DA* 431b2; cf. 429a27–29 and 432a2–3). Hence, Wedin (1988) 91 notes: "The contemplating geometer may have an image

structed by the application of λέξις to *ethos* and *pathos*,[147] and can be deconstructed
by one's opponent: their force is not that of logical inevitability. And this, I believe, is
the note of caution Aristotle strikes when he says that λέξις, insofar as it is φαντασία
towards the hearers, can only be of limited import.[148] The philosopher's comment,
then, is not a dismissive aside, but offers a realistic estimate of the promise of λέξις
and its corresponding limitations.

2.7   ἡ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὑπόκρισις

We come at last to *Rhetoric* 1404a12–19, the section where Aristotle makes clear the
approach to λέξις and ὑπόκρισις he is to take in the rest of the treatise:

> ἐκείνη μὲν οὖν ὅταν ἔλθῃ ταὐτὸ ποιήσει τῇ ὑποκριτικῇ, ἐγκεχειρήκασιν
> δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινές, οἷον Θρασύμαχος ἐν τοῖς Ἐλέοις·
> καὶ ἔστιν φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν
> ἔντεχνον. διὸ καὶ τοῖς τοῦτο δυναμένοις γίνεται πάλιν ἆθλα, καθάπερ
> καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν· οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μεῖζον
> ἰσχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν.

Fortenbaugh (1985) 276 has noted that the Greek of a15–16 is "irritatingly com-
pressed." The first difficulty lies in identifying the referent of ἐκείνη: the two obvious
choices are λέξις and ὑπόκρισις.[149] Most commentators assume without much discus-
sion that the latter, viz. 'delivery', is *exclusively* in view. Apparently, the reasons are
the parallel with ὑποκριτική and the presumption that, if Thrasymakhos has dealt
with 'it' in his *Eleoi*, we should look for a subject that concerns itself with πάθη; and
given that these same scholars are commonly of the persuasion that only ὑπόκρισις
does so (to the exclusion of λέξις), it follows *ipso facto* that not style but delivery is

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'before his eye,' but he does not extract information from it by inspection or any other procedure. In-
formation is forthcoming in virtue of his *doing* something, namely, proving theorems. And although
this requires images, the images merely subserve the thinking. They are not what the thinking is
about."

[147]For πάθη as a rhetorical πίστις see Solmsen (1938) and Conley (1982).

[148]This may be said to apply by implication even to ῥητορική as a whole, because its ultimate
orientation is πρὸς δόξαν, i.e., its goal is to shape opinion.

[149]Another option, but less likely, is τέχνη, which appears at 1403b35 in the sense of 'treatise'
(note the σύγκειται). But here it would not be acceptable in that sense, for ἐκείνη is picked up by
περὶ αὐτῆς, and ἐγκεχειρήκασιν δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον περὶ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν τινές clearly calls for a subject, not a
treatise. τέχνη would be possible, however, in the sense of 'art' or 'professional practice', which by
itself would fail to resolve whether λέξις or ὑπόκρισις or, as I argue, some combination of both is in
view.

meant. I trust I have already succeeded in proving false the impression that Aristotle does not concern himself with ὑπόκρισις in the ensuing chapters of *Rhetoric* III, and that, therefore, the view that λέξις cannot encompass the effective expression of *ēthos* and *pathos* is a prejudice contradicted by the evidence. Such considerations, then, do not suffice to remove the ambiguity.

One might point to the ἔλθῃ and advance that, in light of τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν . . . ὀψὲ παρῆλθεν of 1403b21–23, ἐκείνη must be ὑπόκρισις. The problem with this view is that the last time we have an explicit reference to this word is at 1403b27 (by the demonstrative αὕτη), 21 lines before our ἐκείνη; and though 'delivery' (in its narrow sense) it is still the focus for the following 8 lines, it is through its concern with φωνή and its properties (hence the περὶ αὐτῶν at 1403b35). And, perhaps more significantly, at 1403b36 the matter moves to the broader τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, which henceforth remains in view, as the syntactic agreement of φορτικόν and ὑπολαμβανόμενον (1403b36–1404a1) and the repetition at 1404a8, τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως, shows.[150] And λέξις, too, is said to have come up lately (ὀψὲ προῆλθεν), which might just as well have triggered the ὅταν ἔλθῃ.

The parallel at 1404a13 with acting (ἡ ὑποκριτική) is more promising, for 'delivery' is said at 1403b22–23 to have come to τραγική (i.e. the ποιητική of the tragic stage) when poets stopped acting out (ὑπεκρίνοντο) their own plays. Thus, one could view ὑποκριτική as the application of ὑπόκρισις to τραγική. If ἐκείνη referred to delivery, Aristotle would be saying that "when delivery comes [to rhetoric], it will have the same effect [there] as acting [did in tragic drama]"; and since 'acting' would owe its origin to the application of delivery to drama, we could restate the thought thus: "when delivery comes to rhetoric, it will have the same effect there as when delivery came to tragic drama."[151] This comment is reasonable and apposite and has much to recommend it. But considering the capital importance Aristotle assigns to delivery and its inclusion under style, if, as I argue, the philosopher fully intends to study style on the whole from the perspective of delivery, it would be just as acceptable

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[150]The syntactic agreement by itself would not be decisive, as a superficial substitution of ὑπόκρισις by τοῦτο, without any change of the notional subject—a common occurrence—might be in view. But τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς λέξεως is clearly intended to summarize and drive home the consequences of the preceding passage, i.e. 1403b36–1404a8, and this suffices to show that the broader τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν, a topic neither limited to nor exclusive of ὑπόκρισις, is its subject matter.

[151]'When delivery comes to rhetoric' would mean 'when the study of delivery comes into vogue' and orators apply their technical knowledge of it regularly and effectively.

to refer ἐκείνη to λέξις.[152] Indeed, with the coming of rhetorical[153] λέξις would also come ὑπόκρισις. And surely, for any who hold Aristotle's perspective, the paramount significance of style coming to rhetoric would lie in the coming of *delivery* to rhetoric. When one views style and delivery in the intimate connection in which the philosopher places them, it makes no *ultimate* difference whether ἐκείνη refers to the one or to the other. Only those who have driven a wedge between them make much of the alternative selected. Strictly in terms of meaning and implications, however, I find either equally acceptable, and so perhaps does Aristotle, who apparently did not realize the profound ambiguity he would inflict on future readers by choosing the demonstrative over its referent. Such oversight would be entirely excusable (and a happy one) if in fact λέξις and ὑπόκρισις occupied roughly the same conceptual space in his mind. Nevertheless, having said this much, on contextual grounds I still prefer λέξις as the referent: for from 1403b36 on, Aristotle has addressed himself to style as the more inclusive heading, yet all the while admittedly keeping delivery in mind as its preeminent subdivision. And even though he mentions τὸ ὑποκριτικόν at 1404a15, his interest is in the 'capacity for acting' insofar as it bears a connection to style, i.e. περὶ τὴν λέξιν (1404a16)—so that the controlling thought is not ὑπόκρισις in its 'natural state,' so to say, but in its 'artistic' (or 'artificial') mode. Therefore, the subject matter does not change at 1404a12 from λέξις to ὑπόκρισις, but remains uniformly the same, viz. 'rhetorical style', from 1403b36 on.[154]

But why do I speak of *rhetorical* style? I mean to reflect the all important distinction Aristotle draws at 1404a15–16: whereas τὸ ὑποκριτικόν, 'a capacity for acting', to the extent that it is a natural endowment (φύσεως) is also ἀτεχνότερον, 'quite outside

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[152]There is no difficulty, of course, in having a feminine demonstrative for what has been spoken thus far periphrastically in the neuter as τὸ περὶ τὴν λέξιν or τὸ τῆς λέξεως, for the notional subject matter all along is the feminine λέξις. Cf. the use of feminine adjectives at 1403b29, notionally in agreement with φωνή, even though the preceding clause speaks of τοῖς τόνοις. Or the use of αὕτη at 1403b27 for ὑπόκρισις, which has until then been referred to by a neuter plural (τὰ περὶ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, 1403b21–22) or the neuter singular (τὸ τοιοῦτον . . . ὅπερ, 1403b25). One might also wonder why ἐκείνη is preferred to αὕτη. The reason, I think, is not to direct the reader's attention away from λέξις to the further removed ὑπόκρισις; the distance felt is that between the demonstrative and λέξις, which appears four lines earlier and is separated from ἐκείνη by an explanation and an example, neither of which contains or refers to 'style' at the syntactic level.

[153]On the use of 'rhetorical' to qualify 'style', see below, p. 120.

[154]Rapp (2002) 2.817–18 writes: "Tatsächlich werden im vorliegenden Abschnitt die Belange der sprachlichen Form (λέξις) mit denen des mündlichen (und vom Schauspieler verlangten) Vortrags verglichen. Daher liegt nichts näher, als unter ‚ὑπόκρισις' dieselbe Kunst order Fähigkeit zu verstehen, die schon in 1403b22 damit bezeichnet wurde, und „jene" auf die sprachliche Form (λέξις) zu beziehen; letzteres ist schon deswegen angeraten, weil bereits im vorausgegangenen Abschnitt 1404a8–12 von der Beachtung der sprachlichen Form und nicht von der Vortragskunst die Rede war."

the sphere of art (i.e. of systematic study)', yet when considered in its connection to style (περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν), it is ἔντεχνον, 'susceptible of artistic (i.e. systematic) treatment' (or, as Cope, 1877, 3.8 writes, "when applied to language (declamation) it (the practice of it) may be reduced to an art"). It is impossible to escape the conclusion that Aristotle differentiates between a *natural* ὑπόκρισις, strictly a matter of talent, that, if severed from speech, remains beyond his purview; and a ἡ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὑπόκρισις, where *actio* is bound with speech (and speech reciprocally with *actio*), and which on *that* account is of professional interest and reducible to the systematic treatment of a τέχνη.[155] Where speech is not involved (e.g. pantomime) or else is not of professional concern, the talent itself might safely do without the discipline of training. The ἡ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὑπόκρισις might as well be called, as Cope (1877) *ad loc.* does, ὑποκριτικὴ (or ὑπόκρισις) κατὰ λέξιν, and this is the subject matter of chapters 2–12 of the third book of the *Rhetoric*. Here at last becomes clear precisely how Aristotle relates delivery—that most powerful oratorical device—to the larger field of style;[156] or, reciprocally, the philosopher spells out that a study of style that will serve the ends of the orator must be conducted with a view to delivery.[157] Also clear is what motivates the distinction between artful ὑπόκρισις and artless ὑποκριτικόν:

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[155]The coming of "ἐκείνη" then would signal the arrival of 'scientific delivery', whether we designate it by 'delivery connected with style' or 'style with a view to (or according to) delivery.'

[156]This interpretation is further supported by the lines the follow (1404a19–24), for once again style and delivery are mentioned in close succession. At 1404a19 written speeches are said to owe their effect more to style (λέξις) than to thought (διάνοια); after which Aristotle immediately launches into a historical survey, in which the mimetic quality of φωνή plays a fundamental role and is credited with the origin of the arts of rhapsodic performance, acting (ὑποκριτική), and others.

[157]For a study of the intersection of rhetoric and poetics in Aristotle's treatment of λέξις, see Ricoeur (1996). There, I find much I would qualify or disagree with, but I subscribe in substance the central insight that the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* structure the field of style in ways that are distinctive and reflect their various aims. Thus, e.g., after observing that in the former Aristotle rejects the analysis of λέξις under "modes of speech" (i.e. illocutionary forms of speech), he adds: "Hardly has this line of analysis been alluded to when it is interrupted by the remark: 'Let us pass over this then, as appertaining to another art. . . . ' This other 'art' can only be rhetoric" (*ibid.* 328). Ricoeur, too, thinks that Aristotle addresses himself to the need for "clos[ing] the gap, if not fill[ing] the void" between the theory of a poetic λέξις and a "truly rhetorical theory of *lexis*" (*ibid.* 343). Where I would vigorously depart from him is in his assertion, following the consensus view, that, as a *how*, ὑπόκρισις is further removed than λέξις from the *what* of a speech (*ibid.* 343): this is so from our perspective, and only true of Aristotle in a limited sense, for ultimately the entire science of rhetoric is oriented towards effective and successful delivery. Valid logical distinctions cannot obscure necessary practical connections; yes, "it is through our *lexis* that we teach" (*ibid.* 344), but in fifth- and fourth-century Greece it is preeminently in oral delivery that the act of teaching takes place. For this reason I reject his interpretation and rationale for *Rh.* 1404a18–19: "To the degree that style is the external manifestation of discourse, it tends to separate the concern to 'please' from that of 'arguing.' It is doubtless because writing constitutes a second degree of exteriorization that the separation is particularly dangerous in this case" (*ibid.* 344).

after writing that "when style-with-delivery comes, it will have the same effect as acting," the philosopher adds that "some have endeavored *in a limited way* to talk about it" (my emphasis). But why has the scientific study of so important a rhetorical matter been pressed so inadequately? Why has no one yet succeeded in drawing a full and comprehensive account of it? Aristotle replies: "Because, after all, acting is first and foremost a natural talent, and to that extent, irreducible to art." But, ultimately, this insight cannot serve to excuse inaction, whatever the history of past failure or the theoretical challenge ahead,[158] and consequently Aristotle sets out to fill the gap and perfect the art of rhetoric with a study of 'delivery in its connection with style'.

Fortenbaugh (1985) 287n27, surveying two alternative ways of reading 1404a15–16, notes: "On one interpretation, Aristotle says that the principles of style are technical. . . . On another he says that when delivery is applied to style, then it (delivery) is something technical." Yet only a minority of translators (in my view, incorrectly) have followed the former reading.[159] And no wonder most do not: for we should then expect ἡ δὲ λέξις ἔντεχνον, and not περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον.[160] There is therefore no further sharpening of an alleged contrast between style and delivery, and Fortenbaugh is right in judging that "the Greek suits the latter interpretation better, which is in any case strongly supported by Aristotle's remarks in 3.12" (*ibidem*).

We must similarly understand the implication drawn at 1404a16–18, where two groups are contrasted: οἱ τοῦτο [i.e. τὴν κατὰ λέξιν ὑπόκρισιν] δυνάμενοι, viz. those who by training and profession are capable of delivering their speeches in accordance with the principles of the art of rhetorical stylistics; and οἱ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορες, the orators who merely have a knack for delivery, who without the sophistication and self-awareness of rhetorical instruction nevertheless show the prowess of their natural talent.[161] And just as (καθάπερ) exceptional giftedness can prove itself

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[158]Cf. a similar pronouncement regarding metaphors in the *Poetics* 1459a6–7 and the *Rh.* 1405a9–10 (with Cope's, 1877, note *ad loc.*); and yet no one would deny that much effort is expended in teaching their proper use, in accordance with the principle that art improves nature.

[159]Namely, Ross (1924), Jebb (in Sandys, 1909), and Rapp (2002). On the other side of the divide we find the old Latin translation (*apud* Spengel, 1867), Cope (1877), Freese (1926), Tovar (1953), Dufour and Wartelle (1973), and Kennedy (1991) (cf. Arnhart, 1981, 165).

[160]Or τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον, which is nowhere attested. And while *ceteris paribus* we might readily accept that τό may have fallen out, the placement of δέ, between περί and τήν, rather argues against the emendation. In point of fact, neither does the context recommend the change, for the text makes good sense as is.

[161]Interpreters have failed to note the distinction Aristotle is drawing here. Had he merely wanted to say "just as they do to orators on the basis of their delivery" (Kennedy's, 1991, translation,

victorious in competition, so also (καί) the orator who is properly trained, in *his* turn (πάλιν) can himself well carry off the prize.[162]

This approach contrasts significantly with the one followed in the *Poetics*, where delivery, while explicitly owned as part of style, is nevertheless declared to be of interest only to actors (ὑποκριταί) and, in consequence, rejected as inapplicable to ποιητική. Indeed, at 1456b8–10 we learn that τὰ σχήματα τῆς λέξεως,[163] the 'forms of utterance' (Halliwell, 1999, *ad loc.*), constitute one type of inquiry into matters connected with λέξις, a study which is for ἡ ὑποκριτική to know, as well as any who have such mastery (ὁ τὴν τοιαύτην ἔχων ἀρχιτεκτονικήν).[164] The ensuing list[165] makes clear that Aristotle has *performative* settings in view, where a skillful employment of the voice (e.g. loudness and intonation) is essential for successful communication. Neither knowledge nor ignorance of these earns ἡ ποιητική any serious blame

which is representative of the rest), he should have written instead καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς ῥήτορσιν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν. The attributive position of κατὰ ὑπόκρισιν defines these orators, and this expression would be a very odd way indeed of stating their superiority in delivery: it is hard to see how κατά by itself could bear this meaning, while the slightly modified τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν διαφέρουσιν ῥήτορσιν would have made this plain. Once we accept the implications of the syntax and reflect on the context, it becomes clear that in this expression ὑπόκρισις must stand for τὸ ὑποκριτικόν in its unqualified sense (without any relation to λέξις), i.e. it must refer to the natural talent that is ἄτεχνον.

[162]Fortenbaugh (1985) 287n29 is in error in his interpretation of the contrast. He correctly, I think, rejects Sonkowsky's (1959) 261 translation that sets the opposition as one between "actors with histrionic ability" and "orators who excel in delivery" (this would invert the terms of the comparison, which should rather have had the καθάπερ go not with ῥήτορες but with οἱ τοῦτο δυνάμενοι, i.e. the alleged actors); but thinking that this chapter is an introduction to style, which he divorces from delivery, he concludes that the philosopher is only trying to show that "style, too, conveys power and produces prizes." On this reading, the γάρ sentence that follows would make the point by noting that written texts owe their power more to style than to thought (for my own notions about this, see below, section 2.8). This interpretation would be allowable if Aristotle had written ἡ δὲ λέξις, but, as it stands, the text will not permit τοῦτο to refer to style, and thus support an alleged literary view of style as embodied by written compositions. Fortenbaugh is otherwise correct in contraposing τὸ ὑποκριτικόν, 'a natural gift in delivery' ("orators gifted in delivery") with 'style'—not just any concept of style, but ὑπόκρισις ἡ κατὰ λέξιν, which is Cope's (1877) choice (*ad loc.*), and which Fortenbaugh dismisses as "second best but . . . at least consistent with Aristotle's focus on style." Why it should be "second best" remains unexplained.

[163]The expression recalls *Rh.* 1408b21 and b28–29, where it is used specifically of rhythm. Though there its semantic range is much narrower than the one we encounter in the *Poetics*, both occurrences share the performative emphasis.

[164]*Poetics* 1456b10–11. Presumably the 'architect' of acting displays a technical knowledge of his field (rationale, principles, and application), as opposed to actors who, having learned their trade by trial and error, might rely for their guidance on experience. This probably relates to the observation at *Rh.* 1403b22–24.

[165]οἷον τί ἐντολὴ καὶ τί εὐχὴ καὶ διήγησις καὶ ἀπειλὴ καὶ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἀπόκρισις καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον (1456b11–13). Cf. 1457a21.

(ἐπιτίμημα . . . ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς, 1456b14–15). Protagoras' famous criticism of the opening of the *Iliad* supplies a ready illustration: for why should Homer's μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά be criticized for confusing a prayer with a command? The point is that the same form of words can be made into a prayer or a command depending on the tone of voice employed.[166] Therefore this study (θεώρημα) must belong not to poetry, but to some other art, the philosopher adds. He is not thereby denying *pronuntiatio* its rightful place—surely he would have made it the part of any good rhapsode to utter the words with the solemnity and propriety that befits the invocation of a deity—but since the deficiency (if there is one) must be traced to the actor, not the poet, it is therefore possible to dissociate, as he does, the study of ποιητική from considerations of delivery. It is nevertheless surprising the degree to which Aristotle, for the purposes of his *Poetics*, has separated the poetic texts of epic and tragic drama from their elocutionary performative aspects.[167] In bringing up delivery only to dispose of it as irrelevant, the philosopher surprises the modern reader in a way that is only matched by the striking inclusion under λέξις of the principles of grammar and syntax;[168] for who could think of studying drama today without reference to staging and acting?

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[166]This is not do deny Twining's (1812) 2.251 obvious comment that "[of] Homer's *pronunciation or action* . . . Protagoras knew nothing" (his emphasis). All that is implied in the sophist's censure is an incorrect use of the imperative, of which there is an echo in the scholia of the Venetus A *ad loc.*: ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἤτοι ἄδειαν ἢ συνήθειαν λαμβάνει τὰ προστακτικὰ ἀντὶ εὐκτικῶν. It is wrong, however, to interpret these settings strictly as σχήματα διανοίας (e.g. in Quint. *Inst. or.* 6.3.70) and suppress in turn the 'manner of expression' (but cf. Twining, 1812, 2.253). Note Lucas's (1968) 198 humane observation: "The point raised here probably arose from [Protagoras'] perception that what we call the imperative mood was associated with the tone of command. . . . Those who discover new principles often try to apply them too rigidly."

[167]This of course only makes sense where the text under discussion is notionally, if not actually, independent of the performer, i.e., viewed as a script that can be interpreted with a varying degree of competence. Then one may rightly question how successfully the performer has brought out the expressive potential of the text or acted out what its author intended. This argues for a significant degree of fixation already by Aristotle's time of an Athenian canonical version of the *Iliad*, though it need not rule out a comparatively small degree of *mouvance*. For one, the philosopher's focus is not on epic but on drama, whose authorship and textual status are far more straightforward than those of the Homeric poems; and yet we know that even the text of Athenian tragedies experienced so-called 'textual interpolations,' which, some scholars will admit, are of histrionic origin (cf., e.g., Page, 1934). Moreover, the example selected by Aristotle, *Iliad* 1.1, is likely to have been among the earliest passages to attain fixity; the rhapsode's irrelevance (narrowly conceived) to the textual status of this line (in a poem, besides, that is notionally fixed and uniformly ascribed to the one man 'Homer'), is thus, on the point of analogy, a good parallel to the corresponding 'irrelevance' of acting to drama. For the concept of 'notional fixity' and why it does not rule out a measure of *mouvance*, see Chapter 1.

[168]Bywater (1909) 260 notes on *Poetics* 20: "This whole chapter has been condemned by Ritter and others as an interpolation; and it must be admitted that, according to our notions of the divisions of knowledge, the matter in it belongs to grammar and philology rather than to an Art of Poetry."

This move parallels the dismissal of ὄψις at 1450b16–20.[169]

Note now how different the philosopher's stance vis-à-vis rhetorical delivery: while he thinks of the text of drama and epic as preexisting performance,[170] so secondary is the written form of an orator's speech to his public *actio* (before court or assembly) that Aristotle cannot, in his study of rhetoric, overlook delivery, and the corresponding notion of rhetorical style is quite different from the poetic stylistics that emerge in the *Poetics*.[171] And yet, even there he still owns the study of delivery as a legitimate θεώρημα of a true aspect of λέξις, however irrelevant it be ultimately deemed to poetics. The difference is readily epitomized by their respective definitions: in the *Poetics* 1450b13–14, λέγω δέ . . . λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἑρμηνείαν;[172] while in the *Rhetoric* 1403b16–18 he says of λέξις that ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ συμβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι ποιόν τινα τὸν λόγον (cf. 1404a35– 39). This shift in emphasis is further manifest at *Poetics* 1456a38, where in remarks about the purview of λέξις and διάνοια he assigns *pathos* to the latter without so much as a passing comment about any role *lexis* might have in its expression.[173] It is true that here the emotions are primarily internal to the play, in and towards dramatic characters (Bywater, 1909, *ad loc.*). But for them too is *lexis* as conceived in the *Rhetoric* important for plausibility and dramatic illusion vis-à-vis the spectators,

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[169]ἡ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μέν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς· ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἔστιν, ἔτι δὲ κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τῶν ὄψεων ἡ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστιν. Just as τὸ ὑποκριτικόν, 'spectacle' is ἀτεχνότατον; but in contrast to ὑπόκρισις, which *can* be associated with λέξις and thus become the object of systematic study, the symbolic grammar of the dramatic spectacle fails to benefit from a similar strategy. The crucial difference is in the absence of a natural correspondence between verbal and visual language. Cf. *Poetics* 1453b1–9 and 1462a11–12.

[170]Not necessarily as *written* texts (though also available thus), but as oral literature that can be actualized on demand by performance.

[171]Halliwell (1993) 51 remarks: "[T]he subject of these chapters is rhetorical *lexis*, not *lexis* in general, a point emphasized at 3.1.10, 04a 36–9."

[172]To this definition of λέξις, Aristotle adds the further observation, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν (*Poetics* 1450b14–15). In its light, his earlier statement at 1449b33–34 is but a particular application of ἡ διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἑρμηνεία to metrical expression (cf. Dupont-Roc and Lallot, 1980, 209–10). Note the divergent point of view of *Rh.* 1404a28–29: ἑτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστίν. If the λέξις of the *Poetics* denotes 'expression' (in this sense, equivalent to λόγος understood broadly as 'speech', as observed by Lucas, 1968, 195 *ad* 1456a37), in the *Rhetoric* the focus is more narrowly on the *form* of such expression.

[173]It is true, as Lucas (1968) 195 remarks, that the τοῦ λόγου of *Poetics* 1456a37 overlaps with λέξις as 'expression'; and, to this extent, there is a connection, if implicit, between it and *pathos*. But the particular concept of λέξις explored in this section—to which *pathos* is *not* explicitly tied—diverges from the λόγος that is strictly instrumental to διάνοια, as the division of λοιπόν at 1456a33–34 into λέξις and διάνοια shows; and so it is that, after dismissing διάνοια and referring the interested reader to his *Rhetoric*, he then takes up λέξις at 1456b8 from the point of view of its σχήματα.

all the more so if the performance is to induce in them a catharsis of 'fear and pity' (1456b1).[174]

One final matter should be addressed before I turn my attention to the role writing plays in rhetorical practice, viz. the reference to Thrasymakhos at 1404a14, which might be deemed to support an interpretation of the ἐκείνη (1404a12) that is not the one defended here.[175] For it is clear that the περὶ αὐτῆς (1404a14) shares with it the same referent, and hence it follows that, whatever its identity, Thrasymakhos is singled out as one who has taken in hand to speak a little 'about it' in his *Eleoi*. And since the title itself means 'pities', it invites translations that put the emphasis on emotional appeals *as if* entirely divorced from rhetorical considerations of a technical nature. If the substance of the *Pities* was a gross, inartistic (ἄτεχνον) appeal to emotions—without reference to λέξις, which, I have argued, constitutes for Aristotle the only proper sphere of such appeals—mentioning Thrasymakhos can be read as correspondingly reinforcing the alleged dichotomy between ὑπόκρισις and λέξις. This would then support the view that Aristotle's design is to characterize delivery as not only ethically obnoxious, but inartistic and incapable of systematic treatment, ruling out any further consideration of it in his treatment of style—until, that is, it somehow resurfaces in chapter 12.[176]

But the little we know about the sophist from the extant sources contradicts such a tendentious reconstruction of his practice.[177] We must, of course, make allowance

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[174]There is, as scholars note, a parallel in the passage of the *Rhetoric* that starts at 1356a1, but with this important distinction: that, as befits an introduction, Aristotle there uses *logos* in the most general sense of 'discourse, speech' (cf. Grimaldi, 1980, *ad loc.*) and makes no attempt to apportion *ēthos* or *pathos* to one or another component of the art of oratory. Therefore Kennedy's (1991) 38n41 remark, "Aristotle is not thinking of style and delivery but of the thought and contents," is unnecessary and a little misleading. That the philosopher does not exclude style any more than he does thought is clear from the comment that follows, viz. that persuasion through character happens whenever the speech is spoken *in such a way as* to make the speaker worthy of trust.

[175]For the relevant *testimonia* and fragments, see DK 85 and Radermacher (1951) B.IX. For studies of his contribution to the development of prose and rhetoric, see Blass (1887) 244–58, Schwartz (1892), Drerup (1901) 225–51, and Kennedy (1963) 68–70.

[176]See below, pp. 132ff.

[177]Quintilian's passing comment (*Inst. or.* 3.3.4) that Thrasymakhos had ascribed *actio* to *natura* rather than *ars* is not as definitive in its implications as might appear at first. For on the basis of *Rh.* 1404a15–16 the same can be said, *grosso modo*, about Aristotle himself. And yet we have seen how the philosopher, with this broad statement as a foil, introduces a technical notion of *actio* in its particular connection to *elocutio*. All the same, the logic of his thought has often escaped the modern scholar, and we cannot be sure that Thrasymakhos' words, even if faithfully reported by Quintilian, were not accompanied by such instruction as would have made clear, explicitly or implicitly, that in certain respects *actio* was, after all, susceptible of systematic analysis. Quintilian may have missed this, may have depended on a source that was not sufficiently accurate or detailed, or may have

for the more limited degree of development rhetoric as an art must have received at the hands of this pioneer when compared to Aristotle himself; for I am, after all, arguing that if, according to Aristotle, Thrasymakhos spoke about ὑπόκρισις κατὰ λέξιν *only* ἐπ' ὀλίγον, the philosopher—who observes and, in my opinion, regrets the lack of a τέχνη about delivery—intended to, and in actual fact did, address the gap in the scholarship of his time with his own treatment of λέξις in *Rhetoric* III.1–12. And even though he must have considered the sophist's discussion deficient enough to warrant his simultaneously holding that "no *technē* has yet been composed" and that, all the same, Thrasymakhos and others "have attempted to speak a little about it," tradition attests to the sophist's penning at least one τέχνη,[178] which, as Drerup (1901) 227 notes, must have included not only ready-made examples but also accompanying observations of a theoretical nature. And a survey of his contribution quickly reveals that he moves largely within parameters of rhetorical stylistics not unlike those explored by Aristotle in his manual (rhythm, cola, etc.). The reality that emerges further underscores the two facts I have endeavored to establish: first, that, far from fencing it off, delivery (in its concern with emotions) *was* indeed under the purview of Aristotle's examination of style, just as it received attention (however deficient) by Thrasymakhos; and secondly, that the subjects of rhythm, periodic structure, propriety, and so on could be conceived of, and treated under, the heading of delivery as a sort of rhetorical stylistics with a view to delivery (the ὑπόκρισις ἡ περὶ τὴν λέξιν or ἡ κατὰ ὑπόκρισιν λέξις).

Let us, then, survey what we know about the famous sophist. The first *testimonium*, the one most emphatic and explicit about the emotional impact pursued, comes from Plato's *Phaidros* 267c: τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνῃ μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἀνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπᾴδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη· διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος. τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔοικε συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινες μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα. After a humorous reference to his 'piteously wailing' discourses that dwelt on poverty and old age, Sokrates tells of Thrasymakhos' ability now to excite anger, now

chosen only to report the general statement without any further elaboration. His remark, then, may do nothing more than place the sophist all the more firmly as a forerunner of Aristotle in his approach to ὑπόκρισις.

[178]The *Suidas s.v.* Θρασύμαχος remarks: ἔγραψε συμβουλευτικούς, τέχνην ῥητορικήν, παίγνια, ἀφορμὰς ῥητορικάς. The scholiast to Aristophanes' *Birds* 880, however, mentions a μεγάλη τέχνη: is it the same as the τέχνη ῥητορική of the *Suidas*? Cf. Plato *Phaidros* 261c2 and 266c3.

to charm the angry by his incantations (where ἐπᾴδων suggests the musical quality
of his ῥυθμοί and ἁρμονία, i.e. of his voice in delivery).[179] His superior skill in fab-
ricating and overthrowing slander seems rather to belong to his dexterity in εὕρησις
(mentioned elsewhere); the term ἐπάνοδος, 'recapitulation' (cf. *Rh.* 1414b2), identifies
the part of a speech that best lends itself to such appeals.[180]

Plutarch, in his *Quaest. conv.* 616d mentions Thrasymakhos' Ὑπερβάλλοντες [sc.
λόγοι], which, to judge from the context, must have consisted in arguments built
on comparisons (συγκρίσεις). Athenaios X 416a, in turn, writes about the sophist's
προοίμια: it appears, then, that he not only composed examples of closing *perora-
tiones*, but also of opening *exordia*. These two collections together may correspond
to the ἀφορμαὶ ῥητορικαί of the *Suidas*. As to general qualities of style, Dionysios
Hal. *Lys.* §6 reports that Theophrastos had credited Thrasymakhos with pioneer-
ing the middle style[181] (cf. *Dem.* §3), a manner of expression that "compresses the
thoughts and expresses them tersely."[182] In *Isaios* §20 we also learn that Dionysios
considered the sophist τῶν . . . τοὺς ἀκριβεῖς προαιρουμένων λόγους καὶ πρὸς τὴν
ἐναγώνιον ἀσκούντων ῥητορικήν, a sentence that Usher (1974) *ad loc.* renders as
"[one of] those who preferred *factual* discourses and practical [*sic*] rhetoric designed
for the law courts" (my emphasis)—an understanding of ἀκρίβεια and ἐναγώνιος
that cautions us perhaps not to jump too readily to conclusions as to the meaning
of ἀκριβής in *Rhetoric* III.12,[183] where ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη λέξις is the γραφική and the
ἀγωνιστική is the ὑποκριτικωτάτη. A little later in the same section of Dionysios'
Isaios we read: Θρασύμαχος δὲ καθαρὸς μὲν καὶ λεπτὸς καὶ δεινὸς εὑρεῖν τε καὶ
εἰπεῖν στρογγύλως καὶ περιττῶς, ὃ βούλεται, πᾶς δέ ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς τεχνογραφικοῖς καὶ
ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, δικανικοὺς δὲ [ἢ συμβουλευτικοὺς][184] οὐκ ἀπολέλοιπε λόγους. Aristo-

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[179]Radermacher (1951) 71 comments perceptively on the rhythmic structure Plato imparts to the
words τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων (*Phaidros* 267c7–8): "Ceterum
notabis puros numeros . . . ex quo conicias in ἐλέων exemplis admodum numerosam fuisse sophistae
orationem."

[180]Just as Aristotle does in *Rh.* III.19, though chapter 14.7 makes clear that such devices are also
profitably used in *prooimia*.

[181]Or *a* middle style, if Grube (1952) is right, though his insistence upon rendering λέξις narrowly
as 'diction' (word choice, strictly speaking) seems misguided, as his own comments on pp. 264–66
hint. Cf. also Innes (1985) 260–62.

[182]ἡ συστρέφουσα τὰ νοήματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα λέξις (§6.10–11). Grube (1952) 260
translates: "A manner of writing (or speaking) which gathers up its ideas compactly and brings
them out in bold relief."

[183]See below, pp. 138ff.

[184]E. Schwartz *delevit*: not only is it contradicted by the testimony of the *Suidas* but, as Blass
(1887) 250 notes, by established facts about the sophist, e.g. the extant fragments. It is true that as

tle's *Rhetoric* supplies two relevant *testimonia*. At 1409a2 he tells us that orators have used the paean since the time of Thrasymakhos; with this, Cicero appears in broad agreement;[185] and at *Rh.* 1413a7–10 he recounts a brilliant instance of the sophist's use of similes.

We may quote in summary the considered judgment of Kennedy (1963) 68–69: "What Thrasymachus appreciated, and perhaps he was the first to do so, was the effect of a varied rhythmic pattern. . . . Furthermore, the fragment[186] shows a degree of sentence structure more developed than in any earlier writer and a tendency to avoid hiatus. . . . In both these respects Thrasymachus differs from Gorgias, as he does in avoiding the artificialities of the latter's style." What emerges from this survey is not a figure narrowly concerned with inartistic emotional appeals, but one who paid broad attention to style *and* delivery, in much the same way I argue Aristotle himself does. Hence, it is understandable that the *Suidas* would say that [Θρασύμαχος] πρῶτος περίοδον καὶ κῶλον κατέδειξε καὶ τὸν νῦν τῆς ῥητορικῆς τρόπον εἰσηγήσατο.[187] We cannot, therefore, read much into 1404a13–15 with its mention of the Ἔλεοι, for, as Fortenbaugh (1985) 285n2 recognizes (his unnecessary dichotomy between λέξις and ὑπόκρισις notwithstanding): "In a work on emotional appeal remarks on style are just as appropriate as remarks on delivery."

a non-Athenian he would not have had the right to address the assembly, but neither are all speeches of a *symbuleutic* character necessarily for oral delivery or at least for delivery by the author himself. Thus, the reported Ὑπὲρ Λαρισαίων (DK 85 B2), whose single extant line indeed reads like a political address, may have belonged to a political pamphlet or it may have been written for a Thessalian embassy (so Blass, 1887, 250). And the Περὶ πολιτείας (DK 85 B1) is so generic an *exemplum*, as Radermacher (1951) B.IX.10 notes, that it may well have been extracted from a rhetorical manual. (Cf. Drerup, 1901, 227, who thinks it must have been a political pamphlet. For Dionysios *ad loc.* it is a παράδειγμα from one of his δημηγορικοὶ λόγοι.) In any case, it is surprising that one who arguably took great interest in the rhetorical impact of emotions and whose style was most fitting to the oratory of the law court should not have left any forensic speeches (as Dionysios *Isaios* §20 observes).

[185] *Orator* 175: *nam neminem in eo genere scientius versatum Isocrate confitendum est, sed princeps inveniundi fuit Thrasymachus, cuius omnia nimis etiam exstant scripta numerose.*

[186] He means *Dem.* §3, although on p. 68 erroneously refers to "*Isaeus* 3."

[187] Cf. Grube (1952), who disputes Thrasymakhos' alleged part in the development of the periodic style. But he is countered by Innes (1985) 262, who suggests that Theophrastos may have recognized the sophist as the pioneer of "the mean between the unshaped and the overperiodic sentence."

2.8   Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and writing

Let us now return to Aristotle's statement about written speeches at *Rh.* 1404a18–19: οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μεῖζον ἰσχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν. The γάρ shows that it is an explanation of the preceding sentence, with its opposition between οἱ τοῦτο δυνάμενοι and οἱ κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορες. If my understanding of the identity of these two groups is correct,[188] then it follows that those skilled in that delivery which is made 'artistic' by its connection to λέξις win prizes *because* written speeches carry greater force on account of their λέξις than their διάνοια. Doubtless, this need not be the *only* reason for the success of rhetorically trained speakers. But if the illustration is apposite, we must assume that orators regularly practiced and trained for their delivery with the aid of written drafts of their own speeches.[189] Accordingly, the philosopher's argument would run thus: the acting of 'delivery' (τὸ ὑποκριτικόν) is primarily a matter of natural talent and, as such, 'inartistic'; but, from the point of view of style, it *can* be reduced to an art, i.e. systematized, taught, and learned as a discipline; and this is why they win prizes who, through training, have acquired it as a skill, even as they do too who have a natural knack for it; for the written speeches that orators use to prepare for and hone their delivery owe their effectiveness more to style—which makes delivery susceptible of study—than to their actual subject matter. And so we learn that, in Aristotle's time, the technique of writing was in common use among apprentices of rhetoric and orators generally, but that it still occupied a subordinate place as instrumental to delivery. We do not yet have as an ordinary occurrence speeches that are written primarily for a reading public:[190] they are first and foremost *scripts* of future performances (and only after the fact, secondarily, records of past accomplishment). The circumstances described in the *Rhetoric* represent, therefore, a midpoint in the evolution of the function of writing as a new technology in the performance culture of ancient Greece: a contested technique in the beginning that challenged extemporaneous speaking (and for this reason decried by Alkidamas), it gradually gained broad acceptance among professional practitioners of rhetoric and was, already in Aristotle's time, in common use. But still primarily a script, its function was ancillary and its status derivative,

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[188]See above, p. 122.

[189]And perhaps transcripts of others, not their own, whose past success commended them as models to imitate.

[190]Isokrates' case is truly exceptional and results from his peculiar incapacitating infirmity. Cf. Isok. 5.81–82 and *Rh.* 1414a16–17.

a mere aid to train for the all-important moment of actual delivery.

We are not surprised that writing should have reached this point by the second half of the fourth century BC. After all, according to the *Suidas*, roughly a century earlier even Perikles had used scripts to prepare for his addresses from the βῆμα: ῥήτωρ καὶ δημαγωγός· ὅστις πρῶτος γραπτὸν λόγον ἐν δικαστηρίῳ εἶπε, τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ σχεδιαζόντων.[191] With this, we might compare Aristotle's statement, reported by Cicero in his *Brutus*, that before Corax and Tisias "no one was wont to speak according to method or discipline, but most, however, did with precision and from a written script" (§46).[192] Though some have emended 'from a written script' (*de scripto*)[193] to 'precisely ordered' (*descripte*), hence putting in doubt Aristotle's meaning (see n. 192), it is clear, at any rate, that at first the use of scripts was contested and that to it attached a distinct onus of shame that speakers were eager to avoid; so that, if we believe Phaidros, citizens of the greatest power and dignity were ashamed to write speeches and bequeath their writings to posterity for fear they might be numbered among the sophists.[194] To this sense of shame we might owe that all of Perikles' scripted speeches perished:[195] perhaps he disposed of them as diligently as he prepared, with their aid, to address the assembly.[196] Whatever the truth about this statesman, there is no doubt in regard to Lysias: for Phaidros introduces him as δεινότατος ὢν τῶν νῦν γράφειν (228a1–2),[197] and Sokrates assumes that his young companion not only bade Lysias repeat his speech but at last secured possession

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[191]*s.v.* Περικλῆς, p. 100, entry 1180 in Adler's edition. On this, Blass (1887) 35n5 remarks: "[D]iese letzte Notiz geht ganz entschieden auf Aristoteles oder Theophrast zurück."

[192]*nam antea neminem solitum via nec arte, sed accurate tamen et de scripto plerosque dicere* (Cic. *Brutus* §46). Although the vulgate *descripto* has been plausibly emended to *descripte* (or even *discripte*), one cannot entirely rule out 'from a script' as the true reading, especially if the report of Perikles' practice preserved in the *Suidas* is accurate and goes back to peripatetic sources. Cf. Blass (1887) 27n1.

[193]For this acceptation of *de*, see the *OLD s.v.* 7.c: "indicating personal or other source of information." E.g., *de scripto sententia dicta* (Cic. *Sest.* 129); or *de tabulis publicis recitat* (Cic. *Flac.* 40).

[194]καὶ σύνοισθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον δυνάμενοί τε καὶ σεμνότατοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύνονται λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπειν συγγράμματα ἑαυτῶν, δόξαν φοβούμενοι τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου, μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται (Plato *Phaidros* 257d4–8). Cf. *ibid.* 257c6, where λογογράφος is considered a term of opprobrium.

[195]Plu. *Life of Perikles* 8.7 (156c10–11): ἔγγραφον μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν ἀπολέλοιπε πλὴν τῶν ψηφισμάτων.

[196]Cf. *ibid.* 8.6 (156c7–10). Cicero disagrees with Plutarch, for both his *Brutus* §27 and *De oratore* II §93 mention extant writings; but Quintilian *Inst. or.* 3.1.12, judging from their quality, concludes that they must have been falsely attributed to him.

[197]To which Stallbaum (1857b) *ad loc.* adds: *per totum enim librum Lysias non ut orator, sed tanquam orationum scriptor carpitur.*

of the script (τὸ βιβλίον, 228b2). Later on, at 258a, Sokrates draws a parallel between ψηφίσματα and λογογραφία, either reckoning, in jest, decrees among the private συγγράματα of those who proposed them, or, rather more likely, drawing a serious parallel between the scripts used to prepare for deliberative speeches and the actual language passed by the assembly and inscribed on stone. The picture that emerges presupposes a growing employment of λογογραφία, i.e., the writing of speeches with a view to delivery, which made possible lengthy displays (ἐπιδεικνύμενος) of artistic eloquence (σοφία).[198]

Aristotle, too, mentions λογογράφοι at *Rh.* 1388b22–23, 1408a34, and 1413b13. He does so the first two times, in passing, whereas the third occurs in chapter 12 of *Rhetoric* III, where the matter of writing resurfaces explicitly, still in the context of the philosopher's investigation of rhetorical style. Since this chapter closes his examination of this subject, it is reasonable to expect that he should take a global perspective of the material presented here in its relation to λέξις, and that he should provide the reader with a synthetic summary of the general issues involved in 'style with a view to delivery'. To put it another way: what Aristotle writes about here are not particular issues of detail, but rather matters of general applicability to the subject of delivery in its scientific connection to style. This is an important observation, for if ὑπόκρισις and writing reappear explicitly in what constitutes the capstone of Aristotle's treatment of λέξις, they must not be afterthoughts or considerations secondary to rhetorical style, but, rather, critical elements of it. This validates the views I have propounded throughout this chapter: First, that ὑπόκρισις is not some ethically undesirable feature of the art of oratory to be fenced off and purged from style; rather, it is no more and no less than what the philosopher himself states: "that which has the greatest power" for persuasion; and, therefore, it must be at the heart of any successful speaker's oratorical practice. And second, that writing in the *Rhetoric* is not primarily the instrument of speech production for a reading public, but a subordinate technology at the service of delivery, and hence studied and approached as such.

What is it, then, that we learn from chapter 12? There, Aristotle seems to introduce two pairs of stylistic opposites: first the γραφική and ἀγωνιστική, then the δημηγορική and δικανική. Scholars agree that the latter pair is but an explication (by way of division) of the ἀγωνιστική, the second member of the first and more

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[198]*Phaidros* 258a6–8: ἔπειτα λέγει δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐπιδεικνύμενος τοῖς ἐπαινέταις τὴν ἑαυτοῦ σοφίαν, ἐνίοτε πάνυ μακρὸν ποιησάμενος σύγγραμμα.

fundamental opposition, the one around which Aristotle articulates his presentation
here: there is, on the one hand, a 'graphic', and on the other, an 'agonistic' style. The
agonistic suits situations of ἀγών: these are contests (in the extended sense) in which
various options compete for the allegiance or support of the audience, whether the
setting be the law court or the assembly (calling respectively for the λέξις δικανική
and δημηγορική). The graphic style, however, does not receive the same shorthand
explication as the agonistic. Instead, after noting that "one must know both [the
graphic and the agonistic styles]" (ἄμφω δὲ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι, 1413b5), the philoso-
pher appends as a rationale an enigmatic statement about the possibilities closed to
those who 'know not how to write': τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ
ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασιωπᾶν ἄν τι βούληται μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν
οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν (1413b5–8). This is an observation that has baffled many.
Most interpreters tie the τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ closely to the two poles of the opposition
implicit in ἄμφω: τὸ μὲν, then, would correspond to τὴν ἀγωνιστικήν λέξιν εἰδέναι, τὸ
δὲ to τὴν γραφικὴν λέξιν εἰδέναι. I confess that there is nothing in the grammar of the
sentence that hinders this reading of it; the problem is with the meaning (or rather
nonsense) that results. For why should knowledge of the agonistic style amount to
'knowing how to speak good Greek', and knowledge of the graphic style to not having
to keep silent when wishing to communicate something to others—which is said to
befall those who know not how to write? This seems to require that 'knowing the
graphic style' equal 'knowing how to write', in itself a problematic equation: is the
philosopher thinking merely of basic literacy?[199] Some have supposed that Aristotle
is referring to communication by published books; but it would be strange indeed
to depict the inability to publish (in the somewhat anachronistic, modern sense) as
'being forced to keep silent': we should expect κατασιωπᾶν, in the context of fourth-
century BC rhetoric, to describe a citizen who does not speak up, does not address
an audience or deliver a speech, who lacks the civic *voice*, in law court or assembly,
enjoyed by others (here, particularly, who know how to write).[200] Moreover, if we

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[199]The force of this difficulty is felt by Cope (1877) 3.145 who, noting that Vettori construes the τὸ
μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι . . . τοῖς ἄλλοις "of actual writing, that is of *letters* to absent friends," adds that
this "seems to narrow the meaning of 'writing' in such a way as to produce a somewhat ridiculous
result. Surely *any* educated man, whether he be an orator and statesman or not, requires and
possesses the knowledge of *writing* in that sense" (his emphasis).

[200]Americans are accustomed to a highly abstract concept of 'speech' that is deemed, at times, to
include even the way money is spent: hence the arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court whether
placing restrictions on its use during political campaigns constituted an unlawful abridgment of the
constitutional right to free speech. But surely for Aristotle 'to keep silent' must have denoted sooner

follow this interpretation, it is not clear why Aristotle should think that this explains the need to know both types of styles, graphic and agonistic; for arguably there must have been many in fourth-century BC Athens who were successful in court and assembly but never imagined that their ability to communicate with others depended on their disseminating written documents. And if there was an exceptional orator who made writing so central to his practice that this could be rightly said of him, why would Aristotle take this exceptional individual as an illustration of the *general* need to know both styles of rhetoric?

Despite this intrinsic implausibility, some have adopted the view that the philosopher here was really thinking of 'universal communication' with absent audiences geographically scattered—the sorts of audiences that one could not easily, if at all, assemble for a personal address; and that he held this to be so central an element of rhetoric that, in closing his discussion of λέξις, he declared as imperative the need to know not only the more 'regular' agonistic style, used in the polis setting from the speaker's platform, but also the graphic, employed—under this interpretive scenario— in these catholic addresses dependent on written dissemination. If this reading is to succeed, however, they must interpret τοῖς ἄλλοις, 'the rest', as 'others who are not present', a thought that has to be imported into the passage and is not suggested by the context. Kennedy (1991) *ad loc.* serves well to illustrate this approach: "[Writing] avoids the necessity of silence if one wishes to communicate to others [who are not present], which is the condition of those who do not know how to write." This scholar resorts to the supplement "who are not present" to make sense of what, otherwise, remains strange and obscure. Rapp (2002) 2.932 characteristically sums up the difficulty: "Nicht sehr erhellend is die Begründung, die der Abschnitt für die Nützlichkeit der schriftlichen und der kontroversen Form gibt. Wenn die Kontroverse nämlich mit der Fähigkeit in Verbindung gebracht wird, sich auf korrektes Griechisch (ἑλληνίζειν) zu verstehen, dann scheint damit nur eine minimale Bedingung gennant zu sein, und außerdem eine, die auch der schriftlichen Form zugrunde liegt. . . . Ebenso wenig klar ist, warum die Eigenschaft, nicht zum Schweigen gezwungen zu sein, wenn man etwas mitteilen will, eher die schriftliche als die mündliche Form betrifft."[201]

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one who does not speak than one who does not publish a written communication.

[201]A different attempt to construe the passage is to invert the reference of the τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ, with the former pointing to the graphic, the latter to the agonistic, style. This is Thurot's strategy, who replaces by μόνον the μὴ of οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν; about which Roemer (1898) *ad loc.* writes: *sed tum verba* τὸ μὲν ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι *ad* λέξιν γραφικὴν *referenda essent, quod fieri non potest, contra verba* ἄν τι βούληται μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἄλλοις *latiore sensu intellegenda significare*

I propose a different interpretation, one that I think is in greater consonance with the role that the philosopher implicitly assigned to writing already in *Rh.* 1404a18–19. Where I depart from previous commentators is in the way I take the τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ: I do not map them directly onto the graphic and agonistic styles, but take them more generally as "one thing . . . another thing" (*vel* 'on the one hand . . . on the other hand').[202] In my view, the graphic and agonistic styles are not two mutually exclusive

videntur, quod Bonitzius cum omnibus interpretibus declarat 'tradere per libros scriptos'.

[202]I am not suggesting that τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ must be taken in a strictly adverbial sense (they could still be the subject of ἐστιν); only that they need not point specifically to any of the words that explicitly precede them. The prior sentence contains ἄμφω, which doubtless stands for ἡ γραφικὴ λέξις + ἡ ἀγωνιστικὴ λέξις. It would be natural, but not *necessary*, to assume that, as members of an opposition, these two are the ones to which τὸ μὲν and τὸ δὲ respectively point; but this choice hardly makes compelling sense and leaves the reader perplexed. There is, however, another possibility: that *together*, the two styles gathered under ἄμφω imply a larger notion, which the philosopher then considers from a different point of view. To illustrate my meaning, suppose I say: 'A student of Latin must learn both grammar and vocabulary; for one thing is to know paradigms and another to be able to read Cicero'; it would be incorrect to infer that the following two equations hold true: 'to know grammar' = 'to know paradigms' and 'to know vocabulary' = 'to be able to read Cicero'. (Knowing paradigms would be a subset of knowing grammar, while knowing vocabulary simply would not correspond to being able to read Cicero.) My point would rather be that merely knowing paradigms bespeaks a limited linguistic ability, while a grasp of *both* grammar *and* vocabulary confers a working knowledge of the language. Note that neither grammar nor vocabulary by itself would suffice. Something similar, I believe, happens here: just as the knowledge of *both* styles, graphic *and* agonistic, would equip the orator successfully to address an audience, failure to master *either* would prevent him from doing so. To paraphrase Aristotle's point: 'For one thing is to know how to speak correct Greek; another to be able successfully to communicate (and, presumably, persuade) an audience, avoiding the need to keep silent because one lacks the requisite skills.' When he uses this construction, the philosopher often specifies what τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ point to, by making them follow a genitive (e.g. *Cat.* 4b20, *Eth. Nik.* 1109a33, *Met.* 1072b3, *Pol.* 1334b20, or *Resp.* 471a8); sometimes he uses ἐν + dat. to indicate the sphere in question (e.g. *Gen. corr.* 317a23); at least once, τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ merely stand in apposition (*Met.* 1065a21). What has misled interpreters of *Rh.* 1413b5–8 is the (otherwise natural) assumption that the referent of the μὲν . . . δὲ is ἄμφω; and that since ἄμφω (to put it schematically) is made of the explicitly mentioned 'X' and 'Y', τὸ μὲν must equal 'X', τὸ δὲ, 'Y'. It would then be as if the philosopher had written: ἄμφω δὲ ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι· ὧν τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ. But ὧν is there neither explicitly nor, in my view, implicitly. Aristotle might have written τὸ μὲν . . . ἄλλο δὲ or τὸ μὲν . . . ἕτερον δὲ: but perhaps he chose not to, because this might have conveyed too sharp a contrast between speaking correct Greek and being able to speak to an audience in public address. (Note, e.g., the ἓν μὲν . . . ἕτερον δὲ . . . ἄλλο δὲ in *Pol.* 1291b18–19, where the various categories do not overlap.) After all, we take for granted that competent public speakers will use correct grammar. One clear instance where τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δὲ do not pick up on anything explicit immediately preceding is *Soph. el.* 181b9–10: "If one thing is good and another evil (εἰ τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν τὸ δὲ κακόν), it is true to call them good and evil" etc. There is nothing in the immediate context to which τὸ μὲν and τὸ δὲ respectively point: they must simply be translated as 'one thing' and 'another thing'. So also in *Rh.* 1413b5–8: 'One thing is to speak good Greek; another, not to be forced to keep silent' etc. The general sphere of reference, were it to be made specific, would have to be expressed somewhat along the lines of τῷ γὰρ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦντι τὸ μέν ἐστιν . . . τὸ δὲ (cf. *Rh.* 1354a5–6). A paraphrase might run thus: τῷ γὰρ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦντι τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ πιθανῶς καὶ

subjects with no conceptual overlap; and so, it is not the case that knowledge of one translates into one thing (namely, speaking correct Greek), while knowledge of the other, into another (namely, not having to keep silent etc.). 'Graphic' and 'agonistic' are both connected with delivery and denote stylistic emphases that point to one or another of the ends of a continuum. Ignorance of *either* set of emphases would handicap the orator's delivery and compromise his ability successfully to persuade his audience. Since *both* the graphic and the agonistic styles presuppose the use of written scripts in honing and rehearsing one's delivery, "those who do not know how to write" describe individuals who are not rhetorically trained: laymen who approach their speech without the benefit of schooling and formal training in the discipline of oratory. Such people, at best, can be expected to speak good Greek, but they are not up to the task of addressing the rest of their fellow citizens, whether in the law court or the assembly. My reading, then, makes "one must know both" equivalent to "one must be trained in scientific delivery": this involves knowing the rules of style that make delivery an art in the first place; and these rules include suiting the style to the kind of oratory in view, i.e., choosing the stylistic emphases that make the moment of truth—the performance before the audience—successful.

Thus, I translate: "One must not overlook that a different style suits each genus of rhetoric. For the graphic and agonistic are not the same, nor the demegoric and dicanic. And one must know both: for one thing is to know how to speak correct Greek; another, not to have to keep silent if one wishes to share something with the rest [of one's fellow citizens]—which [is what] those who do not know how to write experience." Two situations are envisaged: one, common to ordinary citizens, whose skill, at best, reaches to linguistic competence; the other, the province of the rhetorically trained, who take the initiative in political affairs, proposing and defending their own motions (or who are unafraid to argue their own cases in forensic settings). Classical Athens must have had many a citizen who, even though present in the assembly, was largely passive, easily manipulated by the better trained (and better educated)[203] ῥήτορες who made a career of their political activities.[204] The

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σαφῶς λέγειν ἐπίστασθαι (or πιθανῶς καὶ σαφῶς λέγειν οἷόν τε εἶναι). The alternative construction ἔστιν μὲν . . . ἔστιν δὲ would have made a poorer choice; for it would only make marginal sense to write: 'it is possible, on the one hand, to know how to speak correct Greek; and possible, on the other, not to have to keep silent' etc. 'Not to have to keep silent' may well be a possible scenario, but, strictly speaking, an *inability* rather than a *possibility*.

[203]Cf. Ober (1989) 112–18.

[204]Cf. Ober (1989) 105–118, esp. 111-12. "[B]y the later fifth and through the fourth century [*rhētōr*] was ordinarily used of individuals recognized as active political experts: those who ad-

degree of proficiency requisite for discharging the political responsibilities of the free citizen, in Aristotle's view, is available only to the one who has mastered the skill of using written scripts to train for the moment of delivery. Ober's (1989) 113 words nicely capture the contrast at 1413b5–8: "Skill in public address was the sine qua non for the politician. This meant not only skill at putting words together but also in putting them across."

The inattentive reader might think that the graphic style alone calls for writing, which would contradict what I have advocated above. And the comment at 1414a18–19 may seem to lend credence to this view: ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικωτάτη· τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις. But "for its peculiar work is reading" is not primarily a statement of design, as if the philosopher intended to say that it is composed first and foremost for a reading public (something that may have been true of Isokrates but not so of other practitioners of this genus). Aristotle is merely reducing the epideictic style to its characteristic essence. Indeed, as he has argued in 1413b14–19, graphic speeches delivered in agonistic contexts seem thin, whereas those of rhetors[205] feel amateurish when read. Therefore, speeches that feature emphases proper to the graphic style (emphases, all, that fall under the umbrella of ἀκρίβεια), even if written for delivery—and epideictic speeches usually *were* delivered in their own characteristic settings[206]—would suffer comparatively little loss of impact if reduced to the reading of their scripts. Agonistic speeches, on the other hand, would suffer great loss and feel thin if deprived of their intended ὑπόκρισις. It is from that limited point of view that one may consider *reading* the natural 'effect' (ἔργον) of the epideictic genus. That this is the correct interpretation of these words is proven by the clause that follows them, which declares the *dicanic* style the second most graphic one after the epideictic![207]

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dressed the Assembly frequently and who competed in political trials with other *rhētores*" (*ibid.* 105). Though, as Ober (1989) 106 notes, *politeuomenos* vied with rhetor as a label for the professional political orator (not far from our own 'politician'), the free citizen's *ideal* of civic life was to be actively involved in the affairs of the polis. It is to that ideal that Aristotle addresses himself in enjoining rhetorical training—particularly, mastery of the use of written scripts as an aid to delivery—on those who wish to escape the status of mere silent spectators at their political assemblies.

[205]Here ῥήτορες must narrowly denote speakers at the assembly and political trials: hence, their speeches are *ipso facto* agonistic.

[206]Note the reference to the *listener* of epideictic speeches at 1415b28–29.

[207]I wonder if Aristotle's analysis is driven in part by the relative preponderance of the various genera of rhetoric among scripts circulating in his time. Epideictic speeches may have been available in written form more frequently than forensic or symbuleutic, with law court speeches in second place. But one must assume that, even if this played a role in the philosopher's analysis, he still

It is clear, then, that Aristotle has in view the technology or writing through-out this chapter: there is no doubt that this is so for the graphic style (the only question here being if *delivery* is called for or not), whereas, in regard to the agonistic, *Rh.* 1413b15–19 contemplates holding it in one's hands to read it as a βιβλίον, thus depriving it of delivery (ἀφῃρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως).[208] Writing, therefore, has be adopted wholesale by successful rhetorical practitioners, and the philosopher correspondingly enjoins its mastery on the rhetorical apprentice.[209]

But we must inquire what the philosopher means when he assigns ἀκρίβεια to the λέξις γραφική and contrasts it with ὑπόκρισις: ἀλλ' ὅπου μάλιστα ὑπόκρισις, ἐνταῦθα ἥκιστα ἀκρίβεια ἔνι (1414a15–16).[210] We must notice first that these terms, ἀκριβές and ὑποκριτικόν, are subject to degrees: this is clear enough from the superlatives of 1413b9 and the comparative of 1414a11 and not surprising, since the inverse relation in which 1414a15–16 puts ἀκρίβεια and ὑπόκρισις suggests that these are two tendencies that point to the extremes of a stylistic continuum. In other words, it is not a matter of a style being ἀκριβής, 'precise', and thus *not* ὑποκριτική, 'histrionic',[211] or vice versa. What the philosopher is underlining through this contrast is that not all the elements of style, however much they can be put at the service of delivery, exhibit the same intimate relationship and immediate connection to voice in its use 'for each *pathos*' (1403b27–28). We readily understand, for example, that prose rhythm depends on the voice to a greater extent than the use of metaphor; and though even instances of the latter, insofar as instrumental to delivery, are carefully designed and

viewed these numbers from the point of view of 'precision' (ἀκρίβεια), the characteristic quality of the graphic style. And so we are not surprised to learn that authors that lend themselves to reading (such as Khairemon) are 'precise' like *logographers* (1413b12–13), or that the dicanic style is, in fact, 'more precise' than the demegoric (1414a11).

[208]Sonkowsky (1959) 261: "The technical term *lexis graphike* must not be confused with *graphomenos logos*, which means 'a speech that is written down.' Speeches in the *lexis agonistike* can also be *graphomenoi*."

[209]Baldwin (1924) 33n83, with his customary sensitivity to Aristotle's views on delivery, comments on τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτῆς ἀνάγνωσις as follows: "The intervening reference to Chaeremon . . . should not deviate us into consideration of speeches written out to be memorized. . . . Here Aristotle is discussing something different, the adaptation of occasional oratory as nicer and more literary in sentence movement. Perhaps he implies too that such speeches had better be composed, as well as elaborated, in writing."

[210]For a classification of ἀκρίβεια according to its various uses in Aristotle, see Grant (1874) 450 *ad Eth. Nik.* 1.7.18.

[211]Since the analysis concerns how to suit style to the various *genera dicendi* (cf. 1413b3–4), ὑποκριτικὴ λέξις is best rendered 'suited to the portrayal of *ethos* and *pathos* that is characteristic of delivery' (note the ἠθική and παθητική at 1413b10). For the sake of convenience, I will use 'histrionic' as shorthand for the fuller, more accurate translation.

chosen to evoke apposite φαντάσματα,[212] when restricted to silent reading (to take an extreme case) metaphors retain much more of their natural effectiveness (ἔργον) than prose rhythm does. And however much the intonation that should attend the delivery of a script may be imagined by a reader, clearly this is a purely 'histrionic' feature (to use Aristotle's terminology) that may be largely absent from the graphic, but is entirely at home in the agonistic, style. The supplied illustration further clarifies what is in view: actors go after such effects in dramas (viz., after what gives the greatest scope to ὑπόκρισις), whereas poets seek such characters.[213] Authors whose works are towards the graphic end of the stylistic continuum are the ἀναγνωστικοί, e.g. Khairemon, who is "precise as a *logographer*" (1413b13).

Yet another series of illustrations follows, which is designed to show the features peculiar to either end of the stylistic continuum. Aristotle's strategy here consists in taking a speech out of the context for which its style is suited, and using the resulting deficiencies to highlight the corresponding strengths when it is left in its natural rhetorical environment. Hence, compared to those crafted for competitive settings, graphic speeches seem thin;[214] whereas those that were delivered well by professional public speakers (the implication being that they must have received high praise) feel amateurish when reduced to mere scripts in the hands of the reader.[215] τὰ ὑποκριτικά are those stylistic elements that most involve the voice and, therefore, the more critically depend for their effectiveness on delivery: absent ὑπόκρισις and reduced to their record on a script, they look silly, lacking in sophistication. We are offered two examples: asyndeta and the frequent repetition of the same thing, two histrionic stylistic elements that are not approved in the graphic style, but which rhetors, in the agonistic, put to good use. Asyndeton, in particular, requires change

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[212]See above, p. 83 and n. 30.

[213]Though one cannot be certain, I think τοὺς τοιούτους are not actors, but 'those [dramatic personae who are] such': not all the characters of a play give the same scope to histrionic displays. (In any case, doubtless τὰ τοιαῦτα equal τὰ ἠθικὰ καὶ παθητικά, and οἱ τοιοῦτοι, οἱ ἠθικοὶ καὶ παθητικοί.)

[214]I believe that the text is best emended to καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι οἱ μὲν τῶν γραφικῶν ⟨τοῖς⟩ ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι στενοὶ φαίνονται. It is easy to see how the first τοῖς might have fallen out; the genitive τῶν γραφικῶν is of quality (Smyth §1320): "On the one hand, those [that are] of the graphic [speeches] appear thin when compared to the ones [used] in *agones*."

[215]I have followed Ross's text. The genitive τῶν ῥητόρων points to authorship and, by extension, to the agent of εὖ λεχθέντες. Aristotle has made his illustration as pointed as possible: from the agonistic, he has selected speeches by professional public speakers (this makes the ἰδιωτικοί sharper by contrast); and by characterizing them as 'well spoken' (with delivery primarily in view), he suggests that they are such as receive the high praise of the audience.

in *ēthos* and *tonos* (1413b31). These illustrations allow us to fill in the meaning of ἀκρίβεια: the precision, in the case of asyndeta, lies in making the script, by itself—without giving voice to it by way of delivery—a fuller record of the meaning and attitude of the author; the connecting particles would attempt to capture something of the missing *ēthos* and *tonos* that voice would readily impart. Whereas in the case of redundancy, a graphic style that is deprived of its effect would have to state more explicitly, perhaps in the form of a direct proposition, the particular *impression* conveyed by the repetition: hence, if in delivery the speaker accentuates another's evil intent by piling up κλέψας, ἐξαπατήσας, and προδοῦναι ἐπιχειρήσας, the equivalent graphic statement may be reduced to a simple explicit "he was bent on harming you," possibly aided, for effect, by some other element of style, perhaps a colorful metaphor. The ἀκρίβεια, then, consists in a more complete propositional expression, with such stylistic elements as survive best the absence of ὑπόκρισις; for, when the latter is present and exploited to the full, the more prolix character of the graphic style turns, comparatively speaking, into a stylistic burden that hinders the expression of *ēthos* and *pathos* through the resourceful use of the speaker's voice. Now, there is a significant byproduct to this 'precision': insofar as it puts less emphasis and is less dependent on delivery, it is more appropriate to situations that may be allowed to lean more decisively on the subject matter of the orator's discourse (τὰ πράγματα). And since style/delivery always holds the potential to provoke the suspicion of the hearer, should one find himself in a situation where this suspicion is likely to arise, adopting a less histrionic style might be desirable. This, at least in part, is the situation envisaged at 1414a11–14, where judgment is in the hands of one judge only.

But before we get to this, first in order of presentation is the demegoric style, which the philosopher introduces as "altogether like *skiagraphia*."[216] Although the nature of *skiagraphia* as a painting technique is disputed, it is clear from Aristotle's and, especially, Plato's use of it that it corresponded to a manner of representation that was intelligible only from a distance.[217] Because of its illusionistic character, σκιαγραφία was used by Plato, in particular, as a metaphor for illusion and deception:

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[216]On σκιαγραφία, sometimes translated 'shadow painting', see Keuls (1975), Pemberton (1976), Keuls (1978) 72–87 (and the index *s.v.*), and Koch (2000) 137–53.

[217]Insofar as it depended for its effect on viewing at a distance, we may think of it as a sort of 'classical impressionism.' Besides the passage of the *Rhetoric* that now concerns us, Aristotle refers to it in *Met.* 1024b23 and *Protr.* fr. 104 (Düring) (Some say it is also in view in *De sensu* 439b20–23 and 440a29–30.) Plato makes more frequent mention of it, and a list of *loci* can be found in Keuls (1978) 78–79.

a case in point is *Republic* 602d2–3, where Sokrates notes that it "falls nothing short of witchcraft."[218] One of the central features of σκιαγραφία is a kind of mixing,[219] and for this reason Plato uses it as a metaphor when he criticizes the fallacious commingling of what cannot (or should not) coexist as a mixture. In the *Republic* 583b, e.g., in the course of discussing the pleasures of three kinds of people—the φρόνιμος, the φιλότιμος, and the φιλοκερδής—we are told that "other pleasure than that of the man of intelligence is not altogether even real or pure (καθαρά), but is a kind of shadow painting (ἐσκιαγραφημένη)" (583b3–5). The word καθαρός reappears at 586a6, where those who have no experience of φρόνησις and ἀρετή, Sokrates says, have never tasted pleasure that is stable and pure (καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς); to which he adds the question: "Are not the pleasures they live with of necessity mixed with pains, phantoms of true pleasure and shadow painted (ἐσκιαγραφημέναις), so colored by juxtaposition that either kind seems intense . . . ?" (586b7–c1). We see that the opposition 'pure' vs. 'mixed' is central to the use to which Plato puts *skiagraphia*. So it does not come as a surprise that at *Rh.* 1414a14 Aristotle, in making his own argument, should also bring it forth to contrast the demegoric style with a judgment (κρίσις) that is *pure* (καθαρά).

The demegoric style is declared to be entirely like *skiagraphia*: the greater the crowd, the more distant the view. One might consider taking θέα, at first, in its literal sense: a large audience perforce separates on average speaker from listener, so that even a clear hearing of what is being said becomes difficult. But this cannot have been the philosopher's point: for, in this respect, the forensic setting would hardly have provided the orator with a better public environment, and juries sometimes numbered in the hundreds. And if we supposed this to be the meaning, the comment would invert the implication of shadow painting, viz. the growing incomprehensibility of what is viewed as the spectator gets close; for, on that interpretive assumption, the hearer could readily overcome the obstacles to his understanding by approaching the speaker. There is also a slight difficulty in that 'view', θέα, is implicitly paralleled with hearing (for, to Aristotle, it is primarily the *voice* that is central to delivery), though one could argue that the metaphor dictates its own terms and is responsible for the lack of a precise fit. But a better option is to consider the implications of

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[218]For a review of this and other passages where Plato touches on painting, see Demand (1975). Cf. Aristotle's *Met.* 1024b23, where σκιαγραφία is classed with dreams (ἐνύπνια).

[219]Whether it involved several colors or just hues of one, and whether the mixing was by superposition or juxtaposition, are matters of contention. Cf. Pemberton (1976).

θέα in an extended sense that may hint at the various views of each listener in the assembly: each with his own θέα, and all 'distant'. But distant from what? I suggest that from the speaker's and from each other's stance, as well as from any univocal formulation of the issue under deliberation that might be felt by each member of the audience with the force of necessity. We could equate each θέα with each individual δόξα, the opinion held by every citizen, which the demegoric speaker is attempting to influence and draw closer to his own. The assembly setting requires his appeal to be as broad as possible, given the corresponding breadth of his target; his approach there should seek to circumscribe the complexity of the issue at hand to the possibilities of a mixed deliberating body. Deliberative matters are inherently more difficult to discuss, because they must cope with uncertain outcomes and future circumstances,[220] and because they cannot be treated with the intellectual precision of a philosophical argument:[221] not only are the abilities represented in a mixed crowd wildly variable, but the orator cannot possibly furnish his delivery with carefully crafted φαντασία that will be persuasive to each and every one of his listeners. Hence, there are limitations of precision regarding 'persuasion through the subject matter' and 'persuasion through the hearer',[222] limitations that must translate into a corresponding style that is artfully imprecise. Imprecise as to subject matter: with enough definition to capture the basic features of a particular issue, yet fuzzy enough to do so in bold strokes that avoid philosophical niceties incomprehensible to men of average ability; imprecise as to delivery: with such stylistic expression of *ethos* and *pathos* as will have broad appeal to the promiscuous crowd that attends to the hearing.[223] Hence, it is

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[220]Cf. *Rh.* I.3, esp. 1358b2–5 and 13–16.

[221]Cf. *Rh.* 1369b31–32: δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἱκανοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ὅρους ἐὰν ὦσι περὶ ἑκάστου μήτε ἀσαφεῖς μήτε ἀκριβεῖς. Here, ἀκριβεῖς means 'precise, exact', and it seems to be opposed to ἀσαφεῖς, 'unclear'. But perhaps it is best understood to stand in contrast to ἱκανούς: "we should consider our definitions to be sufficient if they are neither unclear nor precise about each thing." If one inquires how precision renders a definition inadequate, the answer must be that too great a precision is in view, i.e., a prolixity inhibiting, rather than facilitating, discussion. Thus, the two terms joined by repeated μήτε are not like each other: obscurity is undesirable; precision would be desirable but impractical. If we avoid both the undesirable and the impractical, we end up with something that is adequate, sufficient. Cf. *Eth. Nik.* 1.3.1: "Now we must be satisfied (ἱκανῶς) with the statement of our science, if its distinctness be in proportion to the nature of the subject matter. For exactness (τὸ ἀκριβές) is not to be expected equally in all reasonings, any more than in all the productions of art" (translation by Grant, 1874, 425).

[222]Cf. *Rh.* 1356a1–4.

[223]It is, I think, in that sense that Rapp (2002) 2.940 writes: "Das ist eine der wenigen Stellen, an denen Aristoteles andeutet, dass die besonderen Bedingungen der öffentlichen Rede auf Seiten der Zuhörer nicht nur aus den intellektuellen Unzulänglichkeiten der einzelnen Zuhörer . . . herrühr[en], sondern auch aus den besonderen massenpsychologischen Umständen öffentlicher Reden."

apparent that both in σκιαγραφία and in the demegoric style τὰ ἀκριβῆ is not only περίεργα, but positively χείρω.[224]

That Aristotle is not comparing ἡ δημηγορική with ἡ δικανική (the emendations of some notwithstanding) but with ἡ δίκη[225] proves that his concern is with the sort of style that will suit not only the hearer peculiar to either setting (the κριτής can either be an ἐκκλησιαστής or a δικαστής),[226] but also, as I have argued above, the corresponding subject matter—in the case of symbuleutic rhetoric, τὸ συμφέρον καὶ βλαβερόν (*Rh.* 1358b22). Now we can readily understand the philosopher's point: justice, insofar as it looks to what has happened in the past and calls for a judgment upon it, is less uncertain than the issues of policy that dominate deliberative assemblies. If no further considerations attended his analysis, this alone would justify Aristotle's implication that the dicanic style, called to suit an inherently more precise matter, should reflect this precision in its own precision: with metaphors that have narrow targets, with a comparatively greater abundance of conjunctions and connectives that draw out more explicitly the logic of the argument, featuring φαντάσματα that are more acutely crafted as to their impact on *ethos* and *pathos*, etc. But the implication is all the stronger (ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον) when justice is in the hand of *one* judge alone.[227] Then there is no *agon* between δικασταί that hold a variety of opinions;[228] then the κρίσις is 'pure' (καθαρά) because the *skiagraphic* features of deliberative settings, with their multiplicity of views (translated by the painting metaphor into distance), are absent when there is but a jury of one. "For in the case of one, rhetoric has the least scope":[229] it is not that rhetoric *per se* and, *a fortiori*, delivery are inconsequential, but that, focused on one single individual, the scope is the narrowest possible and, for success, the orator must fine tune every aspect of his speech (including style) to his one-member audience and to the subject matter at hand. Here, Aristotle is being true to life, for we know from experience that a style (including,

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[224]When the peculiar nature of the fuzziness which σκιαγραφία metaphorically represents is not understood, interpreters are not able to explain why precision would be not just wasted effort but, in actual fact, *worse*.

[225]Cf. *Rh.* 1358b26. Rightly, Kassel *ad loc. contra* Ross, Roemer, and others.

[226]*Rh.* 1358b3–5.

[227]ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἡ ⟨ἐν⟩ ἑνὶ κριτῇ (1414a11–12).

[228]Aristotle cannot mean ἀγών between opponents at law, for *that* controversy remains, whether there be one judge or many.

[229]I follow Vahlen's emendation: ἐλάχιστον γάρ ἐστιν ἑνὶ [sc. κριτῇ] ῥητορικῆς. This seems to explain the textual corruption best, while picking up on the context (with the reiterated ἑνί) and still making adequate sense.

say, lavish praise) that may be acceptable in addressing a large audience may meet with suspicion if focused on one individual. When one man alone is the target of persuasion, the danger is great that he will resist the thrust of the speaker's rhetoric; for being self-conscious of, and sensitive to, the fact that the presentation is crafted *for him*, this invites him to second-guess what is said, and whether the appeal to him to embrace a particular opinion is legitimate or not. Consequently, the orator who would persuade one man must narrow the artifice of his delivery so as not to raise his natural suspicion; just as he ought to bear in mind his one listener as he tries to craft stylistic φαντάσματα that hold the greatest promise of persuasion. The use of εὐσύνοπτον is particularly apposite, picking up again on the metaphor of the σκιαγραφία: whereas demegoric settings involve distant views, the forensic one of a single judge makes his judicial analysis of the subject matter's οἰκεῖον and ἀλλότριον 'easy to see'. Note that it does not say '[what is] proper and foreign *to* the subject matter [sc. in the presentation of the speaker]' (which would be τῷ πράγματι),[230] but 'what, of the subject matter, touches or does not touch the judge himself'. This comment recalls Aristotle's observations in *Rhetoric* I.1.10: deliberative rhetoric lends itself to trickery less than forensic, because it is of more common interest;[231] whereas in the assembly the κριτής judges about his own affairs (περὶ οἰκείων), in a trial the decision is about the affairs of others (περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις), and so the dicast is liable to look to his own interests (πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν) and to listen with partiality; and, after being won over by their appeal, to give himself to the litigants rather than render true judgment.[232] The subject of the εὐσύνοπτον is best construed not as the judge but the litigants: since he is only one, it is clear that the range of the οἰκεῖον, i.e., of anything in the facts of the case (the πρᾶγμα) that possibly touches him, is correspondingly narrow and well defined; whereas in a crowd of dicasts the οἰκεῖον and ἀλλότριον would be compounded and multiplied into a patchwork of interests and indifference (a *skiagraphia* of sorts); then it would be much harder for the litigants, in crafting their speeches as to content and form, to tailor them narrowly with a view to moving the entire jury towards the desirable δόξα. In such a situation, the deployment of rhetoric's full resources is all the more critical, and success depends to

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[230]Such a translation could only be sustained if πρᾶγμα stood for the substance not of the case, but of the speaker's presentation. But this is very unlikely, in view of the use of πρᾶγμα and πράγματα to refer to the 'fact' or 'facts' of the case at hand.

[231]On the text of 1354b29, see Grimaldi (1980) 17.

[232]This, I think, proves that the absence of *agon* of 1414a14 cannot refer to the judge's freedom from prejudice on the grounds of his lack of personal involvement in the matter at issue.

a larger extent on the proficiency of the speaker's training in the oratorical art. In the opposite case, when directed to a single judge, the scope of rhetoric is the least.

Chapter 3

Rhapsodes and Rhapsodic Performance

3.1   Of Transcripts and Scripts

"[T]he Druids had their own course of training, in which some pupils remained for up to twenty years, 'so that they could learn by heart a vast number of verses which had not been committed to writing'."[1] So wrote Friedrich August Wolf in his 1795 epoch-making *Prolegomena to Homer*, to which he added plaintively: "How I wish that the Greeks had transmitted to us even that much about their own bards and rhapsodes!"[2] The stark truth is that we have no direct testimony about the life, training, or practice of rhapsodes in Greece; no handbook of ῥαψῳδικ, no reliable biographical information about famous rhapsodes, and little that goes beyond anecdotal evidence regarding their methods, the rules under which they competed, and society's estimation of their profession. Therefore, any attempt to construct a view of their trade and its evolving practices must of necessity be conjectural—even more so than is usual in our field of study. This does not mean, however, that such an endeavor is pointless or hopeless; rather, it is irresistible, for any view of the Homeric Problem and the respective roles of orality and writing in classical Athens must

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[1] The English translation is taken from Wolf (1985) 109–10, chapter XXIV. Wolf is quoting from (and slightly modifying) Caesar's *B. Gall.* 6.14. His Latin (from the second edition) runs as follows: "De his quidem postremis [sc. Druidibus] Caesar et Mela referunt, propriam eorum fuisse disciplinam, in qua nonnulli ad vicenos annos permanserint, *ut magnum numerum versuum ediscerent, litteris non mandatorum*" (Wolf, 1876, 62, his emphasis).

[2] "Quam vellem tantillum nobis Graeci tradidissent de vatibus et rhapsodis suis!" (Wolf, 1876, 62).

be partially based on, and tested against, our conception of these, the preeminent Homeric performers of the time.

This chapter studies the figure of the rhapsode and his performance from the archaic period down to Hellenistic and Roman imperial times.[3] Our sources are literary, documentary (i.e. papyri), and epigraphical. Some bear direct witness to various aspects of this trade; others do no more than hint at one or another relevant datum. My goal is to fit them all into a larger picture using what I trust are reasonable conjectures and plausible reconstructions. But my treatment aims not just at the descriptive; for the rhapsode is the protagonist of a momentous cultural drama: the evolution of ancient Greece away from primal habits of orality towards cultural modes that depended increasingly on the written word. Thus, I am especially interested in probing the consistency with what we know (or can reasonably reconstruct) about the culture of classical Greece of a theory that makes *performance* largely responsible for the fixation of the text of the Homeric poems. My point of departure is Gregory Nagy's proposal of a textual fixation[4] of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* in five stages spanning a continuum in which, at one end, writing plays no role at all, while, at the other, a largely uniform written text of the poems is slavishly memorized and adhered to in performance.[5] My particular focus here is in the transition from what Nagy calls 'transcripts' to 'scripts'. These are his definitions: "A transcript can be a record of performance, even an aid for performance, but not the equivalent of performance";[6] a script, in turn, is "a narrower category, where the written text is a prerequisite of performance."[7] If we assume that rhapsodes down to the fifth century BC trained and performed without the aid of writing—transcripts may have been in limited circulation, but the professional himself did not rely on them—what intellectual trends and cultural developments might have encouraged their increasing reliance on written records (whether self-produced or acquired through the burgeoning

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[3]Important works on the rhapsode and rhapsody include Aly (1914), Patzer (1952), Sealey (1957), Ritoók (1962), Ford (1988), Boyd (1994), and Collins (2001).

[4]This concerns the objective, gradual process of fixation, not necessarily in writing, of the text of the poems as to their themes, sequence, and form, and it is not to be confused with the emic 'notional fixity' considered in Chapter 1 (though the latter contributes to the former in various ways, e.g., by facilitating the rise of 'Homer', the individual author). By 'objective' I mean a measurable, actual fixation from the perspective of a cultural outsider.

[5]First articulated in Nagy (1981), it is developed further in Nagy (1996a) 41–42 and Nagy (1996b) 107–13.

[6]Nagy (1996b) 112.

[7]*Ibid.*

book trade), so that in time (say, towards the late fourth century and beyond) their performance depended on scripts memorized and rehearsed for delivery? I realize that, strictly speaking, training and performance that do not use writing might still depend on the slavish memorization of a fixed, but orally transmitted, uniform text, possibly written down and archived where it may be consulted and appealed to by disagreeing schools of performers.[8] For reasons of historical plausibility,[9] however, and in agreement with Nagy's evolutionary model of text fixation, I assume instead that at the transcript stage Homeric bards composed their poems in performance using traditional language, themes, and sequence, and that their technique allowed a measure of variation consistent with long-standing traditions of composition and delivery. In other words: there was no controlling written 'ur-text', and memory, always of capital importance, was primarily not an instrument of slavish reproduction, but an aid to a traditional sort of creativity that we may call, not without paradox, 'traditional improvisation'.

In this chapter I explore the transition from transcripts to scripts as follows: first, by situating rhapsodes (ῥαψῳδικ ή) against actors (τραγικ ή) and orators (ῥητορικ ή), highlighting the connections that existed between these three performing trades and their professions, connections recognized already in antiquity; second, by focusing on orators and rhetorical theory in the late fifth- and fourth-century BC Athens and on

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[8]I am neither conceding the intrinsic likelihood nor the historical plausibility of such a scenario. Nor is it material to this improbable stance, logically speaking, whether one can conceive that the declamation of so long a poem as, e.g., the *Iliad* could have accurately reflected, down to its phraseology, a written text that for many generations was only—or primarily—transmitted by word of mouth. A scheme for the textual fixation of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* on such terms is very different from the one espoused in these pages.

[9]Proponents of an early fixation of the text resort to conjectures that depend on cultural discontinuities and exceptional circumstances. For example, a ruler of great power and means who realizes the outstanding quality of "Homer's" performance and insists on owning a written transcript of it. Sometimes even the invention of alphabetic writing is tied to the recording of Homeric poetry. The ruler's literacy is tacitly assumed, as is his interest in the written artifact as a natural and culturally obvious aid to memory. One must grant, further, the availability of a sufficiently abundant substrate (papyrus? wood? stone?) and the existence of a scribe capable of writing down thousands upon thousands of lines. The poet, never before engaged in such an ambitious recording session, must have been able to adapt to a much slower performance rate than the one he was accustomed to; and yet, somehow, he excelled, without the encouragement of an audience, and without losing his line of thought while the scribe made haste to inscribe every word he heard. And if this chain of hypotheses is not sufficiently tenuous, one must explain how the diffusion of this extraordinary cultural artifact over so large a geographical extension could have been so effective as to arrest, soon thereafter, a centuries-old habit of composition in performance and impose the uniform, now fixed, text on dozens of itinerant rhapsodes who almost certainly must have been illiterate. I find reconstructions of this sort difficult to believe.

the cultural forces responsible for the, at the time, polemical introduction of writing into their practice: I consider the ancient terms of this debate and the causes that brought about this disputed development; third, by arguing that, making the necessary generic adjustments, similar social trends and expectations impinged on rhapsodes and their art, and to this we owe, at least in part, the move from transcripts to scripts in the performance of the Homeric epics. I also examine the late fourth-century age of Lykourgos, the Athenian statesman, and of Demetrios of Phaleron, the autocratic pro-Macedonian ἐπιμελητής, both historical figures who, I believe, reinforced the cultural dynamics already at work, hastening the transition from the transcript to the script stage of rhapsodic performance. I close with a survey of the Hellenistic and Roman records, documentary and epigraphical, on epic performers, who, I have reason to believe, with very little, if any, exercise of compositional creativity treated the Homeric poems as having a fixed and canonical form; and so, they limited their personal artistry largely to the manner of delivery before the audience—voice, dress, gestures—at times, but for the absence of a mask, nearly indistinguishable from the stage presence of tragic and comic actors.

3.2 The Rhapsode as ὑποκριτής

It was a commonplace of classical antiquity that tragedy had its roots in epic;[10] it is therefore only natural that the acting profession would have looked back to the rhapsode as a model. Even the term for 'actor', ὑποκριτής, reflects this relationship. Homeric usage connects the verb with the interpretation of signs and dreams.[11] One can therefore affirm that originally ὑποκριτής and ὑποκρίνεσθαι must have had their home among μάντεις, προφῆται, and others responsible for interpreting divine oracles to inquiring seekers. ὑποκρίνεσθαι, as Else (1959) 101–2 notes, was to render an interpretive judgment in reply to a questioner's concern. Koller (1957) 102 agrees

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[10]Plato makes frequent reference to this: τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος (*Theait.* 152e4–5), where ἄκροι may refer to Homer's chronological priority (note his pairing with Epikharmos, who some ancient traditions of scholarship, e.g. Aristot. *Poetics* 1448a33–34, placed at the source of comedy; cf. Pickard-Cambridge, 1927, 353–63, esp. 355n3); or else it may denote his superior skill (so LSJ *s.v.* III.1), as other passages suggest (*pace* Gudeman, 1934, 109). Passages from the *Republic* further underline the point: ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ [sc. Ὅμηρος] τῶν καλῶν ἁπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγικῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν γενέσθαι (*Rep.* 595b10–c2); μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε τραγῳδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον (*Rep.* 598d7–8); οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν (*Rep.* 605c10–11); συγχωρεῖν [χρὴ] Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν (*Rep.* 607a2–3). It may well be, as Naddaff (2002) 40–41 remarks, that Sokrates emphasizes (even exaggerates) the similarities between epic and tragedy to open the way for his own 'atragic' reading of the *Iliad* (cf. esp. *ibid.* 144n10). But this rhetorical strategy can only succeed if Homer as the father of tragedy is already a cultural *topos*. We remember, of course, Aiskhylos' celebrated comment (*apud* Athenaios 347e) that his tragedies were "slices from Homer's great dinners" ([Αἴσχυλος] τὰς αὑτοῦ τραγῳδίας τεμάχη εἶναι ἔλεγεν τῶν Ὁμήρου μεγάλων δείπνων); we should probably not read this too narrowly, as if he were only acknowledging that his μῦθοι were cognate with Homer's. A broader reading indeed is supported by Aristotle's parallel between Homer and tragedy (*Poetics* 1448b31–49a2), which makes clear that their point of contact is a proportionality (ἀνάλογον) of form (σχῆμα): ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ σπουδαῖα μάλιστα ποιητὴς Ὅμηρος ἦν (μόνος γὰρ οὐχ ὅτι εὖ ἀλλὰ καὶ μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν), οὕτως καὶ τὸ τῆς κωμῳδίας σχῆμα πρῶτος ὑπέδειξεν, οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας· ὁ γὰρ Μαργίτης ἀνάλογον ἔχει, ὥσπερ Ἰλιὰς καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια πρὸς τὰς τραγῳδίας, οὕτω καὶ οὗτος πρὸς τὰς κωμῳδίας. (Cf. Lucas, 1968, 77 *ad* 1448b35–36.) This cultural *topos* recurs so frequently among later writers that it can hardly be assumed to go back to the distortion and conflation by Plato of two genres generally perceived as independent. Thus, the Homeric scholia to A 332: πρῶτος δὲ Ὅμηρος πρόσωπα κωφὰ παρήγαγεν εἰς τὴν τραγῳδίαν; and to Z 466: πρῶτος παῖδας εἰσάγει τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ; so also [Plu.] *De Homero* 213: ἡ τραγῳδία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔλαβεν ἐξ Ὁμήρου. Cf. Gudeman (1934) 109 for further witnesses (but note that Philostr. *VA* 6.11 does *not* refer to Homer, as he claims, but to Aiskhylos). See also Schmid (1908) on the scholia to the *Iliad* and dramatic μίμησις.

[11]The later acceptation 'to answer' does not lack representation in the diachronic layering of the poems (e.g. at H 407, though cf. Nagy, 2003, 21–22). But, as Koller (1957) 101 observes, this was a semantic development largely restricted to the Ionic dialect, and only rarely present in Athenian authors as a literary affectation (e.g. Thouk. 7.44.5, where the *OCT* inexplicably prints ἀποκρίνοιντο without ever so much as a note in the apparatus that the mss. agree on ὑποκρίνοιντο, as LSJ *s.v.* notes).

in substance, glossing the verb as 'to decide for, explain, or clarify to someone else'. The derivatives ὑπόκρισις and ὑποκριτής are only attested much later. The former, first in Pindar's fr. 140b Sn-M,[12] sometimes paraphrased 'in the manner of', already shows role-playing as an established meaning.[13] The latter is first attested in the inscriptional *Fasti* (*IG* II² 2318) in connection with the actors' contest instituted in 449 BC at the Dionysia,[14] and a few years later in Aristophanes' *Wasps* 1279, dated to 422 BC, where its meaning cannot be settled by an appeal to either its context or the scholia.[15] ὑποκρίνεσθαι is arguably not a natural choice for stage acting: neither etymology nor the earliest attested meaning commends its use in this setting. Therefore, as Koller (1957) 103 pointed out, we must surely assume—the absence of direct evidence to this effect notwithstanding—that ὑποκριτής was *already* in use as the *nomen agentis* applied to the one who rendered the answer of the deity by oracular pronouncement or clarified its meaning or both.[16] Homeric usage makes clear that this can be the only natural setting for the term.

But how, then, does the actor come to be named ὑποκριτής? The most convincing answer is Koller's (1957), who on the basis of Plato's *Ion* concluded that rhapsodes had long been called ὑποκριταί of Homer, not in the sense of 'dramatic actors' but of 'expounders' of his poetry, and that this 'explanation' is the alleged original burden of tragic actors.[17] Two passages can be cited: *Ion* 532d7, where Sokrates refers to Ion

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[12]The relevant lines are as follows: ἐγὼ μ[‖ παῦρα μελ[ι]ζομεν[‖ [γλώ]σσαργον ἀμφέπω[ν ⌊ἐρε- ‖ θίζ⌋ομαι πρὸς ἀϋτά[ν ‖ ⌊ἀλίο⌋υ δελφῖνος ὑπ⌊όκρισιν⌋, ‖ ⌊τὸν μὲν ἀκύμονος ἐν πόντου πελάγει ‖ αὐλῶν ἐκίνησ᾽ ἐρατὸν μέλος⌋ (fr. 140b.11–17).

[13]The construction is best understood as an accusative in apposition to a sentence; cf. Schwyzer II p. 86, *sub* 'Akkusativ der Satzapposition.' For the interpretation of this fragment, see Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1922) 500–2, Fileni (1987), and Henderson (1992). As to Lesky's (1956) 475 contention that this text once for all banishes the possibility that originally ὑποκριτής might have meant 'answerer', I must confess with Page (1956) that I do not understand the logic of his argument. Perhaps his point is that in Pindar's time the use of ὑπόκρισις must have been intelligible to the audience in terms of its original meaning; and that one should therefore be able to make good sense of the passage if we use the alleged meaning to translate it. But if so, is "I am provoked . . . replying like a dolphin" to be discarded in favor of "I am provoked . . . interpreting like a dolphin"? Clearly neither is admissible except as a metaphor, and this does not gain us any advantage in the argument.

[14]Cf. Pickard-Cambridge (1988) 71–72 and 101–7. This view assumes that ὑποκριτής is original and not a scribal anachronism.

[15]Cf. Zucchelli (1962) 52n98. ὑποκρινόμενον in *Wasps* 53, however, does mean 'to interpret'.

[16]Plato's *Timaios* 72a6–b5, though much later, would lend support to this view: ὅθεν δὴ καὶ τὸ τῶν προφητῶν γένος ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐνθέοις μαντείαις κριτὰς ἐπικαθιστάναι νόμος· οὓς μάντεις αὐτοὺς ὀνομάζουσίν τινες, τὸ πᾶν ἠγνοηκότες ὅτι τῆς δι᾽ αἰνιγμῶν οὗτοι φήμης καὶ φαντάσεως ὑποκριταί, καὶ οὔτι μάντεις, προφῆται δὲ μαντευομένων δικαιότατα ὀνομάζοιντ᾽ ἄν. For more on this passage see above, pp. 40f.

[17]The debate can be most readily joined by reading Lesky (1956), Else (1959), and Zucchelli

and his ilk as ὑμεῖς οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ καὶ ὑποκριταί;[18] and *Ion* 535e10–536a1, where Ion, 'the middle ring' in the chain of inspiration, is once again described as ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής.[19] One may counter that there is something of a stage quality to Ion's performance—this is true, and more on this below.[20] But he is surely not an actor in the traditional sense, however dramatic his delivery. By Plato's time, ὑποκριτής in the sense of tragic or comic actor was well established. And after painting the portrait of an epic performer who disavowed interest in *any* poet other than Homer, we might expect that, to remain in character, Plato would have had Ion protest as demeaning the epexegetic καὶ ὑποκριτής that Sokrates repeatedly appends to ὁ ῥαψῳδός, if it could only suggest a generic association with poetry other than Homer's. Not so: ὑποκριτής *was* a traditional description of the rhapsode, and this agrees with Ion's unequivocal insistence that an essential part of his profession, on which he expended the greatest effort, was speaking well about Homer (περὶ Ὁμήρου λέγειν):[21] he must not only know the poet's ἔπη but his διάνοια (530b10–c1); he must both declaim the former and be a ἑρμηνεύς of the latter (530c3–4, 535b2).[22]

We do not know what this rhapsodic exposition of Homer was like, and sadly

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(1962). See also, more recently, Ley (1983). Nagy (2003) 21–38 offers an important modification that complements Koller's insight. He argues that the traditional nature of Homeric poetry—that audiences over the years thought of the rhapsode in performance as 'quoting' the notionally unchanging speeches by the characters in the poems—gives to the instances of ὑποκρίνεσθαι in epic the connotation of "responding by way of performing" (*ibid.* 21). This would readily lead to its use in the context of drama.

[18] *Ion* 532d6–e1: βουλοίμην ἄν σε ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ὦ Ἴων· ἀλλὰ σοφοὶ μέν πού ἐστε ὑμεῖς οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ καὶ ὑποκριταὶ καὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ᾄδετε τὰ ποιήματα, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τἀληθῆ λέγω, οἷον εἰκὸς ἰδιώτην ἄνθρωπον.

[19] *Ion* 535e7–536a1: οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θεατὴς τῶν δακτυλίων ὁ ἔσχατος, ὧν ἐγὼ ἔλεγον ὑπὸ τῆς Ἡρακλειώτιδος λίθου ἀπ' ἀλλήλων τὴν δύναμιν λαμβάνειν; ὁ δὲ μέσος σὺ ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής.

[20] Bölte (1907) offers a helpful exploration of the dramatic potential of Homeric epic and the ways in which a rhapsode might take advantage of it. Cf. also Throop (1917).

[21] E.g. 530c9; cf. 533c5–7 and d2.

[22] For more on the rhapsode and the poet as ἑρμηνῆς see above, pp. 62f. and 69f. That the term passed from the rhapsode to the actor (and not vice versa) is clear: the rhapsode, standing in direct continuity with the ancient singer—ἀοιδός and ῥαψῳδός were but two terms for the same δημιουργός, considered from different angles—could be called the ἑρμηνεύς of the inspiring deity (as Plato speaks of the poet in the *Ion*; cf. 534e4–5 and 535a5). Thus, when in the evolution of his profession an aspect of his performance was conceptualized as explanatory of the poetic tradition—when it was thought of and referred to as 'expounding the poet'—it was natural that, to designate him in this capacity, the same term would be used, ὑποκριτής, that had been applied before to μάντεις, προφῆται, and ὑποφῆται (cf. *Ion* 535a6–7 and a9). The corresponding explanatory function of the actor came later, and it embodied a less immediate conceptual link with its antecedent than the exposition of the rhapsode bore to oracular prophecy.

Sokrates prevents Ion from making a demonstration, so we are left to conjecture. It is an error, however, to argue (as some have) that Ion being our only evidence for such an exegetical rhapsodic practitioner, he must be an idiosyncratic creation of Plato, peculiar to this dialogue and without a real-life parallel. But surely the force (and point) of Plato's dialogue would be lost if Ion were so unrepresentative of the rhapsodes of his day. And one could only judge the focus of his argument misconceived, with its unrelenting insistence on his superb ability to 'expound Homer' (530d2–3, 535a6–10), 'speak about Homer' (530c9), and 'adorn Homer' (530d7) (not, *nota bene*, 'sing Homer' or 'declaim Homer').[23] And even the *topos* of the rhapsodes' stupidity,[24] because they knew Homer's ἔπη by heart but were ignorant of their meaning,[25] must be regarded as proof that they regularly *did* attempt an exposition: for how else would their ignorance be so obviously exposed? This, to me, does not seem a case of revealing their deficiency in private conversation only; the accusation has an official ring to it, as if their excellence at performing and poverty in expounding were of a piece with their trade. Far from standing alone as an exceptional distortion of a tendentious Plato, the *Ion* corroborates that this is so. Now, how are we to think of this hermeneutic function? Koller (1957) 105 suggested that it consisted in "prose speech, mixed with verses, portions of verses, *kola, kommata*, with all the characteristics of poetic speech," in sum, "a mixture of poetic speech and everyday prose."[26] This, he proposed, represented the origin of 'literary' prose—though a very poetic one at first[27]—and hence there was a direct line extending from rhapsodic to sophistic ἐπίδειξις. I believe that the outlines of this proposal are essentially correct,

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[23]For 'to sing' and 'to declaim' ᾄδειν, καταλέγειν, or even λέγειν—but λέγειν τὰ Ὁμήρου [ἔπη], *not* περὶ Ὁμήρου—would have been quite adequate and obvious, but we do not find them used even once!

[24]Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.10: τί δὲ δὴ βουλόμενος ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι, ἔφη, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, συλλέγεις τὰ γράμματα; . . . ἀλλὰ μὴ ῥαψῳδός; ἔφη· καὶ γὰρ τὰ Ὁμήρου σέ φασιν ἔπη πάντα κεκτῆσθαι. μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη· τοὺς γάρ τοι ῥαψῳδοὺς οἶδα τὰ μὲν ἔπη ἀκριβοῦντας, αὐτοὺς δὲ πάνυ ἠλιθίους ὄντας. And Xen. *Symp.* 3.5–6: ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενοίμην ἠνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν· καὶ νῦν δυναίμην ἂν Ἰλιάδα ὅλην καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν. ἐκεῖνο δ', ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, λέληθέ σε, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ πάντες ἐπίστανται ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη; καὶ πῶς ἄν, ἔφη, λελήθοι ἀκροώμενόν γε αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἂν' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν; οἶσθά τι οὖν ἔθνος, ἔφη, ἠλιθιώτερον ῥαψῳδῶν; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη ὁ Νικήρατος, οὔκουν ἔμοιγε δοκῶ. δῆλον γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπίστανται.

[25]Xenophon's Sokrates uses the word ὑπόνοιαι (*Symp.* 3.6.7).

[26]"Sie konnte nur Prosarede sein, untermischt mit Versen, Versteilen, Kolen, Kommata, mit allen Eigenheiten poetischer Sprache, d. h. die Form der Hypokrisis ist eine Mischung von Dichtersprache und Alltagsprosa."

[27]Cf. Aristot. *Rh.* 1404a24–29.

and I would only modify it by conjecturing that initially the explanatory function of the rhapsode would have largely consisted in hexameters composed in performance, joining well known episodes or speeches, effecting transitions between them, elaborating the twists and turns of the poems' plots, as well as the thoughts, feelings, and motivations of participating gods and heroes.[28] On one level, τὸν Ὅμηρον κοσμεῖν, 'to adorn Homer',[29] must have denoted such an elaboration: not the work of an autonomous creativity expressing a rhapsode's individuality, but the traditional re-composition controlled since time immemorial by the notion of 'order', i.e. the κατὰ κόσμον explored in Chapter 1.[30] But with the passing of time and the increasing theatricality of rhapsodic performance, the practice of ornamenting Homer would have been gradually reinterpreted, partly as elaborate ὑπόκρισις,[31] partly as the metaphorical adornment of 'praise'. Ion's gorgeous attire answers to the former;[32] rhapsodic ἔπαινος, which I shall consider presently, to the latter.[33]

The scenario I have outlined here would readily explain Plato's apparent blurring between the inspired poet (notionally the source of the tradition) and the rhapsodes (notionally the performers and expounders). Indeed, were we to reduce the bard's

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[28]The work of Kelly (1990) on the differing rates of corruption in Homeric speeches and narrative would seem to support this conjecture. I quote here from his conclusion: "[T]he formulas for the speeches were composed at an earlier date than the formulas for the narrative. The supposition of a proto-epic composed of speeches and a connecting prose narrative is strengthened by the existence of such poems in . . . the Indo-European community, and by the dominance of speeches in the Homeric text as it now stands. The transition from speeches to [versified] narrative was effected by means of quoted narrative. . . . Narrative, then, not the speeches, remains the locus for innovation" (*ibid.* 80–81). (By "quoted narrative" Kelly means narrative in the mouth of a Homeric character.) My suggestion here ties into the debate whether one can make sense of 'to interpret' for ὑποκρίνεσθαι in the context of drama. Those who dismiss this gloss note that it would equate drama with a dream or enigma that needs elucidation. But if originally the 'interpretation' of the actor was akin to what I have proposed here for the rhapsode, we need not think of him as a scholastic exegete of an otherwise puzzling text (an obviously implausible claim). Remembering that ὑποκρίνεσθαι would take τραγῳδία (*Rh.* 1403b23) or μῦθος as a direct object, and, by extension, a particular πρόσωπον, the actor's 'interpretation' would consist in giving expression to the thoughts, motivations, choices, and antecedents that are instrumental in making the μῦθος what it is and turn out as it does. (For the equivalent of πρόσωπον as the direct object of ὑποκρίνεσθαι cf. Dem. 19.246, which speaks of 'acting Ἀντιγόνην Σοφοκλέους'. Here the drama is meant, but there is only a short distance from this to 'interpreting the character' herself. And in fact the scholiast to Eur. *Or.* writes about οἱ νῦν ὑποκρινόμενοι τὸν ἥρωα [sec. §268.7 Schwartz].)

[29]*Ion* 530d6–8: καὶ μὴν ἄξιόν γε ἀκοῦσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς εὖ κεκόσμηκα τὸν Ὅμηρον· ὥστε οἶμαι ὑπὸ Ὁμηριδῶν ἄξιος εἶναι χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ στεφανωθῆναι.

[30]See above, pp. 22ff.

[31]That is, an stage presence marked by a characteristically histrionic use of voice, gestures, and dress.

[32]Cf. *Ion* 530b6 and 535d2.

[33]See below, section 3.3, pp. 156ff. For more on rhapsodic κόσμησις, see Boyd (1994) 118–20.

performance merely to reproducing (as a mechanical feat of memory) what purported to be Homer's *ipsissima verba*, how could this action even begin to suggest to sort of manic inspiration Plato foists on rhapsodes? There would be hardly anything mysterious and godlike in a feat of memory, for Xenophon makes clear that the layman, too, could boast in his ability to recall the entire poems.[34] To puzzled Ion's question, 'How can it be that when someone talks about another poet, I pay no attention, cannot contribute anything worthwhile, and just doze off, but when Homer is mentioned I am immediately awake, pay attention, and have much to say?', Sokrates' answer must be, 'Is it not obvious? Because you have only memorized Homer!' Memorizing thousands of lines of poetry, however impressive an accomplishment to the modern, is quite different from the notion of 'social memory' embodied by the poetic tradition. The latter alone is shrouded in mystery, for it reenacts the past as only autopsy or divine omniscience (Apollo's or the Muses') can (cf. *Iliad* 2.484–86 and *Odyssey* 8.487–91).[35] On the lips of the poet a claim to *that* memory fully justifies some notion of divine influence. One can hardly say the same when access to the tradition is gained by the hard but ordinary labor of a capacious memory exercised in retaining a widely accessible text. It would be hard to tell in that case who looks more foolish: Ion, for asking the question, or Sokrates, for failing to give the obvious answer. On the other hand, an exposition of Homer strictly as a prose lecture would not suffice: without the creative contribution of the rhapsode's own poetry it is again hard to see how the matter of inspiration would be apposite. An understanding of rhapsodic practice along the lines I have just described accords a unity to the *Ion* that has been denied to it by many a scholar. Whether poetic inspiration or rhapsodic exposition was its theme has been debated by many, and various strategies devised to subordinate the one to the logic of the other.[36] Yet the troubling dichotomy largely dissipates if rhapsodic exposition shares, to some extent, the character of poetic composition. This explains why the composing poet and the performing (declaiming and

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[34]See above, n. 24. This does not hold for the archaic appeal to 'memory', which at that time was not conceived as rote learning and *did* have such connotations. But in the environment of late fifth- and fourth-century BC Athens, as just remarked, laymen might commit to memory large portions of Homer in an ordinary, mechanical way.

[35]For more on poetry and 'social memory' see above, p. 34. For the poet and divine omniscience see p. 19.

[36]For various approaches to the interpretation of the *Ion* a sample of the relevant bibliography might include Verdenius (1943), Ladrière (1951), Diller (1955), Wyller (1958), Flashar (1958), Tigerstedt (1969) 13–29, Partee (1971), Dorter (1973), Schousen (1986), Velardi (1989), Ott (1992), and Harris (1997).

expounding) rhapsode can be handled under a single scheme and assigned the same kind of manic inspiration; at the same time, it preserves the notional priority of the poet as source (author and authority) of the bard's performance, for only through 'Homer' does Ion have access to the Muse. The *afflatus* is mediated, and passes from poet to rhapsode; but, by the same token, the rhapsode is not without his creative inspiration. Over time, the verse component must have given way to an increasingly large proportion of explanatory prose, a development that would readily account for the implicit comparison of rhapsodes with sophistic orators, who made a living of epideictic displays and educational lessons for a fee and for whom Homeric material often furnished a point of departure.[37] These sophists may have proceeded at first in conscious imitation of and competition with rhapsodes.

3.3   The Rhapsode as ἐπαινέτης

One aspect of the *Ion* where the connection between the rhapsodic and sophistic performance traditions comes clearly to the fore is Plato's use, characteristically pointed, of the terms ἐπαινέω and ἐπαινέτης. On four different occasions do the interlocutors employ them. The first comes after the celebrated metaphor of the magnetic chain, which Sokrates closes with the following words: "The cause of this you are asking me about, why you are at a loss in regard to the rest but not in regard to Homer, is that you are a terrific *epainetēs* of Homer by divine dispensation, not *tekhnē*";[38] to which Ion replies: "Well said, Sokrates; but I would be surprised if you spoke well enough to convince me that it is raving and possessed that I praise (ἐπαινῶ) Homer";[39] the other two instances are in the closing exchange between the philosopher and the rhapsode: "But if you are telling the truth, Ion, that by art and science you are able to praise (ἐπαινεῖν) Homer, you are wronging me";[40] faced with this verbal challenge, Ion at last yields his point to Sokrates, who condescendingly ends the dialogue with a declaration of victory: "This nobler title, then, you have in my eyes, Ion, to be an *epainetēs* of

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[37]As the beginning of Plato's *Hippias minor* shows.

[38]*Ion* 536d1–3: τούτου δ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον, ὅ μ' ἐρωτᾷς, δι' ὅτι σὺ περὶ μὲν Ὁμήρου εὐπορεῖς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὔ, ὅτι οὐ τέχνῃ ἀλλὰ θείᾳ μοίρᾳ Ὁμήρου δεινὸς εἶ ἐπαινέτης.

[39]*Ion* 536d4–6: σὺ μὲν εὖ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· θαυμάζοιμι μεντἂν εἰ οὕτως εὖ εἴποις, ὥστε με ἀναπεῖσαι ὡς ἐγὼ κατεχόμενος καὶ μαινόμενος Ὅμηρον ἐπαινῶ.

[40]*Ion* 541e1–3: ἀλλὰ γὰρ σύ, ὦ Ἴων, εἰ μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις ὡς τέχνῃ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ οἷός τε εἶ Ὅμηρον ἐπαινεῖν, ἀδικεῖς.

Homer not by dint of art, but divine."[41] To these four passages from the *Ion* we may add three other. In the *Protagoras* Sokrates gently chides a *hetairos* for his unwitting departure from Homer's view of a youth's charm when he first shows facial hair: "But are you not an *epainetēs* of Homer, who said that youth is at its most charming with its first beard, just the age of Alkibiades now?"[42] And in the *Republic* Homer's theology is censured for its questionable morality: "Though we praise much of Homer, yet this we shall not praise: Zeus' sending of the dream to Agamemnon."[43] But it is the next passage that makes clear the ultimate implications of 'praising Homer', the claim purveyors of culture—educators, rhapsodes, sophists—staked out in connection with the alleged social benefits of his poetry: "Surely then, Glaukos, said I, when you meet *epainetai* of Homer who say that this poet has educated Greece and that, with a view to the management of human affairs and our instruction therein, he is worth taking up, learning, and living one's entire life arranged according to him; you must love and welcome them as being so virtuous as they are able and agree that Homer is *the* Poet of poets and first among tragedians, but you must know that of poetry, only hymns to gods and encomia of virtuous men should be admitted into the city."[44] The point made here by Homer's 'supporters' (the *epainetai*) is clearly one of pedagogical preeminence, comprehensiveness, and absolute sufficiency. It is hard for us fully to grasp the foundational significance of such a totalizing cultural narrative, whose impact descends into the triviality of a bearded youth's charm as easily as it ascends to statesmanship, military leadership,[45] and the most serious matters of state.[46] But it is precisely against this background that the word ἐπαινέτης acquires the connotation of the Homer enthusiast who makes his poetry the sum total of all necessary learning, a type best represented by the rhapsode. Several scholars have sensed and commented

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[41] *Ion* 542b2–3: τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ κάλλιον ὑπάρχει σοι παρ' ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἴων, θεῖον εἶναι καὶ μὴ τεχνικὸν περὶ Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτην.

[42] *Prt.* 309a6–b1: οὐ σὺ μέντοι Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης εἶ, ὃς ἔφη χαριεστάτην ἥβην εἶναι τοῦ ⟨πρῶτον⟩ ὑπηνήτου, ἣν νῦν Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔχει;

[43] *Rep.* 383a7–8: πολλὰ ἄρα Ὁμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι.

[44] *Rep.* 606e1–607a5: οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅταν Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέταις ἐντύχῃς λέγουσιν ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαίδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ πρὸς διοίκησίν τε καὶ παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἄξιος ἀναλαβόντι μανθάνειν τε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον κατασκευασάμενον ζῆν, φιλεῖν μὲν χρὴ καὶ ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύνανται, καὶ συγχωρεῖν Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν.

[45] E.g. *Ion* 541b3–5.

[46] Perhaps the closest parallel in recent history might be the place the Bible held among the early Puritan settlers of Massachusetts.

on the marked character of the term in this context. So Stallbaum (1857a) 331–32: "nempe videntur Homeri ἐπαινέται non tam ii dicti esse, qui Homerum laudabant, quam potius illi, qui unice eius sapientiam probabant eamque ita commendabant, ut inde etiam vitae recte sapienterque regendae ac moderandae praecepta haurienda esse arbitrarentur. In quorum numero certe imprimis etiam Homeridae habendi sunt. . . . His igitur viris sapientiae Homericae consultis sese adiunxerunt sine dubio etiam rhapsodi."[47]

A good fourth-century BC illustration, not by a rhapsode but by a statesman who nevertheless adopts the epideictic pose of one, is Lykourgos' *Against Leokrates*, dated to 330 BC, where Lykourgos the son of Lykophron (of the deme Boutadai) indicts a certain Leokrates for his flight to Megara right after the defeat of the Athenians and Thebans by Philip II of Makedon at Khaironeia.[48] In §102 he commends to the jury the example of Hektor as follows: βούλομαι δ' ὑμῖν καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον παρασχέσθαι ἐπαινῶν.[49] As an ἐπαινέτης of Homer, Lykourgos extols patriotism and courage in the fight for one's country. Velardi (1989) 34–35 sees in the outline of §§102–4 the pattern the more professional rhapsodic *epainetai* might have followed in praising Homer: "1) un breve discorso di carattere generale finalizzato ad introdurre i versi, una sorta di prologo contenente anche informazioni storiche sull'istituzione dell'agone rapsodico delle Panatenee e probabilmente, nel caso di una recitazione rapsodica vera e propria, notizie biografiche su Omero (par. 102); 2) la declamazione dei versi (par. 103); 3) un commento del brano recitato (par. 104)" (p. 35). Though perhaps a little too schematic, if one allows for *ad hoc* adjustments to the particulars of each performance his proposal seems, in the main, sound for the late-classical rhapsode.[50]

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[47]Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1920) 41n2: "Ὁμήρου ἐπαινέτης, das hier 536d und als letztes Wort des Dialoges steht, von Ion an der ersten Stelle mit Ὅμηρον ἐπαινῶ aufgenommen wird, bezeichnet den, der zu Ehren Homers redet, seine Sache führt, auf ihn schwört. . . . Noch der Kreter der Gesetze ist Διὸς ἐπαινέτης 633a"; and Albini (1954) 35 *ad* 536d: "ἐπαινέτης significa «panegirista», «encomiatore». La parola, con cui il dialogo si chiude, ha un valore pregnante." Thus, Velardi (1989) 32 concludes: "In realtà ci sono elementi sufficienti per affermare che i due termini [*epaineîn* ed *epainétes*], almeno in riferimento ad Omero, hanno un preciso valore tecnico."

[48]For a cultural analysis of the speech and, more generally, the times of Lykourgos, see Mikalson (1998) 11–45.

[49]I have restored τὸν Ὅμηρον . . . ἐπαινῶν, the reading of the mss. that Reiske and Koraēs had unnecessarily emended to τῶν Ὁμήρου . . . ἐπῶν (which Conomis prints). Not only is ἐπαινέω here paralleled by its use in connection with Euripides at *Leok.* 100, but it also reflects the conventional diction of *epideixis*, one that, I am arguing, goes back to long-standing rhapsodic practice. Cf. Velardi (1989) 33–35.

[50]See above (p. 154) for my own suggestions about the way in which the practice of rhapsodes in performance may have changed with time, and the corresponding evolution in the character of the

Indeed, the section that precedes Lykourgos' commendation of Homer, with its focus on Euripides' *Erekhtheus*, is explicit about the politician's intent to make poetry serve pedagogical ends (ταῦτα ὦ ἄνδρες τοὺς πατέρας ὑμῶν ἐπαίδευε, §101); further emphasis flows from the ensuing contrast between laws that, owing to their brevity, cannot educate (διὰ τὴν συντομίαν οὐ διδάσκουσιν, §102) and poets who, by mimesis of choice deeds, with *logos* and *apodeixis* (equivalent, respectively, to drama's speech and argument on the one hand, and stage production or *opsis* on the other), persuade men.[51] The goal is the public demonstration, ἐπίδειξις and the related ἀπόδειξις, which, Koller (1957) 105 had argued (see above, p. 153), made the sophists the intellectual heirs (and competitors) of the earlier rhapsodes.[52]

'stitching' and exposition (ἐπίδειξις or ἑρμηνεία, depending on the point of view) they would have engaged in.

[51]Cf. Humphreys (1985) 216–17.

[52]ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας (§102); οἱ δὲ ποιηταί . . . μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἀποδείξεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους συμπείθουσιν (§102). While the traditional term for the display of oratory and of performance generally is ἐπίδειξις, ἀπόδειξις is closely related to it. And though the latter can be employed in the specialized sense of rhetorical or logical proof, it still retains the flexibility to evoke the demonstrative 'show' of ἐπίδειξις. So, e.g., of three instances of ἀποδείκνυμι in Aristotle's *Poetics*, only one (1456a38) more narrowly relates to proving one's point (complementing the refutation of contrary arguments); the other two (1450a7 and 1450b11) pertain more generally to communicating the thoughts of the characters on stage and associate the word with ἀποφαίνεσθαι, the term used by Sokrates in *Ion* 532e8 and 533a4 for the exegetical function of the specialist (specifically, in painting, but, by implication, also in the rhapsodic art). In other words, ἀπόδειξις is part and parcel of the ἐπιδείξεις of the σοφοί: ἐπίδειξις especially regards the public display before the audience, ἀπόδειξις the public display of the subject matter. Hence the designation as ἀποδείξεις of the rhetorical speeches by Themistokles of Ilion (Θεμιστοκλῆς . . . ἀποδείξεις πεπόηται τῶν ῥητορικῶν λόγων) given in Xanthos in 196 BC (see Robert and Robert, 1983, 154–56; cf. Pernot, 1993, 1.50). Robert and Robert (1983) 162n27 write: "Il a donné des « démonstrations », ἀποδείξεις, de son art, à savoir dans des ἐπιδείξεις." And in his *Progymnasmata* 106 (Spengel) Theon of Alexandria explained that *topoi* differ from encomia and invective and that they are "concerned simply with their subjects and involve no demonstration (χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως)," whereas the other two "are concerned with specific persons and include demonstration (μετὰ ἀποδείξεως)" (Kennedy's, 2003, translation *ad loc.*; cf. Pernot, 1993, 2.679). This connection is very old indeed: it is attested in [Plato] *Hipparkhos* 228b6–7 ([Ἵππαρχος] ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο), in Herodotos' proem (Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε), and, significantly, in Alkidamas' *On the Sophists* §§29–32, where a failure to understand it has led scholars to emend the ἀποδείξεις of §29 to ἐπιδείξεις, so as to harmonize it with the τῶν ἐπιδείξεων of §31 (see, e.g., Mariß, 2002, 281–82). Cf. Nagy (1990c) 217–22, who insists on ἀπόδειξις as 'performance' (rather than 'public presentation') because of its implicit reference to the artistic medium in which the display takes place. I am in essential agreement with him on this point, but would accept 'public display', either as a direct reference to performance (in the case of rhapsodes, orators, etc.) or else as a metaphor from the world of the performer and his audience. Cf. Bakker (2002).

3.4   The Rhapsode and ὑπόκρισις

So far we have considered how the rhapsodic trade shaped not only the emerging actor, but also the sophist (who was, in effect, the first professional orator and teacher of oratory). But this is not the only direction in which influence was exerted. In Athens tragedy soon rivaled and even surpassed epic poetry in popular appeal as the queen of all cultural productions, and in time it also exerted a profound reciprocal influence upon the performance of Homer. Evidence for this can be found in many places, including the *Ion* itself, for, as we already observed, Ion's performance was powerfully dramatic, with an exaggerated evocation of πάθη,[53] especially ἔλεος and φόβος (535c5–8), the very emotions Aristotle singles out in connection with the κάθαρσις of tragedy (*Poetics* 1449b27–28).[54] Plato, who is never straightforward, must have been playing with the double meaning implicit in ὑποκριτής: not only the traditional one of 'expounder' of Homer—which is surely the way we are to think Ion heard it—but the far less flattering 'stage actor', with all the negative mimetic nuances the philosopher assigned to it. This, Plato's demeaning ὑπόνοια, would tend to reduce poetry to an instrument for arousing disorderly emotions, primarily through a markedly mimetic delivery. The same unfavorable implication is found in Aristotle's *Poetics* (chapter 26), where, while criticizing exaggerated acting, the philosopher observes that even an epic rhapsode may overdo his gestures.

This paring of rhapsode and stage actor resurfaces in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* III.1,

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[53]The metaphor of the ring embodies the lines of transmission along which the emotions flow: though we know nothing of the poet, his manic possession (which portrays him as a bacchant) is a safe index of his own emotional *ekstasis*; as to the other links, there is no doubt that the magnetic influence takes the form of a rhapsode overcome by his feelings, who in turn overwhelms his audience emotionally. (If we attend to the details, however, the picture is not so tidy; for, contemplating the prize as all but won, Ion combines inner laughter with his and his audience's outward wailing, 535e4–6.) The inclusion of the audience as the terminal link should caution us not to push the metaphor too far, since the audience neither composes nor performs under the influence of such 'possession'— it merely *feels* a powerful emotional influence. The presence of strong πάθη confirms the divine activity, mediated by poet and rhapsode, whose source is the Muse, but its particular effect on each link is peculiar to the link itself: whether it be a poet, a rhapsode, χορευταί, διδάσκαλοι, etc. One should not deny, as Pelliccia (2003) 106 does, the transmission of Homeric epic from rhapsode to rhapsode on the grounds that Sokrates passes from the poet directly to the performing rhapsode (without further intermediate rhapsodic links): such a stance misreads the conceptual universe of traditional poetry, which always claims authority from the notional source, not from the masters to whom the performer may have been apprenticed. Even the *Homeridae* derived their authority from their putative descent from Homer, not from membership in their group or from descent from *other Homeridae*. Cf., most recently, Graziosi (2002) 208–17.

[54]Note also the mention of ἐκπλήττειν at *Ion* 535b2–3, to be compared with ἔκπληξις at *Poetics* 1455a17–18. Cf. Flashar (1958) 67–69.

where we learn that the matter of ὑπόκρισις, 'oral delivery', had only lately come to τραγική and ῥαψῳδική.[55] Happily, the philosopher does not leave us in doubt as to his meaning, but explains that ὑπόκρισις lies in the voice, how its loudness, melodic line, and rhythm should be used to convey πάθος in every circumstance.[56] It is clear, however, that for him delivery was inextricably linked with writing.[57] For in defining the scope of his investigation of λέξις he specifies that it comprehends such principles as can be assembled into a scientific study of 'delivery';[58] and to illustrate this distinction he remarks that "written speeches are more effective on account of their *lexis* than their thought."[59] This comment is most naturally construed to involve writing in the successful deployment of all the expressive resources of 'style', resources that Aristotle views strictly as instruments in the service of effective delivery. Chapter 12 of *Rhetoric* III shows that writing is not a passing concern, even if it seems superficially paradoxical in the context of ὑπόκρισις; for here a distinction is drawn between the *graphic* and *agonistic* styles, the former lending itself best to *precision*, the latter to *delivery*.[60] It soon becomes clear, however, that he assumes that *both* will be written, and that the distinction between them is only how successful a reader will judge the written text, now deprived of its performative setting and voice, as compared to the hearer who sits in the audience when it is delivered.[61] Despite Aristotle's strong emphasis on oral delivery, it is telling that he should state that "one thing is to know how to speak correct Greek; another, not to be forced to keep silent, should one wish to share with the others—which is precisely what happens to those who do not know how to write."[62] The connection the philosopher establishes between rhapsodic, dra-

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[55]See above, Chapter 2.

[56]ἔστιν δὲ αὕτη [sc. ὑπόκρισις] μὲν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, πῶς αὐτῇ δεῖ χρῆσθαι πρὸς ἕκαστον πάθος, οἷον πότε μεγάλῃ καὶ πότε μικρᾷ καὶ μέσῃ, καὶ πῶς τοῖς τόνοις, οἷον ὀξείᾳ καὶ βαρείᾳ καὶ μέσῃ, καὶ ῥυθμοῖς τίσι πρὸς ἕκαστα. τρία γάρ ἐστιν περὶ ἃ σκοποῦσιν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μέγεθος ἁρμονία ῥυθμός (1403b26–31). See above, p. 76.

[57]See above, section 2.8 pp. 130ff.

[58]See above, section 2.7 pp. 118ff.

[59]καὶ ἔστιν φύσεως τὸ ὑποκριτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνότερον, περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἔντεχνον. διὸ καὶ τοῖς τοῦτο δυναμένοις γίνεται πάλιν ἆθλα, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν ῥήτορσιν· οἱ γὰρ γραφόμενοι λόγοι μεῖζον ἰσχύουσι διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἢ διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν (1404a15–19).

[60]ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη (1413b8–9).

[61] καὶ παραβαλλόμενοι οἱ μὲν τῶν γραφικῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι στενοὶ φαίνονται, οἱ δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων, εὖ λεχθέντες, ἰδιωτικοὶ ἐν ταῖς χερσίν. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ἁρμόττει τὰ ὑποκριτικά· διὸ καὶ ἀφῃρημένης τῆς ὑποκρίσεως οὐ ποιοῦντα τὸ αὐτῶν ἔργον φαίνεται εὐήθη, οἷον τά τε ἀσύνδετα καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν τῇ γραφικῇ ὀρθῶς ἀποδοκιμάζεται, ἐν δὲ ἀγωνιστικῇ οὔ, καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες χρῶνται (1413b14–21).

[62]τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασθαι, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀναγκάζεσθαι κατασιωπᾶν ἄν τι βούληται

matic, and oratorical ὑπόκρισις in *Rhetoric* III.1 is all the more significant in that it belongs to a technical discussion with careful definitions and analysis, one that explicitly considers the service writing can offer to what is a preeminently performative task: the oral delivery of rhetorical speeches. This parallel, I believe, suggested itself to Aristotle because in his own time these professionals of public performance shared the broad outlines of a common methodology, and this as much in their preparation and rehearsal as in their delivery before an audience. We readily understand that, however different in the particulars, the delivery of actor, rhapsode, and orator were but three species of one genus: they all had recourse to the same resources—voice, gestures, and outward appearance—through which they were to express *ēthos* and *pathos*. But the recurrent late-classical association of rhapsodes with ὑποκριταί and ὑπόκρισις, and the contexts in which this happens, also confirm that, by this time, they shared with actors and orators an important aspect of their training: the use of written texts (first in the character of transcripts, then of scripts) to prepare for and secure a successful performance. This was an innovation gradual in coming, for since time immemorial the Homeric rhapsode had relied on recomposing epic poetry in performance; but, as we shall see, it was also a departure from the original practice of orators, which some of the more seasoned among them hotly decried as enervating and harmful to the speaker and his art.

3.5   Alkidamas' *On the Sophists*

On the Sophists is one such broadside that has survived to our time, where Alkidamas expostulates with sophists about their reliance on written drafts for their speeches to court and assembly.[63] His polemic is primarily against the professional[64] who has

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μεταδοῦναι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι γράφειν (1413b5–8). This statement has confounded many (e.g. Rapp, 2002, 1.932), and a 'suitable' meaning is extracted by interpolating much that is allegedly tacit (so, e.g., Kennedy, 1991, *ad loc.*)—material that, in my view, is extraneous to the context. See my discussion of this passage above, pp. 133ff.

[63]He does not consider epideictic oratory (though it makes an appearance in §§29–32; see also above, n. 52). Alkidamas' life and *oeuvre* have recently been the focus of much work. In the past, the interest of scholars has been the alleged rivalry between him and Isokrates. More recently, he has been studied on his own terms for his contribution to the development of rhetoric and the origin of literary criticism. See, e.g., Brown (1914) 27–42, Milne (1924), Walberer (1938), Gastaldi (1981), Friemann (1990), Ritoók (1991), O'Sullivan (1992), Bons (1998), Liebersohn (1999), Muir (2001), and Mariß (2002).

[64]The distinction between the λογογράφος and his client is only once acknowledged: λογογραφήσουσι in §6 does not demand (though it may hint at) the technical meaning familiar to

given up the 'experimental learning' (ἱστορία) and 'training' (παιδεία) that would equip him for the intellectually demanding *autoskhediasmos*, i.e. 'extempore speaking',[65] relying instead on writing, a skill open to all regardless of natural ability.[66] Alkidamas' stance is élitist: he prides himself on grounds other than well crafted written speeches (an ability that he is nevertheless quick to own),[67] for writing must remain strictly a 'byproduct' (ἐν παρέργῳ), presumably, of speaking.[68] He allows writing even to those who make improvisation the heart of rhetorical practice, but only so long as it is properly subservient to speaking.[69] By opposing ποιηταί to σοφισταί[70] he acknowledges that writing was current among sophists,[71] and asserts that too pervasive an influence of writing would assimilate them to craft artisans.[72]

Given the relation between sophists and rhapsodes we have argued for and the role of the latter as performers of poetry, we might anticipate that Alkidamas may mention ῥαψῳδική as a *comparandum* to the orators' use of writing. And indeed we are not disappointed, as we shall see below. But consider first how different the talents that improvisation and scripted delivery call for.[73] The former requires speaking fittingly about the happenstance (περὶ τοῦ παρατυχόντος), a swift articulation of thoughts

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the modern scholar (cf. Mariß, 2002, 129); in §13, however, the professional speech writer seems in view. On the relationship between the *logografos* and his clients see Worthington (1993).

[65]Cf. the still essential study by Brown (1914). See also Hudson-Williams (1951), Hammerstaedt and Terbuyken (1994–96), Klawitter (1998), and Schloemann (2000).

[66]τινες τῶν καλουμένων σοφιστῶν ἱστορίας μὲν καὶ παιδείας ἠμελήκασι καὶ τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν ὁμοίως τοῖς ἰδιώταις ἀπείρως ἔχουσι, γράφειν δὲ μεμελετηκότες λόγους (§1); πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐντεῦθεν ἄν τις καταφρονήσειε τοῦ γράφειν, ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν εὐεπίθετον καὶ ῥᾴδιον καὶ τῇ τυχούσῃ φύσει πρόχειρον. εἰπεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παραυτίκα περὶ τοῦ παρατυχόντος ἐπιεικῶς . . . οὔτε φύσεως ἁπάσης οὔτε παιδείας τῆς τυχούσης ἐστίν (§3).

[67]οὐχ ὡς ἀλλοτρίαν ἐμαυτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν ἡγούμενος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐφ' ἑτέροις μεῖζον φρονῶν (§2).

[68]So Radermacher (1951), who emends the text to say τὸ γράφειν ἐν παρέργῳ τοῦ ⟨λέγειν⟩ μελετᾶν οἰόμενος χρῆναι (§2).

[69]Even where writing plays a role, it is ultimately for the hearing (not reading) of the people: ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκρόασιν (§11).

[70]τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸν βίον καταναλίσκοντας ἀπολελεῖφθαι πολὺ καὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ φιλοσοφίας ὑπειληφώς, καὶ πολὺ δικαιότερον ἂν ποιητὰς ἢ σοφιστὰς προσαγορεύεσθαι νομίζων (§2).

[71]From various sources we know that they kept and used books when the Athenian book trade was still in its infancy and owning scrolls was still considered extraordinary. Cf. Dover (1993) 34–35 and Pöhlmann (1994) 19n19.

[72]Later on he mentions ποιήματα: οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἐξειργασμένοι [sc. λόγοι] καὶ μᾶλλον ποιήμασιν ἢ λόγοις ἐοικότες (§12). Mariß (2002) 180 writes: "Im Hinblick auf die Metapher in dem vorhergehenden ἐξειργασμένοι schwingt bei ποιήματα auch hier die Bedeutung, „künstl(er)i(s)ch gefertige Gebilde", mit; den ursprünglichen Sinn von ποιητάς hatte Alkidamas, in einer sprachlich ähnlichen Wendung in §2, polemisch genutzt. . . . Der abwertende Unterton klingt auch in ποιήματα an." For the early history of the word 'poet' in its literary sense see Ford (2002) 131–57.

[73]All the references in this paragraph are to *On the Sophists* §§3–4.

and arguments, a felicitous abundance of vocabulary (the resources of language at
the level of expression), aiming accurately at the 'opportunity' of the matter at hand
(καιρός), and a sensitive speaker-audience interaction that takes adequate account of
the desires of the hearers and their shifting moods: in view is τὸ προσῆκον, a goal
open indiscriminately neither to every nature nor to whatever training the orator may
chance upon. Writing, on the contrary, enjoys leisure of composition (κατὰ σχολήν)
and length of time (ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ), and benefits from comparing and collating other
sophists' συγγράμματα, culled for compelling thoughts (ἐνθυμήματα) and felicitous
expressions (τὰς τῶν εὖ λεγομένων ἐπιτυχίας). Add to this correction, revision, and
rewriting (this last, ἀνακαθῆραι, literally, 'cleaning up' the text), and we have the full
apparatus of a developed editorial practice.

We can easily transfer this to the rhapsode. He would have been schooled from
youth up in traditional composition in performance: his παιδεία was demanding and
called for rare natural talent.[74] He would declaim a sort of improvisation that re-
mained within the parameters of traditional themes, diction, and sequence. The
unexpected would arise from interaction with his audience—whose desires he would
seek to respond to and gratify—and from competing with other rhapsodes under time
constraints and the rules that regulated transitions between one bard and the next
(as to, e.g., thematic continuity). Depending on the format, interruptions from the
audience or amoibaic rhapsodic exchanges may not be out of the question. Speed of
thought and expressive resourcefulness would be crucial to his success. Conversely,
the leisurely drafting and memorizing of a script for oral delivery, away from the
competitive pressures of actual performance and assisted by previous transcripts, in
search of apposite ἐνθυμήματα and the felicitous verses of others—all the while cor-
recting, revising, and rewriting, both on the advice of others and his own—would have
been to the advantage of any who aspired to be a rhapsode but had not enjoyed the
life-long apprenticeship that was the *sine qua non* of recomposition-in-performance.
The same élitist criticism may be levied in this case: we would have, on the one hand,
what called for rigorous, life-long παιδεία, and was only open to singularly gifted tal-
ent; and, on the other, what was readily acquired, derivative, and easy even for the
uninstructed (ἀπαίδευτοι).

Strictly speaking, these two strategies were not mutually exclusive: surely, the
ability to improvise must have spanned a range; some may have employed texts

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[74]Here, too, there would be an opposition between the ἰδιῶται and the δημιουργός (§§1, 4), and
true traditional skill would hardly be εὐεπίθετον (§3).

only as transcripts, to be used in rehearsal not for strict memorization but to hone improvisatory delivery. Memory, after all, remained always an essential tool even of the most creative extempore traditional performance for which Homeric diction functioned as a language, albeit a special one—just as memory is essential for any natural-language ability.[75] Those orators who did not depend primarily (or even regularly) on writing could, by a change in what Alkidamas calls a 'frame of mind' (τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξιν μεταρρυθμίσαντες, §6), draft fitting scripts for their speeches. The same, I think, might be said about the production of poetic transcripts by rhapsodes whose dependence on writing was limited and occasional. Ultimately, the opposition between αὐτοσχηδιασμός and scripted delivery was one of opportunity versus time and leisure (i.e., καιρός versus χρόνος and σχολή), and it marks a shift away from the creative primacy of the performative setting. Improvisation possessed flexibility, but also uncertainty; scripts, in turn, could only thrive where competitive rules minimized the unexpected and put the emphasis on the stylistic finish of the delivery, with the corresponding depreciation of the skills that must have been the guarantee of victory at the ἀγῶνες among the more traditionally schooled singers: viz. responding to audience feedback and interruptions, thematic contraction and expansion to adjust to the available time and the interests of the hearers, mastery of relay poetics,[76] etc. It must be the case, therefore, that the transition from transcripts to scripts, intrinsically likely on the grounds of a change in the extraction and training of rhapsodes,[77] must have been facilitated by competitive rules at the Panathenaia

[75]So, e.g., in Plato's *Ion* memory is mentioned at 537a2–4, and again humorously at 539e7–540a3. Cf. *Hipp. min.* 368d6–7 and 369a4–8.

[76]I.e., a follow-up of one performer by the next that is not only smooth and polished at the thematic level, but also respectful of the generic constraints observed in transitions between poetic sections.

[77]Unfortunately, we are too poorly informed to know even the outlines of what must be a crucial piece of this cultural puzzle: the change in the extraction of the rhapsodes that competed at the Athenian Panathenaia. (Athens played the central role because of its dominance over the recitation and diffusion of Homeric epic during its defining stage. Cf. Nagy, 2001.) The fame of Ionian bards was well established, and we must assume that among them the traditional skill of extempore recomposition still flourished during the classical age. According to a dominant tradition, Homer himself hailed from the region, specifically from Khios, and thus it is only to be expected that, for his dialogue with Sokrates, Plato would choose a bard from a city like Ephesos. But the love of Homer, the distinguished place his poetry held in Athens (emphasized by Lykourgos in *Leok.* 102), and the social and material benefits to successful prize winners must have tempted the more ambitious Athenians to try their hand at the competition. Since the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* were the pedagogical mainstay (Isok. *Paneg.* 159), attaining a level of proficiency adequate for a festival appearance might have seemed to aspiring performers not to go much further than committing to memory large portions of the poems. A book-trade copy might serve as a handy script; to be sure, concentration and recall would have to be honed, but the creative center of gravity would be in the delivery (i.e., in the use of

that enforced an increasingly fixed thematic sequence; this sequence must have been predictable enough before the actual performance to give a competitive advantage to rhapsodes who chose to draft their recital in advance and commit it to memory.

The parallel just sketched, I believe, is not merely conjectural, for just as Plato and Aristotle, Alkidamas too couples ὑπόκρισις and the rhapsode's trade:[78] since it is impossible to memorize written speeches on any and every topic, he notes, it necessarily follows that the orator who depends on scripts will improvise some things and sculpt others; the outcome will look uneven, some of the material approaching ὑπόκρισις and ῥαψῳδία, while the rest looks common and trivial next to the precision of the former. We could read ὑποκρίσει καὶ ῥαψῳδίᾳ (§14) as a hendiadys: 'dramatic rhapsody' (proper to a rhapsode whose declamation is strongly under the influence of stage acting)[79] or 'rhapsodic interpretation' (the rhapsode viewed as expounder of Homer);[80] alternatively, as referring both to stage acting and rhapsodic declamation.[81] Any of these is sufficient for my purposes and shows that for Alkidamas the practice of the rhapsode epitomizes the finish and precision of delivery that corresponds to the use of scripts, drafted in advance of the performance, memorized, and carefully

voice, gesture, and dress). Extraordinary facility and a quick mind might enable one thus trained to save the day by supplying a suitable line of his own making here and there, should his memory suffer a minor lapse in performance. But this would no longer qualify as true traditional oral composition. There may be a hint at this state of affairs in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.10, where Euthydemos' imposing collection of Homeric writings (τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη πάντα) gives rise to Sokrates' gibe that perhaps he wishes to become a rhapsode. And from *Symp.* 3.5–6 we learn that Nikeratos' father, wishing to raise his son to be an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, had forced him to learn all of Homer's *epē* (πάντα τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν); apparently, this called for daily exposure to rhapsodic recitation (πῶς ἄν . . . λελήθοι ἀκροώμενόν γε αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἀν' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν;), an apprenticeship of sorts such as an ambitious Athenian of means might have been able to procure for himself. In fact, some have even suggested that this may be the same Nikeratos who, according to Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1413a7–10), was bested by Pratys at a rhapsodic competition (cf. Ford, 2002, 196n31). If Xenophon's report in the *Symposion* is accurate and his and Aristotle's Nikeratos are one and the same, Nikeratos must have competed as an amateur or else, despite his earlier criticism of rhapsodes, he must have decided to become one himself. (Alternatively, he might have found it preferable to acquiesce in the criticism of his dinner companions, feigning to share it rather than mount a defense of rhapsodes in the face of peer pressure. That he reportedly sought the ὑπόνοιαι of the likes of Stesimbrotos and Anaximander shows he intended to overcome the commonly perceived limitations of the average rhapsodic training.)

[78] περὶ πάντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν πραγμάτων γεγραμμένους ἐπίστασθαι λόγους ἕν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων πέφυκεν· ἀνάγκη δ' ἐστίν, ὅταν τις τὰ μὲν αὐτοσχεδιάζῃ, τὰ δὲ τυποῖ, τὸν λόγον ἀνόμοιον ὄντα ψόγον τῷ λέγοντι παρασκευάζειν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑποκρίσει καὶ ῥαψῳδίᾳ παραπλήσια δοκεῖν εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ταπεινὰ καὶ φαῦλα φαίνεσθαι παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων ἀκρίβειαν (§14).

[79]Schloemann (2000) 215n53 suggests "dichterischer Deklamation."

[80]Whose style would be that of the "gebundene Rede der Kunstprosa" (Koller, 1957, 104).

[81]So Mariß (2002) 195: "Vielmehr steht ὑπόκρισις als Begriff für den Vortrag von dramatischer Dichtung eigenständig neben dem Rezitieren von—in erster Linie—epischen Texten."

rehearsed with a view to attaining the maximum impact on delivery. It is curious that
scripted material is likened here to ὑπόκρισις for its precision, whereas in Aristotle's
Rhetoric III.12 it was the *agonistic* style—the one contrasted with the *graphic* as
comparatively less precise—that was considered the most appropriate for delivery.
This shows that, conceptually, Alkidamas stops short of the more developed extreme
to which Aristotle takes us, viz. the '*graphic* style', best represented by epideictic
speeches. Just as the orator as writer of speeches resembles a *poiētēs*, a 'speech maker'
or 'poet', and his speech recalls a *poiēma* sooner than a *logos*, so also in delivery he
smacks more of a rhapsode than a rhetor. Though my argument here does not turn
on the precise meaning of ὑποκρίσει καὶ ῥαψῳδίᾳ, with Koller (1957) 104 I rather
incline to 'rhapsodic *hypokrisis*'.[82] Indeed, one need not read into Alkidamas the
terminological distinction between tragic and rhapsodic delivery Aristotle observes
in *Poetics* 26 and *Rhetoric* III.1; and though 'poet' may well lurk behind the word
ποιητής (§34) and Isokrates[83] shows us that ποιητὴς τῶν λόγων need not mean more
than 'maker' or 'composer of speeches', the emphasis clearly falls on careful crafting
that almost certainly involves writing, yet all the while is oriented towards delivery.[84]

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[82]*Pace* Mariß (2002) 195.

[83]Isok. *C. soph.* 15: ἡ δὲ παίδευσις τοὺς μὲν τοιούτους τεχνικωτέρους καὶ πρὸς τὸ ζητεῖν εὐπο-
ρωτέρους ἐποίησεν· οἷς γὰρ νῦν ἐντυγχάνουσι πλανώμενοι, ταῦτ' ἐξ ἑτοιμοτέρου λαμβάνειν αὐτοὺς
ἐδίδαξεν, τοὺς δὲ καταδεεστέραν τὴν φύσιν ἔχοντας ἀγωνιστὰς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς ἢ λόγων ποιητὰς οὐκ ἂν
ἀποτελέσειεν, αὐτοὺς δ' ἂν αὐτῶν προαγάγοι καὶ πρὸς πολλὰ φρονιμωτέρως διακεῖσθαι ποιήσειεν.;
Isok. *Antid.* 192: περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς φύσεως καὶ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ταῦτα γιγνώσκω· περὶ δὲ τῆς παιδείας
οὐκ ἔχω τοιοῦτον λόγον εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὁμοίαν οὔτε παραπλησίαν ἔχει τούτοις τὴν δύναμιν. Εἰ γάρ
τις διακούσειεν ἅπαντα τὰ περὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ διακριβωθείη μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, λόγων μὲν ποιητὴς
τυχὸν ἂν χαριέστερος γένοιτο τῶν πολλῶν, εἰς ὄχλον δὲ καταστάς, τούτου μόνον ἀποστερηθείς, τοῦ
τολμᾶν, οὐδ' ἂν φθέγξασθαι δυνηθείη.

[84]Mariß (2002) 99–100 essentially agrees with this view, noting that in *On the Sophists*, as in
Plato's *Phaidros*, the boundary between 'poet' and 'speech maker' is fluid. With ποιητής Alkidamas
may well intend, as she remarks, a disparagement of the orator who places too great a value on
precise drafts, suggesting that he rather resembles a manual artisan. In §34, however, it is clear that
ποιητὴς λόγων is the rhetorical wordsmith (not the poet) who, excessively dependent on writing,
never rises to the level of the true orator. I agree with Mariß (2002) 307 that δεινὸς ῥήτωρ and
ποιητὴς λόγων are mutually exclusive at the rhetorical level of Alkidamas' diatribe; but I do not
think she is correct in denying Isok. *C. soph.* 15 and *Antid.* 192 a connection with delivery. At *C.
soph.* 15, ἀγωνιστὰς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς ἢ λόγων ποιητὰς does not establish an opposition ("Gegenbegriff")
between ἀγωνισταί and ποιηταί: Isokrates does not specify the relationship between them. But since
both are possible outcomes of the sophistic παίδευσις in the case of gifted men, both must *a fortiori*
be included in the promise πολιτικοὶ λόγοι hold for the formation of successful ῥήτορες (*C. soph.* 9).
Thus, one should also see *both* as connected with delivery, for this is the end of such *logoi*. A man
like Isokrates, who mostly writes but does not deliver them, is still at that time an anomaly. Isok.
Antid. 192 confirms this view (*pace* Mariß, 2002, 306: "[Die Junktur vom 'Dichter' und 'Verfertiger']
hat bei ihnen [sc. Isokrates und Platon] jedoch, anders als bei Alkidamas, mit dem Vortrag nichts zu
tun"); for here, Isokrates notes, however refined a ποιητὴς λόγων one might be who attains mastery

3.6　ῥαψῳδέω in Isokrates and Plato

Isokrates and Plato both use ῥαψῳδέω in a sense broader than the declamation of verses learned by rote.[85] Indeed, at *Panath.* 18[86] Isokrates lampoons some in the Lyceum—whom he calls sophists—who claimed to know everything and were quick to show themselves everywhere; in discussing (διαλέγοιντο) the poets, especially the poetry of Hesiod and Homer, they contributed nothing of their own but merely rhapsodized the poets' material (τὰ δ' ἐκείνων ῥαψῳδοῦντες) and called to mind (μνημονεύοντες)[87] the most sophisticated things others before them had said.[88] Though satirical in tone, we recognize the basic description of rhapsodes presented by Koller (1957) and defended above: itinerant, they not only declaim what are notionally Homer's (or another poet's) verses but expound them also as we, modern scholars, might have expected of a sophist. This proves, once again, that the boundary between rhapsode and sophist may not have been as clear then as it seems to us now. Note also that they were performing before an audience (perhaps small, but a real audience all the same), and that the sophists' ensuing criticism of Isokrates (§19) pertained to his view of poetry and its precise role in education.[89] Some believe that Isokrates reserves ῥαψῳδέω strictly for the verse (the ἔπη) and uses another verb for the exposition (here μνημονεύω, since, as the charge goes, it is rote learning). But without an immediate specific referent for the τά of τὰ ἐκείνων,[90] its generic

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of all that pertains to speech-making, only let him lack courage and he will not be able to utter a word before a crowd. The obvious implication of this statement is that the ποιητὴς λόγων is not merely a writer, but also a speaker (as Norlin's *LCL* translation renders it; Mathieu's *Budé*, in turn, offers "un inventeur de discours").

[85]The sense offered by LSJ *s.v.* for *Phaidros* 277e, 'to repeat by heart or rote', is much too narrow; and restricting it to 'reciting poems' in Isok. *Panath.* 18 and 33, though true, is misleading if we do not observe its contextual tie to 'exposition'.

[86]Isok. *Panath.* 18: ἀπαντήσαντες γάρ τινές μοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔλεγον ὡς ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ συγκαθεζόμενοι τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρες τῶν ἀγελαίων σοφιστῶν καὶ πάντα φασκόντων εἰδέναι καὶ ταχέως πανταχοῦ γιγνομένων διαλέγοιντο περί τε τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς Ὁμήρου ποιήσεως, οὐδὲν μὲν παρ' αὑτῶν λέγοντες, τὰ δ' ἐκείνων ῥαψῳδοῦντες καὶ τῶν πρότερον ἄλλοις τισὶν εἰρημένων τὰ χαριέστατα μνημονεύοντες.

[87]'Repeating by rote' or 'from memory' (so Norlin in the *LCL*) is too tendentious a translation for a verb that simply means 'to call to mind, mention, say' (cf. Lykourgos' *Against Leokrates* §110.1). Presumably, such a marked gloss (for which there is not support in the LSJ) attempts to read into the text a preconceived view of the activity these sophists are engaging in.

[88]Cf. Nagy (1996b) 122–24.

[89]This may have been *en nuce* the bone of contention between rhapsodes and those whom *we* call sophists.

[90]ἔπη, e.g., is not found in the context, and although ποίησις is, it appears as the object of διαλέγεσθαι περί; i.e., as a subject of discussion, not of declamation.

character encourages us to think of the expository part as one piece with their rhap-
sodizing. And indeed, whatever else we may say, the entire episode is summarized
by διαλέγοιντο, which unites under one conceptual label of verbal exchange both the
poetry itself and its exposition.[91] This episode is anomalous only to this extent: that
the performance dynamics were such that the outcome was a conversation of sorts
(rather than a declaimed monologue or a series of them); and though the interlocu-
tors are clearly in basic agreement, the dialogue may well have had a competitive
dimension (each one trying to outdo the others): in a more formal competitive set-
ting, a sequence of rhapsodes taking to the βῆμα in succession would answer to such
emulous repartee. At *Panath.* 33,[92] looking back on the same event, Isokrates now
substitutes μνημονεύοντες by ληροῦντας περὶ αὐτῶν, disparaging as sheer prate the
exposition of these sophists (just as was done so often to rhapsodes).[93] But in this
passage, too, when Isokrates writes of silencing them, he does not merely say "I think
I could silence those who prattle about them",[94] but "those who rhapsodize their
things (τἀκείνων) and prattle about them," thus, in effect, witnessing once more to
the unity of declamation and commentary.

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[91]I am not denying that the sophists also declaimed poetry. My point is only that ῥαψῳδέω *by
itself* (without the aid of μνημονεύω) would have sufficed to denote the interspersing of declamation
and commentary that was characteristic of the rhapsode. The clause with μνημονεύω tells us about
the caliber and authorship of the comments, but, as the structure of the passage makes clear, the
presence of interpretation does not hinge on it. Indeed, the main verb, διαλέγοιντο, is qualified by
a participial μὲν . . . δὲ opposition: on the μέν hangs 'saying nothing of their own'; the δέ, in turn,
subdivides into 'rhapsodizing' and 'mentioning'. If 'rhapsodize' referred strictly to the declamation
of ἔπη, it would be an unnecessary intrusion into the logic of the passage; for it would have been
sufficient to say that "they were talking about the poetry of Homer and Hesiod, saying nothing they
could claim as their own, but merely mentioning the finest thoughts others before had said about
them." On this assumption, 'rhapsodizing their poetry' would clearly go beyond 'they were talking
about their poetry', and would hang limp as a curious addition to the opposition 'not their own
thoughts' but 'what others had said'. If, however, 'to rhapsodize' means 'to treat in the manner of a
rhapsode', and rhapsodes, as a rule, *both* declaimed poetry *and* commented on it; and if rhapsodes
were infamous for their intellectual mediocrity and lack of original thinking (and they arguably
were)—then it would have made sense to note, in a show of contempt, that they were "saying
nothing they could claim to be their own original thinking, but merely treating the poets' material
with the same mediocrity rhapsodes are wont to, compensating for this deficiency with the most
sophisticated commentary of earlier thinkers." Then ῥαψῳδέω does not hang limp as a superfluous
detail, but becomes central to the criticism Isokrates levels against the sophists.

[92]Isok. *Panath.* 33: περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πεπαιδευμένων τυγχάνω ταῦτα γιγνώσκων. περὶ δὲ τῆς Ὁμήρου
καὶ τῆς Ἡσιόδου καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ποιήσεως ἐπιθυμῶ μὲν εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν παῦσαι τοὺς ἐν τῷ
Λυκείῳ ῥαψῳδοῦντας τἀκείνων καὶ ληροῦντας περὶ αὐτῶν.

[93]Cf. the *Suidas s.v.* ῥαψῳδοί: ῥαψῳδῆσαι δέ ἐστι τὸ φλυαρῆσαι; *s.v.* καταρραψῳδήσει: φλυαρήσει;
and *s.v.* εἰκῆ ῥαψῳδεῖ: ἀντὶ τοῦ φλυαρεῖ.

[94]It is not clear whether the αὐτῶν is neuter or masculine plural, and thus whether it refers to the
τά of τἀκείνων or the ἐκεῖνοι or both.

Plato's *Phaidros* 277e is another passage that connects ῥαψῳδέω not narrowly with some notion of stage acting, but with delivery broadly defined. Hence, it also supports my preferred understanding of Alkidamas' ὑποκρίσει καὶ ῥαψῳδίᾳ as 'rhapsodic *hypokrisis*', and, by implication, the reading of the *Ion* presented above.[95] Here, Plato denies written speeches (ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ) serious consideration: hence γραφῆναι οὐδὲ λεχθῆναι cannot represent *two* alternatives. It is the fixity of writing that is at issue, its inflexibility that makes it unsuitable to dialogue: hence we need *both* γραφῆναι *and* λεχθῆναι. To illustrate the point, Sokrates mentions 'rhapsodized speeches' (οἱ ῥαψῳδούμενοι [sc. λόγοι]), which are spoken (ἐλέχθησαν)[96] without questioning (ἀνάκρισις) or teaching (διδαχή).[97] Once again, ῥαψῳδούμενοι is best construed not as the declamation of poetry, but as a particular style of lecturing, largely based—and this is crucial—on the oral delivery of scripted material, which does not submit to the interrogation of the ἔλεγχος.[98] And even if he did entertain a question, a speaker so trained would probably lack the intellectual nimbleness to meet the καιρός; he may hold the promise of teaching, but it is a vacuous pledge that goes unfulfilled. Note, finally, that the addresses in view may be verse or prose: though we may be inclined to take these as alternatives, we might also ponder that the original rhapsodic exposition of Homer may have combined verses of notionally Homeric authorship with verse and prose embellishment and exposition: in short, under my proposal, 'rhapsodized speeches' will have fully fitted the scenario

[95] *Phaidros* 277e5–278a1: ὁ δέ γε ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγραμμένῳ λόγῳ περὶ ἑκάστου παιδιάν τε ἡγούμενος πολλὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ οὐδένα πώποτε λόγον ἐν μέτρῳ οὐδ' ἄνευ μέτρου μεγάλης ἄξιον σπουδῆς γραφῆναι οὐδὲ λεχθῆναι, ὡς οἱ ῥαψῳδούμενοι ἄνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς πειθοῦς ἕνεκα ἐλέχθησαν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι αὐτῶν τοὺς βελτίστους εἰδότων ὑπόμνησιν γεγονέναι. I am following the punctuation of Moreschini's *Budé* text, placing (with Stallbaum, 1857b) after λεχθῆναι the comma that Burnet (in the *OCT*) had put after γραφῆναι. Read on for my rationale.

[96] An aorist of description. Cf. Smyth §1932.

[97] Heitsch (1993) 64–65 translates, correctly, "ohne die Möglichkeit von Einrede und Erläuterung." Some take ἀνάκρισις as 'preliminary investigation' *vel sim*. But this misses Plato's point that the give-and-take of true conversation cannot happen when the text is already fixed. (Fixity, of course, is relative, allowing for multiple gradations. But, for Plato, shades of gray would only spoil his black and white analysis, and so γραφῆναι should be read as an accurate description of the dominant tendency.) In this case the semantic component 'preliminary' is beside the point (LSJ correctly, *contra* the *DGE s.v.* ἀνάκρισις), for it is the probing of divergent points of view by careful questioning (the basic meaning of ἀνακρίνω) that matters. In other words, ἀνάκρισις amounts to the Sokratic ἔλεγχος by another name, and διδαχή is the learning netted by the investigation. Cf. Heitsch (1993) 210n481. For more on the Athenian ἀνάκρισις see Todd (1993) 126–27.

[98] A similar criticism can be found in Plato's *Gorgias* 448d1–10, now laid against sophistic rhetoric, which falls short of the give-and-take of which the much more interactive and responsive Sokratic method is capable. This is perhaps why Gorgias' willingness to take questions as part of his display is noted as remarkable (*Gorgias* 447c5–8).

presented by Sokrates.[99] Moreover, though one might construe 'for the sake of conviction' (πειθοῦς ἕνεκα) in reference to the powerful emotions rhapsodes were able to instigate in their audience, the sentiment is most at home where a speech makes an argument and endeavors to sustain it, as rhapsodic interpretation—however deficient in Sokrates' eyes—surely did.

In the final analysis, Alkidamas' criticism of writing strikes us as the swan song of a fast vanishing practice, a swimming against the current where the direction of its flow, though the volume be small at first, has shifted irreversibly. Noting the paradox of his writing against writing (§29), he is forced to offer a justification of the written speech. And it is particularly telling that, faced with proving his excellence to those who are not acquainted with his work, he prefers offering a sample of his writing over making a demonstration of his improvisatory prowess, lest his audience, accustomed to the finish of the written piece, should judge him inferior to others who have made scripted delivery the centerpiece of their art (§31). The same competitive pressure, one can only assume, must have been felt by the Athenian rhapsodes: an uneven field that pitted the finish and flourish of a rehearsed script against the older skill of improvisatory recomposition in the hands of lesser practitioners. Truly gifted traditional bards must have dazzled audiences with their singing and would have had little to fear from those who tried to make up with memory and script what they lacked in creative mastery. This must have been a matter of gradation, with performers falling at various points along a continuum, not the often cited, but simplistic opposition between "creative singers" and "reproducing rhapsodes." But as soon as the festival rules, whether intentionally or not, accommodated scripted performances, writing conferred a clear competitive advantage to the majority of rhapsodes whose talent, as is always true in any profession, did not approach either extreme. This shift in practice is of a sort that tends to build on itself and is hard to reverse. Once

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[99]Stallbaum (1857b) ad loc. translates the passage thus: "qui vero in scripto de quacunque re sermone necessario multum lusum inesse arbitratur, nec unquam ullum sermonem versibus vel sine versibus multo dignum studio scriptum putat aut dictum esse, sicuti ῥαψῳδούμενοι illi sermones nulla adhibita disquisitione et explicatione persuadendi causa recitari consueverunt." And he adds the following note: "In his verba: ὡς οἱ ῥαψῳδούμενοι — ἐλέχθησαν, nescio cur interpretibus tam multum negotii creaverint. Continent enim explicationem praecedentis οὐδὲ λεχθῆναι. Nam quum Socrates negavisset ullam unquam orationem magno dignam studio scriptam aut dictam esse, alterum hoc accuratius erat explicandum. Monet igitur hoc de iis tantum valere orationibus, quae sine accurata rerum pervestigatione recitarentur eo tantum consilio, ut efficeretur aliqua persuasio. Quod nemo est quin videat de orationibus sophisticis et forensibus esse accipiendum." I would only take issue with the aut between scriptam and dictam, for οὐδέ here is the negative of καί, not ἤ: Sokrates does not worry so much about written speeches as about orally delivered speeches that, by adhering to a script, supplant the true give-and-take of dialog.

it began, it must have taken over and displaced most of the rhapsodes unwilling to commit themselves fully to it.

3.7   The Reforms of Lykourgos

The convergence between rhapsodes and actors was in evidence toward the end of the fourth century BC. Just as rhapsodes were relying increasingly on scripted rehearsal and memorized performance—with a drastically reduced extemporaneous creativity and textual variation between successive performances and competing performers—so also at the revival of the old plays actors often felt free to modify their scripts so as to give greater scope to a show of histrionic ability. It is possible that now and then a line spoken on the stage to great dramatic effect occurred to the actor on the spot and was then added to the script for future reuse. Other changes must have been planned and rehearsed in advance. This source of textual instability (if I may call it thus) was of a different order than the extempore recomposition of the traditional rhapsode. But, to the degree that the latter used transcripts, the parallel between the bard and the actor was a similar attitude towards the written word as guiding, but ultimately not constraining, the future performance. Scripted recitals must have left behind numerous written copies of portions of the Homeric poems that would in turn resurface in various social settings (schools, symposia, public speeches, and so on) and may have seen their impact augmented by copies for private use and Athens' book trade. At the same time, the expectation of textual fixity and the desirability of a comprehensive canonical version that reflected the most successful recitals (in sum, 'Homer's original') must have encouraged a regulation of festival performances that would be all the easier to conform to and enforce, insofar as one could readily control the standard selected for rehearsal and memorization and judge the delivery against an authoritative script.

Between the battle of Khaironeia and the Lamian war Athenian public life was dominated by Lykourgos, a statesman whose cultural policy not only reflected the convergence between the dramatic and rhapsodic professions but may even be said to have hastened it. This period, so aptly called "Lykourgan Athens" by Mitchel (1973), was characterized by Lykourgos' drive to recover the splendor of Periklean Athens in what must have been the self-conscious emulation of that golden era of imperial glory. An ambitious public building program, the reinvigoration of local cults, the

spirited public defense of old-time Marathonian morality,[100] the establishment of new festivals, the reorganization of old ones—all these classisizing endeavors with a view to crowning as normative the accomplishments of the past brought in a silver age of peace and prosperity that left its mark on the Athens of Hellenistic times. To all this Lykourgos added a keen interest in drama and epic poetry on account of their didactic potential,[101] especially the models of virtue they held out for imitation and their power to shape for the better the character and behavior of his fellow citizens. It is no coincidence, then, that his famous statement about Homeric performance in *Against Leokrates* follows a long citation from Euripides' *Erekhtheus* that casts Praxithea as a paragon of sacrificial love for the city.[102] Then comes the one and only explicit testimony to the exclusivity of Homeric performance at the greater Panathenaia:

βούλομαι δ' ὑμῖν καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον παρασχέσθαι ἐπαινῶν.[103] οὕτω γὰρ ὑπέλαβον ὑμῶν οἱ πατέρες σπουδαῖον εἶναι ποιητήν, ὥστε νόμον ἔθεντο καθ' ἑκάστην πεντετηρίδα τῶν Παναθηναίων μόνου τῶν ἄλλων ποιητῶν ῥαψῳδεῖσθαι τὰ ἔπη, ἐπίδειξιν ποιούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ὅτι τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἔργων προῃροῦντο. εἰκότως· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νόμοι διὰ τὴν συντομίαν οὐ διδάσκουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττουσιν ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἔργων ἐκλεξάμενοι, μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἀποδείξεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους συμπείθουσιν.

Unfortunately, this famous passage does not make clear whether there were no μου-σικοὶ ἀγῶνες at the lesser Panathenaia—or at least no rhapsodic competition[104]—or else, as some argue (e.g. Frei, 1900, 63–64), rhapsodes did compete but they were free to declaim other poetry (Hesiod, Arkhilokhos, etc.).[105] It is hard for me to imagine that the lesser Panathenaia could have been devoid of poetic declamation, but one

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[100]*Leok.* 104 illustrates this commonplace of Athenian public discourse.

[101]See above, p. 159.

[102]In the light of Aristophanes' *Frogs*, it is ironic indeed that Euripides would here be extolled as inculcator of civic virtue.

[103]For my restoration of the ms. reading over against Conomis' text, see above, n. 49.

[104]That rhapsodes could be singled out from among the other competitors of μουσικοὶ ἀγῶνες is implicit at *Ion* 530a5-7, where to Sokrates' incredulous question whether the locals have established a competition for rhapsodes at the Asklepieia of Epidauros Ion responds, "Yes indeed, and of the rest of μουσική too."

[105]*Ion* 531a1 hints that Hesiod and Arkhilokhos belonged in the rhapsode's repertoire at least by the time of Sokrates (cf. also 530b8-9). Athenaios 620c, citing Khamaileon's *On Stesikhoros*, seems to confirm Sokrates' statement, adding Mimnermos and Phokylides, though the verb used is μελῳδηθῆναι, found at Aristophanes' *Birds* 1381 in connection with Kinesias', at *Thesm.* 99 with Agathon's, lyrics. Dunbar (1995) 208, *ad Birds* 226, suggests that "a wider meaning of 'sing/recite to instrumental accompaniment', not limited to lyric metre, seems possible here, as in the statement of Aristotle's pupil Chamaileon cited by Athenaios (620c), were μελῳδηθῆναι is

cannot entirely rule out that at one time or another of its long history there may not have been *official* contests. We face here the additional difficulty that the point of view is that of the 330s BC, and although Lykourgos emphasizes that it was the forefathers (οἱ πατέρες) who had passed a law (νόμον ἔθεντο) to the effect that Homer alone be declaimed at the greater Panathenaia—laws that ever since the great period of codification at the turn of the previous century must have provided reliable archival testimony about the past[106]—some degree of uncertainty always remains as to how far back we can project that state of affairs. And we cannot even be sure that this poetic exclusivity was still in force at the time of Lykourgos (he might be speaking only of past history for its exemplary value, regardless of the situation current at the time of the speech). But if it is true indeed that the great statesman established a canonical version of the great tragedians and made the performances of their plays conform to that canonical text, we can safely guess that, had the practice of exclusive declamation of Homer at the greater Panathenaia lapsed before his ascendancy to power, he would have moved its readoption. Although I have called *Against Leokrates* 102 the only remaining explicit statement of the exclusive declamation of Homer at the greater Panathenaia, I should add that the so-called succession rule of Diogenes Laertios 1.57 and [Plato] *Hipparkhos* 228b8–c1[107] also attest indirectly to it; for if a succeeding rhapsode was to take up wherever the previous had left off, should any of them declaim the poetry of Homer it is hard to imagine under what conditions the rest could fail to perform more of the same. Thus, if there were other authors included in the repertoire, clearly they must have had their own particular competitive events.

Lykourgos was not only concerned with the exaltation of Homeric poetry as ennobling. He was also instrumental in the construction of the Panathenaic stadium and its θέατρον,[108] and responsible for a financial re-organization of the smaller Pana-

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used of performing . . . presumably with lyre accompaniment." In the same passage Athenaios also reports that a certain rhapsode by the name of Mnasion used to act (ὑποκρίνεσθαι) some of Simonides' iambs, and a Kleomenes would rhapsodize (ἐραψῴδησεν) the *Purifications* of Empedokles at Olympia. [The 'Simonides' of the iambs may be Semonides of Amorgos (West, 1981b, 125 with Nagy, 1990c, 26n46 approving). On the confusion between Simonides of Keos and Semonides of Amorgos see, e.g., Hubbard, 2001, 227.] We will have occasion to return to this text below.

[106]On the reorganization of the Athenian law code between 410–399 BC and the founding of the Metroon, see Sickinger (1999) 93–113 and the other studies cited there.

[107]Note the ὥσπερ νῦν ἔτι οἴδε ποιοῦσιν (228b9–c1), which brings the practice down at least to the dramatic date of the dialog if not to the times of the pseudonymous author.

[108]See [Plu.] *X orat.* 841d and the decree at 852c, to which the fragmentary *IG* II² 457 is a witness. Deinias of Erkhia (*APF* 3163) donated the land for the construction (*X orat.* 841d) and Eudemos of Plataia the teams of oxen for the leveling of the ground (cf. *IG* II² 351 and Schwenk, 1985 no. 48).

thenaia that secured an adequate level of public display[109] and a proper supply of oxen for the sacrifice.[110] When we add to this his comprehensive concern for Athenian festivals (including the Dionysia and the new Amphiaraia),[111] one cannot rule out, even if lacking explicit testimony to this effect, that he may have undertaken the regulation of rhapsodic performances at the Panathenaia. Perhaps, as noted above, if the exclusive rhapsodizing of Homer had lapsed before his time, he might have brought it back and enforced it. And if we can trust the tradition that he had standard editions of the three canonical tragedians compiled and that he made sure that stage performance did not diverge from the official text, we might well assume a similar tendency to standardize in some way the text of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, at least by depositing into the archives of Athens written copies of them, if this had not already been done before.[112]

As just noted, Lykourgos' concern was not limited to the excellence of Homer, but also embraced the Dionysia and its dramatic performances (both tragedy and comedy). Once again, the scope of his reforms was comprehensive: he finished the Theater of Dionysos, only half-done when he took up the project,[113] building in stone what until then most likely had been simple earthen embankments and wooden bleachers;[114] he revived the contest for comic actors, to be held in the theater at the Χύτροι, making the victor eligible to participate at the City Dionysia (which was not allowed before),[115] thus taking up an *agōn* that had fallen out of use (841f);

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[109]αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χρήματα πολλὰ συνήγαγεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ παρασκευάσας τῇ θεῷ κόσμον, Νίκας τε ὁλοχρύσους πομπεῖά τε χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ καὶ κόσμον χρυσοῦν εἰς ἑκατὸν κανηφόρους (*X orat.* 852b).

[110]See *IG* II² 334, conveniently discussed by Schwenk (1985) no. 17 and, most recently, by Rosivach (1991). On the interpretation of the disputed νέα see also Langdon (1987) 55–57.

[111]For this new quadrennial festival which, as one of ten *epimeletai*, he established in 329/8 BC, see Schwenk (1985) no. 50, Knoepfler (1993), and Tracy (1995) 92.

[112]As seems likely from court proceedings in the Attic orators, who often had the clerk read various passage of Homer. The procedure, however, remains elusive, and it is possible that plaintiff or defendant may have given the clerk, in advance of the proceedings, written copies of what he was to read. This might have been the case even with laws or decrees. The record that survives in forensic speeches shows consultation of public *stelai* and visits to the Metroon (cf. Sickinger, 1999, 160–70 and the texts cited there). But regardless of the specifics of the procedure, one must assume that effort would be expended by court officials to make sure that what the *grammateus* read to the jury accurately reflected the alleged sources.

[113]ἡμίεργα παραλαβὼν . . . τὸ θέατρον τὸ Διονυσιακὸν ἐξειργάσατο (*X orat.* 852c).

[114]Cf. Pickard-Cambridge (1946) 134–74.

[115]καὶ τὸν νικήσαντα εἰς ἄστυ καταλέγεσθαι, πρότερον οὐκ ἐξόν, where εἰς ἄστυ refers to the Διονύσια τὰ ἐν ἄστει—also Διονύσια τὰ ἀστικά, Διονύσια τὰ μεγάλα, or simply Διονύσια, as opposed to τὰ κατ' ἀγροὺς Διονύσια—an expression that gives rise to others such as ἐν ἄστει διδάσκειν or εἰς ἄστυ

he honored the three great tragedians with bronze statues (841f); and, most significantly for our present study, he had state officials write down a standard edition of their tragedies, which were publicly kept and enforced on the acting cast at the time of performance: τὰς τραγῳδίας αὐτῶν ἐν κοινῷ γραψαμένους φυλάττειν καὶ τὸν τῆς πόλεως γραμματέα παραναγινώσκειν τοῖς ὑποκρινομένοις· οὐκ ἐξεῖναι γὰρ ⟨παρ'⟩ αὐτὰς ὑποκρίνεσθαι (841f). As Sickinger (1999) 134–35 writes, ἐν κοινῷ is unlikely to denote the place of storage (as, e.g., ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ sometimes referred to the Metroon), for we would then expect the use of the article. But even ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ could denote at times more broadly 'in the public domain',[116] and glossing ἐν κοινῷ along these lines as 'publicly' would adequately express the contrast between the textual transmission, until then largely in private hands, and the state tutelage and patronage that would now apply. Some seize on this insight to suggest that Lykourgos was not concerned with actors so much as with the deterioration of the *paradosis* if left to private hands.[117] But, if we are to believe this conjecture, how should we imagine that the citizens of Athens became collectively aware of this alleged deleterious transmission and were persuaded to support remedial legislation, unless in fact such privately held texts had been used for public performance? We are thus cast back on the inescapable fact that it was to actors that the law bore primary relation. The secretary of the city was to 'read [the tragedies] along to the actors' (παραναγινώσκειν)[118] to secure a performance faithful to the script.[119] This testimony by [Plutarch] derives support from Galen, who reports that Ptolemy III Euergetes had used a ruse to acquire the official Athenian scripts of the three tragedians.[120] It is

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καθιέναι (cf. Pickard-Cambridge, 1988, 57n1). For the interpretation of this clause see O'Connor (1908) 54–55 and Pickard-Cambridge (1988) 15

[116]With the generic article; cf. Sickinger (1999) 100.

[117]Cf. Garzya (1980) 5.

[118]The παρα- conveys the idea of juxtaposition for the purpose of comparison. In the case of written sources it would apply to collation (cf. LSJ *s.v.*). Here, in turn, the idea is that the speaking actors are compared to the reading secretary, though the specific procedure remains elusive.

[119]For the interpretation of this passage see Nagy (1996b) 174–75, who observes that the conjectured ⟨παρ'⟩ is unnecessary, for γάρ, by itself, can mean 'for otherwise' (175n80, with a reference to Denniston, 1950, 62–63). I accept this suggestion as probable and satisfactory, but we cannot entirely dismiss Bergk's (1884) 71n247 emendation, which makes very good sense and is easy to defend on paleographic grounds: τοῖς δ' ὑποκρινομένοις οὐκ ἐξεῖναι παρ' αὐτὰ ὑποκρίνεσθαι, where παρ' αὐτά means extempore (cf. Hesykhios α 8467, *s.v.* αὐτοσχεδιάζει). But this emendation would make the clause strictly a comment that does not draw on the text of the law, and I prefer to see it as reflecting an explicit prohibition by the assembly (see below).

[120]Galen's *Comm. in Hipp. Epidem.* III, 17a607 Kühn (*CMG* 5.10.2.1): ὅτι δ' οὕτως ἐσπούδαζε περὶ τὴν ⟨ἁπάντων⟩ τῶν παλαιῶν βιβλίων κτῆσιν ὁ ⟨Πτολεμαῖος⟩ ἐκεῖνος, οὐ μικρὸν εἶναι μαρτύριόν

well to be somewhat sceptical of the anecdote's veracity. After all, as far as Hellenic cultural history was concerned, Alexandria portrayed itself as the natural heir to the city of Athens. This meant not only attracting and retaining a distinguished immigrant intelligentsia from the Ptolemaic possessions and beyond,[121] and designing a robust festival calendar of competitive events that would give expression to the royal patronage of the arts and sciences;[122] it also called for a vigorous reappropriation of the past in the tradition of peripatetic scholarship, i.e. based on the study of sources and public lectures, activities that centered around the Library and the Mouseion.[123] Against this intellectual background, it is only natural that the Ptolemies, in open competition with Attalid Pergamum, would emphasize the acquisition of texts, the preeminent cultural artifacts, as a key to cultural supremacy. Ownership of the iconic state scripts would have been a powerful index of the unique authority of Alexandria's dramatic performance as Athens' heir, of the prestige of the royal patron, his Library, and the scholars resident at the Mouseion. Thus, we cannot be entirely sure that a story so obviously favorable to the Ptolemies might not be self-interested, false propaganda. But the singling out of Aiskhylos', Sophokles', and Euripides' works would be hard to understand unless there was some reason to expect that of their works alone did Athens have an official, uniquely authoritative script: no similar story survives about Homeric or Hesiodic epic, Aristophanic comedy, etc.[124] This leads me to conclude that, whether the anecdote actually happened or not, there must have been a widely circulating report of the existence of a standard edition of the three tragedians, precisely what the *Lives of the Ten Orators* 841f tells us Lykourgos did with the

φαϲιν ὃ πρὸϲ ⟨Ἀθηναίουϲ⟩ ἔπραξεν. δοὺϲ γὰρ αὐτοῖϲ ἐνέχυρα πεντεκαίδεκα τάλαντ' ἀργυρίου καὶ λαβὼν τὰ ⟨Coφοκλέουϲ⟩ καὶ ⟨Εὐριπίδου⟩ καὶ ⟨Αἰϲχύλου⟩ βιβλία χάριν τοῦ γράψαι μόνον ἐξ αὐτῶν, εἶτ' εὐθέωϲ ἀποδοῦναι cῶα, καταϲκευάϲαϲ πολυτελῶϲ ἐν χάρταιϲ καλλίϲτοιϲ, ἃ μὲν ἔλαβε παρ' ⟨Ἀθηναίων⟩ κατέϲχεν, ἃ δ' αὐτὸϲ κατεϲκεύαϲεν ἔπεμψεν αὐτοῖϲ παρακαλῶν ⟨κατα⟩ϲχεῖν τε τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα τάλαντα καὶ λαβεῖν ἀνθ' ὧν ἔδοϲαν βιβλίων παλαιῶν τὰ καινά. τοῖϲ μὲν οὖν ⟨Ἀθηναίοιϲ⟩, εἰ καὶ μὴ καινὰϲ ἐπεπόμφει βίβλουϲ, ἀλλὰ κατεϲχήκει τὰϲ παλαιάϲ, οὐδὲν ἐνῆν ἄλλο ποιεῖν, εἰληφόϲι γε τὸ ἀργύριον ἐπὶ ϲυνθήκαιϲ τοιαύταιϲ, ὡϲ αὐτοὺϲ ⟨αὐτὸ⟩ καταϲχεῖν, εἰ κἀκεῖνοϲ κατάϲχοι τὰ βιβλία, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἔλαβόν τε τὰ καινὰ καὶ κατέϲχον καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον.

[121]Cf. Fraser (1972) 1.305–12, esp. 1.306–8.

[122]Unfortunately, we are not as well informed about the Alexandrian festivals as we might wish, but enough remains to point to increasing opportunities for competitive display, including poetry, both in Alexandria and in other Egyptian centers. See Fraser (1972) 1.230–33 for the isolympic Ptolemaieia, the Arsinoeia, and the Soteria. See also *ibid.* 3.37 *s.v.* 'festivals'.

[123]For the Mouseion as an institution founded on the peripatetic model of the Athenian Lyceum see Fraser (1972) 1.315–18; for the library, *ibid.* 1.320 (with n. 100 on Aristotle's own collection).

[124]This implies that, if Metroon copies of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* existed, as we suggested above, they must not have been as emblematic and influential for the regulation of Homeric performance as the tragic scripts were for the Athenian stage.

most important works of fifth-century BC drama. Recently Bollack (1994) has subjected this passage to a probing analysis. Reviewing the history of interpretation, he concludes that the variously emended οὐκ ἐξεῖναι γὰρ αὐτὰς ὑποκρίνεσθαι points not to a prohibition of performance that might deviate from the officially commissioned text—which casts actors as destabilizing textual forces—but rather to an open recognition of the importance of public performance: without the activity described by the previous clause as τὸν τῆς πόλεως γραμματέα παραναγινώσκειν τοῖς ὑποκρινομένοις, the texts drawn up might have lacked information essential to performance (musical notation, marks apportioning the lines to the various characters, etc.). In other words, the *grammateus* would have contrasted his text with the ones used by actors with a view to including theatrical cues and textual aids to performance. This is an interesting suggestion, but in the final analysis I find it unconvincing. It does not improve upon the above translation of the emended clause, for he too must read it as "for *otherwise* (sinon) they could not perform them" (my emphasis).[125] The question remains why it was not *otherwise* possible to perform them. Ultimately, one cannot be dogmatic about the meaning, but several details, I believe, support the modern consensus. One is the verb παραναγιγνώσκειν, whose usage points to reading something aloud with the aim of comparing it to something else.[126] In forensic contexts, the *grammateus* simply reads aloud, without making corrections or modifications to the substance of his text. In later usage, it may denote an editor who reads carefully against other sources and when he finds discrepancies enters corrections;[127] but if there is truth to the account, in its fourth-century BC setting one must conceive of the procedure along the established lines of forensic practice.[128] And for this, exam-

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[125]Bollack (1994) 13: " . . . et que le scribe de la cité compare le texte avec les acteurs : il ne serait pas possible, sinon, de les jouer sur scène."

[126]The comparison is sometimes tacit, as in Plato's *Theaitetos* 172e4: the opponent at law reads aloud the ὑπογραφή, which is implicitly compared to the wider scope the speaker may wish to give to his presentation, thus effectively limiting what is admissible.

[127]Such are the late examples in Cameron (1990), which he glosses as 'check' or 'revise', "so long as a caveat is added. There does not seem to be a single text [surveyed] that suggests revision in the sense of addition or expansion. . . . [I]t would be a perfectly satisfactory word to characterize the careful reading and checking that went to produce the sort of editions here under discussion. It corresponds to the primary meaning of the Latin *recognoscere*, 'to examine, check (a document), in order to establish authenticity, accuracy, etc.'" (p. 125). It must be emphasized, however, that in the earlier (classical) usage, the grammatical subject of παραναγιγνώσκω does not modify the text he is reading, although the goal of the exercise is a contrast often with a view to correcting some excess or transgression. In other words, though many times establishing the comparison or proving the discrepancy is the sole goal, if a correction takes place, it is not the text read as *comparandum* that is changed, but whatever else it is contrasted with.

[128]I am assuming that παραναγιγνώσκειν is the diction of the source to the *Lives of the Ten Orators*,

ples such as Demosthenes' *On the Crown* 267, or Aiskhines' *Against Ktesiphon* 201 and *On the Embassy* 135 must be of primary significance.[129] This tells against Bollack's interpretation that the *grammateus* would have annotated the state script with histrionic cues. Depending on whether we follow early or late usage, the dative τοῖς ὑποκρινομένοις might mean 'to read aloud and compare with [the lines spoken by] those acting the plays' or simply 'to read aloud in the presence of those acting the plays'.[130] Though we cannot put much weight on this, the use of the participle (as opposed τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς) might indicate that the action of the secretary takes place as rehearsal is in progress. One could envision a sort of dialogue between him and the acting staff at particular points in the performance, whenever the *grammateus* might detect a divergence or the actors might need prompting from the official script. Those who prefer a less directive process may follow Cameron (1990) 124, who writes that the secretary might have read out the text in advance to allow actors to correct their own copies against it.[131] To me, the most persuasive reconstruction takes into account Arnott's (1967) suggestive study on the use of prompting in classical drama. Arnott built on an "excursus on the prompter" by Page (1934) 98–100, who noted the astonishing absence in sources earlier than the first century AD of any figure that might suggest a prompter. The first occurrence is the word ὑποβολεύς in Philo of Alexandria.[132] But, as Arnott (1967) 45 correctly observes, the *loci* adduced by Page

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and that it is therefore to be read according to late-classical usage.

[129]Dem. *On the Crown* 267: φέρε δὴ καὶ τὰς τῶν λῃτουργιῶν μαρτυρίας ὧν λελῃτούργηκα ὑμῖν ἀναγνῶ. παρ' ἃς παρανάγνωθι καὶ σύ μοι τὰς ῥήσεις ἃς ἐλυμαίνου. Aiskhin. *On the Embassy* 135: ἀκούετε, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν χρόνων παραναγιγνωσκομένων ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων γραμμάτων κτλ. And *Ktes.* 201: ὑπομνῆσατ' αὐτὸν [sc. Κτησιφῶντα] ἀθορύβως τὸ σανίδιον λαβεῖν καὶ τοὺς νόμους τῷ ψηφίσματι παραναγνῶναι. The examples in LSJ *s.v.* show that παραναγιγνώσκω can take the dative of the *comparandum*, and hence means 'to read (aloud) and compare with' (Isok. 12.17 [cf. 4.120], Galen *CMG* 5.4.1.2 pt. 2, book II 5.23); Polybios 2.12.4 proves that in later Greek (if not before) it might simply mean 'to read aloud in the presence of others', i.e. publicly, so as to inform an audience about the text of a document. For other instances, see Cameron (1990) 124, who observes that "[i]n many of these passages there is a clear implication that the text is being read publicly so that everyone can check what it says."

[130]Bollack (1994) 21 suggests the translation " '*face au* texte joué par les acteurs' si τοῖς ὑποκρινομένοις était pris pour un neutre." Though this might not seem at first impossible, LSJ *s.v.* does not include any examples of the passive and I cannot turn up any either. One should at least say that, on the point of usage, the odds that ὑποκρινομένοις is a middle are overwhelming. (Even the aor. pass. and pf. pass. came to be used as middles.) But in the event, as Bollack (1994) 21 notes, the meaning amounts to the same if one takes it, as most do, as a masc. pl. for 'those acting'.

[131]Anticipated by Garzya (1980) 4n6: "[S]i tratta di un'operazione di collazionamento orale (il cancelliere legge, gli attori confrontano con il propio il testo letto)."

[132]E.g. Philo *De migratione Abrahami* 80: καὶ ἐρεῖς πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ δώσεις τὰ ῥήματά μου εἰς τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ", ἴσον τῷ ὑπηχήσεις αὐτῷ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ἃ ῥημάτων καὶ λόγων ἀδιαφορεῖ θείων· ἄνευ

do not so much suggest one who reminds of what has been forgotten as one who teaches what to say: "it is an instructor, not a remembrancer." Aiskhines' *On the Embassy* 35 and the acoustics and design of the classical theater all but prove that there was, in fact, no prompter at the time of the performance. And the meaning of ὑποβολεύς, 'instructor', who, Plutarch teaches us,[133] was indeed involved in dramatic production, suggests his equivalence with the διδάσκαλος of classical times. This means that he would be responsible for training the acting staff by cuing them during rehearsal, reading out loud their lines for them to repeat after him and memorize in the process. Arnott's (1967) 44 description makes this scenario persuasive: "In the modern Greek and Italian theatres the prompter . . . is a vital factor in the rehearsal. Actors do not attempt to learn their parts beforehand. At the rehearsal the prompter sits in front of the cast with script in hand. A scene is then rehearsed by the prompter speaking several lines and indicating the actor who is to say them; the actor repeats after him, and so on through the scene. This method may sound incredibly slow and clumsy, but in fact it is remarkably efficient for actors who are trained to it." If this was the ancient practice, it explains the absence in our classical sources of any reference to the ὑποβολεύς: he was no other than the poet/producer of the play (who of course would have done more than simply cue his troupe); it also dispenses with the difficulty of supplying the cast (actors and chorus) each with his own copy of the play or at least the lines he was to memorize; and it readily explains the role of the Lykourgan city secretary: he was to act, in effect, as the textual *didaskalos* at the time of rehearsal, with the producer presumably taking care of all the other aspect of acting and production.[134] It is ultimately hard to imagine the mechanics of the procedure, but what the law envisions is clearly state control over the performance of the three great tragedians and the public elevation of their plays to the status of exemplary documents of foundational significance to Lykourgos' policies of cultural revival.[135] But whichever reconstruction one finds plausible, attention must be paid

γὰρ τοῦ ὑποβολέως οὐ φθέγξεται ὁ λόγος, ὑποβολεὺς δὲ λόγου νοῦς, ὡς νοῦ θεός. And Philo *De vita Mosis* 2.38: καθάπερ ἐνθουσιῶντες προεφήτευον οὐκ ἄλλα ἄλλοι, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ πάντες ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα, ὥσπερ ὑποβολέως ἑκάστοις ἀοράτως ἐνηχοῦντος.

[133]Plu. *Precepts of Statecraft* 813e10–f5.

[134]This explanation agrees with Rhodes's (1993) 604 notion about the 'secretary of the city' *ad Ath. Pol.* 54.5 (cf. Thouk. 7.10).

[135]Bollack's interesting proposal is also doubtful because it is not easy to see what might move a statesman like Lykourgos to be so self-conscious about the minutiae of performance that he would call for its inclusion in the state script. What we know from ancient papyri (cf. Turner, 1977, 7) suggests that the book trade annotated scrolls sparsely, mostly with παράγραφοι, if at all, especially in

to the syntactic structure of the report about Lykourgos' law, for it further illuminates the nature of its impact on actors. Bollack would have us believe that the clause οὐκ ἐξεῖναι is merely an editorial explanation of the charge to the secretary. An earlier comment (about the Χύτροι) is clearly demarcated as such by its form, an accusative absolute (πρότερον οὐκ ἐξόν). The ἐξεῖναι, however, is an epexegetic infinitive that depends on τὸν δὲ [νόμον], and it reports the law's content: the author of the *Lives*, it is true, has partially turned the text of the law into a comment, perhaps himself inserting γάρ and substituting οὐκ for what must have been an original μή.[136] In other words, the οὐκ ἐξεῖναι κτλ. reports an explicit prohibition in the Lykourgan law, not merely an explanatory aside to the effect that, without the *grammateus* reading the text to those acting and including the histrionic cues they provided, performances would not have been possible on the basis of the Lykourgan state script.[137]

The intervention of the Athenian state in the performance of drama is made plausible by testimonies about histrionic interpolations in the texts of the plays.[138] Thus, the epitome of Phrynikhos' *Praeparatio sophistica* (p. 69 de Borries) preserves the following comment on the comic line ἐπικαττύειν καὶ πτερνίζειν:[139] τὰ παλαιὰ ἐπισκευάζειν. ἡ μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τῶν τοῖς παλαιοῖς ὑποδήμασιν ἕτερα καττύματα καὶ πτέρνας προσραπτόντων. λέγουσι δ' ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν δραμάτων μεταποιούντων

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classical times (it is unknown what histrionic scripts might have looked like in comparison), and one can only envision Bollack's scenario after the ascendancy of philological studies in Hellenistic times (see Turner, 1968, 112–18 and Thompson, 1912, 60). At all events, for late-classical times, Aristotle's *Rh.* 1407b13–18 mentions punctuating (διαστίζω) Herakleitos' works, though it is not clear whether he is thinking of the scribe's writing or the reader's utterance. The εὐανάγνωστον of 1407b11 points to the latter (as Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 1910 128n9 and Kennedy, 1991, 233n73 think), but it is still possible that Aristotle is using the scribe's hardship as an index of the difficulty the reader faces. The use of διαστίζω for a 'punctuation' that consists in *verbal* phrasing must derive from epigraphical practice, though (as Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 1910, 128 notes) the epigraphic *interpunctiones* of the sixth century BC had all but disappeared by the philosopher's time (cf Woodhead, 1992, 28). Another sign mentioned by *Rh.* 1409a21 is the παραγραφή, which could be used to mark the end of a period (or, in dramatic texts, to indicate a change of speaker). Also witnessing to the use of signs at the beginning of paragraphs is Isok. *Antidosis* 59. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1910) 128 seems justified in saying that "in [büchern] ist dem leser fast nichts gegeben als die 'elemente', die buchstaben."

[136] Just as the following clause in *X orat.*: μηδενὶ ἐξεῖναι κτλ.

[137] Instances of ἐξεῖναι in Attic decrees are common.

[138] The best modern introduction is Hamilton (1974). Also read with profit is Page (1934), though frequently criticized as insufficiently mature and unfavorably compared with Jachmann (1982). See also Malzan (1908), Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1910), Vürtheim (1928) 231–48, Cantarella (1930), Reeve (1972) and (1973), and Garzya (1980). Falkner (2002), esp. 352–53, offers an interesting reevaluation of scholia that disparage actors and views histrionic interpolations as a struggle between the performer and the scholar for the control of the text.

[139] *PCG* VIII, fr. 599 = *Comica adespota* fr. 46 Kock

καὶ μεταρραπτούντων. To which Vürtheim (1928) 232 writes: "Die alten Dramen wurden wie Schuhe den modernen Füssen passend gemacht." That this was the case with comedies is generally accepted (so Kock and Bergk, 1884, 70n242). But I find no grounds to dismiss it, with Hamilton (1974) 400, as "the common practice of Roman *contaminatio*."[140] Note in particular the use of μεταρράπτω, which, at home with the cobbler, also draws on the metaphorical world of rhapsodic recomposition. Already in antiquity there were times when the scholar, on stylistic grounds, would condemn a verse or passage as not genuine. Thus, e.g., the second *hypothesis* to the *Rhesos* contains the following remark: καὶ ἐν ἐνίοις δὲ τῶν ἀντιγράφων ἕτερός τις φέρεται πρόλογος, πεζὸς πάνυ καὶ οὐ πρέπων Εὐριπίδῃ· καὶ τάχα ἄν τινες τῶν ὑποκριτῶν διεσκευακότες εἶεν αὐτόν. Such stylistically based comments offer no certain proof that any one particular passage is a histrionic interpolation, but the implication that actors *did* at times modify the authorial text is hard to dismiss, and this lends credence to [Plutarch's] report about Lykourgos and the consensus interpretation above. This is precisely what one would expect from the scattered comments in the literature about the social standing of actors. Two tendencies can be distinguished: the contempt of the learned man, to some degree shared as a stereotype by the populace, and the adulation lavished on the individual star. It is not hard to see how both contradictory impulses might coexist, if we only think of our own culture and the scorn and admiration heaped by turns on modern actors. Plato's strictures against dramatic mimesis for its corrupting potential are well known, but it might be thought exceptional and unrepresentative. Thus, more interesting are the comments by Aristotle and his circle, which likely reflect popular sentiment. The philosopher decries, e.g., that "in the contests actors are now more important than poets,"[141] a comment that can be read against the criticism of *Poetics* 26; contemptuous also is the popular designation Διονυσοκόλακες of the τεχνῖται of Dionysos, who include actors among its performers;[142] and the pseudonymous *Problems* poses the question why the artists of Dionysos are for the most part bad characters (πονηροί).[143] We

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[140]Quintilian's words *ad* 10.1.66, I agree, are confusing and offer little guidance. Cf. Cantarella (1930) 57–58.

[141]*Rh.* 1403b31–33: τὰ μὲν οὖν ἆθλα σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων οὗτοι λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖ μεῖζον δύνανται νῦν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὑποκριταί.

[142]*Rh.* 1405a23–25: καὶ ὁ μὲν διονυσοκόλακας, αὐτοὶ δ' αὑτοὺς τεχνίτας καλοῦσιν (ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω μεταφορά, ἡ μὲν ῥυπαινόντων ἡ δὲ τοὐναντίον).

[143]*Problems* 956b11–15: διὰ τί οἱ Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνῖται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πονηροί εἰσιν; ἢ ὅτι ἥκιστα λόγου σοφίας κοινωνοῦσι διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀναγκαίας τέχνας τὸ πολὺ μέρος τοῦ βίου εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι ἐν ἀκρασίαις τὸ πολὺ τοῦ βίου εἰσίν, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀπορίαις; ἀμφότερα δὲ φαυλότητος παρασκευαστικά.

also remember Demosthenes maligning Aiskhines on the grounds of his early stint as an actor (Dem. 18.262). The rise of the professional of the stage is a late fifth- and fourth-century BC phenomenon (cf. *Rh.* 1403b22–24 and Plato's *Laws* 817a–d), for which the institution of a competition for actors at the City Dionysia in 449 BC provides a convenient *terminus ante quem*. So, if there is truth to an anecdote told by Plutarch, it is significant that already in the times of the Spartan king Agesilaos II the actor Kallippides was famous and respected by all the Greeks.[144] That Aristophanes lampooned actors as readily as other well known citizens (*Frogs* 303, *Peace* 781–86) proves that, from very early on, some at least received much public recognition. We also note the involvement of actors in high-stakes international politics,[145] largely motivated by the delight of the Makedonian ruling dynasty in the performing arts.[146] It is understandable that performers might develop an exaggerated sense of their own importance, and in consequence sought to modify plays to give greater salience to their roles on stage. This was possible because, starting in the fourth century BC, old plays were revived at the Dionysia,[147] well after the author's passing, a fact that precluded authorial control. Thus, we should not be surprised to read in Aristotle's *Politics* that Theodoros would not allow 'cheap' actors to be brought on stage before him, "because the audience endears itself to what it hears first."[148] As Hamilton (1974) 401 says, the wording suggests that accommodating Theodoros forced modifications of the plays that went beyond "scenic effects."

3.8   Demetrios of Phaleron and the Rhapsodes

The next defining stage in the cultural history of Athens arrived in 317/6 BC with Kassander's installation of the pro-Makedonian Demetrios of Phaleron as governor of Athens, a position he held until the liberation of the city in 308/7 BC by Demetrios

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[144]Plu. *Ages.* 21.4: καί ποτε Καλλιππίδης ὁ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ὑποκριτής, ὄνομα καὶ δόξαν ἔχων ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ σπουδαζόμενος ὑπὸ πάντων, κτλ. Cf. Polyainos 6.10.1.

[145]See, e.g., the second hypothesis to Dem. 19 (§2), Dem. 19.315, or Dem. 5.6.

[146]E.g. Dem. 19.192; Plu. *Alex.* 10, 29, 72.1; and Khares *FGH* 125 F4 (*apud* Athenaios 538b–539a). A survey of the growing prominence of actors during the fourth century BC and of their involvement with the Makedonians can be found in Ghiron-Bistagne (1976) 154–63.

[147]*IG* II² 2318 records 386 and 338 BC as the respective dates for the first old tragedy and comedy.

[148]*Pol.* 1336b27–31: ἴσως γὰρ οὐ κακῶς ἔλεγε τὸ τοιοῦτον Θεόδωρος ὁ τῆς τραγῳδίας ὑποκριτής· οὐθενὶ γὰρ πώποτε παρῆκεν ἑαυτοῦ προεισάγειν, οὐδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν ὑποκριτῶν, ὡς οἰκειουμένων τῶν θεατῶν ταῖς πρώταις ἀκοαῖς.

Poliorketes.[149] His most important reform for our purposes is mentioned in passing by Athenaios 620b on the authority of the historian Aristokles (*FHG* IV, p. 331),[150] a passage that examines the contribution of rhapsodes to symposia. We quote it in full:[151]

οὐκ ἀπελείποντο δὲ ἡμῶν τῶν συμποσίων οὐδὲ ῥαψῳδοί. ἔχαιρε γὰρ τοῖς Ὁμήρου ὁ Λαρήνσιος ὡς ἄλλος οὐδὲ εἷς, ὡς λῆρον ἀποφαίνειν Κάσανδρον τὸν Μακεδονίας βασιλεύσαντα, περὶ οὗ φησι Καρύστιος ἐν Ἱστορικοῖς Ὑπομνήμασιν ὅτι οὕτως ἦν φιλόμηρος ὡς διὰ στόματος ἔχειν τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ πολλά· καὶ Ἰλιὰς ἦν αὐτῷ καὶ Ὀδυσσεία ἰδίως γεγραμμέναι. ὅτι δ' ἐκαλοῦντο οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ καὶ Ὁμηρισταὶ Ἀριστοκλῆς εἴρηκεν ἐν τῷ περὶ Χορῶν. τοὺς δὲ νῦν Ὁμηριστὰς ὀνομαζομένους πρῶτος εἰς τὰ θέατρα παρήγαγε Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεύς. Χαμαιλέων δὲ ἐν τῷ περὶ Στησιχόρου καὶ μελῳδηθῆναί φησιν οὐ μόνον τὰ Ὁμήρου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ Ἡσιόδου καὶ Ἀρχιλόχου, ἔτι δὲ Μιμνέρμου καὶ Φωκυλίδου. Κλέαρχος δ' ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ περὶ Γρίφων "τὰ Ἀρχιλόχου, φησίν, [ὁ] Σιμωνίδης ὁ Ζακύνθιος ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ἐπὶ δίφρου καθήμενος ἐραψῴδει." Λυσανίας δ' ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Ἰαμβοποιῶν Μνασίωνα τὸν ῥαψῳδὸν λέγει ἐν ταῖς δείξεσι τῶν Σιμωνίδου τινὰς ἰάμβων ὑποκρίνεσθαι. τοὺς δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους Καθαρμοὺς ἐραψῴδησεν Ὀλυμπίασι Κλεομένης ὁ ῥαψῳδός, ὥς φησιν Δικαίαρχος ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ. Ἰάσων δ' ἐν τρίτῳ περὶ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἱερῶν ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ φησὶν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ θεάτρῳ ὑποκρίνασθαι Ἡγησίαν τὸν κωμῳδὸν τὰ Ἡσιόδου, Ἑρμόφαντον δὲ τὰ Ὁμήρου. (Athenaios 620b–d)

This passage, with its mention of rhapsodes and *homēristai*, raises the question what the relationship between the two is. To approach this matter aright, it is vital to notice that Athenaios unequivocally opens with the intention to speak about rhapsodes: "Nor were rhapsodes (ῥαψῳδοί) missing from our symposia." And should there be any doubt about the kind of professional he has in mind or the nature of his contribution to the symposium, he adds that Larensios delighted in Homer as no other, reducing Kassander to a trifle by comparison, who so loved the poet that it was reported he

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[149]For a comprehensive account of Demetrios' life see Ostermann (1847), Ostermann (1857) and Bayer (1969). Briefer treatments are Wehrli (1968a), Ferguson (1974) 38–94, Habicht (1997) 53–66, and Mikalson (1998) 46–74. For editions of his fragments see Wehrli (1968b) and Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf (2000). (Pages 311–447 of the last item contain important essays on various aspects of his life and works.) For the impact of his philosophical ideas on his policies see Dow and Travis (1943), Gehrke (1978), and Williams (1987). Further bibliography can also be found in Williams (1987) 87n2.

[150]Not in Jacoby's *FGH*. Of Aristokles, Müller writes: "Hoc tantum liquet, Aristoclem qui scripsit de musica chorisque, vixisse Alexandriae post regnum Ptol. Euergetae II (146–117). Id enim colligitur ex Athenaeo (IV, p. 174, B)."

[151]Aristokles' remark, highlighted here, corresponds to fr. 33 Wehrli and fr. 55A SOD (= Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf, 2000) of Demetrios of Phaleron.

knew by heart most of his verse and owned manuscripts of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* written in his own hand. It is clear from the contrast drawn that Athenaios' focus is on the text of the poems, and thus, whatever else may be said about the rhapsodes that attended his symposia, at the heart of their performance must have been the epic *verse* of Homer. This is so, whether they declaimed, employed recitative, or sung his lays; whether they used the accompaniment of an instrument; whether they also acted, and, if they did, alone (adopting the *persona* of the character speaking at each point in the narrative) or with others (in semi-dramatic set pieces). Else the comment about Larensios and his favorable comparison with Kassander would be out of place. The sentence that follows makes clear that in Athenaios' mind there is a difference between rhapsodes and *homēristai*. There are, on the one hand, 'the present-day *homēristai*', οἱ νῦν Ὁμηρισταί, and, by implication, on the other, an older kind of *homēristai*, no longer called by this name. Who are these old-time *homēristai*? The answer is: the rhapsodes who are the focus of the section, for Aristokles in his work *On Choruses* had stated "that rhapsodes were also called *homēristai*."[152]

But why are the *homēristai* introduced at all, if the present-day type does not correspond to the rhapsode? This must be because Athenaios goes on to describe the public performances of rhapsodes, presumably as illustrations of the kind of entertainment that, with the proper adjustments to the setting, they enjoyed at their symposia.[153] But the public performances he adduces had taken place in the theaters, and thus invited comparison with the most theatrical of all performers of Homer, the *homēristai*, who at their showiest joined in small acting troupes to mime scenes from the poems, usually bloody fights from the *Iliad*.[154] Athenaios wants to keep rhapsodes and *homēristai* apart, and thus to prevent confusion feels the need to mention the older kind in passing, since new and old were once called the same. And so, we learn the crucial detail that it was Demetrios of Phaleron who "first introduced the

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[152]Athenaios 620b: ὅτι δ' ἐκαλοῦντο οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ καὶ Ὁμηρισταὶ Ἀριστοκλῆς εἴρηκεν ἐν τῷ περὶ Χορῶν.

[153]That the οὐκ ἀπελείποντο means that the performers themselves attended the symposia, as opposed to their being absent as a topic of conversation, follows from the word used at 616e, ἀκροάματα, which LSJ *s.v.* glosses as 'lectures, singers, or players, esp. during meals'. Cf. Robert (1936) 236–37 and Jones (1991) 191.

[154]As my analysis below will show, I am of the opinion that the current consensus puts too much weight on the miming of battle scenes. The best current overview of *homēristai* is Husson (1993). See, further, Kroll (1918), Robert (1936) 237 (esp. n. 4), Robert (1983) 183–84, and Perpillou-Thomas (1995) 229–30.

present-day *homēristai* into the theater."[155] Now, on the face of it, this statement
must be wrong. For there is nothing in the testimonies from the late fourth century BC
to suggest the existence then of anything like the *homēristai* of late Hellenistic and
Roman times, as will become clear below when we examine what the *homēristai* did
for a living. And I find it implausible to think that Demetrios might have devised
de novo such a colorful profession, without precedent at the time. But, as we noted
above, Homeric poetry had a great dramatic potential, acknowledged for centuries;
and the rhapsode, sensitive to his material, had made increasing use of it, exploit-
ing it for good effect before adoring audiences. So we should not be surprised if he
eventually developed a 'subspecialty' that made the acting of well known episodes
the main fare. Thus, the rich robe was exchanged for a proper costume, and the
staff for a fitting prop—perhaps a shield and a sword or a spear. In all likelihood
working as a *homēristēs* called for a less prodigious memory, and certainly for little
powers of extempore composition. This loss, he compensated with a greater flair for
the dramatic in his deportment, and a full use of the all the available resources of
stagecraft. And in the earliest stages of his development, as he gradually came to
be distinguished from the rhapsode by his peculiar emphases on acting, this must
have been a clear point of contrast: his altogether more slavish dependence on a
script for his performance. Thus, to the degree that the rhapsode still recomposed
any of his material in performance, it is right to see him at one end and the average
homēristēs at the other in a spectrum that spans the variable degree to which slavish
memorization and reproduction—and hence the religious adherence to a performance
script—and a measure of extempore recomposition were combined in each individual
professional declaimer of Homer.

So, how should we envision the *homēristai*? What do we learn about them from
extant sources? Three are the main literary ones, to which a few papyri and two
inscriptions add a small but significant contribution. All of these witnesses date to
Roman imperial times. LSJ *s.v.* ὁμηριστής cites Artemidoros *Oneirokritika* 4.2 and
Akhilleus Tatios 3.20, for which the gloss correctly says 'actor of Homeric scenes'. In
the first passage Artemidoros draws a parallel between the surgeon, whose cutting
draws blood but is not fatal by design, and the *homēristai*, who wound and draw

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[155]Athenaios 620b: τοὺς δὲ νῦν Ὁμηριστὰς ὀνομαζομένους πρῶτος εἰς τὰ θέατρα παρήγαγε Δημή-
τριος ὁ Φαληρεύς.

blood but do not intend to kill.[156] As Jones (1991) 189 notes, we are surely dealing here with the theatrical antics and stage devices of actors who specialize in Homeric combat, poking each other with their make-believe swords and drawing false blood. Their exaggerated battle miming (πολλοὺς τιτρώσκειν) corresponds to the surgeon's many operations (πολλοὺς ἐχείρισε). As to Akhilleus Tatios, he mentions *homēristai* at 3.20, when Satyros tells the story of a ship attacked by pirates that held among the passengers "one of those who performs orally (τῷ στόματι δεικνύντων) Homer's poetry in the theaters."[157] It is important to note the phrase τῷ στόματι δεικνύντων, which makes clear that, from the author's perspective, at the heart of this performer's trade was the recitation of Homer, even though it took place in the theaters and—it soon becomes clear—involved acting out battle scenes. Therefore, still at this late date *homēristai* need not have been seen primarily in their capacity as stages actors, and a focus may still remain on the poetry itself.[158] A third and earlier instance of the term, this time the Latin *homerista*, occurs in Petronius' *Satyricon* 59, when Trimalchio brings in a band of *homeristae* to entertain his guests.[159] In the Roman setting of

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[156] *Oneirokritika* 4.2 Pack: καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν δὲ αἱ δυνάμεις ὅμοιαι, καὶ εἰ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶεν ἀνόμοιοι, εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀποβαίνουσιν. ὡς Ἀπολλωνίδης ὁ χειρουργὸς ὁμηρίζειν νομίσας καὶ πολλοὺς τιτρώσκειν πολλοὺς ἐχείρισε. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ὁμηρισταὶ τιτρώσκουσι μὲν καὶ αἱμάσσουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀποκτεῖναί γε βούλονται· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ χειρουργός (lines 74ff.).

[157] καὶ γάρ τις ἐν αὐτοῖς ἦν τῶν τὰ Ὁμήρου τῷ στόματι δεικνύντων ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις· τὴν Ὁμηρικὴν σκευὴν ὁπλισάμενός τε αὐτὸς καὶ τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν οὕτω σκευάσας ἐπεχείρουν μάχεσθαι (3.20.4).

[158] This fact has not been readily accepted by all. Rightly viewing him as a *homēristēs*, an undue emphasis on his acting was placed by Mitscherlich, who removed τῷ στόματι from his edition, and Berger (*apud* Boden), who emended it to τῷ σχήματι. But Jacobs (1821) 670 rightly comments: "τῷ στόματι delendum censet Bipont. [sc. Mitscherlich] aut cum σχήματι permutandum. Hoc *Bergero* in mentem venerat. Sed bene habet vulgata. Rhapsodus describitur, qui Homerica recitabat carmina, idque in scena, non, ut pantomimi, loquacibus digitis usus aut σχήματι, sed τῷ στόματι, *versus recitando*. De quibus recitationibus, quae non multum abhorrebant ab histrionum in comoediis tragoediisque arte, verbum ὑποκρίνεσθαι usurpatur" (his emphasis). Roueché (1993) 1 clarifies the difference between mimes and pantomimes thus: "The pantomime, a solo performer, performed a dance, accompanied by music, but without words; the subject matter was drawn from mythology, but was essentially serious, and the pantomime's art is regularly described as τραγικός. Mimes performed in groups, both of men and women, and used words and music to present scenes which were often comic, but also encompassed tragic subjects." For bibliography see *ibid.* nn. 1–2. For a related mention of ὁμηρίζειν in close proximity with ὑποκρίνεσθαι and ὑπόκρισις, see Akhilleus Tatios 8.9 with LSJ *s.v.* ὁμηρίζω III and Nagy (1996b) 164–65.

[159] *Satyricon* 59.3–7: "'simus ergo, quod melius est, a primitiis hilares et Homeristas spectemus'. intravit factio statim hastisque scuta concrepuit. ipse Trimalchio in pulvino consedit, et cum Homeristae Graecis versibus colloquerentur, ut insolenter solent, ille canora voce Latine legebat librum. mox silentio facto 'scitis' inquit 'quam fabulam agant? Diomedes et Ganymedes duo fratres fuerunt. horum soror erat Helena. Agamemnon illam rapuit et Dianae cervam subiecit. ita nunc Homeros dicit quemadmodum inter se pugnent Troiani et Tarentini. vicit scilicet et Iphigeniam, filiam suam, Achilli dedit uxorem. ob eam rem Aiax insanit et statim argumentum explicabit.' haec ut

Petronius' satire, the boisterous acting is exaggerated for comic effect: the clashing of spear and shield, the shouting, Ajax' raving attack of the boiled calf with unsheathed sword. But, significantly, even here is the declamation an emphatic component, and the retention of the original Greek verse is striking: "[W]hile the *homeristae* talked to each other in Greek verse, in their usual excessive way, [Trimalchio] intoned the libretto in Latin." Starr (1987) remarks that *homeristae* were not normal party entertainment among the Roman rich, and that Trimalchio substitutes these low-class performers for the more normal *comoedi*, an improper social dislocation that parallels his use of *comoedi* for Atellan farces (53.13). This transposition is significant in light of the gloss *omeristai* for *atellani* in the *Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum* (= *CGL*; see below, p. 194).

Besides the passages reviewed above, we possess other documentary evidence: four papyri from Oxyrhynkhos and one from Faiyūm, one inscription from Aphrodisias in Caria, and one other from Noricum. I print them here for the ease of the reader before I discuss them.

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dixit Trimalchio, clamorem Homeristae sustulerunt, interque familiam discurrentem vitulus in lance du⟨ce⟩naria elixus allatus est, et quidem galeatus. secutus est Aiax strictoque gladio, tamquam insaniret, ⟨vitulum⟩ concidit, ac modo versa modo supina gesticulatus mucrone frust[r]a collegit mirantibusque [vitulum] partitus est."

OXYRHYNKHOS

1. II AD: *P. Oxy.* III 519 (see line 4) = Wilcken *Chrest[omathie]* 492 = *Feste*[160] 36

> (ὧν) ἀπεδόθη
> Μεχ(εὶρ) κγ
> μίμῳ (δραχμαὶ) υϙς,
> ὁμηριστῇ (δραχμαὶ) υμη,
> καὶ ὑπὲρ μου[σ]ι[κῶν][a] [(δραχμαὶ) ...]
> [ὀ]ρχηστῇ [(δραχμαί)] ρ[.]δ

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[a]μου[σ]ι[κῆς] G[renfell]-H[unt].

2. II/III AD: *P. Oxy.* VII 1050 (see line 26) = *Feste* 39

> λόγ(ος) (δραχμῶν) υ.
> ἱερεῦσι[a] (δραχμαὶ) ξ,
> Νείλῳ (δραχμαὶ) κ,
> θρόνῳ (δραχμαὶ) κ,
> ἱπποκόμ(οις)[b] (δραχμαὶ) .,
> κήρυκι[c] [c ?]
> ξυστάρχ(η) [c ?]
> Ὡρείωνι [c ?]
> Σεουήρῳ [c ?]
> Βελλαρείνῳ [c ?]
> βραβευταῖς [c ?]
> πανκρατ(ιαστῶν) ζε[ύγ(ει) c ?]
> σφαιρομαχ(ούντων) [ζε(ύγει) c ?][d]
> ἄλ(λῳ) ζεύγ(ει) παν[κρατ(ιαστῶν) c ?]
> Κώφῳ πύκ(τῃ) [c ?]
> φύλ(αξι) θεάτ[ρου c ?]
> ῥάντα[ις c ?]
> παν.[c ?]
> μαγγαναρ[ίῳ] [c ?][e]
> αὐλητ[ῇ c ?]
> ἱεροδ[ούλοις c ?][f]
> ερ[c ?]
> τ[c ?]

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[a]ἱερευσι Pap.   [b]ἱπποκομ Pap.   [c]First κ of κηρυκι corr. from ιε.   [d]σφαιρομάχ(οις) [c ?] G-H.
[e]μαγγαναρ[ιω] Pap. μαγγανα.[c ?] G-H.   [f]ἱεροδ[c ?] Pap.

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[160]Vandoni (1964).

Col. II

κ.[c ?]

μίμῳ[g] [c ?]

ὁμηρισ[τῇ c ?]

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[g]μειμω Pap.

3. III AD: *P. Osl.* III 189 *verso*, lines 11–13 (see line 12) = *Feste* 13

Παχὼν ιδ ἐπι.[May 9

ιϛ ἀπόδιξις Ὁμηρι[στῶν   May 11

ιθ ἀγὼν ποιητῶν   May 14

4. Late III AD: *SB*[161] IV 7336 (see lines 26,29) = *Feste* 44 (cf. *JEA* 15 [1929] 239)

[ὑ(πὲρ) λη]μμάτων ἐνεχ(θέντων) καὶ ὑ(πὲρ) ι[c ?]

[Διο]νυσίων ? τῶν κυρ[ω]θ[έντων c ?]

[...]κλαρίῳ [ἐ]λθόντι ἐκ [c ?]

ὑ[(πὲρ) ὑ]πολόγου[a] [c ?]

κ[ήρ]υκι ὁμοίως [c ?]

σαλπικτῇ ὁμοίως [c ?]

αἵματος μόσχου [c ?]

Ἥρωνι ὁμοίως [c ?]

Σφόγγῳ ὁμοίως [c ?]

κωμῳδῷ ὁμοί(ως) [c ?]

(γίνονται) αἱ[b] π(ᾶσαι) ? (δραχμαὶ) τπ (ὧν) νε [c ?]

[τ]οῖς Σαραπείοις ὁμοί(ως) νομ[c ?]

[σ]υνηθείας ὁμοίως [c ?]

ἀναλόγου[c] ὀρχηστοῦ [c ?]

[.]ηραρίῳ ὁμοίως [c ?]

[Ἀ]μοιτᾷ εἰς συλ[..]ιμου [c ?]

[Ἥ]ρωνι τιμήματος[d] [c ?]

πανκλυστῇ [c ?]

[θυρ]ωρῷ Σαραπείου [c ?]

[Σαραπ]ίωνι καὶ Ἀμοιτᾷ πανκ[ρατιασταῖς c ?]

[ἀλεί]πταις γ τιμήματος [c ?]

[κ]ωμῳδῷ ὁμοί(ως) [c ?]

κήρυκι ὁμοίως [c ?]

ξένια κυνώπου[e] [c ?]

ἀνδρεοκαταμάκτῃ [c ?]

ὁμηριστῇ τιμή(ματος) [c ?]

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[161]*Sammelbuch griechischer Urkunden aus Ägypten.*

τῷ τοῦ ὀρχηστοῦ δραματοθ[έτηι ? c ?]
ἀναγνώστῃ Σαραπᾶ [c ?]
[ἄλλ]ῳ ὁμηριστῇ [c ?]
[...]γύλλῳ τιμή(ματος) [c ?]

[ᵘ[υ]πολογω Pap.   ᵇε Pap.   ᶜαναλογω Pap.   ᵈτειμη[ματο]ς Pap.   ᵉκυνοπου Pap.

FAIYŪM

5. Late III AD: *P. Oxy.* VII 1025 (see line 8) = *Feste* 26

   Αὐρήλιοι Ἄγαθος γυ(μνασιάρχης)
   ἔναρχος πρύτανις καὶ
   Ἑρμανοβάμμων ἐξηγ(ητὴς)
   καὶ Δίδυμος ἀρχιερεὺς
   καὶ Κοπρίας κοσμητὴς
   πόλεως Εὐεργέτιδος
   Αὐρηλίοις Εὐριπᾷ βιολό-
   γῳ καὶ Σαραπᾷ ὁμηριστῇ
   χαίρειν.
   ἐξαυτῆς ἥκετε, καθὼ[ς]
   ἔθος ὑμῖν ἐστιν συνπα-
   νηγυρίζειν, συνεορτάσον-
   τες ἐν τῇ πατρῴᾳ ἡ[μῶν]
   ἑορτῇ γενεθλίῳ τοῦ Κρόνου
   θεοῦ μεγίστου ἀναγ....[.]
   τῶν θεωριῶν ἅμ’ αὔ[ρ]ιον
   ἥτις ἐστὶν ι ἀγομ[έν]ων
   ἐπὶ τὰς ἐξ ἔθους ἡμ[έρ]ας,
   λαμβάνοντες το[ὺς] μισ-
   θοὺς καὶ τὰ τίμια.ᵃ
   σεσημ(ειώμεθα).
   m² Ἑρμανοβάμμων ἐξηγ(ητὴς)
   ἐρρῶσθαι ὑμᾶς εὔχομ(αι).
   m³ Δίδυμος ἀρχιερ(εὺς) ἐρρῶσθ(αι) ὑμᾶς εὔχομ(αι).
   m⁴ Κοπρίας ἐρρῶσθαι ὑμᾶς
   εὔχομαι.

ᵃτειμια Pap.

INSCRIPTIONS

1. Late III AD, theater at Aphrodisias in Caria, room 6 behind the stage front
   (Roueché, 1993, 18)

   (a)   Δημητρίου ὁμηριστοῦ
          διασκευή
          Α[...c.9...]Σ

   (b)   Ἐγενήσθη Ἀλέξανδρος

2. II AD, from Virunum, Noricum (Heger, 1980, and Leppin, 1992, 194)

   T(itus) Flavius
   Aelianus
   homerista

Papyrus 1, a fragment from an account of expenditures for theatrical performances
at Oxyrhynkhos on Mekheir 23 (February), shows the payment of high sums to a mime
(496 drachmas) and a *homēristēs* (448 drachmas), as well as an allowance for μουσικοί.
Papyrus 2 does not preserve the amount paid to the *homēristēs*, but here too he fol-
lows the mime in the list of expenditures. It records, however, that the priest received
60 drachmas, far less than what the mime and *homēristēs* of Pap. 1 had earned. We
also learn from it about the various kinds of entertainers who participated in the
public festivities. It is worthy of note that Pap. 1 reflects the engagement of a sole
homēristēs, and so may Pap. 2, if the identity in the relative order between him and
the mime can be extended to the number of artists. It is hard to imagine how a spe-
cialist in the dramatic reenactment of fighting scenes from the *Iliad* would have been
able to perform alone, unless the theatrical element had been subservient to declaim-
ing the poetry. But if Homeric verse was the focus—complemented, to be sure, by
costuming, gestures, and whatever else might contribute to a strong stage presence—
his performing alone presents hardly any difficulty of execution and is unlikely to have
disappointed the expectations of his audience.[162] Papyrus 3 is a calendar, though too

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[162]Husson (1993) 97 well realizes this and defends, e.g., the restoration of a plural in Pap. 3 (for
which the editors, however, offered in the notes the alternative Ὁμηρι[στοῦ). She cannot account,
however, for the inescapable singular of Pap. 1 and the likely one of Pap. 2. Furthermore, in pairing
the ὁμηριστής and the ἄλλος ὁμηριστής of Pap. 4 (lines 26 and 29), she elides the independence of
their respective performances implicit in their separate listing, with two other items intervening. She
attempts to tie them more closely together by arguing that 'to the reader Sarapas' designates a reader
of the text mimed by the actors. But we are dealing with mimes, not pantomimes, who themselves
recited their lines, as Petronius illustrates: Trimalchio's Latin reading took place in a spell of silence

fragmentary to discern whether it included accounting details or merely a list of competitive events. Each of the three lines 11–13 takes place on different days: May 9, 11, and 14. May 14 featured a competition for which poets presumably contributed their own original compositions. As the editors note, the ἀγὼν ποιητῶν apparently belonged to the same festival as the ἀπόδειξις three days earlier. Unfortunately, we do not know for certain that said 'display' involved more than one *homēristēs*, even though the editors have restored a plural. Robert (1983) 184 emphasizes the distinction between an ἀγών and an ἀπόδειξις.[163] He points out that in Hellenistic times there were cases in which even the verb ἀγωνίζεσθαι need not have implied a competition against other participants. So, e.g., in *SIG*[3] 738 (whose text should be compared with Robert's own *ad loc.*) a χοροψάλτρια by the name of Polygnota is said to have 'competed for three days' (ἀγωνίξατο ἐ[πὶ ἁ]μέρας τρεῖς) at a time when the Pythian games could not be held because of war (Robert, 1929).[164] All the same, such 'displays'—the use of ἀγωνίζεσθαι shows—was never entirely non-competitive, as might be expected from the close ties between entertainment and competition in the ancient festival setting. The frequent mention of the approval of the audience in honorary inscriptions,[165] the crowning, and the language of ἀγωνίζεσθαι all point to the ideology of competition underlying the honorary decree: true, the performer at times may not have competed against other rivals, but, even when there was no

and would have intruded on the performance if the host had made it coincide with the boisterous Greek declamation of the *homēristai* themselves. Nor do I think likely that the ἀναγνώστης may have been a *souffleur* for the *homēristai* (cf. Nagy, 1996b, 177), whose performances at any rate must have been a lowly affair. Otherwise, we would also have to assign the δραματοθέτης to the same production and expect 'of the dance', not 'of the dancer'. (But a choreographer, if that is what the word means, would sooner belong in a pantomime, not a mime.) A show that involved the hiring of a choreographer and a 'reader' of some sort would seem too high an event to account for the anticlimactic 'for another *homēristēs*', which, if we insist in joining him to the individuals listed before, reads like an afterthought. Why not just use a plural to start with? Hence, we must simply own that we do not know what Sarapas' role as 'reader' was.

[163] "D'autre part, le vocabulaire en ce qui concerne ces deux lignes du papyrus d'Oslo est, pour chacune d'elles, radicalment différent : l'ἀγὼν ποιητῶν est un concours traditionnel, à la fin duquel on proclame le vainqueur ; pour les homéristes, il y a une ἀπόδειξις, c'est-à-dire qu'ils sont « produits »." But there is no established technical use of ἀποδείκνυμι in the sense of 'to produce (a play)', and it is better to view ἀπόδειξις here in terms of its connection with ἐπίδειξις (see above, n. 52).

[164] "Polygnota n'a pas concouru. C'est un usage qui se répand à l'époque hellénistique que les musiciens et les poètes ne se fassent pas entendre seulement dans les concours, mais donnent aussi des auditions (ἐπιδείξεις, ἀκροάσεις), soit en dehors de l'époque des concours, soit à l'occasion des concours." Even a crown need not imply a previous competition (cf. *SIG*[3] 450). Cf. Aneziri (2003) 222n106.

[165] εὐδοκιμέω, e.g. in *SIG*[3] 659.5, 737.7, or 738.8.

tangible prize, he would have certainly striven to gain the favor of his audience.[166]
The stakes would have been the bestowal of honors at the pleasure of the officials
who acted on behalf of the city. If we bear this in mind and accept *ex hypothesi* that
the ἀπόδειξις of Pap. 3 did not involve several rival *homēristai* in competition (or
groups of them), still only an artist whose performance had won the loudest acclaim
would have his honors recorded for a permanent witness. At any rate, Robert's dis-
tinction will not decide whether one *homēristēs* or more might have taken part in the
'display'. Our study has made clear, however, that ἀπόδειξις cannot be reduced to
dramatic production, but encompasses a wide range of public performances, including
the declamations of rhapsodes and public lectures by sophists. Still Robert is right
that there is a distinction of emphasis between the poets' ἀγών and the ἀπόδειξις
of the *homēristēs* (or *homēristai*): the latter put more weight on the *opsis* of the
stage. Papyrus 4 mentions two *homēristai*, but individually, as *two different* line
items. This almost certainly means that they gave two independent performances,
once again undercutting the notion of the *homēristēs* as a mime specializing strictly
in Homeric fights, which would call for at least two of them acting together. Indi-
vidual performances suggest a greater emphasis on the declamation of poetry than
might otherwise appear from our previous survey of the literary sources: what they
did on stage did not necessarily call for accompanying actors. Indeed, commenting
on Pap. 4, the editors of Pap. 3 noted: "ἄλλ]ῳ ὁμηριστῇ—the recital from Homer to
be continued after a pause?" In Papyrus 5 officials from Euergetis engage the services
of a *biologos* (a type of mime) and a *homēristēs* from Oxyrhynkhos, both regulars, to
participate at a local festival (the birthday of Kronos?). The pairing of these two pro-
fessionals recurs, as mentioned above, in the *CGL* II p. 22, 40: "Atellani: cκηνικοι·
αρχαιολογοι· ‖ βιολογοι· ωcδεοβοι· ‖ διος ομηριστην· δη ‖ τοι· νυχοροι." Although
somewhat corrupt,[167] the *homēristēs* is clearly put on a level with the *biologos* and
the *atellanus*. As to Inscriptions 1 (a and b), Rouehé (1993) 19–20 suggests it was
cut on the wall of the doorway to the back-stage theater room 6 to mark it as reserved
for a Demetrios. The word *homēristēs* is in a different hand (cursive, not square) and
apparently was added to identify him further by his trade. (Traces of other inscrip-
tions, surely of previous users, are still visible.) Ins. 1.b is harder to interpret: if it

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[166]Wörrle (1988) 8, lines 44–46 records three days devoted to "mimes and performers and shows for
which there are no prizes," when any of the other performers that pleased the city (τῶν ἀρεσκόντων
τῇ πόλει) would also be admitted.

[167]One of the sources, *h* (= *margo* ed. Steph. Leid. 764.B.8), offers the *v.l.* "ὁμηρισταὶ δετοὶ σὺν
χοροῖς."

meant '*né* Alexander', why the need to give his birth name? and if it means 'he acted Alexander' (the Paris of the *Iliad*), why the prominence of that one role? (hardly a martial paragon befitting the stereotype of a bloody *homēristēs*).[168] Inscription 2 witnesses to the vitality of the profession, spanning several centuries, and, in the case of Virunum, extending the declamation of Greek Homeric verse even to provincial cities where—if Petronius' text can serve as a reliable guide—few would have been able to understand it. To summarize the results of our survey: Husson (1993) 93 was right to follow Robert (1936) 237n4 in criticizing those who made no distinction between the rhapsode and the *homēristēs*; but our analysis shows that the emphasis placed since then on their stage acting to the detriment of their recitation has been overdone. The *homēristēs*, to be sure, may have dressed to impersonate a Homeric character, and his stage delivery, as to voice and gesture, must have exceeded anything a classical Athenian audience ever witnessed. But even the most satiric of all literary sources firmly attests to an on-going declamation of the poetic Greek text, and this, even where comprehension was far from guaranteed. The papyri also show us, in all likelihood, *individual* performers who, thus unable to place a heavy emphasis on the choreography of fighting scenes, must have made the spoken word a vital ingredient of their successful demonstrations.[169] The word ἀπόδειξις, which has survived in one of the documents, further ties their performances to the long-standing rhapsodic and rhetorical traditions of public displays. This makes it more likely that the statement by the late fourth-century AD grammarian Diomedes[170] that casts them as reciters in

[168]Roueché also notes his likely association with a *biologos* attested in a stray find that probably belongs with the texts from the theater (*ibid.*).

[169]Someone might object that single mimes too are sometimes mentioned in our documents. But this is a valid objection only on the (false) assumption that mimes always acted in groups. Csapo and Slater (1994) 370 state that "mimes acted, sang, and danced without masks, either individually or in a troupe." It is very unlikely that a city would supply a single out-of-town mime whose services it had engaged (as in Pap. 5) with a supporting band of local actors: Roueché (1993) 52 is clear that, so far as we can ascertain their status, mimes were associate-performers. Prevented from competing at sacred festivals, their participation in synods of τεχνῖται was barred also (Aneziri, 2003, 331–32). Although some did form associations in the second and third centuries AD, they remained separate from the artists of Dionysos (*ibid.* 332n77). Wiemken's (1972) 182 considered judgment is that "[ü]berhaupt . . . von stehenden Mimentruppen in der Überlieferung niemals die Rede [ist]; vielmehr waren die Mimen Solisten in ihrem jeweiligen Fach, die auf Tagesgage spielten und von Fall zu Fall herangezogen und zu einem Ensemble vereinigt werden konnten." *Ad hoc* associations, then, seem to have been the norm among them. This is quite different from views of *homēristai* that assume without hesitation that they must have always acted in troupes, a *modus operandi* required by assuming further that their sole specialty was the staging of bloody fights.

[170]*GL* 1.484 Keil: "rapsodia dicitur Graece ποιήσεως μέρος . . . vel quod olim partes Homerici carminis in theatralibus circulis cum baculo, id est virga, pronuntiabant qui ab eodem Homero dicti Homeristae."

the theaters is not a misinformed inference from early sources, but a true reflection of the central role that declamation of the poems (in their original Greek) held even among performers who in time became notorious for their exaggerated stage antics, especially their choreography of battle scenes.[171]

Our survey, then, puts the rhapsodes of the classical era in continuity with the *homēristai* of Hellenistic and imperial times. There are points of continuity and discontinuity, but it is possible to establish lines of gradual development that lead from one to the other by an increasing emphasis on the dramatic potential of the Homeric poems and a corresponding exploitation of voice, gesture, and dress in their performances before an audience (cf. Nagy, 1996b, 171). This serves to return us to the text of Athenaios 620b and its report about Demetrios of Phaleron as the one responsible for the introduction of the *homēristai* into the theater. It is undeniable that the governor of Athens had a live interest in Homeric poetry: Diogenes Laertios 5.81 includes a Περὶ Ἰλιάδος α′ β′, a Περὶ Ὀδυσσείας α′ β′ γ′ δ′, and a Ὁμηρικὸς α′.[172] The first two must have been *hypomnemata*; about the latter we can only guess.[173] Thus, he continued the time-honored philological interests of the founder of the Lyceum. Building on Lykourgos' broad restoration of Athens' cultural life, Demetrios was instrumental in bringing about a reorganization of the social mechanisms of dramatic production. In particular, he abolished the χορηγία, which Aristotle in the *Politics* 1309a14–20[174] had criticized as exacerbating useless spending, harming the fortunes of the rich, and undermining social cohesion by aggravating excessive φιλοτιμία. Lykourgos, too, expressed particular resentment at liturgies that purported to be for the public good (*chorēgia* among them), but benefited only the reputation of the sponsor (*Leok.* 139). To these, he opposed truly useful services such as trierarchies. Demetrios adopted this

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[171]For the opposite view, cf. Garelli-François (2000) 504n15, who thinks Diomedes to be wholly derivative of Athenaios 620b: he would have neither known what Garelli-François calls "the *homēristai* from the time of Athenaios" (whom she assumes to be very different from the rhapsodes of old) nor the ones attested in the first and third centuries AD, who, she thinks, may have disappeared by the time of Diomedes.

[172]Fragments assigned to his *homerica* are 190–93 Wehrli or 143–46 SOD.

[173]Wehrli (1968b) 85 suggests a rhetorical declamation, such as he imagines Plato's Ion boasted about when he compared himself with Metrodoros of Lampsakos, Stesimbrotos of Thasos, or Glaukon (530c9–d1). Cf. Bayer (1969) 146–47. On Demetrios' philological writings see, further, Montanari (2000).

[174]δεῖ δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις τῶν εὐπόρων φείδεσθαι, μὴ μόνον τῷ τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἀναδάστους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρπούς, ὃ ἐν ἐνίαις τῶν πολιτειῶν λανθάνει γιγνόμενον, βέλτιον δὲ καὶ βουλομένους κωλύειν λειτουργεῖν τὰς δαπανηρὰς μὲν μὴ χρησίμους δὲ λειτουργίας, οἷον χορηγίας καὶ λαμπαδαρχίας καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται. Cf. *ibid.* 1305a3–7 and 1320b2–4.

policy in an effort to curtail conspicuous consumption, legislating also limits to funer-
ary spending.[175] One of the few preserved fragments in his own voice expresses his
criticism of the *chorēgia*:[176] καὶ τούτων [sc. τῶν χορηγῶν] τοῖς μὲν ἡττηθεῖσι περιῆν
προσυβρίσθαι καὶ γεγονέναι καταγελάστους· τοῖς δὲ νικήσασιν ὁ τρίπους ὑπῆρχεν,
οὐκ ἀνάθημα τῆς νίκης, ὡς Δημήτριός φησιν, ἀλλ' ἐπίσπεισμα τῶν ἐκκεχυμένων
βίων καὶ τῶν ἐκλελοιπότων κενοτάφιον οἴκων. τοιαῦτα γὰρ τὰ ποιητικῆς τέλη καὶ
λαμπρότερον οὐδὲν ἐξ αὐτῶν (Plu. *On the Fame of the Athenians* 349b1–6).[177] In-
stead of the *chorēgoi*, a state official, the ἀγωνοθέτης, was henceforth in charge of
the festival, not only the Dionysia, but the Lenaia and the Thargelia,[178] but *not* the
Panathenaia;[179] and the people were to be the notional *chorēgos*.[180] The effect of
these reforms, which probably took place towards the beginning of his tenure,[181] was
that henceforth actors were the employees of the state. And so we should expect that,
with the abolition of the *chorēgia*, Demetrios must have also pursued a more formal
arrangement between the polis and the professionals of tragedy and comedy, making
the payments to the cast in return for their service at festivals predictable and stable.
This would have gone a step beyond the Lykourgan control of the text of the plays
through the *grammateus*. It is ultimately in such a management model—one in which
the city formally contracts with her actors and other dramatic staff as a whole—that
an important impetus must lie towards the founding of the synod of Dionysian artists
sometime later during the third century BC. Doubtless we must credit other fac-
tors: economies of scale, the flexibility and synergism of complementary specialties,
the ability to negotiate better terms of employment or to secure immunity, a more
effective match of supply and demand, etc. But I believe that it must have been
the management model first established by Demetrios what proved so convenient to
the professionals of drama and others that it was soon to be made permanent in the

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[175]Cic. *De legibus* 2.63–66 (fr. 135 Wehrli = fr. 53 SOD).

[176]Fr. 136 Wehrli = fr. 115 SOD.

[177]With the modern editors, I follow Reiske's emendation ἐπίσπεισμα τῶν ἐκκεχυμένων βίων, which
is doubtless correct for the awkward ms. reading ἐπὶ πεισμάτων ἐκκεχυμένον βίον.

[178]Cf. Wilson (2000) 272n33.

[179]*Pace* Ferguson (1974) 57 and n. 2. Cf. Nagy (1978) and (1992a) 62–65, esp. 64. Although
a *temporary* suspension of the *athlothetai*'s responsibility for the Panathenaia in favor of a single
agōnothetēs cannot be dismissed, it remains entirely speculative.

[180]*IG* II² 3073: "ὁ δῆμος ἐ[χορήγει. . . . " Cf. *IG* II² 3074, 3076–77, 3079, 3081, 3083, 3086–88. For
more on the *agōnothetēs* see Pickard-Cambridge (1988) 91–92, Mikalson (1998) 54–59, and Wilson
(2000) 270–76.

[181]An obvious date would be 317/6 BC, when he was *nomothetēs*. Cf. Wilson (2000) 272 and 307–8
(appendix 4).

autonomously organized and self-ruled synods of τεχνῖται. The *terminus ante quem*
for Athens' own is the amphictyonic decree *IG* II² 1132 (cf. Aneziri, 2003, 347–50),
dated 279/8 or 278/7 BC. That the Athenian synod was probably the first in existence
is admitted by many authorities. It both explains its superiority and legitimizes its
claims to preeminence vis-à-vis the Isthmian *koinon*, a claim famously upheld by the
amphictyonic decree *FD* III.2.69 (= *SIG*³ 704e) of which *IG* II² 1134 is a copy (cf.
Aneziri, 2003, 368–72). The mention there of Athens priority is couched in anachro-
nistic language that projects the situation that obtained ca. 117/6 BC back to archaic
and classical times.[182] But all the same, the language would hardly be defensible in
the polemical setting of inter-synodical rivalries unless the cultural preeminence of
classical Athens had been further buttressed by her pioneering establishment of *koina*
of Dionysian artists. It is not likely, however, that the Athenian model would have
succeeded in the long run and enjoyed as witness to its success the establishment of
rival associations in the Corinthian isthmus, Ionia, and Egypt, had not many of the
Hellenistic rulers offered them protection and robust patronage (a practice contin-
ued with distinction by late republican and imperial notables and potentates).[183] No
longer did 'Dionysiac' contests take place only at a festival to Dionysos; they could
also be organized for the festivals of other gods, and even in honor of rulers. Artistic
specialties and their representative performers became unmoored from their original
settings and transportable to new ones. The dominant factor henceforth was to be
the artist himself, his professional persona. This was not, however, an entirely new
development. That performers already during the fifth and fourth centuries BC might

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[182]Surely the language—ἐπει[δὴ] γεγονέ[ναι κ]αὶ [συνειλέ]χθαι τεχνιτῶν σύνοδον παρ' Ἀθηναίος
συμβέβηκε πρῶτον . . . (11) and πρῶτός τε πάντων, συναγα⟨γ⟩ὼν τεχνιτῶν σύνοδον [καὶ ἀγωνιστῶν,
θ]υμελικ[οὺς καὶ σκ]ηνικ[οὺ]ς ἀγῶνας ἐποίησεν (16–17)—is not intended as a description merely of
the founding of third-century BC competitions, but, as the panegyric that follows makes clear, of
the invention of all the arts by the Athenians (tragedy, comedy, and others).

[183]See above, n. 146. In places like Alexandria, which had not enjoyed, as Athens, centuries of
rich cultural traditions and which, for this reason, was subjected by its rulers to a vigorous official
policy of Hellenization, the establishment of a guild of artists had obvious advantages for recruiting
performers and supplying newly established festivals. Here it was not merely a matter of regulating
preexisting religious and cultural forms, but of founding entirely new festivals to give expression
to the ideologies of power. There would also be the added benefit of evoking Alexander the Great
as Dionysos in his patronage of the arts (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.63 and Ath. 538f). The respective
termini ante quos for the non-Athenian κοινά are ca. 270 BC for the Egyptian, ca. 240 BC for the
Ionian, and ca. 260 BC for the Isthmian. Following in Alexander's footsteps influential Romans,
too, portrayed themselves in the guise of Bakkhos: so Mark Antony (Athenaios 148c) and Caligula
(Athenaios 148d). By the time of Hadrian and Antoninus Pius, it was no longer a personal claim, but
an established honorific address: Ἀδριανὸν Καίσαρα Σεβαστὸν νέον Διόνυσον (Roueché, 1993, 226
no. 88 iii.3; cf. *IG* II² 1350).

have enjoyed a loose association of sorts to defend their common interests, and had at least the consciousness of a shared professional identity, might be inferred from the (otherwise clearly anachronistic) language of Athenaios 407b about Hegemon of Thasos and the passing comment in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1405a23. Demetrios' alleged reorganization of the performers cannot be proved, but the environment was certainly ripe for it, and all the circumstantial evidence suggests that it must have taken place.

Although very likely, then, given the abolition of the *chorēgia* and the assumption by the state of the exclusive sponsorship and financing of city festivals, we do not have any explicit mention of a corresponding reorganization of the actors themselves. But we do steal from Athenaios' remark about Demetrios and the rhapsodes a passing glance at his comprehensive concern for the performing arts of the city he ruled. That this cannot have meant a radical change in the fourth-century BC character of Homeric rhapsodic performance, I have argued above in my discussion of *homēristai*: to be sure, their flair for the dramatic can only have been encouraged by the move, but this would have merely been another step in the gradual march towards the ever increasing influence of scripted acting on what had once been the extempore recomposition of Homeric poetry in performance without mimetic costuming, voice, and gesture.[184] Granting then that there was a change in setting, what did it consist in? One possibility is that it was into the Dionysia itself that Demetrios brought the reciting rhapsodes (with Athenaios' τὰ θέατρα standing not only for the place, but metonymically for the preeminent festival celebrated there). But I believe that this is not very likely: no inscription we know so much as hints at the performance of rhapsodes during the feast of Dionysos. And only on the assumption that the performance of the rhapsodes in their new setting was very close to the much later acting of the *homēristai*—an anachronism I cannot accept—is it plausible to imagine them as furnishing ἐμβολίματα between acts or plays. On the other hand, if they kept their character primarily as reciters of Homeric epic and still did take part in the Dionysia, we would have, in effect, a θυμελικὸς ἀγών.[185] But as Pickard-Cambridge (1946) 168 once said, the term θυμελικός was never used for an Athenian compe-

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[184]This evolution of the performance practice is reflected by late sources, e.g. the *Suidas s.v.* ῥαψῳδοί: οἱ τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ἀπαγγέλλοντες.

[185]Strictly speaking, θυμελικός referred to the μουσικοὶ ἀγῶνες in the setting of the theater. A mixed competition, with drama and 'music' (*rhapsōidia, kitharōidia, aulōidia*, etc.) would go by the fuller name θυμελικοὶ καὶ σκηνικοὶ ἀγῶνες (or, in Vitruvius' V 7.2.6 words, it would involve *scaenici et thymelici artifices*). But later practice played loose with the term and used θυμελικοί as shorthand for both in contrast to γυμνικοί. Cf. Wörrle (1988) 227.

tition; perhaps unsurprisingly, for we might expect a city with such long-standing festival traditions, especially after the conservative turn of the Lykourgan era, to have usually respected the broad characteristic outlines of each of her feasts and their peculiar customs. The other alternative, then, is to assume that Demetrios moved the rhapsodic competitions from the odeion of Perikles to the theater of Dionysos.[186] The reasons for this move are not hard to understand: after Lykourgos rebuilt the theater, the site must have been used with increasing frequency for all sorts of assemblies. It was now a convenient, solid, and safe structure, situated in the heart of the city (as opposed to the slightly more peripheral *Pnyx*). Capacious, it had the convenience of its unimpeded view and its semi-circular shape. The odeion, on the contrary, neither intended nor designed originally as a music hall,[187] was proverbial for its many interior columns (πολύστυλον)[188] and 'many seats' (πολύεδρον).[189] It was a square-shaped building whose 'many seats' must have been wooden bleachers (ἴκρια) built between the columns. Performers must have stood on a wooden platform built for the occasion.[190] Its views and perhaps acoustics were less than ideal,[191] a state of affairs that might well be justified for the similarly constructed Eleusinian Telesterion, for which secrecy recommended roofing and illumination by torches, and the columns supporting the roof might be a necessary nuisance. But only a departure from its original purpose would explain why Perikles made it the seat of rhapsodic and other 'musical' competitions. With the newly refurbished theater of Dionysos available, where already in times past occasional meetings of the *ekklesia* had been held,[192] at last the Periklean tradition might be relaxed and all competitions other than athletic and equestrian might be held there.[193] With this, Hesykhios *s.v.* ᾠδεῖον

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[186]For the odeion of Perikles see Robkin (1976) and (1979).

[187]Cf. Robkin (1979) 10.

[188]Cf. Robkin (1976) 23–26.

[189]Robkin (1976) 26–28. Cf. Plu. *Perikles* 139–11. See also Theophrastos' *Characters* 3.3.6–7.

[190]Plato's *Ion* 535e1–2: καθορῶ γὰρ ἑκάστοτε αὐτοὺς ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος.

[191]We do not know what the acoustics of the building were. It certainly lacked the design that has made Greek theaters the world over famous for their ability to convey sound. The roofed enclosure must have helped to palliate its dissipation; but the return to a traditional shape for the auditorium in the construction of the odeions of Agrippa and Herodes suggests that the semi-circular stone theater must have surpassed what the Periklean odeion could offer. For an interesting exploration of the acoustics of the *Pnyx* and the corresponding limitations on the political process see Johnstone (1996a) 116–26.

[192]Cf. McDonald (1943) 47–51 and Pickard-Cambridge (1988) 68–70.

[193]We learn from Hyperides' *In Defense of the Children of Lykourgos* (fr. 118 Jensen) that the great Athenian statesman also subjected the odeion to construction. The word used, ᾠκοδόμησε, is

agrees: τόπος, ἐν ᾧ πρὶν τὸ θέατρον κατασκευασθῆναι οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ καὶ οἱ κιθαρῳδοὶ ἠγωνίζοντο. Davison (1958) 35 assumes that Hesykhios' theater corresponds to the structure that stood in Perikles' lifetime (built ca. 470 BC, he says). The odeion (whose construction he assigns to Themistokles) was not in use then, either because the 'musical' contests, if ever housed there, had been transferred to the theater, or simply because they had been discontinued at some earlier point and were not held until Perikles refounded the μουσικῆς ἀγῶνες and returned them to the odeion. But I think that Robkin's (1979) 8 analysis makes the hypothesis of a Themistoklean construction of the odeion (based on Vitrivius V 9.1) very unlikely, and that it is therefore better to take Hesykhios' note as the transference of the 'musical' contests, or at least the rhapsodic ones, from the odeion to the theater after Lykourgos' reforms,[194] a move at least began (if not entirely carried out) by Demetrios of Phaleron. It is clear, at any rate, that during Hellenistic times the theater of Dionysos increasingly became the preferred meeting place.[195]

The translation of 'music' contests to the theater need not have been complete. It is possible that the meetings at the odeion continued during the greater Panathenaia, but may have been transferred to the theater for the lesser Panathenaia. This is on the assumption that μουσικοὶ ἀγῶνες were held at the yearly festivals too, a matter that is not agreed by all scholars. Unfortunately, it is hard to settle this question with certainty, since the celebration of the greater Panathenaia is, to a large degree, involved in resolving calendrical matters, with the result that, starting with the Eusebian date of 566 BC, the date of any epigraphical or literary instance

applied also to the theater (among others). Thus it must mean not 'build', but 'rebuild' or 'refurbish', and the degree of construction and modification implied must be allowed to vary. (Cf. Lykourgos' *Against Kephisodotos* fr. 2 Conomis, which credits Perikles with the construction, οἰκοδομήσας, of the odeion.) Robkin (1976) 65 suggests that the work for the theater necessitated some modifications to the odeion: the crosswall that connects the west end of the north wall of the odeion to the *analemma* of the theater, as opposed to the buttresses at the center and east end, may be one such modification. At any rate, no work on the odeion can have compensated for a design unsuited to 'musical' performances.

[194]Davison (1958) 34n17 observes: "It should be noted that Hesychius does not say to which theatre he refers; he might be speaking of the 'Periclean' (or even of the Lycurgean) one."

[195]Pollux 8.132.8–133.2 makes reference to this change: ἐνεκλησίαζον δὲ πάλαι μὲν ἐν τῇ Πυκνί· . . . αὖθις δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐν τῷ Διονυσιακῷ θεάτρῳ, μόνας δὲ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας ἐν τῇ Πυκνί (cf. Wachsmuth, 1874, 647n2). McDonald (1943) 47–51 and 56–61, after examining the epigraphical and literary sources, concludes that starting in the times of Lykourgos' reforms, after which the "[t]heater must have been much the best equipped meeting place in Athens for any large group" (58), regular assemblies there (flagged by the expression ἐκκλησία ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ) slowly increased in number during the third century BC until the new venue entirely supplanted the *Pnyx* after the first third of the second century BC (cf. *ibid.* n. 74 in pp. 57–58).

of the festival that is associated with 'musical' performances is *ipso facto* adjusted
to a year away by some appropriate multiple of four from 566. A case in point is
IG II² 784, a decree from the archonship of Athenodoros, whom Meritt had once
dated to 240/39 BC[196] and more recently redated to 256/5 BC.[197] In either case, the
significance of the year is that it corresponds to a lesser Panathenaia (566-240 is not
divisible by 4); and since the inscription deals with a μουσικὸς ἀγών,[198] this would
seem to prove conclusively that Davison (1958) 26 was in fact wrong when he wrote
that "it is reasonably certain that the individual competitions [i.e. 'music', athlet-
ics, and horse-racing] were instituted in the sixth century and confined to the 'great'
Panathenaea." Meritt (1981) 82, however, noted that Habicht (1979) 137 (whose
arguments prompted the higher redating) had suggested a "Panathenaic year" (i.e. a
year when the greater Panathenaia was held) because the decree mentions *athlothetai*,
whom some believe were not involved in the greater festival.[199] Thus, Habicht only
considered the Panathenaic years 258/7, 254/3, or 250/49 for Athenodoros' date.[200]
The same rationale is accepted by Osborne (1989) 227 ("Athenodoros . . . needs one
of the Great Panathenaic years"). I note with interest that Tracy (2003) 84 now
gives the date of Athenodoros as 238/7 BC, and, for a rationale, the terse statement,
"Steinhauer, Νεότερα στοιχεῖα 47, places him without discussion in 238/7 and indi-
cates the date as certain" (*ibid.* 2n6). He is referring to Steinhauer (1993) 47. That
there is no strong consensus emerges from the latter's table on page 36, but I suspect

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[196]Meritt (1961) 234, revalidated in Meritt (1977) 176. In agreement is Samuel (1972) 215, who
places Athenodoros on his second column for "those archons whose placement depends solely upon
the reconstruction of the secretary cycle" (*ibid.* 211). This was already the dating offered by the
editor of *IG* II² 784.

[197]Meritt (1981) 79 and 82–83 (cf. p. 94).

[198]*IG* II² 784.7–10: ἐπειδὴ ᵛ οἱ ἀθλοθέται ἐπεμελήθησαν [τῆς διοικήσεως τῶ]- ‖ ν Παναθηναίων ᵛ
Ἀγαθαίου Προσπ[αλ]τ[ίου συντελοῦντος κα]- ‖ ι τοῦ ἀγῶνος τοῦ τε μουσικοῦ καὶ [τοῦ γυμνικοῦ καὶ
τῆς ἱππ]- ‖ οδρομίας ᵛ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἅ[παντα κτλ.

[199]This matter is complex, since *IG* I³ 370.67, with its ἀθλοθέταις ἐς Παναθέναια, the evidence
alleged (e.g. by Meritt, 1981, 82n19 and Nagy, 1992a, 63) to prove the involvement of *athlothetai*
in the lesser festivals, was long ago argued vigorously by Davison (1958) 32 to apply not to the
festival that year but to the greater one the following (414/3). If *athlothetai* were in charge of the
lesser Panathenaia (not of the sacrifices and the procession, for which the *hieropoioi* continued to
be responsible, cf. *IG* I³ 375.6–7 and II² 334), this surely implies that this festival too must have
included contests with prizes.

[200]"[D]ie traditionelle Datierung auf 240/39 ist nicht nur zu spät, sondern auch deshalb falsch, weil
Athenodoros aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach in ein Jahr der Großen Panathenäen gehört" (Habicht,
1979, 137). "Es muß sich hier um die Großen Panathenäen handeln, denn die Athlotheten sind «eine
Behörde der penteterisch begangenen Panathenäen», während die Hieropoioi das kleine, jährliche
Fest vollständig verwalten" (*ibid.*).

that, in the end, he assigns Athenodoros' archonship to 238/7 on the grounds that, if 'music' was included in the Panathenaia that year, it must have been a greater Panathenaia: the closest fine-tuning would adjust him up to 242/1 or down to 238/7. Perhaps a more reliable indicator might be Lykourgos' *Leok.* 102, where the Athenian fathers are said to require Homeric rhapsodic performances καθ' ἑκάστην πεντετηρίδα τῶν Παναθηναίων. Admittedly, it would be odd to speak thus if in fact such contests were held yearly. But other interpretations are possible: perhaps the yearly Panathenaia did include 'music' contests, but did not enforce on rhapsodes the exclusivity of the Homeric repertoire; or else the point may be that in the time of the fathers rhapsodic performances during the greater Panathenaia were exclusively of Homeric poetry, but this was no longer the case. (If so, the comment would have no bearing at all on the lesser Panathenaia.) Even if we take the position that in Lykourgos' time no 'music' contests were held at the lesser festival, nothing hinders the notion that during his tenure as governor of Athens Demetrios of Phaleron might have added them, or at least performances by rhapsodes, as part of his populist policies, which Walbank (1967) 358 (*ad* Polybios 12.13.10) has characterized as "cheap food and . . . entertainments, *panis et circenses.*" This might henceforth have been the norm, still observed in 256/5 (if this is the correct date!) according to *IG* II² 784.

Whatever the view adopted, we can agree that the new theater setting must have encouraged the tendency to dramatize the delivery of Homeric poetry, and encouraged even further the dependence of rhapsodes on a carefully rehearsed script such as would maximize the dramatic impact of the performance. The kinship of Homeric epic and tragedy was at last given free course and wide scope, enhanced by the identity of setting—certainly of location if not of time. In what was to be a prelude to the joint participation of actors and rhapsodes in the synods of the artists of Dionysos, both performers were brought into a much closer contact than they had ever enjoyed before, and it is likely that their performances were regulated with similar care by Demetrios, the *epimelētēs* of the city. Nothing would have pleased him better than a heavy dose of theatricality. During his archonship of 309/8 BC he was responsible for the πομπή of the Dionysia,[201] which he gave in great style: a self-moving snail that spewed saliva led the way, and donkeys were marched through the theater (10–11).[202] Demokhares

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[201]Cf. Bayer (1969) 70–71.

[202]Fr. 123 Wehrli = fr. 91 SOD. For the emendation ὄνοι for the ms. ἀνοῖ see Walbank (1967) *ad loc.* The expansion ἄνθρωποι seems much too weak without elaboration and cannot be accepted unless we assume a *lacuna* in the text that supplies further details.

derides him for these (ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτὸν οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθαί), but Walbank (1967) 359 is surely right to conclude that "they were presumably a part of the grandiose show put on by Demetrius and not of any other significance."[203]

Now, the very name *homēristēs* must have had its origin in the context of the increasing specialization of performers in Hellenistic times. It is then that we find among the αὐληταί the ἀσκαύλης, καλαμαύλης, θρηναύλης, and χοραύλης; among string instrumentalists the πανδουριστής and σαμβυκιστής; among ὀρχησταί the κορδακιστής and παντόμιμος, sometimes referred to as τραγικῆς καὶ ἐνρύθμου κινήσεως ὑποκριτής or μύθων ὀρχηστής; among acrobats the κοντοπέκτης, σκανδαλιστής, and καλοβάτης; among the μῖμοι the κίναιδος, μαλακός, μαγῳδός, ἀρχαιολόγος, and βιολόγος.[204] Such terms could be multiplied. In this cultural and professional context, it is only natural that the ὁμηριστής too would find his place.[205]

3.9   Actors at the Panathenaia?

Answering to the introduction of rhapsodic declamation into the theater, there was a reciprocal inauguration of a dramatic event at the Panathenaia. Relatively speaking, this development was much later in coming, a fact that speaks perhaps of the more traditional character of this old feast and its correspondingly greater reluctance to adopt the cultural eclecticism of the more recently founded festivals. The one literary testimony to the innovation comes from Diogenes Laertios 3.56, where we learn that, according to Thrasyllos the astrologer friend of Tiberius, Plato published his dialogues as tetralogies after the manner of the tragedians, who competed with four plays "at

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[203]See Athenaios 542e (fr. 34 Wehrli = fr. 43A SOD) for another report of the same occasion, according to which the chorus sang to Dionysos in verses that flattered Demetrios.

[204]Cf. Bélis (1988), Chaniotis (1990) 90–92 (also table 1, pp. 99–102), and Perpillou-Thomas (1995) 226–30.

[205]Nagy (1996b) 178–80 argues for the late fourth-century BC origin of the term, for which Demetrios of Phaleron himself may be responsible. I agree with the connection between this label and "a decreasing flexibility in the inherited repertoire, . . . correlated with an increasing professionalism" (*ibid.* 180). But, as argued above, I do not believe that Demetrios' impact extended beyond a formal control of performers by the state, i.e. established official procedures for the supply, employment, and payment of performers (which might have encouraged further self-regulation and self-organization), and the less official tendency towards greater theatricality in the practice of Homeric rhapsodes (owing to the new performance venue, and perhaps even a desire to indulge Demetrios' delight in a 'good show'). Assuming that Demetrios was responsible for the sobriquet would imply too radical a discontinuity in the performance tradition at the time, rather than the more likely gradual change encouraged by the implicit fostering of already existing cultural tendencies.

the Dionysia, Lenaia, Panathenaia, and Χύτροι."[206] To this we can now add two inscriptions. One is the first-century AD *IG* II² 3157:

[*c.8*] αν ἀ[γωνι]σάμενος χ[υ]-
[χ]λίοις χορο[ῖς] ἀνδρῶν Κεκροπίδι
[φ]υ[λ]ῇ αὐτὸς χορηγῶν καὶ διδάσ-
[χων, χα]ὶ τραγῳδίαν Παναθήναια τ[ὰ]
[μεγά]λα χαινὴν διδ[ά]ξας χα[ὶ *c.5*]
[.]αστα τρία *ᵛ* Ἀθηναίο[ις].

The other, the much earlier *SEG* 41.115, contains an entry at the end of the Panathenaic victor lists for the year 162/1 BC, which records that Zeuxis staged dramatic contests (Tracy and Habicht, 1991, 189, col. III lines 39–43):

τοὺς δὲ σκηνικοὺς ἀγῶνας π[*c.10*]
⟨Ζ⟩εῦξις ἐποίησε καὶ τοὺς ἐν τα[*c.10*]
σαις τοῖς εὐεργέταις ἡμέραν [*c.10*]
ἀγωνισαμένους εἰσήγαγεν [*c.11*]
τῆς πανηγυρέως ἐπέθηκε [*c.12*]

For line 39 the editors suggest a supplement π[ρῶτος πάντων] or π[άντας καλῶς]: the fragmentary nature of the text does not allow us to determine if this might have been the first time the contests were held (although they cannot have been introduced much earlier). Since Zeuxis' name is inscribed without patronymic or demotic, he must have been mentioned in the preamble to the inscription, now lost. The editors are surely right in suggesting that he must have been the *agōnothetēs* and a man of great influence who either added drama to the festival or staged it with great extravagance. With the restorations καὶ τὰς θυσίας for line 42 and ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων for 43, the following tentative translation is offered: "Zeuxis staged the dramatic contests [admirably?], sponsored? those who contested (on) the day [added?] in th[e——] in honor of the benefactors of the city, [and] provided [the sacrifices] of the festival [at his own expense]" (Tracy and Habicht, 1991, 204).

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[206]Θράσυλλος δέ φησι καὶ κατὰ τὴν τραγικὴν τετραλογίαν ἐκδοῦναι αὐτὸν τοὺς διαλόγους, οἷον ἐκεῖνοι τέτρασι δράμασιν ἠγωνίζοντο—Διονυσίοις, Ληναίοις, Παναθηναίοις, Χύτροις.

3.10   The Performance of Homer after IV BC

Although the *homēristēs*, whom we have already considered,[207] takes us decisively into Roman imperial times, I now return more broadly to the performance of Homer during and after the Hellenistic period by professionals who did not concern themselves more narrowly with the acting of Homeric scenes.

3.10.1   The Τεχνῖται of Dionysos

The last chapter in the performance of epic during Hellenistic and imperial times prominently features the σύνοδοι or κοινά of the so-called οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνῖται or simply Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνῖται, to which we have made reference several times already.[208] The rise of these professional associations (in parallel with lower-status artists, such as mimes, who did not enjoy the privileges of membership)[209] meant a privatization in the supply of performers that would not be wrong to describe, to use a modern term, as the subcontracting of local festivities to professional caterers who could provide everything necessary to stage elaborate festivals. The officials of a given polis would deal directly with representatives of the σύνοδοι for all their hiring needs rather than individually with each performer. The multiplication of theaters all throughout the Greek world (cf. Paus. 10.4.1), even in smaller cities that could not hope to fill all the scheduled events with local artists, greatly increased the demand for capable performers and encouraged the internationalization of the cultural life of Greece. Even the more prestigious sacred festivals[210] cultivated

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[207]See above, section 3.8 , pp. 183ff.

[208]For a comprehensive summary of the Διονυσιακοὶ τεχνῖται see Poland (1934). Shorter surveys are Ghiron-Bistagne (1976) 163–71 and Pickard-Cambridge (1988) 279–321, 365. Excellent updates in Aneziri (2003) and Le Guen (2001).

[209]See above, n. 169.

[210]In classical times, only the Olympic, Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean contests, all Panhellenic, enjoyed the status of 'sacred', i.e., they were ἱεροὶ στεφανῖται because the they did not offer money but crowns as prizes. Victors were called ἱερονῖκαι and στεφανῖται, and ultimately their reward came from the official recognition of their triumph by their own cities (they would 'bring in their crown', εἰσάγειν τὸν στέφανον). In exchange for their share of glory their native poleis would grant prerogatives that often entailed material compensation, e.g. the right to dine at public expense or to ἀτέλεια (exemption from some public burden). One such privilege was the right to drive into the city (εἰσελαύνειν) to public acclaim—the corresponding contest, in imperial times, being labeled εἰσελαστικός. Competitions which offered money prizes were called θεματῖται or ταλαντιαῖοι ἀγῶνες. Becoming a sacred victor would increase the likelihood of making even more money in the lesser games or in private engagements for the wealthy, who often rewarded participation with handsome sums. Cf. Robert (1989).

ties of friendship with the guilds, acknowledging their services with honorary decrees and grants of rights and privileges. Their aim was to encourage the participation of (and rivalry among) the various synods and, if at all possible, the supply of performances at their own expense as a favor to the city and a pious service to the gods, to be dutifully repaid with such honors as might foster similar benefactions in the future. We have already seen one important development in the performance of Homeric epic during Hellenistic times, the *homēristai*. These did not, however, belong to the synods of τεχνῖται, perhaps because, just as the mimes with whom they were often associated, they were unable to compete at sacred festivals. But their earliest attestation, Petronius, dates to the first century AD. And though we must reckon with the accidents of preservation, the over three-hundred-year interval between the end of the classical era and the first instance of the declaimer-actor should itself convince us that Homeric poetry must have survived in the hands of other artists who kept its performance alive and a part of the festival setting. And indeed, such is the case with the synods, from which we have epigraphical confirmation that epic generally (and, we must assume, Homeric epic in particular) did not lose its vitality, sustained not by the comparatively rarefied literary reaches of the Alexandrian court and its institutions of high-culture, the library and Mouseion, but by the circle of popular festivals where rhapsodes were still prized performers. Attested as members of the associations are the following professions:[211] σαλπιγκταί; κήρυκες; for poets, τραγικοὶ ποιηταί, κωμικοὶ ποιηταί, ποιηταὶ σατύρων, ποιηταὶ ἐπῶν, ποιηταὶ διθυράμβων, ποιηταὶ προσῳδίου; connected with drama, τραγῳδοί, κωμῳδοί, τραγικοὶ συναγωνισταί, κωμικοὶ συναγωνισταί, διδάσκαλοι (χοροῦ or αὐλητῶν), and τραγικοὶ ὑποδιδάσκαλοι;[212] for dancers (some involved in drama), κωμικοὶ χορευταί, παῖδες χορευταί, ἄνδρες χορευταί, and ὀρχησταί; for instrumentalists, κιθαρισταί or οἱ προσκιθαρίζοντες, αὐληταί or οἱ προσαυλίζοντες, and κιθαρῳδοί; for singers αὐλῳδοί, and ῳδοί; perhaps at times with reduced melody, else merely as declaimers, ῥαψῳδοί; for auxiliary staff, ἱματιομίσθαι and σκευοποιοί. Of course not all are attested for any given synod or inscription, and the role and precise sphere of expertise involved is not always clear to the modern scholar. With the distinction between mere ὑποκριταί and τραγῳδοί or κωμῳδοί, e.g., we are familiar from fourth-century BC Athens, when old dramas first (in 386) and then comedies (in 339) were admitted into festivals. The

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[211]Cf. Aneziri (2003) 425–28 table 3.

[212]For the meaning of διδάσκαλος, χοροδιδάσκαλος, and ὑποδιδάσκαλος see Sifakis (1967) 80–81 and 119–20.

need for new labels must have become necessary at least in part to be able to tell them apart in the *Fasti*. The oscillation for a time between ὑποκριτὴς παλαιᾶς τραγῳδίας or κωμῳδίας and τραγῳδός or κωμῳδός eventually gave way to the exclusive use of the latter (if nothing else, a significant saving of labor for the letter cutter). A similar terminological need may have spurred the coining of ὁμηριστής to distinguish him from the more traditional ῥαψῳδός: even though the former did not belong to the Dionysiac synods (or perhaps because of it), when their respective performance practices had so diverged as to mark them as two different kinds of artists, it must have been a matter of pride and prestige for the latter to be clearly set apart from the former. The *homēristēs* not only declaimed Homeric poetry but was also responsible for the *mise en scène*[213] (especially when several of them worked together to stage fighting duels). The rhapsode, in turn, need not have limited himself strictly to Homeric poetry, though we must assume, if only for reasons of continuity with the classical age, that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* remained the mainstay of his repertoire. But the mere presence of ποιηταὶ ἐπῶν shows that the composition of *epos*—here surely in the Aristotelian sense of hexametric poetry[214]—was common and popular. And this, in turn, suggests an expanded repertoire that could draw on relatively recent compositions. Athenaios 620c–d himself witnesses to the performance by rhapsodes not only of Homer, but also of Hesiod, Arkhilokhos, Mimnermos, and Phokylides. Thus, Klearkhos tells of a Simonides from Zakynthos who sitting on a stool performed Arkhilokhean poetry in the theater as a rhapsode.[215] And from Lysanias we learn about Mnasion the rhapsode, who acted the iambs of Simonides[216] in his shows.[217] Note the verb ὑποκρίνεσθαι in the context of 'shows' (δείξεις) before a theater audience. Other recorded instances are: Kleomenes the rhapsode reciting Empedokles' *Purifications* at Olympia; Hegesias the κωμῳδός (no. 1055 in Stephanēs)[218] and Hermophantos (no. 908 in Stehphanēs), perhaps also a comic actor, respectively 'acting'

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[213]Just as the τραγῳδός and κωμῳδός, for whom no authoring poet would play the role of διδάσκαλος.

[214]*Soph. el.* 180a20–21, *Metaph.* 1023a32–33 and 1093a30. Cf. Hdt. 4.29 and 7.220.

[215]Κλέαρχος δ᾽ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ περὶ Γρίφων τὰ Ἀρχιλόχου, φησίν, [ὁ] Σιμωνίδης ὁ Ζακύνθιος ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ἐπὶ δίφρου καθήμενος ἐραψῴδει.

[216]For the identity of this 'Simonides' see above, n. 105.

[217]Λυσανίας δ᾽ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ Ἰαμβοποιῶν Μνασίωνα τὸν ῥαψῳδὸν λέγει ἐν ταῖς δείξεσι τῶν Σιμωνίδου τινὰς ἰάμβων ὑποκρίνεσθαι.

[218]For Stephanēs's numbers see below, n. 226.

(ὑποκρίνασθαι) Hesiod and Homer in the great theater in Alexandria.[219] There is no doubt that these are far from the stereotype of a *homēristēs*: they almost certainly performed alone, one even sitting on a stool; and what they 'acted' (e.g. Hesiod or the *Purifications*) was far from the bloody fights some associate with *homēristai*. Nor is Hegesias' label as a 'comic actor' in any obvious way related to his 'acting' Hesiod.

3.10.2   The Τεχνῖται and Specialization

One aspect of the practice of artists during Hellenistic times that has obvious implications for the partial convergence between rhapsodic and dramatic performance is the matter of specialization. With the passing of time there were two simultaneous movements, in some ways mutually complementary, in some ways the result of opposing tendencies: the one led to finer distinctions between artists and is reflected in the proliferation of titles that described increasingly narrow areas of expertise; the other was embodied by individual artists who crossed the newly defined boundaries, proving that their proficiency extended beyond the confines of a single field and gaining for their accomplishments the right to use more than one professional label. Many years before, Plato's Sokrates had already taken it for granted that neither dramatic poets nor actors could successfully cross the generic boundary between tragedy and comedy, that whoever distinguished himself in one could not, by the very nature of mimesis, prove proficient in both.[220] His argument is not fully developed. It appears to depend on the assumption that excellence requires the single-minded pursuit of a goal; and that mimesis, by taking one away from his true self, breaks the requisite unity of being. A similar point of view, but with quite different arguments, is put forth at *Ion* 534c3–4: now the boundaries between the several compositional genres are set not by personal ability but by the Muse's gift of inspiration. The opposite case is defended at the end of the *Symposion*.[221] There is, however, a crucial distinction

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[219]τοὺς δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους Καθαρμοὺς ἐραψῴδησεν Ὀλυμπίασι Κλεομένης ὁ ῥαψῳδός, ὥς φησιν Δικαίαρχος ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ. Ἰάσων δ' ἐν τρίτῳ περὶ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἱερῶν ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ φησὶν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ θεάτρῳ ὑποκρίνασθαι Ἡγησίαν τὸν κωμῳδὸν τὰ Ἡσιόδου, Ἑρμόφαντον δὲ τὰ Ὁμήρου.

[220]*Rep.* 395a1–b1: —Σχολῇ ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει γέ τι ἅμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μιμήσεται καὶ ἔσται μιμητικός, ἐπεί που οὐδὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμεῖσθαι, οἷον κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ποιοῦντες. ἢ οὐ μιμήματε ἄρτι τούτω ἐκάλεις; —Ἔγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ γε λέγεις, ὅτι οὐ δύνανται οἱ αὐτοί. οὐδὲ μὴν ῥαψῳδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα. —Ἀληθῆ. —Ἀλλ' οὐδέ τοι ὑποκριταὶ κωμῳδοῖς τε καὶ τραγῳδοῖς οἱ αὐτοί· πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μιμήματα. ἢ οὔ; Note that the objection is extended to rhapsodes and actors.

[221]*Symp.* 223d1–6: τὸ μέντοι κεφάλαιον, ἔφη, προσαναγκάζειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁμολογεῖν αὐτοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνῃ τραγῳδοποιὸν ὄντα ⟨καὶ⟩

here. Sokrates speaks of ὁ τέχνῃ τραγῳδοποιὸς ὤν: if it be granted that the composition of tragic plays is a matter of τέχνη, it follows that one and the same composer can be both a tragedian and a comedian. With this agrees Cicero's sentiment in the *Orator*.[222] Thus, we have an acknowledgment, however fortuitous, of the dynamic of specialization that gave rise both to ever refined specialties and to the drive by the more ambitious performers to master several of them. But this phenomenon cannot be merely reduced to a matter of bearing labels. We have epigraphical evidence that boundaries were crossed even when the individual in question did not publicly own the corresponding titles.[223] A study of the degree to which professionals exceeded the limits of one specialty is partially hindered by the incomplete epigraphical testimony. It is hazardous to equate various instances of the same name, e.g., if the identity of patronymic and place of origin (ethnic or demotic *vel sim.*) cannot be established. As far as the data in our possession allow us to determine it, the general trend is towards an increasing versatility or willingness to exceed in practice one's putative area of expertise. Just to offer an illustration: Sifakis (1967) 119 observes that the same persons are sometimes called χοροδιδάσκαλοι, sometimes ὑποδιδάσκαλοι. The old canonical distinction (reflected, e.g., by Photios) lay between the poet, the διδάσκαλος, and his aid, the ὑποδιδάσκαλος, who was more narrowly concerned with the chorus (ὁ τῶι χορῶι καταλέγων). As the artists traveled around and put on the same performance in the absence of the poet, presumably the ὑποδιδάσκαλος would act as producer. The old opposition was no longer applicable, and the more specific term χοροδιδάσκαλος may now be used to express the added responsibility, while still maintaining the focus on the training of the chorus. A certain Elpinikos, e.g., in his visit to Delphi the year 130/29 BC as representative of his guild was described as a tragic ὑποδιδάσκαλος (*IG* II² 1132.46, 72). Two years later, as participant in the second Phythais, he was called χοροδιδάσκαλος (*SIG*³ 698.28) and was also numbered among those who sang the paean (*ibid.* 15). But at the first Pythais he conducted the choir of boys with Kleon the χοροδιδάσκαλος (*FD* III.2.11, 20–22).[224] Sifakis

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κωμῳδοποιὸν εἶναι. For a philosophical analysis of this contrast between the *Ion* and the *Symposion* see Harris (2001).

[222]Cic. *Orator* 109: "histriones eos vidimus quibus nihil posset in suo genere esse praestantius, qui non solum in dissimillimis personis satis faciebant, cum tamen in suis versarentur, sed et comoedum in tragoediis et tragoedum in comoediis admodum placere vidimus." See also the statement in Aristot. *Pol.* 1276b4–6.

[223]Fundamental here is the study by Chaniotis (1990). See also the comments in O'Connor (1908) 39–44 and Sifakis (1967) 81, 119–20.

[224]Cf. *SIG*³ 696b.

(1967) 120 concludes: "Evidently therefore the *hypodidaskaloi* were qualified musicians, competent to conduct a purely musical performance." We need not, however, press to the corollary that in the second and first centuries BC there was no difference between χοροδιδάσκαλοι and ὑποδιδάσκαλοι. There might have been flexibility in labeling professionals not because the terms were entirely interchangeable, but because the ethos of the professional association allowed for exploration and the acquisition of ever greater expertise in activities related to one's original training. Crossing terminological boundaries was coextensive with a real broadening of technical purview. This same dynamic was at work at the interface between the dramatic and the rhapsodic trades, and the proliferation of such cross-over in Hellenistic and imperial times was only the logical consequence of the increased professionalism and the mutual influence to which the practices peculiar to the several performers were subjected as they interacted one with another in the context of tightly articulated artistic associations.[225] Using the ground-breaking study by Stephanēs (1988), which includes the fullest prosopography of artists to date, Chaniotis (1990) has collected the following cases in which rhapsodic performance is combined with some other specialty:[226]

1. χορευτής, αὐλῳδός, ῥαψῳδός[227]   (2174)

2. ᾠδός, τραγικὸς συναγωνιστής, ῥαψῳδός[228]   (1146, 1368, 1913)

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[225]Chaniotis (1990) 92 seems to work with too strict a definition of specialization when he questions, e.g., whether we can truly consider Elpinikos, to use our previous example, a master of three specialties: singer, χοροδιδάσκαλος, and ὑποδιδάσκαλος. He is right, of course, that strictly speaking we only have parallel descriptions of a given individual's activities, and these do not reveal what his training or apprenticeship might have been, or which of these activities (if any) was the primary one. But surely it is more important to realize that, moving at the highest professional levels, Elpinikos both had occasion and felt free to participate in the various capacities recorded, and was recognized and honored for it. As regards our focus on the degree to which such cross-over occurred, it is only a matter of relative interest whether he achieved the same level of proficiency and success in all of them. More significant is that the cross-over occurred at all.

[226]The numbers refer to Stephanēs's (1988) study, and the identifications and dates (as he gives them) are as follows. **2174**: Πυθοκλῆς Ἀριστάρχου Ἑρμιονεύς, III.2 (= second quarter of the third century BC). **1146**: Θεόδοτος Πυθίωνος Ἀθηναῖος, I.1. **1368**: Κάλλων Κάλλωνος Ἀθηναῖος, I.1. **1913**: Ξενόφαντος Εὐμάχου Ἀθηναῖος, I.1. **908**: Ἑρμόφαντος, III.3. **1055**: Ἡγησίας, III.2/3. **1979**: Πόπλιος Αἴλιος Πομπηϊανὸς Παίων Σιδήτης καὶ Ταρσεὺς καὶ Ῥόδιος, II.2 AD. **822**: Εἴρανος (or Ἴρανος) Φρυνίδου Ταναγραῖος, I.1–2. **54**: Ἀείμναστος Εὐφραίου Θηβαῖος, II/I. **955**: Μᾶρ. Αὐρ. Εὔκαιρος Ταναγραῖος, III.4 AD. **956**: Κορνήλιος Εὔκαρπος Ἀργεῖος, II/III AD. (For "X/Y" read 'boundary between X and Y'; for "X–Y", 'period from X to Y'.)

[227]Also in Le Guen (2001) 2.128.

[228]Also in Le Guen (2001) 2.128, who adds a fourth, no. 732, a certain Διονύσιος Διονυσοδώρου Ἀθηναῖος from the first century BC, whom Stephanēs labels only as a singer (ᾠδός). I cannot confirm from her own sources Le Guen's additional τραγικὸς συναγωνιστής and ῥαψῳδός, so I omit no. 732 from the references here.

3. κωμικὸς ὑποκριτής, ῥαψῳδός   (908)

4. κωμῳδός, ῥαψῳδός   (1055)

5. ποιητής, μελοποιός, ῥαψῳδός, θεολόγος   (1979)

6. κῆρυξ, τραγῳδός, κωμικός, ῥαψῳδός   (822)

7. κῆρυξ, ῥαψῳδός   (54, 955, 956)

For our purposes, it is significant that 2–4 and 6 provide seven cases in which professional performers are explicitly known to have practiced both as a rhapsode and as an actor. The numbers are small, surely owing to how improbable it is that the versatility and accomplishments of a given artist in more than one area of expertise would be recorded and the record would survive. The evidence, therefore, is significant well beyond its numbers, and it is doubtless in agreement with the kinship between rhapsody and acting we have been exploring.[229] Taking all the disciplines into account, we find that most of the combinations show activities that are closely related in their practices. This is predictable, for the training in one made the performer, if not proficient, at least able to try his hand at the others. So, e.g., the trained voice of the singer would stand him in good stead as an actor; or the tragic actor, who often sang arias on stage, could with relative ease compete as a singer, especially if (as Chaniotis, 1990, 93 suggests) he did so with memorable excerpts from plays in which he had acted. This can also be said of those who combined acting and rhapsody: voice, stage presence, and scripted delivery all contributed to the cross-over; the artist needed only to add the corresponding works to his repertoire. Thus, Chaniotis (1990) 93 seems justified in concluding that, "Trotz der häufigen Kombination mehrerer Tätigkeiten, dürfen wir also tatsächlich von einer Spezialisierung reden; es handelt sich zwar nicht immer um eine Spezialisierung in einer bestimmten Tätigkeit, aber doch einer Spezialisierung im Bereich der Kunst."

3.10.3 Rhapsodes in the Inscriptional Record

An important development in the performance of epic poetry during the Hellenistic period is the rise of the so-called 'poet of epics', ἐπῶν ποιητής, often featured in

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[229]Commenting on the entire record, not just the instances that include rhapsodes, Chaniotis (1990) 93 writes: "Diese 126 Personen sind vielleicht prozentual gesehen eine sehr kleine Minderheit (weniger als 4%); angesichts jedoch der Lücken unserer Überlieferung ist diese Zahl eigentlich sehr hoch."

honorific and festival inscriptions.[230] To be distinguished from the ῥαψῳδός, with whom he frequently appears, he probably composed and performed new epic poetry, whereas the rhapsode must have concerned himself predominantly, if not solely, with a traditional repertoire.[231] Although nothing survives to confirm explicitly that such was the difference between them, it is clear that both he and the rhapsode concerned themselves with epic (the rhapsode, largely so, if not exclusively).[232] We may confidently credit an increasing professionalism among performers with the creation of ever more precise subdisciplines, together with the labels used to tell them apart. Once the specialization of a competitive event had take place—demanding, e.g., not only a rhapsodic declamation but, specifically, the declamation of a *new* epic poem, perhaps even composed for the very festival in question—giving proper recognition to the performer made it necessary to distinguish his particular area of accomplishment from others closely related. This need was especially acute for inscribed catalogs of victors, which had to state with the utmost economy of expression the competitive categories that accompanied the name of the winning performer. As I have argued in Chapter 1,[233] the association of the epic meter with elevation of style and solemnity of purpose goes back to its religious roots in prophetic and mantic poetry. Indeed, what I have called 'revelatory' poetry[234] made dactylic hexameter the meter of choice. The Homeric poems had acquired the status of cultural icons by the time Aristotle classified the heroic meter as σεμνός (*Rh.* 1408b32). Therefore, its selection by the poetic tradition of Greek praise—to which, as we shall see presently,[235] the production of the 'poet of epics' bears a close relation—was natural: it would serve well to celebrate individuals, peoples, cities, islands, countries, or any other subject connected with the circumstances of performance (its location, the performer, his audience, a patron or an influential citizen, etc.).[236] As Weil (1900) 243 observed, the Greeks did not

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[230]Important studies on the 'poet of epics' are Frei (1900) 57–59, Guarducci (1926–29) 631–40, Powell (1929), Pallone (1984), and Fantuzzi *apud* Ziegler (1988), pp. XXXIV–LXXXVIII.

[231]So, e.g., Fantuzzi *apud* Ziegler (1988), p. XXXVI: "Il *rhapsodós* recitava opere di autori precedenti (più spesso di Omero, si può immaginare dal gradimento testimoniato per questo autore dai papiri . . . ; il *poietès epôn* recitava epica propria di tipo tradizionale, cioè mitologica oppure storico-locale."

[232]See above, p. 208.

[233]See above, p. 64.

[234]See above, section 1.3.2, pp. 41ff.

[235]See below, p. 215.

[236]One can easily find early examples of this encomiastic tradition. Thus, Diogenes Laertios 9.20 reports that Xenophanes had composed poetry about the foundation of Kolophon, his native city, and a two-thousand-line epic on the settlement of Elea. Towards the end of the fifth century BC

speak of the ἐπικὸς ποιητής (nor τραγικός or κωμικός, for that matter), because at first ποιητής meant not 'poet', but 'maker': thus, not 'epic maker' but 'maker of epics' (whereas 'epic poet' would have been quite natural). Inscriptional nomenclature was conservative and, even when equating ποιητής with poet became common, it held to the old label. This does not rule out our conjecture that ordinarily the poet of epics would have declaimed his own works. Therefore, the opposition 'rhapsode vs. poet of epics' could be formulated either as 'performer of *traditional* epic vs. performer of *new* epic' or as '*performer* of epic vs. *composer* of epic'. Clearly, one cannot definitely rule out the possibility that, on occasion, the rhapsode might have declaimed what the poet of epics had composed. If so, the competition would have recognized the victorious performer as performer, and the victorious composer as composer. But we must assume that the traditional rhapsodic competition continued after the model of classical festivals, with the rhapsode declaiming the traditional repertoire (Homer, Hesiod, Arkhilokhos, and others); and that festivals gave increasing recognition to the more recent composer-performer of epic (for whom, in classical times, Antimakhos of Kolophon provides a ready model), who made the rounds of local festivals with compositions in honor of the cities, rulers, heroes, or gods connected with the celebration at which he would compete (ἀγών) or offer a show of skill (ἐπίδειξις). Pallone (1984) 161, in trying to identify the earliest instance of 'poet of epics', accepts the very tentative reconstruction of *SEG* 3.368 [ἐπῶν ποιητ]ής, but inexplicably dates the inscription to the fourth century BC; the editor, however, dates it to the second century BC. (Cf. Steph. 2909, who himself dates it to the middle of the second century BC, specifically, to II 2/3.)[237] The scarcity in the inscriptional record of

Antimakhos of Kolophon and Nikeratos Herakleotes competed at the Lysandreia with what must have been epic poems (almost certainly hymnic encomia) in honor of Lysander, himself present for the occasion (Plu. *Lys.* 18.8, Test. 2 Wyss or 2 Matthews). Of course, epic hymns to various divinities are collected into the corpus of the so-called "Homeric" hymns; no less a poet than Arkhilokhos carried the prize at a competition in Paros with a hymn to Demeter (schol. to Aristophanes' *Birds ad* 1764). It is precisely such epic compositions that we are to imagine formed the rhapsodic Arkhilokhean repertoire to which Plato's Ion alludes (531a3). One cannot rule out the rhapsodizing of other meters: Diogenes Laertios 9.18, after stating that Xenophanes "wrote in hexameters, elegies, and iambs" (γέγραφε δὲ ἐν ἔπεσι καὶ ἐλεγείας καὶ ἰάμβους), goes on to say that "he himself rhapsodized his own compositions" (αὐτὸς ἐρραψῴδει τὰ ἑαυτοῦ). It is clear that ῥαψῳδέω, focusing attention on the mode, rather than the substance, of performance, could be used for meters other than epic. Nevertheless, it is likely that a rhapsode schooled in epic who ventured into Arkhilokhos would sooner rhapsodize his epic hymn to Demeter than his iambs (but cf. Ford, 1988, 302). Other Hellenistic instances of encomiastic epic are the infamous poets of Alexander's court and those who eulogized Antigonos Gonatas, Antigonos Soter, and others. See Hardie (1983) 86–87.

[237]For the meaning of nomenclature such as 'II 2/3', used by Stephanes for dates, see below, p. 216.

individuals that can be persuasively argued to have been both poet and rhapsode argues for a stubborn separation between the traditional and the new repertoire, a reflection perhaps of an attitude of narrow engagement best exemplified by Plato's Ion, who vehemently denied any interest in poets (even traditional ones) other than Homer.[238] The only instance I am familiar with of an individual qualified both as ῥαψῳδός and [ποιη]τής is Πόπλιος Αἴλιος Πομπη[ιανὸς] Παίων (Steph. 1979), from the famous inscription of the Colossus of Memnon.[239] In his case the appellative is to be taken broadly: he is called [ποιη]τοῦ πλειστονείκου, μελοποιοῦ καὶ ῥαψ[ῳδοῦ] ‖ [θε]οῦ Ἀδριανοῦ, at a time when the various Western synods of τεχνῖται of Dionysos had been consolidated into one imperial association. As his title of rhapsode of the divine Hadrian shows, his labor is too closely associated with imperial cult to serve as an adequate illustration of a performer who was both a regular rhapsode and a poet.[240]

The relationship between the poet of epics and the encomiastic tradition is undeniable, and we should not be surprised to find that with increasing refinements in the competitive categories—probably responding to the rise of the prose encomium—the label 'poet of epics' would have given way to 'epic encomium'. There are inscriptions, however, where 'epic encomium' and 'poet of epics' coexist, e.g. *IG* VII 416.9, 13 (*EO* 523.9, 13): the epic encomiast is [Δ]ημοκλῆς Ἀμινίου Θηβαῖος (Steph. 645), known from Papagiannopoulos (1947–48) 75.20, not surprisingly, as an ἐπῶν ποιητής; and the poet of epics is Ἀγαθοκλῆς Θεοδοσίου Νεαπολίτης (Steph. 26), not otherwise known. Another instance of this close connection is the double victory of Μήστωρ Μήστορος Φωκαιεύς (Steph. 1686) under [ἐ]πικόν and ἐπῶν ποιητής at the Ἀμφιαράια καὶ Ῥωμαῖα of Ōrōpos (*IG* VII 418.5, 9 and *EO* 524.6, 10).[241] It is impossible to say

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[238]It is helpful to refer here to Tracy (1975) 60–67 n. 7h (cf. *FD* III 2, 48), an inscription from Delphi honoring the Athenian τεχνῖται on the occasion of the fourth Pythais (98/7 BC). Given the number of participants named, we might reasonably have expected it to cite under both 'poets of epics' and 'rhapsodes' anyone skilled in both categories, had there been such a one in the synod. But the ἐπῶν ποιητάς (line 43) are Ἀρίστων Μενελάου (Steph. 394), Διοφάνης Θεοδώρου (Steph. 782), and Λυσίας Λυσιμάχου (Steph. 1577). Whereas we do not meet again the last two in any other inscription, the first is listed as a [τραγι]κὸν ποιητάν in 17, as ᾠδός (implicitly) in line 23, and among the [π]οητὰς σατύρων in 48. The rhapsodes in this case were Κάλλων Κάλλωνος, Θεόδοτος Πυθίωνος, and Ξενόφαντος Εὐμάχου (line 44).

[239]See *SEG* 20.673–90 and Wankel (1979) no. 22, pp. 134–39.

[240]Cf. Poland (1934) 2514–19.

[241]A third instance, if the reconstruction [ἐπῶν ποιητὰς Δι]οφάνην Διοδώρου, Κράτερον Ἀντι[of *FD* III 2, 49.25 is accepted, is the poet Κράτερος Ἀντιπάτρου Ἀμφιπολίτης (Steph. 1488), who appears in *IG* VII 420.12 (*EO* 528.12) as winner of ἐγκώμιον ἐπικόν.

with certainty what the precise difference between these two competitive events must have been. Possibly, just a distinction in the subject matter: an individual vis-à-vis a deity or a city? It is clear, however, that whatever overlap these categories enjoyed did not prevent their joint appearance at the Amphiaraia of Ōrōpos in the first century BC, as witnessed by *IG* VII 416, 418, 419, 420 (*EO* 523, 524, 526, and 528).[242] The contemporaneous *IG* VII 2727, however, from the Soteria at Akraipheia, features an ἐνκώμιον λογικόν and an ἐπῶν ποιητής, but no ἐνκώμιον ἐπικόν. This confirms our intuition that the poetry of the poet of epics and the epic encomium are closely related, with the latter a peculiar instantiation of the former, perhaps openly incorporating, in epic meter, the rhetorical conventions of the prose encomium as to subject matter, arrangement, or the like.

Prosopography of Rhapsodes

Here follows a list of the rhapsodes extant in the inscriptional record.

Abbreviations used:

EO B. X. Πετράκος Οἱ Ἐπιγραφὲς τοῦ Ὠρωποῦ

PA I. Kirchner *Prosopographia Attica*

Reisch A. Reisch *De musicis graecorum certaminibus*

Steph. Stephanēs Διονψσιακοὶ Τεχνῖται

For dates the Roman numerals refer to the century (BC unless otherwise noted); an additional Arabic numeral refers to the quarter of the century in question. Thus, e.g., III.3 would be the third quarter of the 3rd century BC (ca. 250–225 BC).

IV Century BC

1. Ἄλεξις Ταραντῖνος (Steph. **127**, IV.3/4) ῥαψῳδός

   Athenaios 538e (XII.54.27). Performed for Alexander at Susa.

2. Κλεομένης (Steph. **1445**, V/IV) ῥαψῳδός

   Diogenes Laertios 8.63; Athenaios 620d: τοὺς δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους Καθαρμοὺς ἐραψῴδησεν Ὀλυμπίασι Κλεομένης ὁ ῥαψῳδός, ὥς φησιν Δικαίαρχος ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ.

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[242]In *IG* VII 418, 419, and 420, it to be contrasted with καταλογάδην (418 and 420) and λογικόν (419; restored also in 416).

3. Σωσίστρατος (Steph. **2355**, IV?)

Aristotle's *Poetics* 1462a7.

4.]στρατος Σικυώνι(ος) (Steph. **2786**, IV.2–3) ῥαψ]ωιδός? (αὐλ]ωιδὸς π[αῖς more likely)

IG VII 414.4, EO 520.4. Ἀμφιαράϊα] τὰ μεγάλ[α] of Ōrōpos.

For the date see EO p. 413. In IG VII 414 Dittenberger made him out to be a κιθαρ]ωιδός, possible only on the assumption that the preceding word, Θηβαῖ(ος), is abbreviated (the spacing allows only for five letters). The restoration ῥαψ]ωιδός is marginally possible (with Θηβαῖος unabbreviated); so, e.g., Frei (1900) 71.II. But as printed in EO 520.3, it seems best with E. Preuner (in MDAI(A) 28, 1903, 338–46) to supply αὐλ]ωιδὸς π[αῖς.

III Century BC

1. Ἀγαθῖνος Κριτοδήμο[υ Σικ]υώνιος (Steph. **18**, III.2) ῥα[ψωι]δός

   Nachtergael (1977) 420 n. 9, line 9. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, in 258/7 or 254/3 BC.

2. Ἀρισταγό[ρας] (Steph. **306**, III.2) ῥαψωιδός

   Nachtergael (1977) 408 n. 3, line 5. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, ca. 265–258 BC.

3. Ἀριστείδης Ἀρίστωνος [—]ς (Steph. **318**, III.2) ῥα[ψωι]δός

   Nachtergael (1977) 420 n. 9, line 10. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, in 258/7 or 254/3 BC.

4. Ἀριστομένης Ἀριστομένου [—]ιος (Steph. **362**, III.2) ῥα[ψωι]δός

   Nachtergael (1977) 420 n. 9, line 11. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, in 258/7 or 254/3 BC.

5. Ἀρχέλας Θετταλός (Steph. **435**, III.1) ῥαψῳδός

   IG XI 105.27. At Delos in 284 BC. His performance, an ἐπίδειξις, is listed under the heading ἐπεδείξαντο τῶι θεῶι.

6. Γλαῦκος Ἀθηναῖος (Steph. **549**, III.1) ῥαψῳδός

   IG XI 105.28. At Delos in 284 BC. His performance, an ἐπίδειξις, is listed under the heading ἐπεδείξαντο τῶι θεῶι.

7. Ἑρμόφαντος (Steph. **908**, III.3) ῥαψῳδός, κωμικός, ὑποκριτής

   Athenaios 620d: Ἰάσων δ' ἐν τρίτῳ περὶ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἱερῶν ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ φησὶν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ θεάτρῳ ὑποκρίνασθαι Ἡγησίαν τὸν κωμῳδὸν τὰ Ἡσιόδου, Ἑρμόφαντον δὲ τὰ Ὁμήρου. It is not clear whether the rhapsode is really the same individual as the κωμικός and ὑποκριτής. See Steph. *ad loc.*

8. Εὐθ]ύδημος Χάρητος Ἀθηναῖος (Steph. **948**, III.2) ῥαψωιδός

   Nachtergael (1977) 423 n. 10, lines 9–10. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, in 257/6 or 253/2 BC.

9. Εὐρύβιος Λυκίσκου Μεγαλοπ[ολίτης] (Steph. **982**, III.2) ῥαψωιδός

   Nachtergael (1977) 479 n. 63, line 6; 480 n. 64, line 6. Αἰτωλικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, ca. 225–221 BC.

10. Ζηνόδοτος Σωπάτρου Ἀντιοχεύς ἀπὸ Πυρά[μου] (Steph. **1024**, III.4) ῥαψῳδός

    IG VII 1762.5, Jamot (1895) 333 n. 7, line 5. The overlap of names with Jamot (1895) 332–33 n. 6 convincingly ties n. 7 to the Μουσεῖα of Thespiai.[243] Feyel (1942) 113 persuasively argues that two celebrations of the Μουσεῖα, even if chronologically close, can hardly have had the same winners in five different categories. Yet this would be the case unless n. 6 and n. 7 refer to one and the same festival. And although scholars have followed Jamot (1895) 346 in thinking them to be "séparées l'une de l'autre par quelques années à peine," there is in fact no need to do so. For line 8 of n. 6 refers clearly to οἱ νικήσαντες τὸν θυμ[ε]λ[ικόν]; and hence it is only natural that it would merely list those events reclassified under the umbrella of the στεφανίτης θυμελικὸς ἀγών. Whereas n. 7 would be a fragment of the complete catalog of victors, with the addition of any event that had not been reorganized as στεφανῖται (see more on this immediately below). If we adopt this more plausible assumption, then n. 7

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[243] All the names in n. 7 appear under the same competitive headings in n. 6 except for two: Ζηνόδοτος the ῥαψῳδός and a Σώφιλος Σωτέ[λους] whom Jamot (1895) 349 thinks might be a κῆρυξ or σαλπιστής and Steph. 2377 makes out to be a [ποιητὴς προσοδίου]. At any rate, his competitive event joins rhapsody and ἐπινίκια as additions vis-à-vis the n. 6.

dates from the same time as n. 6, namely, ca. 210–203 BC.[244] The competitive events that survive on n. 7 are: ποητὴς ἐπ[ῶν], ῥαψωιδός, αὐλητής, αὐλωιδός, κιθαριστής, κιθαρωιδός, and ἐπινίκια. Concerning the third-century BC reorganization of the Μουσεῖα by Thespiai and the Boiotian league, we learn from the decree of the Isthmian and Nemean *koinon* ratifying it[245] that recognition as στεφανίτης ἰσοπύθιος was sought for a θυμελικὸς ἀγών of αὐλητῶν καὶ αὐλωιδῶν καὶ κιθαριστῶν καὶ κιθαρωιδῶν καὶ ἐπῶν ποητῇ (*sic*).[246] ῥαψωιδῶν is conspicuously absent from this list, which has led some to conclude that its appearance in n. 7 was an innovation.[247] But, as already noted, this does not mean that initially rhapsodes did not take part in the reorganized festival; only, that their competition remained θεματικός. Arguably, both as a professional trade and a competitive category, rhapsody was more traditional than the events reorganized as στεφανῖται; and rhapsodes may well have been more popular with the festival public. If so, the officials involved in the reorganization of the Μουσεῖα might have been hesitant to change the prizes for rhapsodes lest the festival's appeal to them be diminished: the winner, then, must have continued to fetch a monetary reward.[248]

11. Ἡγησίας (Steph. **1055**, III.2/3) ῥαψῳδός

Athenaios 620d. See above, item 7.

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[244]For the dating of n. 6 see Feyel (1942) 116–17, followed by Roesch (1982) 188–89 n. 32 (his dating of n. 7 is explicitly given on page 493). Cf. also Aneziri (2003) 412 Gb1.

[245]Fr. A in Jamot (1895) 313ff. n. 1 or *SIG*³ 457; fr. B in *IG* VII 1735a. See, most recently, Aneziri (2003) 360–61 B4. Cf. Ringwood (1927) 48–49 and Feyel (1942) 88–112.

[246]Here, as noted above, I follow Feyel (1942) 112–14.

[247]Cf., e.g., Ringwood (1927) 49.

[248]It is worth noting that none of the other inscriptions (nn. 8–18) in Jamot (1895) require the absence of rhapsody. The ones that do not list rhapsodes are 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, and 17. But n. 16 was reedited with additional material in *SEG* 3.334, and lines 29–30 show a [ῥαψῳδό]ς | [—]ιου Ὑπαταῖος; n. 8 is too fragmentary (Jamot's line 12, θυμ[ελικὸς ἀγών], might have excluded mention of a rhapsode, but it has been corrected to ἐνε[ί]κων οἵδε by Roesch, 1982, 189 n. 33); none of the fragmentary 9, 10, 11, and 14 rule out a possible rhapsodic event from the text that perished. Only n. 17, from the third quarter of II AD, might suggest the absence of rhapsody: enough of the catalog is left for us to expect ῥαψῳδός to appear—perhaps in line 8 after the κῆρυξ or in line 17 before the κιθαριστής. But the inscription breaks after the name of the poet of new comedy and, if the list continued at that point, one cannot completely rule out the possibility that a winning rhapsode may have appeared in the text that perished.

12. Καλλίας Ἀρχετίμου Συρακ[όσιος] (Steph. **1325**, III.2) ῥαψωιδός

    Nachtergael (1977) 409 n. 4, line 13. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, ca. 265–
    258 BC.

13. Κλειτόριος Ἀριστείδου Ἀρκάς (Steph. **1429**, III.2) ῥαψωιδός

    Nachtergael (1977) 409 n. 4, line 12; 413 n. 7, line 11; 416 n. 8, line 10; 423
    n. 10, line 8–9. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, ca. 265–252 BC.

14. Νικίας (Steph. **1820**, III.4) ῥαψωιδός

    Nachtergael (1977) 481 n. 65, line 7. Αἰτωλικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, ca. 217/6 BC.

15. [Νι]κομή[δης —] (Steph. **1858**, III) [ῥα]ψωιδός

    Kontorini (1975) 102, side B, line 5. [τ]ὰ μεγ[άλα Ἐρεθίμια] of Rhodes.

16. Π[—] (Steph. **1971**, III.3) ῥαψωιδός

    Nachtergael (1977) 476 n. 59, line 6. Αἰτωλικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, perhaps
    in 241/0 BC.

17. Πολύμνηστος Ἀλεξάνδρου Ἀρκάς (Steph. **2106**, III.2) ῥαψωιδός

    Nachtergael (1977) 413 n. 7, line 10. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, in 260/59
    or 256/5 BC.

18. Πυθοκλῆς Ἀριστάρχου Ἑρμιονεύς (Steph. **2174**, III.2) [ῥαψωι]δός

    Nachtergael (1977) 408 n. 3, lines 3 and 14–15; 409 n. 4, lines 7–8; 411 n. 5,
    line 9; 417 n. 8, lines 30–31. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, ca. 265–254 BC.

19. Σίμαχ?]ος Σατύρου Ἀργεῖος (Steph. **2273**, III.3) [ῥαψωιδός]

    Nachtergael (1977) 478 n. 62, line 5. Αἰτωλικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, perhaps
    in 229/8 BC.

20. Φιλοκράτης Λυσίππου Ἀργεῖος (Steph. **2530**, III.4) [ῥαψ]ωιδός

    Nachtergael (1977) 482 n. 66, line 7. Αἰτωλικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, perhaps
    in 213/2 or 205/4 BC.

21. [— 4–5 —]ν Θρασωνίδου Σινωπεύς (Steph. **2729**, III.2) ῥα[ψωι]δός

    Nachtergael (1977) 416 n. 8, line 11. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, perhaps
    in 259/8 or 255/4 BC.

22. —]ράτης Καλλιφ[— (Steph. **2762**, III.2) [ῥαψωιδός?]

Nachtergael (1977) 411 n. 5, line 11. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, perhaps in 262/1 or 258/7 BC.

23. [—] [—]ς Ἀθηναῖος (Steph. **2886**, III.2) [ῥαψωιδός?]

Nachtergael (1977) 411 n. 5, line 12. Ἀμφικτυονικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, perhaps in 262/1 or 258/7 BC.

24. ỊΑΛΛΗΣ (Steph. **2979**, III.4) ῥαψωιδός

Nachtergael (1977) 483 n. 68, line 6. Αἰτωλικὰ Σωτήρια of Delphi, perhaps in 205/4 or 209/8 BC. Flacelière: "Je crois lire ΦΑΛΛΗΣ ou ΨΑΛΛΗΣ"; Βυδάλης (?) or ̣ṬΥΛΛΗΣ, perhaps Εὐάδης, Jardé; ΑΛΛΗΣ, Nikitsky. Ḳαλλίας, Klaffenbach.

II Century BC

1. Ἄβρων Φιλοξένου Θηβαῖος (Steph. **12**, II/I) ῥαψῳδός

   Jamot (1895) 339 n. 12, line 22, corrected by Roesch (1982) 494.[249] Μουσεῖ[α] of Thespiai.

   Dated by Roesch to 110–90 BC. The order of events is: σαλπιστής, [κῆρ]υξ, ποιητὴς ἐπῶν, ῥαψωιδός, αὐλητής, and αὐλωιδός. The poet of epics is Μνάσαρχος Δάμωνος Θεσπιεύς (Steph. 1712).

2. Ἀείμναστος Ε[ὐφ]ραίου Θηβαῖος (Steph. **54**, II/I) κῆρυξ, ῥαψῳδός

   IG VII 2448.3–6. An unknown festival.

   According to Roehl, from Tanagra or Orkhomenos. Reisch (1885) 127.XI, in turn, conjectures that it may be from the Agrionia (accepted by Pallone, 1984, 156n1) or from another of the Theban festivals. On this occasion Ἀείμναστος won both as κῆρυξ and as ῥαψ[ῳδ]ός. Dittenberger arrived at the date by comparing it *IG* VII 416 (inverting Reisch's, 1885, 127.XI reasoning). Note that the rhapsode precedes the ἐπῶ[ν ποιητ]ής of lines 7–8.

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[249]Cf. also Roesch (1982) 192 n. 38. His corrections supersede Jamot's Αμ[—]λος [—]ους Θηβαῖος and the (Λ)ό[κ]ρ[ω]ν [Φ]ιλοσ[όφ]ου [Ἀ]θηναῖος of Keramopoulos in Ἀρχ. Ἐφ. 1936, p. 41 n. 217 of the supplement.

3. Μιλτιάδης Διονυσίου (Steph. **1708**, II) ῥαψῳδός

   SIG 959.9

4. [—] [Βοι]ώτιος (Steph. **2919**, II.2/3) [ῥαψῳδ?]ος

   SEG 3.368, line 12. Βασίλεια τῆς Λεβάδειας.

I Century BC

1. Ἀγάθων Δαμᾶ Θεσπιεύς (Steph. **34**, I) ῥαψῳδός

   IG 4147.11 (cf. Ringwood, 1927, 42–43). τῶν πενταετήρων Πτωΐων.

   The name Γάιος Ἰούλιος in line 15 led Holleaux, the original editor, to date it to after the dictatorship of Caesar, perhaps as late as the beginning of the Christian era. Dittenberger disagrees, positing the end of I or the beginning of II BC (so Pallone, 1984, 156n1). Recently, however, Roesch (1982) 226.3 has approved Holleaux, preferring the earlier end of his range (i.e., the middle or second half of I BC). The order of events is: σαλπιστής, κῆρυξ, ῥαψῳδός, ἐπῶν ποιητής, αὐλητής, κιθαριστής, and κιθαρῳδός. The list is preserved in full.

2. Ἀριστόδικος Δημοκράτους Ὀπού⟨ν⟩τιος (Steph. **335**, I.1) ῥαψῳδός

   SEG 19.25. τ[ῶν] | Σαραπιείων of Tanagra. Second prize. See below, item 6.

3. Ἀρτέμων Ἰσιδότου Ἀθηναῖος (Steph. **422**, I.1) ῥαψῳδός

   IG VII 416.12, *EO* 523.12. [τῶν Ἀμφιαράων καὶ Ῥωμαίων] of Ōrōpos.

   PA 2276, brother of Στράτων (Steph. 2318). The ῥαψῳδός precedes the ἐπῶν ποιητής. Though it is possible that he may have performed a new composition by epic poet, lines 27ff. suggest that the composer should precede the corresponding performer. Thus it is more likely that the rhapsode would have performed the traditional repertoire (certainly Homer, perhaps Hesiod or even Arkhilokhos), while the epic poet would have performed his own composition.

4. Ἀρχίας Σωτηρίδου Θηβαῖος (Steph. **441**, I) ῥαψῳδός

   Bizard (1920) 251, line 14. Ptoia of Akraipheia.

5. Βίοττος [Μ]ε[ν]ελάου Χαλκιδεύ[ς] (Steph. **524**, I.1) ῥαψωιδός

   EO 521.14. τὰ πρῶτα Ἀμφιαρᾶα καὶ Ῥωμαῖ[α]. Listed also as ἐπῶν ἱερός.

6. Βουχάττης Γλαύχου Ταναγραῖος (Steph. 533, I.1) ῥαψῳδός

   IG 540.5. τ[ῶν] | Σαραπιείων of Tanagra.

   Arguably, the ἀγωνοθέτης listed in line 1 as [Γλ]αύχου τοῦ Βουχάττου and
   the [σ]ατύρων ποιητής of line 11, an Ἀλέξανδρος Γλαύχου Ταναγραῖος, were
   his father and brother respectively. The rhapsode is listed after a σαλπιχτής
   and a [χ]ῆρυξ, and before a ποιητής (ἐπῶν, presumably). In lines 12–13, if
   the restoration of 13 (which the spacing encourages) is correct, the τραγῳδιῶν
   ποιητής precedes his ὑποχριτής. On balance, then, the rhapsode is not to be
   thought of as the poet's performer.

7. Εἰέρων Ἀριστοβούλου Θηβαῖος (Steph. 820, I.1) ῥαψῳδός

   IG VII 419.18, *EO* 526.18. τῶν Ἀμφιαράων καὶ Ῥωμαίων of Ōrōpos.

   Here ῥαψῳδός follows ἐπῶν ποιητάς. Given the placement of ὑποχριτής in
   lines 29 and 33 after their corresponding ποιηταί, one might argue that on
   this occasion the rhapsodes must have performed compositions by the epic po-
   ets. But this is unlikely given the evidence collected from other inscriptions.
   Rather, the order here must be dictated by the close logical connection between
   the ἐνχωμίῳ λογιχῷ 11, ἐνχωμίῳ ἐπιχῷ 13, and the ἐπῶν ποιητάς 15: the dis-
   tinction between a newly composed epic poem and an encomiastic hexameter
   poem (the poetic equivalent of the ἐγχώμιον λογιχόν) was not always reflected
   by the nomenclature used. Where a festival featured respective competitive
   events for a hexameter encomium and a hexameter composition of an other-
   than-encomiastic character, it would have been natural for these two events to
   follow each other in the program and the victors' record.

8. Εἴρανος Φρυνίδου Ταναγραῖος (Steph. 822, I.1–2) χῆρυξ, ῥαψῳδός, χωμῳδός,
   τραγῳδός

   Papagiannopoulos (1947–48) 75.21–22 lists him as [Ἴραν]ος Φρυνίδου Τανα-
   γραῖο[ς], victorious as ῥαψῳιδός at the Μουσεῖα of Thespiai. Here he follows
   the ποιητὴς προσοδίου, the σαλπιστής, the χῆρυξ, and the ἐπῶν ποιητής. Noth-
   ing is preserved from the rest of the inscription to suggest a particular relation
   between the poet and the rhapsode on the basis of their relative order (it breaks
   with the αὐλητής immediately after the rhapsode). The epic poet, however, is
   [Δημ]οχλῆς Ἀμεινίου Θηβαῖος (Steph. 645), who resurfaces in *IG* VII 416.10
   (*EO* 523.10) under ἐνχωμίῳ ἐπιχῷ, now preceding the rhapsode and the epic

poet (in that order). This not only underlines the close relationship between the epic encomium and the epic poet, but on balance makes it likely that the rhapsode at Thespiai would have performed not a new composition, but one from the traditional repertoire. Roesch (1982) 192n37 dates this inscription to ca. 118–112 BC, though on page 494 he restates the range as 110–90 BC.

IG 542.1. From a festival in Tanagra (the name is not preserved), according to Dittenberger *ad loc.* "sine dubio hic quoque victorum recensus ad Sarapiea spectat" (accepted by Petrakos, 1997, 425 *ad* 523.26).[250] The name Εἴρανος Φρυνίδου Ταναγραῖος heads the list at the top of the block, followed by the competitive categories ποιητάς, αὐλητάς, κιθαριστάς, etc. Reisch (1885) 129.XIII suggests that ῥαψῳδός or κῆρυξ may have preceded his name; on the model of *IG* VII 540 (for which see also *SEG* 25.501), the former category is slightly more likely. The letter shapes lead Reisch to conclude that this inscription is more recent than *IG* VII 540, which has been dated most recently to ca. 85 BC (cf. *SEG* 25.501). Thus, with Stephanēs (1988) *ad* 1716, I assign it to I.1–2.

IG VII 543.1, 3. In line 3 he appears under [τρα]γῳδός (before ποιητάς); it is uncertain under what designation he is listed in line 1. Present once again in *IG* VII 416.26 (*EO* 523.26) as a κωμῳδός.

Bizard (1920) 261 n. 11 reconstructs [Εἴ]ρανος Φρυνίδ[ου Ταναγραῖος] from *IG* VII 416.25–26 under κῆρυξ, apparently from the Ptoia of Akraipheia (cf. Ringwood, 1927, 41).

9. Θεόδοτος Πυθίωνος Ἀθηναῖος (Steph. **1146**, I.1) (ᾠδός)[251] ῥαψῳδός (τραγικὸς συναγωνιστής)

Tracy (1975) 62.39, 44, and 50.[252] Fourth Pythais of the Athenians to Delphi (98/7 BC).[253] Θεόδοτος is listed at 39 among τοὺς ᾀσομένους τούς [τε παιᾶνας] καὶ τὸν χορόν (line 21; hence the ᾠδός); again at 44 among the ῥαψῳδούς,

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[250]For Tanagran festivals cf. Ringwood (1927) 34–35.

[251]The parentheses indicate that, although he is not explicitly designated ᾠδός in the inscription, one can infer the label from the context. Similarly with τραγικὸς συναγωνιστής.

[252]The text can also be found in Aneziri (2003) 354–56 A 11. This represents an improved text of *FD* III 2, 48, whose corresponding line numbers are 26, 31, and 37. (The text can also be found in *SIG*³ 711 L.)

[253]Some ascribe it to the third Pythais (106/5 BC); so, e.g., Pomtow in *SIG*³ *ad loc.*: " [P]ertinet nullo dubio ad Pyth. III, sc. a. 106/5." See, further, Tracy (1975) 64, Nachtergael (1977) 474 n. 56, and Aneziri (2003) 356.

together with Κάλλων Κάλλωνος and Ξενόφαντος Εὐμάχου (about whom see below); and one final time at 50, similarly in the company of Κάλλων Κάλλωνος and Ξενόφαντος Εὐμάχου, among τοὺς τούτοις συναγωνιξαμένους (hence the τραγικὸς συναγωνιστής), where τούτοις refers to the two τραγῳδοί listed in line 49.

IG VII 1760.17.[254] τὰ Μ[ουσεῖα] of Thespiai. The order of events is: ποιητὴς προσοδίου, σαλπισ[τής], κῆρυξ, ἐπῶν ποιητής, ῥαψῳδός, αὐλητής, αὐλῳδός, κιθαριστής, κιθαρῳδός, σατύρων ποιητής, ὑποκριτὴς παλαιᾶς [τρα]γῳδίας, and [ὑ]ποκριτὴς παλαιᾶς κωμ[ῳδίας].[255] The poet of epics is Μήστωρ Μήστορος Φωκαιεύς (Steph. 1686), who reappears under ποειτάς at the Χαριτήσια of Or-khomenos (*IG* VII 3195.10) and under [ἐ]πικόν and ἐπῶν ποιητής at the Ἀμ-φιαράια καὶ Ῥωμαῖα of Ōrōpos (*IG* VII 418.5, 9 and *EO* 524.6, 10).

10. Θεοφάνης Σωκράτου Θηβαῖος (Steph. **1186**, I.1) ῥαψῳδός

    IG VII 420.14, *EO* 528.14. τὰ Ἀμφι[α]ρᾱα καὶ Ῥω⟨ι⟩μαῖα of Ōrōpos.

    Stephanēs (1988) *ad loc.* suggests that he may be the brother of Ἡρῴδης (cf. Steph. 1121). The order of competitive events at this festival was σαλπικτής, κῆρυξ, ἐγκώμιον καταλογάδην, ἐγκώμιον ἐπικόν, ῥαψῳδός, ποιητὴς ἐπῶν, etc. Lines 29ff. make the τραγωιδίας καινῆς ποιητής and κωμωιδίας καινῆς ποιητής precede their corresponding ὑποκριταί. Hence the epic poet is likely to have performed his own composition.

11. Κάλλων Κάλλωνος (Ἀθηναῖος)[256] (Steph. **1368**, I.1) (ῴδός) ῥαψῳδός (τραγικὸς συναγωνιστής)

    Tracy (1975) 61.27–28, 62.44 and 50. Fourth Pythais to Delphi (98/7 BC). See above, p. 224, under item 9.

12. Κράτων Κλέωνος Θηβαῖος (Steph. **1502**, I.1) ῥαψῳδός

    IG VII 418.7, *EO* 524.8. From Ōrōpos (festival uncertain, since the inscription lacks its top). The list of competitive events appears to follow the same order used in *IG* VII 416; among the correspondences:

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[254]Cf. Jamot (1895) 339 n. 13, line 18. Roesch (1982) 192–93 n. 39 dates it to *post* 84 BC.

[255]These last two are equivalent to τραγῳδός and κωμῳδός respectively.

[256]For the meaning of the parentheses, see above, n. 251.

EO 523		EO 524	
line	event	line	event
5	[κῆρυξ]	1	[κῆρυξ]
7	[ἐνκωμίωι λογικῶι]	3	ἐγκώμιον καταλογάδη[ν]
9	ἐνκωμίωι ἐπικῶι	5	[ἐ]πικόν
11	ῥαψωδός	7	ῥαψωδός
13	ἐπῶν ποιητής	9	ἐπῶν ποιητής
15	αὐλητής	11	αὐλητής
17	κιθαριστής	13	κιθαριστής

IG VII 3195.12. τὰ Χαριτείσια of Orkhomenos.

In the Boiotian dialect, the name now spelled Κράτων Κλίωνος Θειβεῖος and his category, ῥαψαϝυδός. Here ποειτάς precedes ῥαψαϝυδός, but none of the listed categories establish a preferred order for composer and performer. There is therefore no reason to infer that the rhapsode would have performed anything other than the traditional repertoire. *IG* VII 3196 and 3197, moreover, similarly from the Χαριτήσια of Orkhomenos and, according to Dittenberger, contemporaneous with *IG* VII 3195, list the rhapsode *before* the poet: ῥαψῳός 6, ποιητής 8 in 3196; ῥαψῳδός 7, ποιητής ἐπῶν 9 in 3197. And *IG* VII 3197.24–34 makes ποιητής (σατύρων, τραγῳδιῶν, and κωμῳδιῶν) precedes the corresponding victorious ὑποκριτής. The care taken in 3197.50 to repeat κωμῳδιῶν ποιητής for Alexandros, now victor under the category of τὰ ἐπινίκια, argues in favor of the significance even of the order in this inscription's arrangement: it would have been more economical to list him only once, but since "epinician" traditionally belonged after the dramatic events, Alexandros reappears at the end of the inscription, with the additional note of his triumph as comic poet.

13. Μέντωρ Ἀπολλοδώρου Ἡρακλεώτης (Steph. **1667**, I.1) ῥαψῳδός

IG 3196.6–7. ἐν τοῖς Χαριτησίοις of Orkhomenos. For the festival, see Ringwood (1927) 39–40. The ῥαψῳδός is followed by a ποιητής (on the basis of the contemporaneous 3197, a ποιητὴς ἐπῶν). The events are: σαλπιστής, κῆρυξ, ῥαψῳδός, ποιητής, αὐλητής, αὐλῳδός, κιθαριστής, τραγῳδός, and κωμῳδός. If we are to be guided by the relative order of ποιητής and ὑποκριτής in 3197, we will incline towards the view that the rhapsode did not compete as the performer of the ποιητής.

IG XII 9, 139.10. From a festival in the area of Amarynthos. If we accept Wilhelm's (1905) 9 supplements, lines 9–10 feature [M]έντω[ρ Ἀπολλοδώρου] (Ziebarth prints Wilhelm's erroneous [Ἀπολλοδότου]); the diplomatic transcript by Kuruniotes (1899) 140 n. 5 is ΦΛ[| ΕΝΤΩ. Wilhelm's emendation of the Φ is very plausible on internal grounds: the Λ may represent a badly preserved Α, and ΦΛ[should correspond to a competitive event. No ordinary category would fit ΦΛ; but if the Φ can be read as Ρ, ῬΑ[ΨΩΙΔΟΣ], which regularly follows or precedes the poet of epics, is the obvious choice. It is surprising, however, that Kuruniotes could have misread a Φ for a Ρ, given their respective shapes.[257] (A Φ may perhaps be misread as a Ρ, but the converse is not easy to explain. Wilhelm dots the ῬΑ[.)

14. Νουμήνιος Νουμηνίου Ἀθηναῖος (Steph. **1893**, I.1) ῥαψῳδός

    IG VII 3197.8. τῶν Χαριτησίων of Orkhomenos.

    A particularly fulsome catalog that, unfortunately, seems to have perished. The order of events is: σαλπιστής, κῆρυξ, ῥαψῳδός, ποιητὴς ἐπῶν, αὐλητής, αὐλῳδός, κιθαριστής, κιθαρῳδός, etc. The text mentions three winning ὑποκριταί, each one *after* his respective poet, whether of satires, tragedies, or comedies.[258]

15. Ξενόφαντος Εὐμάχου (Ἀθηναῖος)[259] (Steph. **1913**, I.1) (ᾠδός) ῥαψῳδός (τρα-γικὸς συναγωνιστής)

    Tracy (1975) 62.38, 44, and 51. Fourth Pythais to Delphi (98/7 BC). See above, p. 224, under item 9.

16. [—] (I) ῥαψῳδός

    IG VII 2727.15. τῶν τριετήρων Σωτηρίων πρῶ[τον] | ἀπὸ τοῦ πολέμου.

    The name of the rhapsode was not preserved. The date is I BC, after the wars of Mithridates VI. The competitions were (by order of appearance): trumpeter-ing, heraldry, an event for ἐνκωμίῳ λογικῷ, another for poets of epics (with

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[257]*Pace* Wilhelm (1905) 9, who notes: "ΦΛ wird daher vermöge eines, bei Buchstaben gerade dieser Zeit begreiflichen Versehens, statt ΡΑ verlesen und zu ergänzen sein." No further certainty is possible without inspecting the inscription.

[258]The poet of epics is the Ἀμινίας Δημοκλέους Θηβαῖος (Steph. 153) who reappears in line 25 as the victorious ποιητὴς σατύρων, and in *IG* VII 419.14, 16 (*EO* 526.14, 16) as the winner at the Amphiaraia of the categories ἐνκωμίῳ ἐπικῷ and ἐπῶν ποιητάς. For one other doubtful occurrence see Roesch (1982) 493.

[259]For the meaning of the parentheses, see above, n. 251.

a Πρωτογένης Πρωτάρχου Θεσπιεύς as victor, about whom see Steph. 2156), and rhapsody. The fragment breaks at this point. A second one, included in the same entry of *IG* VII, may correspond to the same catalog (cf. Reisch, 1885, 130.XV): starting with the fragmentary name [Σ]ωσιμένης Σωσικ[—], the heading κιθαριστής follows; this probably makes [Σ]ωσιμένης an αὐλητής or an αὐλῳδός (cf. Steph. 2353).

I Century AD

1. Ἐράτων (Steph. **881**, I/II AD) ῥαψῳδός

   Plu. *Symposion* 736e4 and 645d10. Friend of Plutarch.

2. Νεικομήδη[ς] (Κῶος) (Steph. **1782**, I/II AD) ᾄδων ⟨θ⟩υμέλαισιν Ὅμηρο⟨ν⟩

   IG II² 9145. Epitaph from Athens.

3. [—] [Φι]λοκράτους Θη[βαῖος] (Steph. **2846**, I/II AD) [ῥαψῳδό]ς

   Bizard (1920) 262 n. 12. A very small fragment of a victors' catalog from either the Ptoia or the Soteria of Akraipheia, for which the editor restores [σαλπιγκτής], [κῆρυ]ξ, and [ῥαψῳδό]ς. The dating is Roesch's (1982) 226 n. 5.

II Century AD

1. Εὐτυχιανὸς Κορίνθιος (Steph. **993**, II.3 AD) ῥαψῳδός

   IG VII 1773.18, Jamot (1895) 341 n. 15, line 18. Μουσεῖα of Thespiai.

2. Κιλικᾶς Κιτεύς (Steph. **1405**, II AD) ῥαψῳδός

   Peek (1955) 388 n. 1305.

3. Κορ(νήλιος) Εὔκαρπος Ἀργεῖος (Steph. **956**, II/III AD) κῆρυξ, ῥαψῳδός

   IG VII 4151.4–6. The editor considered 4151 from the same inscription as 4150 and 4152. Discovered at the temple of Apollo Ptoios, it probably lists victors at the Ptoia of Akraipheia. The absence of instances of 'Aurelius' suggests a time *ante* 212 AD. After the winner of σαλπικ[τ]ῶν, we meet Κορνήλιος as victor both of κηρύκων and [ῥα]ψῳδῶν. These events are followed by [αὐλ]ητῶν, and κυκ[λίων αὐλητ]ῶν. Under the editor's reconstruction, then, no poets of epics took (official) part in the festival. But cf. Roesch (1982) 227n7, who supplies [ποι]ητῶν for the editor's [αὐλ]ητῶν.

4. Μᾶρκος Αὐρήλιος Εὔκαιρος Ταναγραῖος (Steph. **955**, II.4 AD) κῆρυξ, ῥαψῳδός

   IG VII 1776.15–16. τῶν μεγάλων Καισαρήων | Σεβαστήων Μουσεί[ω]ν (i.e., the Mouseia of Caesar Augustus). The name was inscribed as Μ(ᾶρκος) Αὐρή(λιος) Εὔκαιρος Ταναγραῖος. The order of events is σαλπικτής, κῆρυξ, ῥαψῳδός, πυθικὸς αὐλητής, πυθικὸς κιθαριστής, κύκλιος αὐλητής, etc. Dated to the time of Caracalla's rule, the festival program has been shortened vis-à-vis the one in effect towards the middle of the second century AD (cf. *IG* VII 1773 and Ringwood, 1927, 50). Note, in particular, that there is no competition for poets of epics or for any sort of encomia.

   IG VII 2726.1. Roesch (1982) 227–28 n. 10 assigns the catalog to the Ptoia of Akraipheia. His own rereading of the first line is [ῥαψ]ῳδῶν Αὐρ. Εὔκαιρ[ος Ταναγραῖος]. Its dating is *post* 212 AD. Competitors followed the order [ῥαψ]ῳ-δῶν, [π]υθαυλῶν, [χ]οραυλῶν and [κ]ιθαρῳδῶν. On the basis of the inscription that follows, we can assume events in trumpetering, heraldry, and of (new epic?) poetry.

   This performer appears one other time in Bizard (1903) 297.9 and 12 as victor, respectively, in heraldry and rhapsody at the Ptoia of Akraipheia (τῶν πενταετηρικῶν Πτωΐων Καισαρείων). The events were: σαλπικτῶν, κηρύκων, ποιητῶν, ῥαψῳδῶν, πυθικ[ῶν αὐ]λητῶν, κυκλίων [αὐλητῶν] and κιθα[ριστῶν] (the inscription breaks at this point). The text details explicitly that the poet "carried off a double prize according to the arrangements."

5. Πολείταρ[χος —]α (Ἀργεῖος?) (Steph. **2082**, II/III AD) ῥαψῳδός

   IG IV 649. Epitaph from Argos.

6. [—] [—]ίου Ὑπαταῖος (Steph. **2859**, II.3 AD) [ῥαψῳδό]ς

   SEG 3.334, line 30. Μουσεῖα of Thespiai, ca. 160 AD.

Conclusion

The study of Homeric poetry, Milman Parry and A. B. Lord have taught us,[260] must necessarily consider its performance, for it was in performance that it was orally composed. And yet the times between Hellenistic Greece and our own were bridged not by sound recordings of recitations, but by written artifacts like papyri and codices. How, then, are we to reconstruct and understand in literary-historical terms the present textual shape of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*? How should we variously apportion responsibility to earlier and later periods for the textual phenomena in our editions? How are we to conceive of the process that joined the early stages of relatively greater compositional freedom (though still within the parameters of the tradition)—when two performances of the 'same story' would have exhibited significant variation in their thematic construction and specific poetic diction—and stages when recitals even by different performers produced predictable lines of poetry that were largely 'the same' in sequence, content, and form?

Two avenues are open to the scholar who seeks answer these and related questions: he may either look at the internal evidence of the extant text or he may consider the external evidence of its surrounding culture. It is the latter approach that I have followed here. My proposal in this dissertation has been that, if we wish to investigate the formation, evolution, and fixation of the Homeric poems, one can hardly do better than consider the figure of the epic performer in the exercise of his trade. For, if it is true that the composition and performance of Homeric poetry were but two aspects of one and the same act of creative engagement with this traditional material, then the shape of the text must have been affected primarily by what the performer of Homeric epic, the rhapsode, did as he trained for and actually delivered his performance. Doubtless, this must have been the case until such time as the poems became primarily the province of teachers, scholars, and an educated *reading*

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[260]See especially Parry (1971) and Lord (1960); cf. also Lord (1991) and Lord (1995).

public, and the primary agents of their transmission were no longer the rhapsodes and their festivals performances.

As we have seen, focusing on the rhapsode opens a window into the peculiar nature of Homeric poetics. We learned that archaic poetry cast the performer in the role of mediator between the Muse and the audience. In this capacity he could be viewed as an instrument of revelation and proclamation, and thus notionally akin, respectively, to the *mantis* and the prophet. This realization, in turn, gave us insight into one of the most significant and puzzling features of Homeric poetry: its notional fixity. Chapter 1 demonstrated that this emic notion follows from the worldview, at the heart of Homeric poetics, that the song is but the quoted speech of the omniscient Muse to which the rhapsode has privileged access. Authority is at the root of authorship: authority to say, sing, and perform; authority to legitimize festival gatherings and religious ceremonies; authority to validate a ritual and empower their participants to achieve its ends. So long as the occasion of performance was the primary determinant in the recitation of Homeric poetry, the invocation of the Muse (and, by implication, Apollo) lent authority to the rhapsode's recomposition, and the matter of individual creativity did not overtly arise. In a multiform oral tradition, conflict between rival versions is bound to occur; but in these formative periods, it took the form not of accusations of interpolation of extraneous material of doubtful authorship, but of lying performers, who for the sake of their bellies produced whatever the audience wished to hear. But we saw that in the second half of the sixth century BC, responding to a tendency broadly attested among the Greeks to trace the origin of cultural watersheds to specific human inventors, biographical speculation about the composer of the poetry about Troy and Odysseus attracted growing interest, especially as it allowed competing states to vie for the control of so significant a cultural capital. This move, from an authorizing divinity who presides over the performance to a legitimacy based on the rhapsode's faithfulness to a human author, was helped by the notional fixity of the poetic corpus: for if it was the end product of one man's work, then surely it could not change with every new performance, according to the individual rhapsode's recomposition, and still claim faithfulness to the author behind it—such, at least, must have been the logic, regardless of what actually happened in performance. Chapter 1 also explored how the placement of the performer as mediator between the audience and the source of authority naturally allowed for his twofold role as performer and *hermeneus* of his tradition. Diachronically speaking, both facets changed character with the passing of time: originally the performer was also the

composer, and in fact composer-in-performance; his hermeneutic role, from the emic perspective, made reference to his explication of the divine intention (especially past, but also future), expressed in the poetry; from our etic stance, we would make a distinction between the relatively less fluid poetry (particularly the speeches), which the rhapsode would reproduce with more predictable regularly as to form and content, and the more fluid (usually narrative) portions, for whose composition he would be responsible in greater measure, and by which he would elaborate the μῦθος (in Aristotle's sense) and stitch together the speeches into a larger whole. With the passing of time, the performance involved a decreasing measure of recomposition, and the hermeneutic function gradually changed into the ἐπίδειξις of prose commentary and pedagogic lecture. It is in opposition to the rhapsode's role in classical education (as ἐπαινέτης of Homer) and his monopoly of the cultural capital of Homeric poetry that the rising sophists defined their own practices.

The rhapsode is a privileged protagonist of the gradual transition of ancient Greece from predominantly oral, to predominantly written habits of culture. This evolution, several centuries in the making, did not always proceed at the same pace. For Athens, in particular, it is clear that the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC were defini- tive, and that the technology of writing then made great strides into the various domains of performance. I studied this transition in Chapter 2, primarily through the lens of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and his study of oratorical delivery. My increasingly Athenocentric focus was justified by the central role of Athens' Panathenaic festi- val in rhapsodic practice and in the transmission of Homeric poetry. We saw that, in his work, Aristotle himself made the connection between rhetoric, tragic drama, and rhapsody, and we argued that only by considering together these three preemi- nent domains of performance in their mutual relations and influences could we gain a proper understanding of the evolution in the training and performance practices of rhapsodes. Aristotle's own connection between rhapsody and rhetoric in the matter of ὑπόκρισις justified my application, *mutatis mutandis*, of the philosopher's, and, subsequently, Alkidamas', observations about 'delivery' to the rhapsode's trade. In fact, I argued that the treatment of ὑπόκρισις in the *Rhetoric* is broad enough to allow us to translate this concept as 'performance', and not merely *oratorical* perfor- mance, but any that focuses on the voice in its the expression and arousal of *pathos*, and depends on the sensory aspects of diction (especially the auditory) for its effect. This is surely the case of the rhapsode too. Aristotle's work also offered an account of the status of writing in his own time as a subordinate aid to delivery. Insofar as

the culture still prized declamation over written dissemination of speeches, I argued that the role of writing among orators was parallel to the gradual introduction of writing among rhapsodes: first as transcripts, as 'accidental'—in the philosophical sense of the term—recordings of performances; then as scripts, as aids designed for the honing of delivery, but still in tension with a measure of traditional creativity at the moment of performance; and finally, during the Hellenistic and Roman imperial times, as 'scripture', largely controlling the thematic sequence and specific diction of rhapsode and *homerista*.[261]

The move from transcripts to scripts was the focus of Chapter 3. Here the rhapsode had already evolved to where his technique was emphatically histrionic. Thus, he was often compared with the dramatic actor, appearing as a ὑποκριτής of Homeric poetry in his own right. In adopting, under the influence of drama, some of the accouterments of the acting trade, he was only bringing out the significant mimetic potential already inherent in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The statement that Homer was foremost among composers of tragedy (*Rep.* 607a)[262]—initially a reflection that the actor, at his emergence, had taken the venerable rhapsode as his model, owing to him even the name ὑποκριτής—now could be reinterpreted to speak to the mimetic potential of Homeric poetry, which made its subject matter so eminently susceptible of dramatic treatment. Thus, ὑποκριτής, surely an early (though unattested) term for the rhapsode as *hermeneus* of the Homeric tradition, could now be reapplied to him by the critic who disliked his excessively histrionic delivery.

The history of the Athenian rhapsode in the late fourth century BC is marked by the state's increasing regulation of his trade. Chapter 3 explored the central role that Lykourgos and Demetrios of Phaleron played in asserting public control by state officials on the organization of the festivals and the participation of artists—matters, some of these, that until then had been left largely to the initiative of wealthy patrons. This bureaucratic regulations reinforced a tendency among performers towards specialization, and doubtless gave the necessary impetus for the formation of σύνοδοι or κοινά of τεχνῖται in Athens and other cultural centers, associations that largely dominated the festival scene in the Hellenistic period. It was during that time that the twofold office of the rhapsode, as composer and performer, explicitly unfolded into the figures of the ἐπῶν ποιητής and the continuing ῥαψῳδός, as the inscriptions from this period show: the latter kept to the traditional repertoire, whereas the former was

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[261]For the meaning of 'scripture' as I have used it here, see Nagy (1996b) 110–12.

[262]*Rep.* 607a2–3: συγχωρεῖν [χρὴ] Ὅμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶτον τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν.

responsible for the composition of new hexametric poetry, primarily encomiastic in nature. Parallel to these was the *homerista*, who put greater emphasis on the acting out of Homeric scenes, especially fights, with appropriate dress and props, but, as I demonstrated, not to the exclusion of poetic recitation as some had hitherto thought.

The basic theme of this dissertation is that one cannot hope to understand the performance of Homeric poetry except form a diachronic perspective, in the multiplicity of time-dependent relationships of reciprocal influence between the three great domains of performance in ancient Greece: oratory, tragic drama, and rhapsodic recitation. History has not been kind to the Homeric performer; it has left us with hardly any explicit reflection on his trade and practices, and our study of him must needs be indirect. But against the cultural matrix explored in this work, the rhapsode emerges in clearer light, with more definite outlines. And with a clearer vision of him we also gain a deeper understanding of the cultural processes, in their full diachronic sweep, to which we owe the final textual shape and the preservation, in writing, of the Homeric poems.

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